Social class differentials at the transition from lower to upper secondary education in France : School track choices, parental involvement and grade retention by Barg, Katherin
Universität Mannheim 
Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften 
 
 
Social class differentials at the transition 
from lower to upper secondary education 
in France 
 
School track choices, parental involvement and 
grade retention 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines 
Doktors der Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Mannheim 
 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
Dipl. Soz. Katherin Barg 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dekan der Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften 
Prof. Dr. Michael Diehl 
 
Gutachter 
Prof. Dr. Marita Jacob 
HDR Dr. Louis-André Vallet  
Tag der Disputation: 18. September 2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erklärung gemäß § 10 Abs. 2a der Promotionsordnung: 
Ich versichere, diese Dissertation selbständig und ohne Hilfe Dritter verfasst zu haben.  
Sämtliche Quellen und Belege sind im Text deutlich gemacht und als solche gekennzeichnet. 
Diese Arbeit hat in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form noch keiner Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegen. 
Acknowledgments 
 
Four and half years did I spend on this PhD thesis. Now I look back on an instructive 
and interesting time. I learned a lot about academia, empirical research and myself. I am glad 
to have had this chance and I would like to thank the people who have supported me along 
this journey and helped me so much with finishing it. 
First of all, I owe a great deal of thanks to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Marita Jacob, who 
contributed greatly to this PhD project with her expertise and emotional support. She always 
had the time and a sympathetic ear to discuss the state of my work. She provided me with 
highly relevant and very fruitful suggestions and knew “how to handle me”: She gave me the 
freedom and confidence to develop my own ideas, to frame my PhD project according to my 
discretion and to finally hand in a dissertation that meets my standards. Moreover, I am 
deeply indebted to Dr. Louis-André Vallet who took his time to introduce me in the relevant 
French literature and the state of the art, to regularly discuss my ongoing project and to 
provide me with very important and stimulating input. His expert knowledge and friendliness 
were a crucial and substantial contribution to this PhD project.  
Many, many thanks go to Prof. Dr. Clemens Kroneberg for helping me formalize and 
refine the “theoretical heart” of this dissertation and for helpful, stimulating and encouraging 
comments.  
Furthermore, I want to thank the Center for Doctoral Studies in Social and Behavioral 
Sciences (CDSS) and its staff for supporting my research and funding in the first years of my 
PhD project. I also thank the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) for financial 
support during my research visit at the Institut de Recherche sur l’Éducation (IREDU) of the 
University of Burgundy in Dijon, France. This research stay was a great opportunity to work 
in an excellent French research environment. Many thanks also go to the IREDU and its staff.  
I want to thank Oshrat Hochman and Konstanze Jacob who read and discussed early 
parts of this project and the student research assistants Raffaela Gentile, Aitana Gräbs and 
Michael Josten at the Chair of Statistics for their great commitment during this project. A big 
thank you goes to Simone Gantz for proofreading. 
Finally, my biggest thanks go to Markus for his immense emotional and psychological 
support throughout the years. I deeply thank him for his understanding and patience.  
 
Mannheim April 2013                Katherin Barg 
 Content 
 
1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Learning from the French case ............................................................................... 3 
1.2 Research strategy .................................................................................................... 9 
1.3 Outline .................................................................................................................. 11 
2 The institutional context ........................................................................................ 14 
2.1 History of the French secondary school system ................................................... 14 
2.2 Structure of the French educational system .......................................................... 17 
2.3 The dialogue between family and school ............................................................. 22 
2.3.1 Procedure of the dialogue .............................................................................. 24 
2.3.2 Support and formal involvement of families ................................................. 27 
2.4 School choice and school types ............................................................................ 31 
2.4.1 The school map .............................................................................................. 31 
2.4.2 ZEP-schools and private schools ................................................................... 33 
3 A cultural and a rational action approach to social inequality in education .......... 36 
3.1 Social reproduction and cultural capital ............................................................... 37 
3.1.1 The theory of Bourdieu and Passeron ............................................................ 37 
3.1.2 Cultural capital literature ............................................................................... 44 
3.1.3 Cultural capital in family-school interactions ................................................ 50 
3.2 Rational action and status maintenance ................................................................ 55 
3.2.1 Boudon’s application of RAT to educational choices ................................... 57 
3.2.2 The Erikson and Jonsson-model .................................................................... 58 
3.2.3 The Breen and Goldthorpe-model ................................................................. 64 
3.2.4 Variations of rational action approaches to educational decision-making .... 68 
3.3 Confrontation of the two approaches .................................................................... 76 
3.3.1 Criticism ......................................................................................................... 76 
 3.3.2 Utility and integration .................................................................................... 81 
3.4 Evaluation and conclusion .................................................................................... 84 
4 Theoretical considerations on teacher decision-making ........................................ 88 
4.1 Cultural capital and non-cognitive traits ............................................................... 88 
4.2 Determinants of teacher school track decisions .................................................... 90 
4.3 Theories of discrimination .................................................................................... 93 
4.4 Evaluation and conclusion .................................................................................... 95 
5 Decision-making within the institutionalized dialogue ......................................... 97 
5.1 Family’s decision-making ..................................................................................... 98 
5.1.1 Independent decision-making: the model by Esser ....................................... 98 
5.1.2 Family’s school track request ...................................................................... 100 
5.1.3 Family’s rejection decisions ........................................................................ 103 
5.1.4 The generation of social class differentials .................................................. 105 
5.1.5 Hypotheses ................................................................................................... 107 
5.2 School’s decision-making ................................................................................... 110 
5.2.1 Staff meeting’s school track proposition ..................................................... 110 
5.2.2 Headmaster’s decision and the decision of the recall meeting .................... 113 
5.2.3 The generation of social class differentials .................................................. 114 
5.2.4 Hypotheses ................................................................................................... 115 
5.3 Grade retention decisions .................................................................................... 116 
5.3.1 Family’s grade retention request .................................................................. 117 
5.3.2 Staff meeting’s grade retention proposition ................................................. 119 
6 Previous Research ................................................................................................ 121 
6.1 Family’s decision-making ................................................................................... 121 
6.1.1 Tested theoretical implications .................................................................... 121 
6.1.2 Operationalization and degree of direct testing ........................................... 124 
 6.1.3 Findings ....................................................................................................... 128 
6.2 School’s decision-making ................................................................................... 131 
6.2.1 Comparisons of secondary effects on teacher and family decisions ........... 131 
6.2.2 Determinants of teacher decisions ............................................................... 134 
6.3 Grade retention decisions .................................................................................... 139 
7 Research framework ............................................................................................ 142 
7.1 General description of the data and basic sampling ........................................... 142 
7.2 Variables ............................................................................................................. 145 
7.2.1 Dependent variables ..................................................................................... 145 
7.2.2 Core explanatory variables .......................................................................... 148 
7.2.3 Variables “directly” testing the model on family’s decision-making .......... 159 
7.2.4 Controls ........................................................................................................ 165 
7.3 Notes on the application of non-linear regression methods ......................... 168 
7.3.1 Comparing regression coefficients of non-linear models ............................ 168 
7.3.2 Solutions ...................................................................................................... 170 
7.3.3 Interactions in non-linear regression models ............................................... 174 
8 Results .................................................................................................................. 175 
8.1 Social class differentials within the dialogue...................................................... 177 
8.2 General “bridging hypotheses” ........................................................................... 190 
8.2.1 Social class differentials in school performance .......................................... 190 
8.2.2 Social class differentials in parental involvement in school ........................ 193 
8.3 Family’s decisions .............................................................................................. 208 
8.3.1 Specific “bridging hypotheses” ................................................................... 208 
8.3.2 Testing the decision-making model ............................................................. 215 
8.3.3 Family’s rejection decisions ........................................................................ 234 
8.4 School’s decisions ............................................................................................... 236 
 8.4.1 Staff meeting’s school track proposition ..................................................... 236 
8.4.2 Decisions of the headmaster and the recall meeting .................................... 250 
8.5 Grade retention decisions .................................................................................... 252 
8.5.1 Family’s grade retention request .................................................................. 254 
8.5.2 Staff meeting’s grade retention proposition ................................................. 257 
8.5.3 Rejections of retention decisions and headmaster’s retention decision ....... 260 
8.5.4 Grade retention next to LGT and LPA ........................................................ 261 
9 Summary and conclusions ................................................................................... 264 
References ..................................................................................................................... 275 
Appendix ....................................................................................................................... 290 
 
 List of Figures 
Figure 1 The French educational system ................................................................................. 21 
Figure 2 The institutionalized dialogue between family and school ....................................... 25 
Figure 3 Students’ traversing of the dialogue: frequencies and shares (basic sample, N=12 
591) ...................................................................................................................................... 176 
Figure 4 Social class differentials in family’s school track request, staff meeting’s school 
track proposition and the final outcome of the dialogue (percentages; basic sample) ........ 178 
Figure 5 Social class effects on family’s school track request, staff meeting’s school track 
proposition and the final outcome of the dialogue by mark (predicted probabilities and 
discrete change effects; LGT vs. LPA) ................................................................................ 180 
Figure 6 Predicted probability that family’s request, staff meeting’s proposition and final 
outcome of the dialogue are LGT instead of LPA by mark and social class ....................... 182 
Figure 7 Discrete change effects of social class on family’s school track request, staff 
meeting’s school track proposition and the final outcome of the dialogue by mark (discrete 
change effect; LGT vs. LPA) ............................................................................................... 183 
Figure 8 Predicted probabilities of attending parents’ evenings by social class ................... 195 
Figure 9 Predicted probabilities of parents’ initiation of meetings, teachers’ initiation of 
meetings, PA-membership and being parent representative in the staff meetings by social 
class ...................................................................................................................................... 196 
Figure 10 Discrete change effects of social class on attendance at parents’ evenings by 
parents’ performance assessment ......................................................................................... 201 
Figure 11 Discrete change effects of social class on parents’ initiation of meetings ............ 202 
Figure 12 Discrete change effects of educational motivation on family’s school track request 
(LGT vs. LPA) by mark and social class ............................................................................. 224 
Figure 13 Discrete change effects of parental education on family’s school track request 
(LGT vs. LPA) by mark and social class ............................................................................. 225 
Figure 14 Discrete change effects of PA-membership on family’s school track request (LGT 
vs. LPA) by mark and social class ....................................................................................... 226 
 Figure 15 Interaction effect of mark and parents’ performance assessment on family’s school 
track request (LGT vs. LPA) by social class, predicted probabilities ................................. 228 
Figure 16 Interaction effect of mark and social class on family’s school track request (LGT 
vs. LPA); parents’ performance assessment held constant at 3; discrete change effects 
(reference: EGP VI, VIIa) .................................................................................................... 229 
Figure 17 Interaction effect of mark and educational motivation on family’s school track 
request (LGT vs. LPA) by social class; discrete change effect, performance assessment held 
constant at 3 ......................................................................................................................... 231 
Figure 18 Interaction effect of mark and educational motivation on family’s school track 
request (LGT vs. LPA) by social class; discrete change effects, performance assessment held 
constant at 1 ......................................................................................................................... 232 
Figure 19 Interaction of marks and attendance at parents’ evenings on family’s school track 
request (LGT vs. LPA) by social class; discrete change effects, performance assessment held 
constant at 1 ......................................................................................................................... 233 
Figure 20 Predicted probabilities of receiving an LGT-proposition by school track request, 
mark and social class ........................................................................................................... 241 
Figure 21 Interaction effect of family’s request and mark on staff meeting’s proposition by 
social class, predicted probabilities ...................................................................................... 247 
Figure 22 Interaction effect of parental education and family’s request on staff meeting’s 
proposition (LGT vs. LPA) at three mark-levels (predicted probabilities) ......................... 248 
Figure 23 Interaction of education of the involved parent and family’s request on staff 
meeting’s proposition (LGT vs. LPA) at three mark-levels (predicted probabilities) ......... 249 
Figure 24 Cumulative predicted probabilities of staff meeting’s proposition (LGT, LPA, GR) 
by mark and social class ...................................................................................................... 262 
Figure 25 Cumulative predicted probabilities of families’ request (LGT, LPA, GR) by mark 
and social class ..................................................................................................................... 263 
 
 List of Tables 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and survey source of the dependent variables (basic sample) 147 
Table 2 Categories of the EGP class schema and form of employment regulation .............. 150 
Table 3 Descriptives and survey source of the core explanatory variables (basic sample) ... 154 
Table 4 Pairwise spearman correlations of the five types of parental involvement (number of 
observations in parentheses) ................................................................................................ 159 
Table 5 Descriptives and survey source of the variables exclusively used in the analysis of 
family’s decision-making (basic sample) ............................................................................ 161 
Table 6 Descriptives and survey source of the control variables (basic sample) .................. 166 
Table 7 Decomposing social class effects on family’s request, staff meeting’s proposition and 
the final outcome in direct effects and indirect effects via student performance; AMEs. ... 186 
Table 8 Social class effects on final outcome (results of binary logistic regressions; AMEs)
 .............................................................................................................................................. 188 
Table 9 Social class effects on student’s mark on brevet (results of linear regression) ........ 192 
Table 10 Social class effects on previous grade repetition (results of binary logistic 
regression; AMEs) ............................................................................................................... 193 
Table 11 Decomposing social class effects on attendance at parents’ evenings in direct effects 
and indirect effects via parental education; AMEs. ............................................................. 197 
Table 12 Decomposing social class effects on parents’ initiation of meetings and teachers’ 
initiation of meetings into direct effects and indirect effects via parental education; AMEs.
 .............................................................................................................................................. 198 
Table 13 Decomposing social class effects on PA-membership and being Parent 
representative into direct effects and indirect effects via parental education; AMEs. ......... 199 
Table 14 Social class effects on parents’ opinion on parent-teacher relationships (results of 
binary logistic regressions; AMEs) ...................................................................................... 207 
Table 15 Social class effects on parents’ subjective performance assessment (results of linear 
regressions) .......................................................................................................................... 209 
Table 16 Social class effects on family’s employment situation (results of binary logistic 
regressions; AMEs) .............................................................................................................. 210 
 Table 17 Social class effects on family’s educational motivation (results of binary logistic 
regressions; AMEs) .............................................................................................................. 212 
Table 18 Social class effects on family’s knowledge of the right to reject the staff meeting’s 
proposition (results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) ................................................... 214 
Table 19 Social class effects on family’s school track request (LGT vs. LPA): test of the 
model on family’s “independent decision-making” (results of binary logistic regression; 
AMEs) .................................................................................................................................. 216 
Table 20 Social class effects on family’s school track request (LGT vs. LPA): Test of the 
impact of the parameter l (results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) ............................. 220 
Table 21 Social class effects on family’s rejection decision and mediating effect of parental 
education (results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) ...................................................... 235 
Table 22 Social class and family’s second rejection (frequencies; percentages in parantheses)
 .............................................................................................................................................. 236 
Table 23 Social class effects on staff meeting’s school track proposition (LGT vs. LPA); 
results of binary logistic regressions; AMEs ....................................................................... 239 
Table 24 Social class effects on staff meetings’ school track propositions (LGT vs. LPA) and 
mediating effects of parental education and involvement (results of binary logistic 
regressions) .......................................................................................................................... 245 
Table 25 Family’s social class and headmaster’s decision by social class (frequencies; 
percentages in parentheses) .................................................................................................. 251 
Table 26 Family’s social class and recall meeting’s decision (frequencies) ......................... 252 
Table 27 Social class and family’s grade retention request among students for whom the final 
outcome is GR, by social class (percentages in parentheses) .............................................. 253 
Table 28 Social class effects on family’s decision to choose grade retention over the 
vocational track (results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) ........................................... 256 
Table 29 Social class effects on staff meeting’s decision to choose grade retention over the 
vocational track (results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) ........................................... 259 
Table 30 Frequencies and percentages of family rejections of GR-propositions by social class 
(percentage are in parentheses) ............................................................................................ 260 
 
 
1
1 Introduction 
There is firm international evidence of social inequality in educational attainment. Even 
though in all economically advanced countries educational expansion has increased overall 
rates of educational attainment, students from higher social classes are still more likely to 
attain higher educational degrees than students from lower classes. Sociologists investigating 
inequality in educational opportunity – i.e. the effect of ascriptive traits such as social class 
origin on educational attainment (Breen and Jonsson 2005) – conceptualize individuals’ 
educational careers as series of transitions (e.g. Mare 1980; Boudon 1974). Thus, educational 
decisions at these transitions become “nodal points” of the link between social origin and 
educational attainment (Hillmert and Jacob 2005; Hillmert and Jacob 2010) and, to address 
why social class differentials in educational attainment are still evident, theories have been 
developed to explain students’ and their parents’ educational decision-making. One prominent 
group of theories takes a rational action perspective (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Erikson and 
Jonsson 1996; Esser 1999b; Goldthorpe 1996b and others). 
In practice, however, students and their parents often do not have the only word in 
educational decision-making. Depending on the specific institutional regulation of a transition 
from one educational level to another, teachers are involved in the decision-making process or 
even take the ultimate decision. In some countries, e.g. in the Netherlands or some German 
federal states, parents take the final school track decision but teachers make guiding school 
track recommendations; in other countries, e.g. in other German federal states, teachers have 
the final say. Therefore, questions came up such as how do institutional regulations affect 
transitions from one educational level to another and, more specifically, how do these 
regulations shape families’ and teachers’ decision-making (e.g. Becker 2000; Hillmert 2005).  
In France, the regulation of students’ transition from lower to upper secondary 
education considerably differs from that in other countries: families and school staff – notably 
teachers and the headmaster – are involved in an institutionalized dialogue between family 
and school. The outcome of this dialogue is the decision on which upper secondary school 
track a student will attend. The first step of this dialogue is a school track request by the 
family. Aside from a general upper secondary school track and two different vocational 
tracks, the family can request grade retention. Subsequently, the staff meeting makes a school 
track proposition. The staff meeting can choose the general track, one of the vocational tracks 
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or grade retention, too. If a family’s request and the staff meeting’s proposition do not 
correspond, the family can reject the proposition. To do so, it has to attend a talk with the 
headmaster. Based on this talk, the headmaster makes a virtually binding decision. Yet, if the 
family does not want to accept the headmaster’s decision, it can reject again and thus initiate a 
recall meeting. External teachers and other professionals attend that recall meeting and make 
a final binding decision. At the end of every school year, headmasters have to report rates of 
disagreements between families’ requests and schools’ propositions to the governmental 
authorities (Masson 1994; Masson 1997). 
This institutionalized dialogue was implemented amidst important reforms. These 
reforms aimed at a démocratisation of the educational system, which first meant raising the 
overall level of educational attainment and later also comprised reducing social inequality of 
educational opportunity (Lapostolle 2005; Mellizo-Soto 2000; Prost 1997). Prior to the 
implementation of the dialogue in the 1970s and 1980s, the regulation at the transition from 
lower to upper secondary school required that only teachers made the school track decisions. 
Through the implementation of the dialogue, power was transferred to families in order to 
reduce social inequality. Indeed, broad empirical studies for France show that throughout the 
last decades the association between social background and education has decreased (Brauns 
1998; Duru-Bellat and Kieffer 2000; Duru-Bellat and Kieffer 2008; Ichou and Vallet 2011; 
Thélot and Vallet 2000; Vallet and Selz 2007).1 Nevertheless, these studies find that there is 
still a considerable effect of social background on educational attainment at present. 
Moreover, there are strong effects of social background on transition rates to general upper 
secondary school, even when student school performance is controlled (Brinbaum and Kieffer 
2009; Duru-Bellat, Jarousse and Mingat 1993; Duru-Bellat and Kieffer 2001; Duru-Bellat and 
Mingat 1989; Ichou and Vallet 2013). This result seems to reveal that the reforms still allow 
“non-meritocratic” decision-making. In fact, closer empirical analyses of the dialogue indicate 
that, in the majority of cases, the teachers accept families’ requests and thus strengthen the net 
effects of student social class (Duru-Bellat 1996; Duru-Bellat 2002; Duru-Bellat, Jarousse and 
Mingat 1993; Duru-Bellat and Mingat 1989; Roux and Davaillon 2001). In light of this partial 
                                                 
1 As for other European countries, there is a debate on whether the association between social background and 
education has persisted or decreased. Studies focusing on earlier decades also claim that the association has 
remained constant (Garnier and Raffalovich 1984; Goux and Maurin 1997) while studies analyzing more recent 
short-term periods find even an increase (Merle 2002). Still, in sum, analyses with sophisticated methods and 
large data sets show that the association between social origin and completing upper secondary school declined, 
though social class effects on attaining different types of upper secondary attainments and higher education 
diplomas has remained (for more details see e.g. Brauns 1998; Duru-Bellat and Kieffer 2008; Ichou and Vallet 
2011). 
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explanation and the fact that the dialogue consists of even more steps than family’s request 
and staff meetings’ proposition, the question rises via which exact mechanisms the effect of 
students’ social background on each step of the dialogue –family’s request, staff meeting’s 
proposition, family’s decisions to reject, headmasters’ and recall meetings’ decisions – 
operates. 
1.1 Learning from the French case 
I argue that investigating the mechanisms that generate social class differentials at each 
step of the institutionalized dialogue between family and school can provide important new 
findings on how families’ and teachers’ make decisions under specific institutional 
circumstances – e.g. when the main decision-making power lies in the hands of the teachers 
and families have the right to reject – and how social class effects on families’ and teachers’ 
educational choices emerge in such an institutional context. This dissertation does not 
investigate the effects of specific institutional circumstances on families’ and teachers’ 
decisions but takes into account and puts considerable emphasis on the specific institutional 
setting of families’ and teachers’ decision-making, namely the French institutionalized 
dialogue. I suggest that an analysis of this institutionalized dialogue can address four major 
shortcomings of previous research on educational decision-making.  
First, elaborate empirical tests of the rational action models on families’ decision-
making reveal that the models cannot fully account for social class effects in families’ 
educational choices.2 That is to say, even when considering very sophisticated measures of the 
theoretical model parameters, they find significant effects of student social origin (Becker 
2000; Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish 2010; Stocké 2007). This raises the question what 
additional or competing mechanisms contribute to the secondary effects. According to other 
theories, this unexplained social class effect could be due to class-specific norms and values 
(e.g. Bourdieu and Passeron 1970), preferences (e.g. Gambetta 1987) or significant others 
(e.g. Jaeger 2007; Morgan 1998; Morgan 2002; Sewell, Haller and Ohlendorf 1970). 
Moreover, it is also argued that the institutional context (i.e. the institutional regulation of the 
transition from one educational level to another) causes additional mechanisms to affect 
families’ decision-making in ways that reinforce social class effects on their decisions.  
                                                 
2 Since this dissertation investigates educational decisions at the transition from lower to upper secondary school 
in France, i.e. when students are around 14 years old, I assume that parents are still very involved in their 
children’s schooling decisions and therefore I will generally speak of families’ and not of students’ decision-
making. 
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For instance, Becker (2000) proposes that social class effects on families’ intended 
educational decisions differ from those on families’ actual decisions because institutional 
regulations such as teacher recommendations affect families’ actual decision-making. In 
particular, Becker argues that families differ with regard to their belief in their influence on 
the actual decision in which school their children will be enrolled and differently adapt their 
actual decisions to teacher recommendations (see also e.g. Wiese 1982, Hillmert 2005). Other 
suggested micro-mechanisms linking institutional contexts to families’ choices are, for 
instance, that highly stratified educational systems with early transitions and tracks with 
“dead-ends” increase social class differences because higher-class families are better 
equipped with knowledge of the educational system (e.g. Jungbauer-Gans 2004; Pfeffer 
2008). Even though previous research draws attention to the institutional circumstances of 
families’ decision-making, it either specifies only marginally the mechanisms through which 
these circumstances could contribute to social class differences and does not directly test them 
with survey data, or it concentrates on institutional circumstances that do not consider the role 
of teachers (see also e.g. Erikson and Jonsson 1996; Hillmert 2007; Hillmert and Jacob 2003). 
I argue that developing a theoretical model on families’ decision-making within the 
institutionalized dialogue in France can integrate an “institutional component” into existing 
rational action approaches to educational decision-making and thereby contribute to the 
explanation of secondary effects, i.e. social class effects on educational choices that remain 
after controlling for performance (Boudon 1974).3 More specifically, such a theoretical model 
takes into account that families make their school track requests prior to school track 
propositions by the school staff and that families are allowed to reject these propositions. 
Beyond that, an empirical test of this adapted model can show whether the theoretically 
expected mechanisms do indeed generate social class effects on families’ school track 
requests within the French dialogue. 
Second, previous studies dealing with teachers’ decision-making provide no elaborate 
theory that explains why student social origin affects teacher school track decisions and how 
specific institutional circumstances (e.g. families’ right to reject) influence teachers’ decision-
making. Not only in France student social class has considerable effects on teacher school 
track decisions. For instance, studies that compare student transition rates in German federal 
states with binding and non-binding teacher recommendations find that secondary effects are 
                                                 
3 In the German context, for instance, such an “institutional component” is the school track recommendation by 
the primary school teachers. 
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smaller in binding contexts, i.e. the context where teachers have the final say, than in non-
binding contexts where families have the final word (Dollmann 2011; Gresch, Baumert and 
Maaz 2009; Maaz and Nagy 2009; Neugebauer 2010). Nevertheless, in both institutional 
settings students’ social background has strong effects on teachers’ recommendations even 
when school performance is controlled. Aside from that, studies show that in non-binding 
contexts secondary effects on teacher recommendations are even stronger than in binding 
contexts (Dollmann 2011). Given these findings, it appears to be important to investigate 
what other determinants than student performance teachers consider when making school 
track decisions under specific institutional circumstances. 
So far, quantitative and qualitative analyses of teacher school track decisions have 
shown that – apart from school performance – teachers consider students’ effort and 
motivation, docile behavior, school work mastery, participation in class and their parents’ 
capacity to support them (e.g. Hollstein 2008; Perier 1994: 70; Schneider 2011; Stahl 2007). 
Since these factors are related to students’ social origin, they are able to partially explain 
secondary effects on teachers’ school track decisions. This finding is in line with research on 
teachers’ grading-behavior: Studies that analyze discrepancies between objective measures 
such as test scores and subjective ones such as marks detect middle-class biases that more or 
less remain after controlling for student habits, behavior and other non-cognitive traits (e.g. 
Ditton and Krüsken 2006; Farkas et al. 1990; Maaz and Nagy 2009). 
Both research on teacher decisions and teacher grading-behavior present diverse, partly 
conflicting, theoretical explanations of their findings. Some put forward arguments of conflict 
theoretical approaches of Bourdieu (e.g. 1966; Bourdieu and Passeron 1970) or Bowles and 
Gintis (1976). Other researchers seek more “rational” explanations for teachers’ behavior. 
That is, teachers consider students’ traits and abilities which go beyond their mere academic 
performance in order to better assess their chances to succeed in their future school careers 
(e.g. Hollstein 2008; Neugebauer 2010; Schneider 2011). Moreover, assuming that teachers 
behave similar to employers, theories of discrimination were applied (Arrow 1973; Becker 
1971). Even though previous findings and theoretical considerations provide important 
insights in teachers’ decision-making, they appear to be only parts of the puzzle. Until now, 
no comprehensive theoretical approach concretely formalizes teachers’ decision-making 
thereby taking the institutional context into account. 
I suggest that developing and empirically testing a theoretical model on school staffs’ 
decision-making within the French institutionalized dialogue can further specify why student 
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social class affects teacher decisions. Since the French governmental authorities require 
headmasters to report grade retention rates and rates of families’ rejections of staff meetings’ 
propositions, it is argued that the staff meetings and headmasters adapt their decisions so as to 
reduce rejection rates (Masson 1994; Masson 1997; Van Zanten 2002). 
Third, investigating the French dialogue between family and school can shed light on 
how families and teachers influence the decision-making of each other and how family-school 
interactions may contribute to the generation of social inequality in education. Up to now, it 
was found, for instance, that teacher recommendations have strong effects on school track 
decisions of lower-class families while higher-class families tend to refrain from following 
teacher recommendations if they do not correspond to their aspirations (e.g. Ditton and 
Krüsken 2006; Ditton and Krüsken 2009). Moreover, families’ aspirations have strong effects 
on teacher decisions indicating that families with high aspirations attempt to influence 
teachers and start early to prepare their children’s transition to the next educational level (e.g. 
Dollmann 2011; Ditton and Krüsken 2006; Ditton and Krüsken, 2009; Schneider 2011). 
Accordingly, previous research on the French dialogue between family and school reveals 
that families’ school track requests strongly affect staff meetings’ school track propositions 
(Duru-Bellat 1989; Duru-Bellat, Jarousse and Mingat 1993; Roux and Davaillon 2001) and 
the question is raised whether families’ involvement in the dialogue increases social 
inequality in students’ transition to upper secondary education (Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 
2007; Duru-Bellat 1996; Duru-Bellat 2002; Duru-Bellat and Kieffer 2000). Generally, it 
seems that families differ in terms of their interactions with the school and therefore 
differences in families’ school track choices and teachers’ school track recommendations 
emerge. 
The “cultural approach” to social inequality in educational attainment provides an 
argument on how family-school interactions contribute to the generation of social class 
differences in educational success (Lareau and Weininger 2003). It argues that social 
inequality in education is strengthened because parents are differently equipped with cultural 
capital that meets the school standards: Parents with higher educational attainment and from 
higher social classes are more confident in the school context, interact more easily with 
school staff, are generally more involved in school and therefore acquire preferable treatment 
for their children. Indeed, a set of qualitative studies shows that parents of more favorable 
social origin are more involved in school and put more effort in influencing teachers (e.g. 
Lareau and Horvat 1999; Horvat, Weininger and Lareau 2003; Reay 1999) and quantitative 
analyses of teachers’ school track recommendations reveal that teachers take parents’ support 
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of their children at home into account (e.g. Hollstein 2008; Schneider 2011; Stahl 2007). 
However, no studies investigate the impact of parental involvement in school (e.g. 
membership in parent associations, parents’ initiation of meetings with teachers) on families’ 
school track decisions and teachers’ school track decisions. If parents strategically make use 
of their cultural capital to meet the standards of the school and hence to receive preferable 
treatment for their children and teachers take into account whether families meet the school’s 
standards, parents’ cultural capital and their involvement in school can be expected to have 
important effects on families’ and teachers’ school track decisions (Becker 2000; Ditton and 
Krüsken 2009; Schneider 2011).  
Previous research does not theoretically specify how these family-school interactions 
influence families’ and teachers’ school track choices and previous empirical analyses test 
only parts of the link between social class, cultural capital, involvement in school and 
educational decisions of families and teachers. Investigating families’ and school staffs’ 
decision-making at the transition from lower to upper secondary education in France entails 
analyzing how family-school interactions and parental involvement in school contribute to the 
generation of social inequality in educational attainment. This is because the dialogue 
institutionalizes an interdependent decision-making of families and school staff. Moreover, 
the French educational system promotes parental involvement as it gives parent associations 
and parent representatives an important voice and strongly requires headmasters to regularly 
organize school events and parent-teacher evenings (Masson 1994; Masson 1997). 
Fourth, analyzing the dialogue between family and school can contribute new findings 
to research on grade retention. While there is broad literature on the consequences of grade 
retention and the characteristics of retained students (see e.g. the overview by Jimerson et al. 
2006), research on families’ use of grade retention to postpone crucial transitions is 
comparatively sparse. Few studies, notably for France, show that when children are poorly 
performing, families from higher social classes are more likely to demand grade retention 
than families from lower classes (Davies, Heinesen and Holm 2002; Duru-Bellat, Jarousse 
and Mingat 1993; Kloosterman and De Graaf 2010; Roux and Davaillon 2001). This result 
indicates that families’ opportunity to choose grade retention may increase social inequality in 
educational transitions and it is argued that letting teachers decide on grade retention could 
restrict the social class differences that emerge by that way (Kloosterman and De Graaf 
2010). However, if – as in France – teachers accept families’ grade retention requests (and in 
the subsequent school year students ultimately get access to higher school tracks) transferring 
the decision-making power to teachers seems no solution. Moreover, it could be argued that 
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staff meetings and headmasters use the grade retention option to offer families with high 
aspirations and low performing children a “compromise” (Cayouette-Remblière and De Saint-
Pol 2011; Duru-Bellat 1996; Duru-Bellat 2002; Roux and Davaillon 2001). 
To theoretically explain social class effects on families’ grade retention decisions, the 
French literature argues that parents intend to give their children the chance of improving 
themselves in order to attain the higher school track (e.g. Duru-Bellat, Jarousse and Mingat 
1993). Similarly, other studies advance arguments of the educational decision-making models 
by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) and Erikson and Jonsson (1996): Families from higher social 
classes are more likely to choose grade retention than a lower track because they need their 
children to attain a higher educational track to maintain the family’s social status 
(Kloosterman and De Graaf 2010). These families hope that throughout the repeated grade 
their children will sufficiently improve and thus be able to attend the higher educational track 
later on. Theoretical explanations for teachers’ grade retention decisions are less defined. 
Generally, it is argued that teachers propose grade retention to enable students to “grow up” 
and improve (e.g. Schnurr, Kundert and Nickerson 2009). I propose that investigating 
families’ and school staffs’ grade retention decisions within the institutionalized dialogue in 
France enables to further detect the reasons why both actors choose these options and via 
which mechanisms student social class affects these decisions.  
In sum, investigating the mechanisms that generate social class differentials at different 
steps of the dialogue will provide insights in how social class effects emerge on families’ 
school track choices and their decisions to reject school track propositions by the school, on 
teachers and headmasters’ school track decisions, on family-school interactions and on 
families’ and school staff’ grade retention decisions. From these insights, important policy 
implications can be derived. Knowing how secondary effects on families’ and teachers’ 
decisions emerge can tell how present transition regulations could be modified and which 
additional provisions have to be made to reduce social inequality in educational attainment. 
For instance, further findings can be added to the discussion on whether transferring more 
decision-making power to teachers could provide more meritocratic transitions to next 
educational levels (e.g. Becker 2000; Dollmann 2011; Schimpl-Neimanns 2000) and to the 
advantages and drawbacks of grade retention.  
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1.2 Research strategy 
This dissertation investigates how social class effects on families’ and school staffs’ 
decisions emerge within the institutionalized dialogue between family and school at the 
transition from lower to upper secondary education in France. Thereby, it investigates 
families and school staffs’ interactions, i.e. how they attempt to influence each other and 
whether they take account of each other’s prior or future decisions. To find out whether the 
institutional setting “contributes” to social inequality in families’ and school staffs’ decisions, 
I investigate theoretically specified mechanisms on the generation of social class effects at 
every step of the dialogue.4 
I approach families’ and school staffs’ decision-making from a rational action 
perspective. The theoretical foundation of this work is the subjective expected utility (SEU) 
theory. I adopt Esser’s (1999b) SEU-model on educational decision-making, which is a 
variation of the rational action models by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) and Erikson and 
Jonsson (1996). To develop a theoretical model that explains families’ making of their school 
track requests within the dialogue, I extent Esser’s model so that it takes the institutional 
setting of families’ decision-making into account. More specifically, I integrate a theoretical 
mechanism derived from the “cultural approach” to social inequality in education (e.g. 
Bourdieu and Passeron 1970). This mechanism is based upon a theoretical suggestion 
advanced by Lareau and Weininger (2003; see also Lareau 1987; Lareau 1989; Lareau and 
Horvat 1999) on the role of cultural capital in family-school interactions. It posits that parents 
and students need cultural capital to meet the standards of the school staff. Namely, schools 
require parents to be involved in their children’s schooling, to help them with their 
homework, to be interested in their performance and behavior in school and to attend 
meetings with teachers. Since parents from higher social classes tend to be better equipped 
with cultural capital that is required by the school than parents from lower classes, they are 
                                                 
4 This dissertation does not attempt to detect the effects of certain institutional circumstances on social inequality 
in families’ and school staffs’ decision-making (for this e.g. a country-comparison would be necessary), but it 
specifies mechanisms that are driven through the institutional setting of the dialogue (e.g. through the fact that 
the school has the final say) and empirically tests these mechanisms. Therefore, in the following I will 
sometimes speak of how the institutional setting “shapes” or “contributes” to families’ and school staffs’ 
decision-making meaning that certain mechanisms caused by the dialogue’s institutional setting add to the 
mechanisms proposed by the “classical” rational action models by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997), Erikson and 
Jonsson (1996) and Esser (1999b). I do not claim to assess the impact of this institutional context as compared to 
a differing institutional context. 
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more likely to be involved in interactions with the school and thus they are more likely to 
meet the school’s standards.5  
Beyond that, I apply SEU-theory to the staff meetings’ decision-making and factor in 
the institutional conditions under which staff meetings make their decisions. These conditions 
include for instance that schools have to report grade retention rates and rates of families’ 
rejections to administrative authorities. The “cultural capital-mechanism” applied to families’ 
decisions can also explain how effects of students’ social class on staff meetings’ propositions 
are generated within the French institutionalized dialogue: On the one hand, parents’ cultural 
capital and their involvement in school show the teachers that parents are capable of 
supporting their children with school issues. On the other hand, the staff meeting considers 
parents’ cultural capital and their involvement in order to evaluate the likelihood that a family 
rejects their proposition and therefore increases rejection rates. 
Using the refined theoretical models on families’ requests and staff meetings’ 
propositions, I make theoretical suggestions on how families make their decision to reject 
staff meetings’ propositions and headmasters’ decisions. Moreover, I attempt to explain how 
headmasters and recall meetings make their decisions following families’ rejection. 
Furthermore, I address the question how families, staff meetings and headmasters make use of 
grade retention to postpone the binding school track decisions and to offer a compromise to 
the other party. 
To test hypotheses derived from the theoretical models, I use longitudinal data – the 
panel d’élèves du second degré – on a cohort of 17 830 French students who entered lower 
secondary school in 1995. Depending on whether students have repeated grades, they attained 
the institutionalized dialogue at the transition to upper secondary school between 1999 and 
2001. The data document each step of the dialogue and its single outcome. Moreover, it 
contains rich information on students’ family background, students’ school performance in 
the two grades prior to the dialogue and parents’ involvement such as attendance at parents’ 
evenings, membership in a parent association and initiation of meetings with teachers. The 
data allow me to analyze the direct effects of most parameters in families’ decision-making. 
With regard to the school staffs’ decisions, I am not able to directly measure each decision-
making parameter. However, available information on students’ family background, students’ 
                                                 
5 This argument is similar to that on knowledge of the educational system advanced in previous studies such as 
Pfeffer (2008), for instance. As compared to previous research, however, I derive this argument from a general 
theory, specify it and integrate it in the existing formalized rational action models to educational decision-
making (e.g. Esser 1999b). 
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performance, their parents’ educational attainment and involvement in school allows me to 
test straightforward hypotheses on staff meetings’ decision-making. 
1.3 Outline  
The following chapter provides an introduction to the educational system and thus to the 
institutional context in which families and school staff make their upper secondary school 
track decisions. I start with a brief summary of the French educational system’s history to 
give an idea of the values and principles on which the modern French educational system is 
founded. Subsequently, I describe the general structure of the educational system to show 
which upper secondary school tracks are at choice for families and the school staff and which 
higher education possibilities these tracks lead to. I give a lot of attention to the description of 
the institutionalized dialogue between family and school, relevant school standards (e.g. 
regular meetings of parents and teachers) and official ways in which parents become involved 
in school (e.g. through membership in parent associations). Moreover, I mention relevant 
information on school choice and different school types (e.g. private schools). 
The ultimate goal of the theoretical part is to develop a model on families’ and school 
staffs’ decision-making that explains the generation of social class differentials along the 
institutionalized dialogue between family and school. The theoretical part consists of Chapter 
3, 4 and 5. Chapter 3 presents and evaluates a cultural approach and a rational-action 
approach to social inequality in education. The former approach embraces Bourdieu and 
Passerons’ theory on social and cultural reproduction (Bourdieu 1966; Bourdieu and Passeron 
1964; Bourdieu and Passeron 1970) as well as theoretical and empirical research on the 
impact of cultural capital on educational success and family school interactions. The second 
approach embraces Boudon’s (1974) rational action approach to social class differences in 
educational decisions and the seminal decision-making models by Erikson and Jonsson 
(1996) and Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) that are based upon Boudon’s approach.  
While Chapter 3 focuses on families’ educational decision-making, Chapter 4 deals 
with theoretical considerations on teachers’ decision-making. This chapter summarizes and 
evaluates the theoretical arguments previous research on teacher school track decisions and 
grading-behavior has put forward to explain why student social origin affects teacher 
decisions and evaluations.  
Chapter 5 is the “heart” of the theoretical part of this doctoral thesis. This chapter 
develops separate theoretical models that explain families’ and school staffs’ decisions at each 
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step of the institutionalized dialogue. It starts with an outline of Esser’s (1999b) SEU-model. 
Then, I refine this model to explain how the institutional context of the dialogue shapes 
families’ school track requests. After applying this refined model also to families’ decision to 
reject the proposition by the staff meeting, I present the mechanisms that generate social class 
differences in families’ requests and rejection decisions. Subsequently, I address staff 
meetings’ making of the school track propositions: Further relying on SEU-theory, I 
formulate a model that explains how the staff meeting evaluates costs, benefits and 
probabilities. Then, I apply this model to the headmasters’ and the recall meetings’ decision-
making and present a set of mechanisms that explain the generation of effects of student 
social class on the school staffs’ different decisions. The last part of Chapter 5 addresses 
families’ and staff meetings’ decision between grade retention and a lower track. Throughout 
Chapter 5, I derive a set of concrete testable hypotheses. 
Chapter 6 segues from the theoretical part into the empirical part of this dissertation. It 
presents selected quantitative and qualitative studies that deal with families’ and teachers’ 
school track choices. The goal of this chapter is to outline the current state of research. 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 form the empirical part of this thesis. Chapter 7 presents the 
framework of the empirical test and Chapter 8 describes and interprets the results. In Chapter 
7, I present the data – the panel d’élèves du second degré – and first sampling steps. 
Moreover, I explicate the construction of the dependent variables, i.e. the decisions families 
and the school staff make at different steps of the dialogue, and explanatory variables.  
Chapter 8 presents the results of the empirical analysis. The goal of the first subchapter 
is to illustrate the main explananda of this study; it evaluates social class differences in 
families’ requests, staff meetings’ propositions and the final outcome of the dialogue. The 
second subchapter addresses the core mechanisms that explain the generation of social class 
effects on the different steps of the dialogue. These mechanisms are social class differences in 
students’ marks and parents’ involvement in school, for instance. The third subchapter 
presents a test of the model on families’ making of their school track request and their 
rejection decisions. Subchapter 4 tests hypotheses derived from the theoretical model on staff 
meetings’ propositions, headmasters’ decisions and the decisions of the recall meetings. 
Subchapter 5 takes into account the grade retention option and tests hypotheses on families’ 
and staff meetings’ usage of this option as a compromise. Finally, in the last subchapter, I put 
the three available options – general track, vocational track and grade retention – in relation to 
each other. 
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Chapter 9 provides a summary and a discussion of the findings of this dissertation. It 
confronts the findings of previous research with the results obtained from the empirical 
analysis presented in Chapter 8 and discusses the implications of this dissertation’s findings 
for educational policy and further research.  
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2 The institutional context 
The goal of this chapter is to outline the institutional context in which families and 
teachers make upper secondary school track decisions. I start with a brief description of its 
history ranging from the first important reforms under the Secretary of Education Jules Ferry 
to the implementation of a comprehensive lower secondary school (collège unique) in 1975. 
This description introduces values and principles on which the modern French educational 
system is founded and outlines the reasons for stepwise modification of the secondary school 
system. Thereafter, I provide an overview of the basic structure of the educational system and 
describe the institutionalized dialogue between family and school. I further address legal 
regulations and relevant institutional circumstances such as supply of information on the 
educational system for parents and the organization of parental involvement. I concentrate on 
two forms of parental involvement namely membership in a parent association and holding 
the office as Parent representative in several meetings. These involvement forms give an idea 
of how institutional regulations integrate students’ parents into important decision-making 
and which possibilities parents have to get involved. Finally, I shortly summarize relevant 
information on secondary school types and on the regulation of school choice. 
2.1 History of the French secondary school system 
From the French Revolution until the end of the 19th century the state and the church 
struggled for the authority over the “republican school” (Brauns 1998: 40). The struggle 
ended in the 1880s when Jules Ferry achieved the implementation of a centralized laicistic 
primary school system and compulsory schooling from age 6 to 13. At that time, the aim of 
the school was not at all to reduce social inequality (Prost 1997: 47-49). Nevertheless, it was 
based on progressive values such as humanism and emancipation: its aim was to form 
individuals that are capable of independent reasoning and of building a Republic, i.e. a society 
in which people are equal in dignity and have equal rights. This liberalizing and equalizing 
purpose of the republican school implied that (primary) education had to be compulsory, 
laicistic and cost-free.6  
However, the system was socially stratified to a large extent. Children from the main 
population attended the “primary school” and an “elite” of children of higher social origin 
                                                 
6 I denote with italic letters either terms that I want to emphasize or proper names. The proper names include 
those in their original language. 
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attended “secondary schools” (Lycées, Collèges modernes/classique), which lead to the 
certificate baccalauréat (Brauns 1998: 43-44; Prost 1997: 65, 85-86). Students who had 
attended primary schools could proceed with their education either in vocational schools or in 
the prestigious “higher primary schools” (Écoles primaires supérieures), to which only 
students who had passed central examinations were granted access. Students who had 
successfully attended the secondary schools either entered universities or “preparatory 
classes” (classes préparatoire) that – still today – train students for the admission exams of 
the elite universities “Grandes écoles”. Both school types taught children during their whole 
– more or less short – school careers; there were no levels of education in which children 
were jointly taught in one school context. Moreover, at that time, individuals were persuaded 
that educational success would solely depend on natural talents, abilities and intelligence and 
thus nobody recognized it as a product of socialization in the family or in the school (Prost 
1997: 49). 
In the early years of the 20th century the politician and Nobel peace prize laureate 
Ferdinand Buisson, who strongly had promoted the laicistic education, already advanced the 
idea of a comprehensive unified school for students between the age of 5 and 11 and a 
subsequent secondary education for students of age 12 to 14 (Prost 1997: 51-52). However, 
no considerable reforms in such direction were undertaken. After the First World War, social 
stratification in primary and secondary schools was again strongly criticized by a group of 
teachers from various schools (les Compagnons de l’Université nouvelle) and by socialist 
politicians. Only few of their suggestions were directly implemented, but their ideas 
motivated further important developments. In 1923, students who attended the higher primary 
schools became entitled to enter the higher grades of secondary schools if an examination 
board gave them the permission (Brauns 1998: 46-47). Secondary education became cost-free 
in the 1930s and access was generally granted to students who had passed an admission exam. 
Also, in 1936, the compulsory schooling age was extended from 13 to 14.  
Nevertheless, it were the low birth rates due to the war that caused a lack of students in 
the secondary schools and made them accept students that would have attended the primary 
schools otherwise (Prost 1997: 87-88). After this lack of students in general, working and 
lower class students were again more likely to attend primary schools since these seemed 
better adapted to their “needs” (e.g. ensuring professional jobs). The primary schools became 
general competitors for secondary schools and, in 1941, under the Vichy government, a 
reform implemented an “upper cycle” in secondary schools that accepted also students who 
had attended the primary schools up to then. Another step to further integrate the primary and 
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secondary schools was the incorporation of the higher primary schools into the collèges 
modernes in 1945. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the call for “democratization” (démocratisation) of the 
educational system motivated important reforms (Prost 1997: 84). The institutional changes 
went along with promoting demographic developments such as a general increase of 
educational participation, the general call for equality of educational opportunity and the need 
for a work force that is qualified to help the modern French economy to prosper. The Bethoin 
reform in 1959 augmented the age of compulsory schooling from 14 to 16 and transformed 
the upper grades in primary schools (Cours Complémentaires) into distinct secondary schools 
(Collèges d’Enseignement Géneral) (Prost 1997: 241-245). This increased the rate of students 
from lower and working classes in secondary education. The reform implemented also an 
“observation cycle” in grade 6 and 7 that aimed at identifying which of the five school tracks 
available after grade 6 would be appropriate for students. The school decided whether a 
student had to attend the short general track in the distinct secondary schools (Collèges 
d’Enseignement Géneral), the long general track in the prestigious Lycées Modernes or 
Classiques, the short vocational track of three years in Collèges d’Enseignement Technique, 
the long vocational track of four or five years in Lycées techniques or the “terminal cycle” 
that led students with very low performance to an elementary school diploma. The schools’ 
school track decisions were supposed to be based upon students’ aptitudes. 
In 1962 a study commissioned by the French government that revealed that given the 
same performance, students from higher social origin had higher chances to attend the Lycées 
than students of lower social origin (see also Girard and Bastide 1963) and Bourdieu and 
Passeron’s (1964) work “les héritiers” launched passionate discussions on inequality of 
educational opportunity (Masson 2001; Prost 2001; Van Zanten 2005). Amidst these 
discussions, in 1963, the Fouchet reform went on integrating the different secondary schools 
and implemented an “orientation cycle” in grade 8 and 9 (4ème-3ème). The “orientation cycle” 
incorporated the “observation cycle” and stretched over the first four grades of secondary 
education. As a consequence of this modification, the main selection of students – fully based 
on a decision by the school – into general and vocational tracks was postponed by two years 
to the end of grade 9. Another major change was that students attended the full four grades of 
the “orientation cycle” in one single comprehensive secondary school named “Collège 
d’enseignement secondaire”. However, the school was still divided into a general academic 
branch, a general vocational branch and a more practical vocational branch, into which 
students were selected in accordance to their performance. After grade 9 in the comprehensive 
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college, students were selected –based on their aptitudes again – into one of three available 
tracks: (i) a long general track leading to the general diploma “baccaulréat”, (ii) a short 
general track with one additional completing year or two years leading to vocational training 
and (iii) a practical cycle level to finish secondary education. Although the goal of the reform 
Fouchet was to postpone the important selection to grade 9, many poorly performing students 
left the collège after grade 7 and attended pre-vocational education. Moreover, the three 
branches were still socially stratified.  
Last important changes finally caused the “Law Haby” (Loi Haby) in 1975. It fully 
integrated the remaining separate secondary schools into one general type of secondary school 
that is simply named collèges. Grade 6 and 7 that had been divided into three branches (one 
general and two types of vocational branches) became one unified branch (tronc commun); 
grade 8 and 9 remained divided into one academic and one vocational branch. At this level 
students could also directly enter pre-vocational education if their performance was not good 
enough to stay in the collège (Brauns and Steinmann 1999: 12-13). Then they attended two 
specific successive classes (Classe Préprofessionnel de Niveau, CPN; Classe Préparatoire à 
l’apprentissage, CPA). These grades prepared for an apprenticeship. Typically, this 
educational path led to early entry into the labor market or vocational certificates and was 
held in low esteem. After the full “orientation cycle”, i.e. after grade 9, students were selected 
into a long general track, a long vocational track within the same school or a short vocational 
track in another school. The tracking in upper secondary education is very similar to today 
and will be outlined in more detail in the next section. 
2.2 Structure of the French educational system 
In France, the educational system is highly centralized (OECD 1996: 273-276). The 
authorities at the state-level have the decisive power over core issues such as education 
policy, national curricula, teachers’ recruitment and their remuneration, the centralized 
organization of exams for diplomas such as the baccalauréat, which provides access to 
university studies, and the conferment of these diplomas. However, since the 1980s more and 
more responsibility has been transferred to the académies, départements and municipalities.7 
The educational administrative area is divided into 30 académies, which mainly correspond to 
the French regions (régions). 26 lie in metropolitan France and 4 lie in the overseas territories 
(Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique, Reunion). Every region is divided into départements; 
                                                 
7 Actually, there were discussions about decentralization and first small reforms already in the decades before, 
but the main changes happened in the 1980s (Combaz 1996). 
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overall there are 101 départements. Generally, académies have been charged with the 
provision and financial management of upper secondary schools (lycées), départements have 
taken over the corresponding responsibility for lower secondary schools (collèges) and 
communes are responsible for nursery schools and primary schools. Regions are now also 
commissioned to develop regional education and investment plans and to present these to the 
authorities on the national-level. Though, as the educational system is still highly centralized, 
its structure is the same everywhere in France.  
Compulsory education starts at the age of 6 (Figure 1). However, nearly all children are 
already enrolled in preschools (école maternelle). Preschools can be attended from the age of 
2 to 5; typically, children do so from the age of 3 (OECD 1996: 273-276). Primary schools 
(école élémentaire) teach children during 5 years from age 6 to 11. Secondary education starts 
at the age of 10 or 11, depending on whether parents decide to enroll their children 
prematurely. Up to grade 9, the students jointly visit the collège. Grade 8 and 9 form the 
“orientation cycle” which consists of a more academic branch and a more vocational branch 
(4ème, 3ème technologique). At the end of grade 7, the school allocates students in the 
respective branches.8 Virtually, students can also directly enter pre-vocational education and 
prepare for an apprenticeship. The two preparing grades (CPN and CPA, see the prior 
subchapter) are attended in vocational upper secondary schools (lycée professionnel); during 
the apprenticeship students attend “centers for training of apprentices” (Centre de Formation 
d’Apprentis). After three or four years this track leads to the vocational certificate termed 
“CAP”. This track has been gradually eliminated since the 1980s by integrating students into 
the vocational branch of grade 8 and 9 of the collège. The elimination of the separate early 
vocational track and the implementation of the vocational grades 8 and 9 was part of the 
project to increase the rate of students with a baccalauréat to 80 per cent in one age group 
(Lapostolle 2005).9  
Lower secondary education ends with the centralized brevet-exam. Students who 
successfully pass the whole exam are rewarded with the brevet, i.e. the certificate of lower 
secondary education. During the “orientation cycle” marks play an important role as they are 
taken into account by the brevet-exam. More specifically, students’ marks in grade 8 and 9 
                                                 
8 The selection of students into one of the two branches is based on their performance in grade 6 and 7. However, 
parents can object (Brauns and Steinmann 1999: 12).  
9 In 1998, a famous law was implemented that explicitly stated that 80 per cent of an age group of students 
should attend the upper secondary certificate that provides access to tertiary studies (baccalauréat) (Loi n°89 -
486 du 10 Juillet 1989 – Loi d’orientation sur l’éducation). This requirement was based on an announcement of 
the socialist Secretary of Education Jean-Pierre Chevènement in 1985. Indeed, the target was attained and the 
overall duration of education was largely augmented (Lapostolle 2005). 
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determine their score on the “continuous examination” (contrôle continu) of the brevet. The 
second part of the brevet is a written and an oral exam at the end of grade 9. The score on the 
“continuous exam” typically represents 60 to 63 per cent of the final score (DEPP 2008).  
After the “orientation cycle”, i.e. at the end of grade 9, students follow up their 
education either in a general upper secondary school track or in the vocational upper 
secondary school track (Figure 1 indicates the entry to these two tracks by large black 
arrows). Which of the tracks they will attend is decided via the institutionalized dialogue 
between family and school or – as it is also called in the French literature – the “orientation 
procedure at the end of grade 3” (procédure d’orientation en fin de 3ème). The general track is 
further divided into an academic track that ends, after three grades, with the “general 
baccalauréat” (baccalauréat général) and a more professional track that leads, also after three 
grades, to the “technological baccalauréat” (baccalauréat technologique). 10  The more 
professional track is also termed “long technological track”. The school that provides the two 
tracks is the “lycée général et technologique” (LGT). Students can also attain a “technician’s 
diploma” (brevet de technicien; not denoted in Figure 1) if they complete two grades of the 
more professional track. The school students attend in the vocational upper secondary school 
track is called “lycée professionnel” (LP). The students who successfully complete two grades 
in this track can drop out with the vocational certificates “CAP” (Certificate of Vocational 
Aptitude) or “BEP” (Diploma of Vocational Studies); those who attend four grades usually 
achieve the “professional bac” (baccalauréat professionnel). 
The CAP and the BEP formally have the same “value” but the BEP has a more 
theoretical foundation and provides a broader qualification than the CAP (Brauns and 
Steinmann 1999: 13-14). The CAP is rather an apprenticeship credential and a steppingstone 
to the craftsmen masters certificate (Brevet Professionnel) that can be attained after at least 
two years of specific professional experience. Generally, the CAP is regarded as “lower” as 
compared to the BEP with the consequence that this is a rather unpopular educational path. 
Students who achieved a BEP (or a CAP) can attain the professional bac after two additional 
years. The professional bac was introduced in 1985 to give vocational education a better 
reputation and to make it possible for students who after grade 9 opted for the short vocational 
track to revise their decision by achieving a professional bac (or even a technological bac) 
and gaining access to tertiary education (Brauns and Steinmann 1999: 14). 
                                                 
10 In the following I abbreviate baccalauréat with the term bac as it is common in the literature. 
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All bac-diplomas allow for entry into higher education (OECD 1996: 273-276). 
However, while students with a general bac more often go to university, their peers with a 
technological bac rather opt for vocational higher education. The differentiation of the three 
types of bac was meant to enable students to choose educational pathways in accordance with 
their interests, but in practice it became a means of selection (Brauns and Steinmann 1999: 
15). The same applies to the differentiation of “sections” within the general bac: After grade 
10 students can decide whether they want to achieve a “bac S”, i.e. a bac mainly based on 
mathematics and physics, a “bac ES”, which is based on social and economic studies, or a 
“bac L” implying literary studies. The “bac S” is the most prestigious diploma as only very 
good students attain it. Regarding the technological bac, there are even more specializing 
“sections”. The choice of general bac type is strongly influenced by student social origin and 
linked to the level of tertiary education that will be attended (Duru-Bellat 2002: 85-87).11   
  
                                                 
11 The decision-making at the end of grade 10 is based on an institutionalized dialogue between family and 
school that is similar to the one at the end of grade 9. 
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Figure 1 The French educational system 
 
Note: Grey boxes denote certificates. Tertiary education is presented less detailed. For a more detailed 
description see e.g. OECD (1996: 275) or Brauns and Steinmann (1999: 11). 
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Tertiary education is very differentiated (not all details are presented in Figure 1). Due 
to the great number of bac-holders, the system of tertiary education was filled up with various 
institutions and possibilities to achieve tertiary certificates after diverse durations of studies. 
Typically, after three years of studies in a university, students can attain a “licence” (also 
termed “bac+3”), after 5 years they are rewarded with a “master” (“bac+5”) and adding three 
more years they can attain a doctorate (“bac+8”).12 Only access to the “licence” is open for all 
bac-holders; access to the higher levels of studies depends on examination results and other 
selection criterions. The technological bac is supposed to prepare students for tertiary studies 
in a “Section de Technicien Supérieur” (STS) or in an “Institut Universitaire de Technologie” 
(IUT). During two years students follow a fixed course schedule and pass several weeks in 
internships to be qualified as technicians. Those who attend the STS – which is usually 
located in a general upper secondary school (LGT) – attain the “BTS” (Brevet de Technicien 
Supérieur). Two years in an IUT are rewarded with a “DUT” (Diplôme Universitaire de 
Technologie). Admission to both institutions STS and IUT is selective and notably the IUT 
has a good reputation. Aside from STS and IUT, which train technicians, there are other 
institutions at the same lower tertiary level that qualify nurses, kindergarden- and primary-
school teachers (Brauns and Steinmann 1999: 17). To get access to the elite universities 
“Grandes Écoles” students have to pass difficult and demanding national admission 
examinations. Throughout at least two years, “preparatory classes” (classes préparatoires) 
prepare students for these exams. Often, the preparatory classes take place in lycées. 
2.3 The dialogue between family and school 
The gradual establishment of a comprehensive lower secondary school – the collège – 
in the 1960s and 1970s was a difficult endeavor that was characterized by some negative 
consequences. Prost (1997: 104-111) summarizes three failures or problems that occurred and 
led to additional reforms. First, a lot of students left lower secondary school already after 
grade 7 (5ème) in order to do an apprenticeship or to attend the vocational upper secondary 
school and attain a CAP after three years. Moreover, the rate of grade retention increased 
considerably. Second, the selection of students into different upper secondary tracks appears 
not to depend on student’s achievement and preferences only but also on the availability of 
positions in the surrounding general and vocational upper secondary schools and in firms that 
provided apprenticeships. Third, due to these two problems, distinct social class differentials 
                                                 
12 Certain other studies such as medical studies are organized differently. 
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in student’s attendance of the different upper secondary tracks appeared. The number of 
students from lower classes in the general upper secondary school track decreased more and 
more and this was even more unfortunate as yet it had started to constantly increase since 
World War I. 
These developments made the public and politicians increasingly call for a 
“democratization” of the educational system. Initially, quantitative democratization, i.e. the 
augmentation of the overall duration of education, was tackled through actions like the 
gradual elimination of the vocational track that led to a CAP after grade 7 and the 
implementation of the vocational branch in grade 8 and 9 within the collège (Brauns and 
Steinmann 1999; Lapostolle 2005). 13  Later, particularly in the 1980s, the qualitative 
democratization, i.e. the reduction of social inequality in the selection into different 
educational tracks, became more and more relevant. The educational system and notably the 
teachers’ selection procedures were made responsible for the social disparities and thus giving 
more attention to the family’s choices appeared to be a solution (Lapostolle 2005; Van Zanten 
2002). Up to then, the teachers’ assignment of students to secondary tracks had been based on 
students’ marks (especially in mathematics) and age (Prost 1997: 107). A selection based on 
these “objective” indicators was perceived as narrow and as putting a lot of pressure on 
students. Generally, it was criticized that the well being of the individual student was 
disregarded. 
Already in 1973, an enactment (Décret n°73-129 du 12 février 1973) invited families to 
pronounce their school track wishes and gave them the opportunity to reject the school’s 
decisions. If the family rejected the decision, it could ask either for a recall meeting that is put 
together and directed by the Ministry of Education or for a standardized test. However, 
despite the legal formalization of a dialogue between family and school, there appeared no 
effective modification of the selection (Mellizo-Soto 2000). It was criticized, for instance, that 
teachers’ decisions still had too much weight, that families were not sufficiently informed 
about their rights to object and that there was not enough exchange between the staff meeting, 
the family and the student (Lapostolle 2005). Finally, the 1989 Orientation Law reinforced 
the implementation of the dialogue between family and school. With article 8, the “orientation 
procedure” was made more concrete. Article 8 posits:  
                                                 
13  Other actions promoting quantitative democratization were the implementation of comprehensive lower 
secondary schools that students jointly attend until a relatively high age (see Subchapter 2.1) and the before 
mentioned law from 1998 (“1998 Orientation Law”) that required that 80 per cent of a student age group should 
achieve the bac. 
 
24
“[…] The student works out his/her educational orientation plans with the help of the 
school and the educational community, in particular the teachers and the orientation advisors, who 
will support the student in realizing his/her educational plans during schooling and at its ending. 
The orientation decision is based upon a continuous observation of the student. The family is 
responsible for the student’s choice; the student is responsible when he/she is of full age. Every 
disagreement with the proposition of the staff meeting becomes part of a talk prior to a decision by 
the school principal. If this decision does not correspond to the request of the student or the family, 
it is [still] valid. The orientation decision can be part of the recall procedure”14 (Loi n°89-486 du 
10 juillet 1989, §8). 
2.3.1 PROCEDURE OF THE DIALOGUE 
The dialogue starts at the end of the second trimester of grade 9. The first step is 
family’s preliminary school track request (see Figure 2): In January, students receive an 
“orientation dossier” via which their parents have to tell their school track demand. Families 
can also indicate a second choice. Moreover, students have to outline their school track choice 
and educational plans with some words. The “orientation dossier” (fiche navette) is “the main 
instrument within the dialogue between the families and the different categories of secondary 
school agents” (Masson 1997: 135). At the end of the school year, it will be transferred to the 
regional educational authorities and administration (rectorat and inspection académique) to 
be used for the official statistics on family requests. The family can choose one out of four 
alternatives: (i) the general upper secondary school track, i.e. attending the lycée general et 
technologique; (ii) the higher vocational track, i.e. attending the first grade to attain a BEP at 
the lycée professionnel; (iii) the lower vocational track, i.e. attending the first grade to attain a 
CAP at the lycée professionnel (or in “centers for apprenticeship training”, CFA); (iv) grade 
repetition. 
  
                                                 
14  Own translation. 
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Figure 2 The institutionalized dialogue between family and school 
 
 
After the family has filled in the dossier the student submits it at his or her school. 
Within the next 2 to 3 months, the staff meeting discusses the family’s request and makes a 
(preliminary) proposition. The family is informed about the proposition before the end of the 
second trimester. The staff meeting (conseil de classe) is attended by all of a student’s 
teachers, the class teacher, the headmaster, an “orientation advisor” (conseiller d’orientation), 
Parent representatives and students’ representatives (Décret 85-924 1985-08-30 jorf 31 août 
1985). Formally, during the meeting the class teachers or the orientation advisor present each 
student’s written outline of her educational projects and thereby her school track requests 
(Circulaire n°95-057 du 8 mars 1995). Then, the teachers of the student evaluate her school 
performance and decide on an upper secondary school track or grade retention. Hence, like 
the family, they can choose between the four options (i) general track, (ii) higher vocational 
track, (iii) lower vocational track, and (iv) grade repetition. Moreover, they can make more 
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than one proposition, too. The regulations of the dialogue require the staff meeting to provide 
an explanation for their decision and, in case a student is likely to not get access to the track 
she requested, the teachers have to formulate requirements that she has to meet (e.g. 
improvement of marks in certain subjects). The reasons for the staff meeting’s decision and 
the requirements are written down in the “orientation dossier” or in another formal document. 
Legal regulations explicitly state that the headmaster has to make sure that the information is 
transferred to the family (Circulaire n°95-057 du 8 mars 1995). If the proposition by the staff 
meeting does not correspond to a family’s preliminary demand, the school is required to 
further communicate with the family. Around May the families have to tell their definitive 
school track requests via the orientation dossier and at the end of the school year, in June, the 
staff meeting makes its definitive school track proposition. Mostly, the definitive decisions 
correspond to the preliminary ones. 
If a family does not agree with the staff’s decision, it can reject it. In order to do so, the 
family has to tell the rejection via the orientation dossier. Moreover, it has to come to the 
school to meet the headmaster. A family’s rejection – step three of the dialogue – can only 
lead to a reconsideration of a student’s case if the family attends this obligatory talk with the 
headmaster. In case a family does not, the staff meeting’s proposition remains binding. Based 
upon the obligatory talk with the family, the headmaster makes the school track decision.  
Families have the right to reject headmasters’ decisions, too. If a family wants to reject, 
it has to do so within an exact period of very few days. Given this second rejection, a general 
meeting of external teachers, external headmasters and parent representatives take a final 
binding decision. The meeting takes place on the level of départements (higher governmental 
level). The student and the family are admitted to this meeting. The headmaster expresses the 
school track decision that is generated by this “recall procedure” (procédure d’appel). This is 
the binding outcome of the dialogue. Typically, a second rejection happens only in few cases. 
During lower secondary school, the staff meeting can propose grade retention also at the 
end of grade 6, grade 7 and grade 8 (Masson 1994). Families can reject this proposition. If 
they do so at the end of grade 6 or grade 8, they have to talk to the headmaster and the 
headmaster makes a virtually binding retention decision. If the parents still do not agree, they 
can initiate a recall meeting. By contrast, family’s rejection is binding at the end of grade 7: If 
the family does not agree, the student is not retained. 
It is important to note that every school year the headmasters have to report grade 
retention rates, the distribution of final decisions of the dialogue and rates of discrepancies 
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between families’ requests and staff meetings’ propositions to the administrative authorities 
(Masson 1994). These statistics are published by the départements and thus enable the public 
to see the rates of every secondary school. A qualitative study of the dialogue reveals on the 
one hand that headmasters who do not meet the requirements of the académie-authorities (e.g. 
because their school has too high rates of discrepancies) are contacted by these and told to 
modify their decision-making procedures (Masson 1994: 169). On the other hand, the study 
shows that headmasters who meet the requirements have good career prospects: For instance, 
they can get prestigious positions in municipalities.  
The publication of these indicators of “school quality” is criticized since it seems to 
reinforce social class effects on school choice. Families of higher social origin are more likely 
to obtain this information as it is published in newspapers and as they tend to better 
understand it than lower class families (Karsten, Visscher and De Jong 2001). Moreover, as 
the information fuels competition between schools, it puts pressure on headmasters and 
teachers and creates conflicts between them and student parents (Van Zanten 2002). The 
school staff perceives the published school evaluations as bureaucratic instruments of control 
and they make teachers and headmasters feel deficient. Researchers criticize that the 
published indicators do not increase school’s quality as policy has expected, that no 
independent institution publishes them and that they are not corrected for social class or other 
“biases” (Karsten, Visscher and De Jong 2001). 
2.3.2 SUPPORT AND FORMAL INVOLVEMENT OF FAMILIES 
The first article of the 1989 Orientation Law requires that students work out their 
educational plans including their decisions on school tracks, university studies and 
professional plans with the help of their parents, teachers, the orientation advisors and other 
responsible school staff. Moreover, the article states that the working out of students’ 
educational plans has to be based on his or her abilities and aspirations. Finally, the concerned 
administrations, local communities, associations, and firms contribute to help students work 
out their educational plans. 
More specific legal regulations define the dialogue at the end of grade 9 (3ème) as “a 
continuous procedure that is led by the headmaster and that is based on a permanent dialogue 
between the school staff, the students and their families” (Circulaire n°95-057 du 8 mars 
1995). According to these regulations, the goals of the dialogue are to make students and their 
parents better understand the decisions of the staff meetings, to help them identify their 
abilities and aspirations and to meet the requirements of their teachers. The student can ask 
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for help from the orientation advisor, too. To achieve these goals, it is suggested that the 
schools organize regular meetings of the families and the teachers; there has to be at least one 
meeting in the second trimester.  
At the beginning of the school year, headmasters have to distribute to families a folder 
that contains a calendar with the dates of meetings and a detailed outline of the procedure of 
the dialogue (Circulaire n°95-057 du 8 mars 1995). The folder also provides information on 
how exactly the student has to write down his or her educational plans and school track 
demand. All students and parents are supposed to know how the dialogue functions and are 
supposed to be able to take advantage of it. Brochures about the dialogue and the available 
educational options are handed to the students and, as more and more households have access 
to the internet, families are today informed about internet links to informatory pages of the 
ONISEP (national office of information on schooling and vocations) and the Ministry of 
Education. Moreover, in the third trimester, the families are invited to open hours at the 
different upper secondary schools and at the firms that offer apprenticeship positions (Masson 
1997). Nevertheless, students and parents report to not feel well informed and perceive some 
of schools’ informatory activities as needless (Caille 2005; Masson 1997). 
Finally, the orientation advisor is charged to inform students and their parents about the 
different secondary education tracks and to help them elaborate their academic or professional 
projects. The orientation advisor usually is an external professional employed by the Ministry 
of Education who has a degree in psychology and who has attended two additional years of 
special schooling (Masson 1994). Orientation advisors are in charge for several schools where 
they meet students and parents once a week and attend the staff meetings. Typically, they 
have other goals than the headmasters and therefore the headmaster attempts to keep down 
their voice in the decision-making procedures (Masson 1994).  
Parent representatives 
The 1998 Orientation Law states: 
“The students’ parents are members of the educational community. Every school [primary school, lower 
secondary school and the different types of upper secondary schools] makes sure that they participate in school 
life and in the dialogue with the teachers and other school staff. Students’ parents take part in the administrative 
meetings of the school and in the staff meetings via the parent representatives. […]” (Loi n°89-486 du 10 juillet 
1989, §11) 
This quotation reveals that parent representatives should play an important role within 
the dialogue. Moreover, law requires the schools to ensure that the representatives can 
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effectively execute their office (MEN2013c). For instance, schools are supposed to organize 
their meetings in ways that make it possible for the representatives to attend the meetings (e.g. 
in the later afternoon or evening). Further, schools have to make sure that the representatives 
have all the information they need to accomplish their tasks. Representatives are allowed to 
communicate information they obtain from the official meetings they attend.  
Annually, the election of parent representatives takes place. All parents (and legal 
guardians) of students enrolled in the school have the right to vote. The school staff is 
required to strongly incite parents to vote. The election is very formal and many aspects are 
defined by legal regulations. Parent associations as well as parents who are not members in 
parent association can submit a list of candidates. The candidates are allowed to canvas. 
Parent representatives are elected for the “school council” (conseils d’école) and the 
“administration advisory council” (conseils d’administration) of the school (Horvat, 
Weininger and Lareau 2003). The school council decides on school-intern issues regarding, 
for instance, school canteens, the utilization of rooms and materials, and the organization of 
additional activities. Members of the administration advisory council decide on the budget, 
discuss general issues regarding the school and formulate the school’s opinion on 
modifications of the educational system that have been decided by authorities on higher 
governmental levels. The presence of parent representatives in these decision-making 
institutions indicates that the government puts emphasis on giving power to students’ 
families. However, qualitative studies of staff meetings indicate that Parent representatives act 
rather passively and tend to agree with teachers (Masson 1994). One can expect that 
representatives in school councils and in advisory councils are reserved, too. At least 
formally, Parent representatives have a lot of decision-making power.15  
Two parent representatives (per class) attend the staff meeting. According to an 
enactment from 1985 (Décret 85-924 1985-08-30 jorf 31 août 1985), they are selected 
through the following procedure: In the first trimester of grade 9 the headmaster meets with 
the parents who have made successful lists of candidates for the annual election of 
representatives for the administration advisory council. These individuals represent either a 
parent association or “independent” groups of parents. In a meeting with the headmaster, they 
                                                 
15 Aside from the school council and the administration advisory council, there are other committees on the 
school-level: the “permanent commission” (commission permanente) which prepares decisions for the 
administrative advisory council, the “disciplinary meeting” (conseil de discipline) which resembles the staff 
meeting and decides on sanctions such as school exclusions, and the “commission for sanitation and security” 
(commission d’hygiène et de sécurité). Basically, the parent representatives that are member of these councils 
have been chosen by the parent representatives in the administration advisory council (MEN 2013a). 
 
30
suggest parents for the role of parent representative in the staff meetings. The headmaster 
selects two main parent representatives (and two substitutes) in accordance with the results of 
the elections. That is to say, the headmaster has to privilege parents that have been suggested 
by the parent association or the “independent” group of parents who achieved a lot of votes in 
the annual elections. The headmaster still has the final word on who definitively attends the 
staff meetings since he decides which of the suggested parents will be representatives. 
Therefore, the headmaster seems to have some scope to choose Parent representatives that suit 
his interests (e.g. parents who are “submissive”).   
Parent associations 
In France, parent associations are prevalent and have – through their representatives in 
different councils – considerable influence on educational issues at various governmental 
levels. There are three main national parent unions that represent the interests of students’ 
parents who are attending public schools (MEN2013d).16 As an example, the oldest one is the 
“union of parents of students in public education” (fédération des parents d’élèves dans 
l’enseignement public, PEEP); it was founded in 1905 and incorporates 5.000 associations 
located all over the country (PEEP 2013). The other two unions started their work in the 
1940s and 1960s and also manage large numbers of associations. Typically, there is an 
association for every département that has local associations in municipalities. The unions 
and associations vary with regard to the ideas they represent. 
Parent associations are legally allowed to inform students and parents and to 
communicate with them within the schools (MEN 2013c). That means, for instance, that they 
have the right to hang posters, distribute brochures and organize meetings in the school 
buildings. They even have an own room in schools (MEN 2013a). As mentioned before, the 
parent associations mainly exert influence through “their” Parent representatives, i.e. the 
Parent representatives that are members in the parent association. These do not only take part 
in the councils on school-level (administration advisory council, school council and staff 
meeting), but can be selected into important committees on higher governmental levels, too.17 
                                                 
16 There are specific parent associations representing parents of students enrolled in private schools, too. The 
main union is the UNAPEL. Since this book focuses on the majority of students who are enrolled in public 
schools, I mainly address the associations that are involved in public education here. 
17 For instance, there are parent representatives on the national level in the “superior council of education” 
(conseil supérieur de l’éducation, C.S.E.) or on the level of the académies in the “académie’s council of national 
education” (conseil académique de l'éducation nationale, C.A.E.N.). The C.S.E. is involved in the decision-
making of the ministry of education, while the C.A.E.N. addresses all educational issues in a respective 
académie. In view of the research topic of this book – the institutionalized dialogue between family and school – 
it is important to note that, on the level of the département, three parent representatives attend the “recall 
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Generally, parents can become member of each parent association that is responsible for 
the département in which their children’s school is located. They pay an annual subscription 
and, apart from having their interests represented by the parent association, they can benefit 
from several services: If they have questions regarding their child’s schooling, they can call 
hotlines and ask for brochures. They can subscribe to the informatory journal of the 
association and cover “school insurance”, too. As mentioned above, members of the 
associations can become candidates for the function as parent representative at several 
councils and meetings. The representatives receive training by the association they are 
member in. The government funds this training. 
In sum, the dialogue seems to be embedded in an institutional context that promotes 
parental involvement and information: Headmasters have to regularly organize parents’ 
evenings and other events that provide parents with relevant information, schools have to 
support the work of parent associations, parent representatives attend different administrative 
meetings in which they have a voice and professional orientation advisors help students and 
parents develop educational plans. However, institutional regulations such as headmasters’ 
ultimate selection of parent representatives seem, at the same time, to restrict parental 
involvement. Moreover, previous research indicates that parents and students find informatory 
events like open hours at firms useless and still feel uninformed about the concrete criteria on 
which the staff meeting and the headmaster base their school track decisions (Caille 2005; 
Masson 1997). Moreover, only 17 per cent of parents are PA-members (Caille 1992: 20) and 
parent representatives act passively in the staff meetings and therefore seem not to make 
much use of their “power” (Masson 1994). Hence, schools formally define involvement 
standards and promote parental involvement and information but in practice not all parents 
seem to meet these standards and benefit from their institutionalized involvement.  
 2.4 School choice and school types 
2.4.1 THE SCHOOL MAP 
In 1963, along the facilitation of access to secondary schools (see Subchapter 2.1), 
school choice was restricted. The government introduced a “school map” (carte scolaire) that 
assigned a district to every school and thereby defined that students had to be enrolled in a 
school near to their home (Brauns 1998: 67; Meuret, Broccholichi and Duru-Bellat 2001: 38-
                                                                                                                                                        
meeting” (commission d’appel). Again, this is the institution that makes a final decision in case a family has 
rejected the staff meeting’s proposition and the subsequent decision of the headmaster. 
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39). On the one hand, the map enabled the governmental authorities to plan the supply of the 
schools with staff and other resources. On the other hand, the map was supposed to contribute 
to the “democratization” and to reduce social inequality. It was required that every student 
had a secondary school located in short distance and, consequently, would not have to account 
for high transportation costs (Circulaire du 3 mai 1963). However, as the districts themselves 
differ with regard to their social distribution and families of more favorable social origin 
found ways to circumvent the restriction (notably by enrolling their children in private 
schools), the “school map” did not considerably alter social segregation in schools. 
Later, in the early 1980s, the local commitment was increasingly softened because it 
seemed inconsistent to leave the choice of private schools unrestricted while the “school map” 
restricted the choice of public schools (Meuret, Broccolichi and Duru-Bellat 2001: 39-42). 
Moreover, a poll commissioned by the Ministry of Education in 1982 revealed that a very 
large part of parents of children attending public and private schools strongly favored a free 
choice.18 However, as the “experimental” softening of the “school map” caused new political 
and budgetary problems, a compromise was developed which is still defining school choice 
today: Students have to attend the (lower or upper secondary) school they are locally assigned 
to, but they can request an exceptional permission (MEN 2013b; Code de l'éducation - Article 
D211-11). This request has to be addressed to the authorities at the level of the académie. For 
every school year the academié defines how many students each school located in its area will 
be able to teach. Depending on whether this maximal number of free places is filled with 
students who are officially assigned to a school, the académie gives the permission to students 
from other districts to enroll in that school. 
Given this school choice regulation, families from higher social classes are more likely 
to make use of the possibility to circumvent the school map and to enroll their children in 
schools with more favorable social distributions (Ballion 1986; Broccholichi and Van Zanten 
1997). As mentioned above, this phenomenon is reinforced through the publication of school 
quality indicators such as retention and rejection rates (Karsten, Visscher and De Jong 2001). 
Therefore, headmasters are very concerned with their school’s image and teachers are not 
only valued for their teaching ability but for their loyalty to the school, too (Van Zanten 2002: 
291). Again, the competition between schools was supposed to increase schools’ quality but it 
is strongly questioned whether this goal was achieved (Karsten, Visscher and De Jong 2001).  
                                                 
18 Considerably fewer teachers favored the freedom of choice. 
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2.4.2 ZEP-SCHOOLS AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
With the gradual decentralization already mentioned in Subchapter 2.2 schools became 
more autonomous. The purpose of the decentralization was to give the schools the possibility 
to take into account their “individual” social composition and to take action against social 
inequality. As it is common for decentralization movements, the public and politicians were 
persuaded that decisions made at the national level could not be effective because they were 
taken far apart from the actual scenes and, consequently, did not take into account the specific 
local needs (Meuret, Broccolichi and Duru-Bellat 2001: 36). From summer 1981 on, each 
school was charged with the planning and implementation of specific educational projects that 
aim at the reduction of social inequality (Projects d’actions éducatives) (Combaz 1996). 
Reforms in 1983 and 1985 gave collèges and lycées the right to decide on the composition of 
classes, time schedules, cooperation of the school with social, cultural and economic 
institutions in the local area, and the organization of additional cultural, educational and sport 
activities (Meuret, Broccolichi and Duru-Bellat 2001: 111-112). The 1989 Orientation Law 
even provided the collèges with the right to modify and adapt the number of hours during 
which major subjects are taught (Combaz 1999). 
ZEP-schools 
Along with the first steps of decentralization, which charged the schools with the 
development of projects to reduce social inequality, the so-called “ZEP”-program was 
implemented in 1982 (Combaz 1996). “ZEP” stands for “education priority zones” (zone 
d’éducation prioritaire) and means districts with high rates of “disadvantaged” families. 
Mostly primary schools and lower secondary schools (collèges) have the ZEP-status; only 
very few upper secondary schools (lycées) are in the program. The goal of the ZEP-program 
is to provide “disadvantaged” schools with autonomy and resources to develop and implement 
specific teaching strategies to reduce social inequality. The exact criteria that determine 
whether a school is assigned to the ZEP-program are unknown; the authorities at the 
académie-level were supposed to designate schools with certain rates of unemployed parents, 
blue-collar workers, school dropouts, etc. (Bénabou, Kramarz and Prost 2009). ZEP-schools 
receive additional support by the state. Notably, they benefit from extra teaching hours and 
bonuses for the teachers and other school staff. 13 per cent of the students who entered lower 
secondary education in 1995 were enrolled in a ZEP-school (Caille 2001). Recent convincing 
evidence indicates that the program does no improve students’ school achievement and, 
hence, does not achieve its goals (Bénabou, Kramarz and Prost 2009). 
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According to teachers in ZEP-schools, their classes are characterized by high rates of 
students with “very disadvantaged” backgrounds meaning they grow up with unemployed 
parents, with single-parents and in low-income families (Guillaume 2001). While there is no 
convincing evidence for the effectiveness of the ZEP-program regarding students’ school 
performance (Bénabou, Kramarz and Prost 2009; Meuret 1994), students who spend their 
whole lower secondary education in a ZEP-school were found to be less likely to repeat 
grades and, holding constant students’ social origin and marks, students in ZEPs have higher 
chances to have their school track demand accepted by the staff meeting (Caille 2001). 
However, when social origin is not controlled, ZEP-students are more likely to attend the 
vocational upper secondary track than students in common public schools (Stefanou 2001). 
The staff considerably differs as compared to other public and private schools: the teachers 
tend to be younger and slightly of lower social origin, they have a different teaching style and 
closer relations to their students’ parents (Chauveau 2001; Emin et al. 2001; Guillaume 2001). 
Private schools 
Another school type that is prevalent in France is the private school.19 From the 1980s 
on, around 40 per cent of the students have attended at least one grade in a private school 
during their secondary education; almost one third of the students changed the sector at least 
once (Caille 2004; Langouët and Léger 2000). 95 per cent of the private schools are catholic 
schools (Brauns 1998: 74; Héran 1996). Since 1959 private schools are closely bounded to the 
state and can choose between two types of contract: Either they opt for the more restrictive 
“contrat d’association”, which implies that the school’s staff is paid with public funds and, in 
return, the school’s time schedule and teaching program has to follow the official standards or 
they choose the looser “contrat simple”, which implies only a limited funding of the staff and 
requires less compliance regarding the national pedagogical standards (Caille 2004). The 
former contract is by far the most common. French private schools are rather “para-private”: 
the only main differences between private and public schools are teacher selection and the 
organization of additional activities that the families have to pay for (Héran 1996). In private 
schools, headmasters select teachers. Apart from that, the school staff has the same diplomas 
as the teachers in public education. The religious background usually has not a very visible 
impact: Most headmasters and teachers are not religious and catechesis is only an optional 
course. Families enroll their poorly performing children in private schools to give them the 
chance to improve; religious education plays no important role in most parents’ decision-
                                                 
19 See Langouët and Léger (1991, 2000) as comprehensive and important work on private schools in France. 
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making (Langouët and Leger 2000). As regularly indicated by quantitative studies, families 
from higher social classes and self-employed are more likely to make use of private schooling 
(Caille 2004). Moreover, there are large differences between academiés in the general 
provision of private schooling. Monthly fees for private secondary schooling range from 150 
to 600 euros depending on whether a student is attending a boarding school, for instance.20  
Since French families have the freedom to choose schools they are not locally assigned 
to and school choice is strongly influenced by family’s social origin, public and private 
schools differ with regard to their social distribution (Héran 1996; Meuret, Broccolichi and 
Duru-Bellat 2001; Tavan 2004a; Tavan 2004b). Students who spend all of their secondary 
education in a private school perform somewhat better in upper secondary school than 
students who attend public secondary schools (Caille 2004). Holding constant performance 
and family characteristics, students enrolled in private schools have similar chances as 
students in public schools to be admitted to the general track, but they are more likely to 
repeat grades (Caille 2004; Nauze-Fichet 2004; Tavan 2004a; Tavan 2004b). Furthermore, the 
literature indicates lower social class differentials in grade repetition in private as compared to 
public secondary schools (Tavan 2004a; Tavan 2004b). Finally, parents who enroll their 
children in private schools have higher educational aspirations and are more involved in 
school than parents whose children attend public schools (Caille 2004; Tavan 2004b). 
  
                                                 
20 http://www.allo-education.fr/etablissements/college-prive/tarif-des-colleges-prives.html. 
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3 A cultural and a rational action approach to social 
inequality in education 
This chapter presents and discusses two prominent approaches to social inequality in 
educational attainment. The “cultural approach” is based on Bourdieu and Passeron’s theory 
on “social reproduction via cultural reproduction” (esp. Bourdieu 1966; Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1964; 1970). This approach includes numerous empirical studies that use the 
concept of cultural capital to explain the association between social origin and school success 
(De Graaf, De Graaf and Kraaykamp 2000; DiMaggio 1982; Sullivan 2001 as some most 
prominent and important examples). Bourdieu’s original theory and subsequent research 
based on it are harshly criticized. However, some promising suggestions for refining it were 
made as well (see the suggestion by Lareau and Weininger 2003). Among the various theories 
on educational decision-making which can be assigned to a “rational action approach” or 
“RAT-approach” to social inequality in education, I focus on seminal theoretical models that 
have their roots in Boudon’s (1974) application of RAT to educational decision-making of 
students and parents: The model by Erikson and Jonsson (1996) and the model by Breen and 
Goldthorpe (1997; Goldthorpe 1996b). Despite critique of these theories and of the utilization 
of RAT in general, they appear to be powerful approaches to explain social class differentials 
within the institutionalized dialogue between family and school. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the two prominent theoretical 
movements and, thereby, to present the theoretical foundations of the model on families’ and 
teachers’ decision-making within the institutionalized dialogue that will be developed in 
Chapter 5. While the main foundation of this model is clearly the RAT-approach, a selected 
argument of the cultural approach will play a key role in the model. This argument comes 
from Lareau and Weininger (2003) who suggest applying the concept of cultural capital in 
analyses of family-school interactions. As will be outlined in detail below, they assume that 
social classes differ with regard to cultural resources such as knowledge of the educational 
system, linguistic abilities and confidence in dealing with school staff and therefore parents 
from different classes cannot equally meet standards that schools define. Such standards are 
for instance attendance at parent-teacher meetings or other forms of parental involvement. As 
a consequence, teachers treat students from different social classes differently and social class 
differences in various school outcomes emerge. 
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Both approaches are evaluated in the light of one part of this dissertations’ research 
question: How do families make decisions within the institutionalized dialogue? And, which 
additional mechanisms due to the specific institutional context of the dialogue could 
contribute to the generation of social class differences in the families’ choices? Hence, in this 
chapter, I mostly focus on families’ decision-making and discuss theoretical arguments that 
implicate effects of certain institutional conditions on families’ educational decision-making.  
Teachers’ decision-making will be addressed in Chapter 4. 
After summarizing the main arguments of Bourdieu and Passeron’s theory and 
presenting the cultural capital literature that arose from it, I will outline the theoretical 
suggestion on cultural capital in family-school-interactions and previous research on parental 
involvement in school. With regard to the presentation of the RAT-approach, I will start with 
a short outline of the general principles of rational action theory and varieties of it. 
Subsequently, I will present the seminal theoretical models of Boudon (1974), Erikson and 
Jonsson (1996) and Breen and Goldthorpe (1997; Goldthorpe 1996b) and some other relevant 
RAT-approaches to educational decision-making. The chapter ends with summaries of 
critique of the two approaches, their benefits and possibilities to integrate them. The last 
sections evaluate both approaches and conclude.  
3.1 Social reproduction and cultural capital 
3.1.1 THE THEORY OF BOURDIEU AND PASSERON 
Bourdieu and Passeron’s theory on “social reproduction via cultural reproduction” (esp. 
Bourdieu 1966; Bourdieu and Passeron 1964; 1970) was developed in a time when research 
was preliminarily required to detect the detailed processes that link student social 
characteristics to their educational performance without referring only to class differences in 
economic resources (Goldthorpe 2007a: 84). As Bourdieu and Passeron argued that cultural 
differences between classes caused social class differentials in student’s school achievement, 
they lined up with other seminal works such as that of Bernstein (1961; 1965) on class 
differences in linguistic “codes” learned at home. For this reason, their arguments were 
notably applied to the association between social origin and educational achievement. 
However, Bourdieu and Passeron actually aimed to explain more than this association: They 
wanted to develop an encompassing theory on social reproduction (Goldthorpe 2007a; 
Lamont and Lareau 1988). 
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It is mainly Bourdieu and Passeron’s work “les héritiers, les étudiants et la culture” 
(1964) that initially advanced their arguments on the role of the educational system within 
social reproduction. In this contribution, Bourdieu and Passeron present quantitative and 
qualitative evidence for a strong relationship between social origin and access to university 
studies in France (1964: 13).21 In addition, they provide evidence for the association between 
social origin and student traits such as cultural leisure activities, family resources and attitudes 
towards education. They argue that social stratification in university studies is persisting – 
regardless of reforms that aim to augment equality of opportunity – because the rigid 
educational system deliberately privileges students of favorable social background (see also 
Bourdieu and Passeron 1970: e.g. 194-195, 202, 205). Following the interests of the dominant 
social classes, schools exclude children from lower social classes and thus foster social 
reproduction (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970: e.g. 36-41, 50).  
More specifically, children from the dominant social classes enter school with cultural 
and social abilities and habits (i.e. the well-known concepts cultural capital and habitus that 
will be addressed in more detail below) that children from the working class and the lower 
classes do not have. In school, children from less favorable classes have to acquire – with the 
utmost effort – competencies, behaviors and knowledge to overcome their lack of key cultural 
and social resources (e.g., Bourdieu 1966: 334; Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 39-40). 
Although they can attain these resources during education, they can never achieve the natural 
familiarity of children from the higher classes and will be disadvantaged for that reason 
(Bourdieu 1976: 225; Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 32-35). Basically, as the following 
quotation summarizes, social reproduction follows from the distance between the culture of 
the different classes and the culture of the school (see also e.g., Bourdieu 1966: 338; 1976: 
226; Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 39-40, 113; 1970: 177):  
“To think that all have equal chances to attain the highest education and highest culture by 
assuring the same economic means to all those who have the indispensable ‘gifts’ [i.e. talents], is 
to remain halfway in the analysis of the obstacles and to ignore that the abilities measured by 
school criteria depend, more than on natural ‘gifts’ ([…]), on a more or less strong affinity 
                                                 
21 Another important and famous work of Bourdieu in which he outlines fundamental arguments of his theory is 
“la distinction” from 1979. This book is more concerned with the distribution and manifestation of cultural 
capital and other forms of capital over “adult” social classes than with the links between students’ social origin, 
the school system, students’ school performance and their educational attainment. As it deals with the means that 
higher social classes use to maintain their privileged social position, it does, of course, address the core 
arguments on social inequality in education. However, the main purpose of the work is to develop a theory on 
social class differences in tastes and life-styles. 
Generally, this chapter does not have the ambitious goal to review all of Bourdieu’s works, his colleagues and 
successors. Instead, I focus on contributions that emphasize the arguments that are relevant in view of the 
research topics of this dissertation. 
 
39
between the cultural habits of one class and the requirements of the school system or the criteria 
that define [educational] success” (Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 37).22 
Social reproduction is itself legitimized because ability or “gifts” – and not cultural and 
social resources acquired in the family – are generally expected to determine academic 
achievement and, hence, academic standards are not supposed to put lower class children at a 
disadvantage (Bourdieu 1966: 336-337; Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 104-109; 1970: 198-
201). Put another way, the exclusion of children from lower classes appears to be legitimate 
and is generally accepted because schools are thought to be relatively autonomous and to 
reward achievement that can be generated only by schooling and not by socialization in the 
family. The “double-dealing” of the educational system is further legitimized since no one – 
regardless of their social origin – is aware of it; it is generally unknown and overlooked (e.g. 
Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 103, 109; 1970: 53). 
Besides, Bourdieu and Passeron argue that the legitimization of the exclusion of 
children with low social background is reinforced by the fact that they eliminate themselves 
(Bourdieu 1966; Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 94-95, 107-109; Bourdieu and Passeron 1970: 
188-193). Families from lower classes send their children to lower school tracks or let them 
drop out of school because they have certain typically lower-class attitudes towards 
education. Moreover, families from lower classes do so because they “collectively 
underestimate” the actual abilities of their children. Further, as lower-class families recognize 
that they are not capable of succeeding in school, they devaluate school and education in 
general and accept their exclusion from the educational system without protest. 
With their approach to the processes that drive the intergenerational reproduction of 
social stratification, Bourdieu and Passeron introduced the concept of cultural capital. 
Throughout their work the concept of cultural capital embraces diverse forms of class-specific 
behaviors, attitudes, preferences and goods. The review by Lamont and Lareau (1988: 155) 
shows that the concept ranges from informal knowledge about the school, traditional 
humanist culture, linguistic abilities and styles over general knowledge, previous academic 
attainment and linguistic aptitudes to “tastes” that are mobilized for social selection. In a 
comprehensive chapter on economic, cultural and social capital, Bourdieu (1983) 
differentiates cultural capital into embodied cultural capital, institutionalized cultural capital 
and objectified cultural capital (see also Bourdieu 1997). The first form, embodied cultural 
                                                 
22 Own translation. 
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capital, comprises most of the before mentioned cultural attitudes, preferences, knowledge 
and competencies. It is needed to attain educational success. The second form, 
institutionalized cultural capital, corresponds to educational credentials and the third form, 
objectified cultural capital, involves objects that can be used, consumed and “understood” 
only with incorporated cultural capital, e.g. paintings, music instruments, books.23  
Most notably, Bourdieu (1983) outlines in this contribution how the dominant classes 
accumulate and monopolize economic, cultural and social capital in order to maintain their 
privileged position. One central process is the institutionalization of the different forms of 
capital: For instance, economic capital is institutionalized via property rights that, in turn, 
yield monetary returns; cultural capital is institutionalized through certificates that can lead to 
other certificates and to occupational positions that, in turn, yield economic capital. Another 
core argument of Bourdieu’s theory is lucidly explained in that work: Cultural capital is the 
key in social reproduction because of the specific ways in which it is transmitted and 
converted. Basically, all forms of capital can be transmitted between individuals and 
converted into one another and the transmission can occur via conversion. A simple example 
for a conversion of economic capital into objectified cultural capital is the purchase of 
paintings. However, while the transmission of economic capital can happen immediately and 
is visible, cultural capital is transferred through a lengthy, invisible and “discrete” process 
(Bourdieu 1983: 186-188; Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 34). The core transmission of capital, 
in particular of cultural capital, occurs within and through the family and, therefore, drives 
social reproduction. The “invisibility” of the transmission is another aspect that supports the 
legitimization of social reproduction through cultural reproduction. Bourdieu himself states 
that: 
“The most important and (at school) effective part of cultural heritage, […], is transmitted 
in osmotic ways, even without any methodical effort and any manifest action, what contributes to 
reinforce the belief of the members of the cultivated classes [the dominant classes] that this 
knowledge, these abilities and attitudes that do not appear to them as the result of a learning [at 
home] are due to their gifts [i.e. talents]” (Bourdieu 1966: 330).24 
More generally, he argues that the visible transmission of power, e.g. through the 
transmission of economic capital, is publicly criticized and that, for this reason, other ways to 
transfer power from one generation to another have to be found (Bourdieu 1983: 198). The 
                                                 
23 In “la distinction”, Bourdieu (1979) also uses the term “school capital” (capital scolaire) when he speaks of 
educational credentials. 
24 Own translation. 
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educational system appears to be an ideal institution to cheaply convert embodied cultural 
capital into institutionalized one, which provides access to privileged occupational positions. 
Lastly, Bourdieu’s well-known concept of the habitus appears when he considers the 
transmission of embodied cultural capital from parents to their children. “Embodied capital is 
a possession that has become an inherent part of a ‘person’, a habitus; ‘to have’ has turned 
into ‘to be’” (Bourdieu 1983: 187).25 In fact, embodied cultural capital appears to be the 
habitus itself. The habitus is a system of socially constituted dispositions that the individual 
acquires, most effectively in early life, and that determines his or her entire orientation to the 
world and modes of conduct within it (Goldthorpe 2007a: 87). As explained before, it is 
transmitted from parents to children through “secret” channels and, for this reason, the 
transmission of (embodied) cultural capital is more secure and irreversible compared to 
economic capital for instance. According to Bourdieu and Passeron the habitus is “the 
principle that produces the most durable educational and social differences” (Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1964: 198). One main critique of the work of Bourdieu (and Passeron) is its lack of 
clarity and precision regarding the mechanisms through which cultural capital is transmitted 
from parents to their children (e.g. Lamont and Lareau 1988). This point of criticism is 
outlined again at the end of this chapter, together with other critique of Bourdieu’s original 
theory. 
Families’ decision-making 
In the following sections, I briefly outline Bourdieu and Passeron’s arguments on the 
generation of social class differences in families’ educational decision-making. Bourdieu and 
Passeron are concerned with educational decisions such as choosing a certain school track, 
university studies or drop out from the educational system. They also address the secondary 
effects, but without using this label, of course: Bourdieu refers to early studies that find 
important social origin effects on school track choices that remain after controlling for 
students’ school performance (Bourdieu 1966 cites: Clerc 1964; Girard and Bastide 1963). 
When trying to explain this net social class effect, Bourdieu indicates that he does not 
perceive it as reflection of the “will of the parents” (Bourdieu 1966: 330). His general 
argument is rather that the decisions of the families are unconsciously determined by the 
objective chances of educational success that members of the same social class have. As one’s 
education determines one’s occupation, families’ decisions are therefore affected also by the 
objective chances of attaining prestigious occupational and class positions of their own social 
                                                 
25 Own translation. 
 
42
class. By saying that “the members of the middle and lower classes take reality for their will” 
(Bourdieu 1966: 331), he indicates again that lower-class families have internalized their 
social fate and do not question it; instead, they act in accordance with this fate.   
In the passages that deal with “self-elimination” of students from lower classes, 
Bourdieu and Passeron argue: 
“[…] every single action of choice through which a child excludes him- or herself from the 
access to an educational path […] is based on the entirety of objective relationships […] between 
his or her social class and the educational system […]. This is why the structure of the objective 
chances of upward social mobility depending on social origin and, more precisely, the structure of 
chances of upward social mobility through the School [capital letter in original], determines 
attitudes towards School and [towards] upward social mobility through the School, attitudes that, 
in turn, contribute in a determining manner to the definition of the chances to attain to School, to 
agree with its norms and to succeed there, thus, the chances to move upward socially” (1970: 189-
190, see also Bourdieu 1966: 332).26 
At first sight, this excerpt seems confusing; still it is a good example for the line of 
arguments that Bourdieu and Passeron conduct to explain social class differentials in 
educational decisions: the decisions of students and their parents are determined by the 
objective chances of members of their own social class to experience upward social mobility 
through education. These objective chances have been internalized by the family members 
and affect their “subjective hopes”, their attitudes towards education and towards social 
mobility through education.  
Parents transmit such attitudes to their children and – partly as a consequence – children 
experience failure in school and further internalize these objective chances (Bourdieu 1966: 
332-333). Their failure in school indicates to them that they have the same low chances as 
other students from the same unfavorable social classes. Students (and their parents) get to 
know these objective probabilities through their results in school and the advices that the 
school staff gives to them; these advices may be “biased” by the teachers since these may – 
consciously or unconsciously – take into account student’s social origin (Bourdieu 1966: 
331). Bourdieu further relies on arguments of theories from social psychology to emphasize – 
somewhat inconsistently – that it is the experience of success and failure that forms 
                                                 
26 Own translation. 
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aspirations and that the ideals and actions of individuals depend on the group they belong to 
and on the goals and expectations of that group.27 
In sum, it appears that Bourdieu and Passeron’s theory explains social class differentials 
in families’ educational decisions through social class differences in attitudes towards 
education and towards social mobility through education (see also Bourdieu and Passeron 
1964: 38). With regard to the generation of these class-specific attitudes, Bourdieu and 
Passeron seem to argue that there are two stages: First, parents transmit to their children 
attitudes towards education, attitudes towards social mobility through education and thereby 
their “knowledge” and experience of class-specific objective chances of success. Second, 
children’s attitudes are reinforced through their individual experience of success and failure 
within the educational system and the success and failure of other members of the same social 
class.   
Policy and other implications of Bourdieu and Passeron’s work 
Bourdieu and Passeron’s book “les héritiers” was published at the beginning of the 
1960s when French politics and public where debating on social inequality in education 
(Masson 2001; Prost 2001). Its findings were in line with the results of studies that had been 
commissioned by the government and therefore further promoted reforms such as postponing 
the main selection of students into general and vocational tracks to the end of grade 9 and 
implementing the comprehensive secondary school named “Collège d’enseignement 
secondaire”. On the one hand, Bourdieu and Passeron’s work fitted in the general French 
“passion for equality” inherited from the Revolution in 1789; on the other hand, professionals 
and intellectuals involved in the educational process (e.g. teacher unions) rejected it and 
evaluated it as too pessimistic and deterministic (Van Zanten 2005: 676-677). Moreover, 
teachers’ belief in their work’s quality and the power of school to reduced social inequality 
was disturbed and students failing in school were encouraged to make school responsible for 
their defeat (Martucelli 2002 cited in Van Zanten 2005). 
                                                 
27 When addressing social class and gender differences in students’ learning behavior and choices of field of 
study, Bourdieu and Passeron (1964: 89-90, 94-95) hint at the role of objective chances: They emphasize that the 
behavior and the choices of students from lower social classes and those of girls are affected by their uncertainty 
about their professional future. Since students from less favorable classes cannot be sure to attain higher 
“intellectual” positions, they choose more vocational fields of studies that promise a specific occupational future. 
By contrast, students from higher social classes are more confident about their future, as they experienced 
success in school already and can – most importantly – rely on the resources of their family. Thus, they are more 
likely to choose “humanistic” disciplines with vague professional prospects. 
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In view of the context in which Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1964) work became known 
and the subsequent reforms of the educational system, it is probable that teachers (and 
headmasters) are sensitive to social inequality in education. In his recent works, Bourdieu 
recognizes that the general acceptance of differences in educational success being caused by 
“talents” or “gifts” has weakened (Nash 2003: 445-446). In particular, he suggests that 
teachers have now a different view on students’ performance since they are aware of the 
association between social class and educational outcomes (Bourdieu 1999: 442). Indeed, a 
study by Meuret and Alluin (1998) showed that most teachers think that the educational 
system does not make enough effort to reduce inequality of educational opportunity and that 
inequality has remained stable over the last decades. At the same time, they found that around 
one quarter of them supports an educational system that compensates for disadvantages of 
certain student groups – e.g. through more and better teaching – while 70 per cent have the 
opinion that all students should have teachers of same “quality”. According to these findings, 
it appears that teachers are aware of social inequality in education but that this does not 
necessarily mean that they take care of it when making evaluations and decisions or even 
favor “positive discrimination”. Furthermore, given that social inequality in education is a 
sensitive topic in France, social desirability may have affected teachers’ answers. 28 
3.1.2 CULTURAL CAPITAL LITERATURE 
Bourdieu and Passeron’s theory and particularly their concept of cultural capital became 
popular in the 1980s. Since then numerous studies on social inequality in different school 
outcomes have tested hypotheses derived from Bourdieu and Passeron’s theory. Possibly as a 
consequence of Bourdieu’s diverse conceptualization, researchers have defined and 
operationalized the concept of cultural capital in a variety of ways. The essence of the 
definitions presented in these empirical studies seems to be “familiarity with the dominant 
culture” embracing linguistic and social skills, general knowledge and the competencies to 
understand and appreciate arts (e.g. Aschaffenburg and Maas 1997; Becker 2010; De Graaf, 
De Graaf and Kraaykamp 2000; Dumais 2002; Jungbauer-Gans 2004; Sullivan 2001; Van 
deWerfhorst and Hofstede 2007). Another prominent definition is that by Lamont and Lareau 
(1988: 156) who carefully reviewed and condensed Bourdieu’s descriptions and arguments to 
                                                 
28 In his recent work, Bourdieu seems to have undergone a certain change: he recognizes that the general 
acceptance of differences in educational success being caused by “talents” or “gifts” has weakened (Nash 2003: 
445-446). In particular, he suggests that teachers have now a different view on students’ performance since they 
are aware of the association between social class and educational outcomes (Bourdieu 1999: 442). 
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“institutionalized, i.e., widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, 
formal knowledge, behaviors, goods and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion”. 
This definition is widely acknowledged and directly employed in several studies (e.g.  De 
Graaf, De Graaf and Kraaykamp 2000; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 1996; Roscigno and 
Ainsworth-Darnell 1999). 
With regard to the operationalization of cultural capital, a wide range of measures has 
been applied: Parent’s educational attainment (e.g. Robins and Garnier 1985), parent’s and 
child’s highbrow cultural activities such as attendance at classical concerts, visits to museums 
and taking music lessons (e.g. Aschaffenburg and Maas 1997; De Graaf, De Graaf and 
Kraaykamp 2000; DiMaggio 1982; DiMaggio and Mohr 1985; Dumais 2002; Jungbauer-Gans 
2004; Katsillis and Rubinson 1990), parent’s and child’s reading behavior (e.g. 
Aschaffenburg and Maas 1997; Crook 1997; De Graaf, De Graaf and Kraaykamp 2000; De 
Graaf 1988), parent’s interest in philosophy and politics (De Graaf 1988), number of books at 
home (e.g. De Graaf 1988; Jungbauer-Gans 2004; Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell 1999), 
availability of other educational resources such as dictionaries, newspapers and a quiet place 
to study (e.g. Jæger 2009b; Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell 1999; Teachman 1987), and 
measures of cultural knowledge, e.g., names of painters, writers, scientists (e.g. Becker 2010; 
Sullivan 2001). In addition, the attempt was made to operationalize the concept of habitus 
through students’ occupational expectations (Dumais 2002; McClelland 1990).29  
In their works, Bourdieu and Passeron give a few – sometimes rather indirect – hints for 
the measurement of cultural capital. For instance, to properly measure the embodied cultural 
capital of an individual, Bourdieu argues that “duration of education” including number of 
schooling years plus socialization within the family should be used (Bourdieu 1983: 186-
187). The socialization within the family should be taken into account in terms of the cultural 
distance between the education received at home and the requirements of the school system. 
That is to say, when measuring an individual’s cultural capital, number of schooling years and 
social origin should be considered. Bourdieu (1966: 326) also suggests using educational 
attainment of mother and father and general level of cultural knowledge prevailing in the 
family. The idea behind considering the educational level of both parents is that the general 
level of cultural knowledge in a family is different when mother and father do not have the 
                                                 
29 Not all of cited studies explicitly operationalize “cultural capital”: Notably, although they mention Bourdieu, 
Teachman (1987) speaks of “educational resources” and De Graaf (1988) of “cultural resources”. However, I 
still assign such studies to cultural capital literature as they are cited by contributions that do explicitly analyze 
the effects of cultural capital and of the arguments of the original theory.  
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same degree. In sum, Bourdieu’s suggestions are quite vague and, hence, they tempt to use 
“whatever” available variable seems appropriate. 
In cultural capital literature, the typical hypothesis that is derived from the original 
theory is that the effect of social class on educational attainment is mediated by cultural 
capital. To further explain this relationship, the authors refer to Bourdieu’s notion of the 
similarity between the culture of higher social classes (or “dominant” classes) and school’s 
culture. Putting the same argument differently, they refer to schools’ “rewarding” of abilities 
and behaviors that are typical for higher social classes. When it became apparent that different 
measures of cultural capital have different effects depending on which country was analyzed, 
two competing theoretical mechanisms were developed: Referring to Crook (1997), the 
argument was that in some countries highbrow activities have an impact on educational 
success because they indicate a student’s social class position, while in other countries 
“cultural activities” such as reading behavior and the availability of books and other learning 
material have an impact because they promote students’ cognitive skills and abilities and 
these translate into good examination results and marks (see also Dumais 2002; Sullivan 
2001; Swartz 1997). 
The early studies also advanced hypotheses that deal with interactions of social origin 
and cultural capital: DiMaggio (1982) argued that “cultural reproduction theory” yields that 
cultural capital has even stronger effects for higher class students than for lower class students 
and suggested the competing “cultural mobility model” which, by contrast, assumes that 
students of lower social origin benefit more from (later acquired) cultural capital than students 
from higher classes. Other resembling assumptions – not derived from Bourdieu – were 
presented in early contributions: parents’ cultural capital is more beneficial in students’ early 
school career and students’ own cultural capital becomes more relevant in their later 
educational career; parents’ and children’s cultural capital accumulate and have independent 
effects (e.g. Aschaffenburg and Maas 1997; De Graaf 1986; Teachman 1987). Finally, in 
more recent studies, the link between social class and educational success is disentangled into 
complementing assumptions such as (i) parents must have cultural capital, (ii) parents must 
transmit their cultural capital to their children, and (iii) children must transform their cultural 
capital into educational success (Jæger 2009b; see also Sullivan 2001). 
Cultural capital literature provides empirical findings that are ambiguous with regard to 
their support of the original theory or, at least, of the hypothesis it derives from it. The results 
seem to vary because of the diverse operationalization of cultural capital (Dumais 2002; 
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Sullivan 2001), but also because different dependent variables (test scores, marks, years of 
schooling, educational choices) and groups of explanatory variables are analyzed. Most of the 
studies find positive effects of cultural capital on different educational outcomes, whereby, 
when several different measures (e.g. highbrow activities and reading behavior) are analyzed 
simultaneously, some measures have greater effects than others (Aschaffenburg and Maas 
1997; De Graaf et al. 2000; Sullivan 2001). Again, one explanation is that educational 
systems vary with regard to the type of cultural capital they “reward”. It is concluded that, for 
instance, in the U.S., the Netherlands and Britain, where standardized examinations play an 
important role, reading behavior and educational resources in the home have a greater effect 
than highbrow activities (see also Katsilis and Rubinson for Greece and, contradicting 
evidence by Jaeger (2009b) for Denmark where ”cultural signals” are supposed to have the 
greater effect). 
With regard to cultural capital’s mediating of the effect of social origin on educational 
attainment, many studies provide supporting evidence (De Graaf 1988; De Graaf, De Graaf 
and Kraaykamp 2000; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 1996; Jaeger 2009b; Roscigno and 
Ainsworth-Darnell 1999; Sullivan 2001; Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede 2007) and fewer do 
not (DiMaggio 1982; Katsilis and Rubinson 1990; Robinson and Garnier 1985). Findings 
with regard to DiMaggio’s “cultural mobility model” and Bourdieu’s “cultural reproduction 
theory”, which predict a negative respectively a positive interaction of social origin and 
cultural capital, are ambiguous but still slightly more in favor of Bourdieu: For instance, 
DiMaggio’s (1982) study finds a positive interaction for women (but a negative for men); De 
Graaf, De Graaf and Kraaykamp (2000) find that especially lower-class children benefit from 
reading behavior; Aschaffenburg and Maas (1997) show a positive interaction of class and 
parent’s cultural capital on the most important school transition in the Netherlands and 
Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell (1999) do so for marks and test-scores. Against ideas that 
are deduced from Bourdieu’s original theory, the findings of several studies support the 
assumptions that parent’s cultural capital has a stronger effect on student’s early school career 
and that parents’ and student’s cultural capital do accumulate and have independent effects 
(Aschaffenburg and Maas 1997; De Graaf 1986; Teachman 1987). 
Critique of cultural capital literature 
Cultural capital literature is criticized for several reasons. As the critique is not referring 
to Bourdieu’s original work but rather to the application and interpretation of it, I present the 
critique of cultural capital studies in this section and not together with general critique of 
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Bourdieu and Passeron’s original theory at the end of this chapter. One point of criticism is 
the great variety of definitions and measurements of cultural capital. Already in 1988, when 
work dealing with cultural capital was still in the early stages, Lamont and Lareau argued that 
the concept was used with plenty of different and, sometimes even contradictory, meanings 
and that this variety entails the risk of confusion and of making the concept obsolete. Despite 
this early “warning”, research applying the concept of cultural capital remained inconsistent 
(Goldthorpe 2007a; Kingston 2001; Lareau and Weininger 2003; see also brief overview in 
previous section). 
Besides, it is argued that the cultural capital concept (and Bourdieu’s other ideas) is 
only applicable to France (Kingston 2001; Lareau and Weininger 2003). Throughout their 
work, Bourdieu and Passeron occasionally indicate that their theory holds especially for the 
society and the educational system in France. They suggest, for instance, that the desire to 
attain the highest position within the hierarchical system of the university is particularly 
strong in France and therefore that social selection through cultural selection, i.e. through 
criteria that are defined by the school, is particularly well accepted there (Bourdieu and 
Passeron 1964: 106). They also emphasize that the role of exams is especially important and 
dominant in the French school and university system and they explicitly mention that “among 
all European educational systems” the French system is the one that puts most importance on 
exams (Bourdieu and Passeron 1970: 175, 169). Bourdieu and Passeron regularly point to the 
specific procedure of selection of students for the Grandes Écoles: examinations that require 
“general culture”, meaning general knowledge including knowledge of history, literature, 
culture, politics, etc. (e.g. Bourdieu and Passeron 1970: 205).30 However, I object that cultural 
capital literature has become more sensitive to specific national contexts as it employs 
adapted measures (e.g. reading behavior and resources in the home), analyzes detailed 
mechanisms (e.g. Jaeger 2009b; Sullivan 2001) and justifies why one or the other measure 
better “applies” to a specific country (e.g. Jaeger 2009b; Jungbauer-Gans 2004).  
Another important point of criticism is that the theoretical understanding of Bourdieu in 
the cultural capital literature is not consistent with Bourdieu’s original theory (Goldthorpe 
2007a: 94). Critics see two main deviations: First, they argue that the differentiation between 
ability (measured in terms of standardized tests) and cultural capital is not in the sense of 
                                                 
30 Generally, Bourdieu and Passeron do not state that their theory cannot be applied to other countries, but they 
outline specific aspects of the French system and society that support their assumptions or provide the context 
for the testing of their assumptions. Consequently, these specific aspects should exist in other countries when 
one wants to make use of their theory there. 
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Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital (Goldthorpe 2007a; Lareau and Weininger 2003). 
Typically, they say, the studies claim to test Bourdieu’s arguments when they hold constant 
standardized test scores, observe a remaining social origin effect on school success (e.g. 
marks, diplomas) and, subsequently, take into account measures of cultural capital. However, 
as sustained by citations of Bourdieu and Passeron, Lareau and Weininger (2003) argue that 
cultural capital is supposed to be “irrevocably fused” with “skill” or “ability” and therefore 
distinguishing between them is not in line with Bourdieu’s original theory. In his explications 
on the association between educational attainments and occupational positions, Bourdieu 
indicates that educational credentials simultaneously verify two types of competences: first, 
technical knowledge and, second, competences that are directly linked to social origin 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1970: 217, 202-203). From this, critics deduce that the “effects of 
‘status’ for Bourdieu are not distinct from those of ‘skill’ (or by extensions, ‘ability’)” 
(Goldthorpe 2007a: 95; Lareau and Weininger 2003: 120). 
The second deviation from Bourdieu’s original ideas concerns the operationalization of 
cultural capital through highbrow cultural activities and attitudes. Critics refer to the original 
texts of Bourdieu that could be interpreted as incitement to measure cultural capital through 
interest in and performance of “highbrow” culture but that – when reading closer – actually 
do not (Lareau and Weininger 2003: 115-118). To the contrary, Bourdieu’s works which are 
most clear about the concept of cultural capital and which provide some hints to the 
operationalization of it, nowhere mention indicators such as attendance and attitudes towards 
highbrow culture (esp. Bourdieu 1983: 186-190). Finally, critics say that, if at all, highbrow 
culture could be a signal of higher status groups in France (esp. Bourdieu 1979) but hardly in 
other countries (Kingston 2001: 90-91; Lareau and Weininger 2003: 117).  
Despite this mostly understandable criticism, cultural capital literature provides relevant 
findings. Especially recent studies face up to some of the main points of criticism by refining 
and adapting the ideas of the original theory: The authors propose theoretical arguments on 
why and how cultural capital effects vary by educational system (e.g. Crook 1997), split up 
the concept into dimensions such as highbrow activities, cultural skills and abilities (e.g. De 
Graaf, De Graaf and Kraaykamp 2000), and try to detect the exact mechanisms that link 
social class, parents’ and students’ cultural capital, (teacher evaluations,) and educational 
outcomes (e.g. Jaeger 2009b; Sullivan 2001). 
Considering the research topic of this thesis, notably studies that analyze effects of 
cultural capital on educational transitions and choices seem interesting. For example, De 
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Graaf (1988) finds for the Federal Republic of Germany that, holding constant marks, social 
class effects on the choice of secondary school are considerably reduced when parental 
cultural capital (reading environment at home) is taken into account. Also, Aschaffenburg and 
Maas (1997) show that parental cultural capital (highbrow activities) has stronger effects on 
early transitions and that these effects are even stronger for children from higher classes than 
for children of less favorable origin. Such results indicate that cultural resources of the parents 
– measured in direct or indirect ways – affect school track decisions and may contribute to a 
mechanism that explains social class differentials in families’ educational decision-making 
within a specific institutional context. Cautiously, one could argue for instance that De 
Graaf’s finding for Germany is operating through teacher recommendations: Teachers could 
take into account parents’ cultural capital (e.g. to evaluate parents’ capacity to support their 
child) and students’ cultural capital (that translates e.g. in participation in class) and therefore 
are more likely to recommend higher tracks to families with a lot of cultural capital. Hence, if 
families take into account teacher recommendations cultural capital affects their choices. The 
result of Aschaffenburg and Maas (1997) could indicate that parents from higher classes 
“make use of” their cultural capital to influence their children’s transitions to next educational 
levels. Since the most important transitions are at early educational stages and parents are 
more involved in children’s schooling when these are young, the cultural capital effects are 
strongest on early transitions.31  
In view of this interpretation, the question comes up how parents’ cultural capital 
affects their involvement in school and whether social class differences in the “possession” of 
cultural capital cause social class differences in beneficial parental involvement, i.e. parental 
involvement that achieves preferable treatment by teachers and therefore higher school 
success. As mentioned above, Lareau and colleagues advance a theoretical suggestion on the 
role of cultural capital in family-school-interactions. The following subchapter outlines this 
suggestion. 
3.1.3 CULTURAL CAPITAL IN FAMILY-SCHOOL INTERACTIONS 
Some researcher who criticize cultural capital literature advance that certain ideas of the 
original work of Bourdieu and Passeron, in particular their concept of cultural capital, could 
                                                 
31 The assumption that parents’ involvement in their children’s schooling is stronger at early transitions can be 
derived from the life-cycle hypothesis (Müller and Karle 1993), which advances that social class effects are 
stronger at early transitions because parents have more influence and students are not emancipated from them. 
Even though there are arguments against stronger effects at early transitions, the argument that effects of 
parents’ own educational experience are stronger in early stages of students’ school careers seems uncontested 
(Hillmert and Jacob 2010).    
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be efficiently refined. In contrast to the fundamental opponents of Bourdieu’s original theory 
who suggest putting the concept of cultural capital away, they see potential in the use of his 
ideas and concepts (Lamont and Lareau 1988). More specifically, they suggest making use of 
the concept of cultural capital in investigations of family-school interactions (Lareau and 
Weininger 2003). 
The original theory provides no explicit arguments regarding parental participation in 
schooling but it emphasizes the importance of cultural capital in the communication between 
students, their parents and teachers (Lareau 1987). Lareau and Weininger (2003: 568) see 
potential in the original work and suggest refining “the micro-interactional processes through 
which individuals comply (or fail to comply) with the evaluative standards of dominant 
institutions such as schools”. More specifically, they put forward the assumption that 
individuals strategically use cultural resources such as their knowledge, skills and 
competences in order to meet institutionalized standards of evaluation. In the school context, 
this implies that students make use of their cultural resources to get good marks and parents 
apply certain socially determined knowledge, skills and competences when communicating 
with the teachers in order to get preferable treatment for their children. In keeping with 
Bourdieu’s concept of “capital”, the authors propose that these cultural resources can be 
monopolized and transmitted between family members and across generations, and provide 
advantages or “profits”.  
Moreover, cultural capital is supposed to be strongly associated with social class. 
Adopting Bourdieu’s notion of the similarity of the culture of certain classes and school’s 
culture, Lareau and Weininger advance the assumption that certain classes impose evaluative 
criteria on the educational system (Lareau and Weininger 2003: 587-588). They rely on 
Bourdieu’s “conflict-theoretical” idea, which states that higher social classes define and 
implement educational norms or evaluative criteria that are at most favorable for their own 
children. From arguments of that kind, Lareau and Weiniger deduce that those classes who 
have not the power to impose educational standards are disadvantaged and that the standards, 
i.e. the cultural capital that is required in the educational system, is not fix over time. They 
argue that with the change of the conceptualization of children, the standards of child rearing 
and of interactions with “professionals and semi-professionals” (e.g. medical doctors, 
teachers) have changed. Today, parents are generally required to be “active”, “involved”, 
“assertive”, “educated” and to act as “advocates” of their children (Lareau and Weininger 
2003: 589).   
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Lareau and Weininger (2003: 589) suggest that empirical studies, document, firstly, 
which formal and, particularly, informal criteria the school staff uses to assesses the 
performance of students (and parents) and, secondly, whether students’ and parents’ 
equipment with cultural capital they can use to meet the requirements of the school staff 
varies with their social class position. Also, they suggest, research should investigate social 
class differences in parents’ skills and knowledge to influence the standards. They label these 
mechanisms “dynamics” (Lareau and Weininger 2003: 588). The latter points yield the 
investigation of social class differentials in parents’ communication with school staff and their 
involvement in their children’s schooling (e.g. membership in parent associations, initiation of 
meetings with the school staff, participation in school events). 
Qualitative and quantitative research on parental involvement in school provides 
findings that are in line with Lareau and Weininger’s suggestion. Not all studies directly rely 
on Bourdieu or refer to the arguments of Lareau and her colleagues, but they all show which 
resources parents need and make us of in interactions with the school. Based on a review of 
psychological literature, Hoover-Dempsey and Sandler (1997) have developed a model on 
parent’s shaping of their decision to become involved. They argue that three major constructs 
determine parent’s involvement decision: Role construction, self-efficacy and invitations, 
demands and opportunities to get involved. Role construction implies that parents believe that 
they have to be involved. This belief is influenced by the expectations of significant others 
(e.g. the child, teachers, other parents) and the behavior of significant others. Self-efficacy 
represents parents’ belief that they have the skills and ability to achieve goals such as 
improving their children’s educational success and getting preferable treatment by teachers. 
Individuals with a high level of self-efficacy perceive difficult situations as challenges and try 
even harder while individuals with low levels try to avoid difficult situations (Bandura 1989a; 
Bandura 1989b). Invitations, demands and opportunities – the third construct – have a 
comparatively smaller effect. However, given certain combinations of role construction and 
self-efficacy, they considerably increase the likelihood that a parent becomes involved. For 
instance, if parents have a low self-efficacy but a high role construction, invitations by the 
school are supposed to a have great positive impact.  
The model by Hoover-Dempsey and Sandler (1997) yields that parents become 
involved when they think that they are required to, when they believe that they are equipped 
with resources that make them successful in dealing with teachers and when they are invited 
to be involved. Applying this assumption to the suggestion by Lareau and Weininger, parents 
become involved when “being involved” is a standard required by the school and when 
 
53
parents believe that they have the cultural capital that is needed to meet these standards and, 
beyond that, to achieve goals such as improving of their children’s achievement and 
educational outcomes. Invitations and opportunities contribute to standards’ definition and 
hence to parents’ evaluation of the “appropriateness” of their resources.  
The formal standard is that all parents, regardless of their abilities and resources, should 
be more involved at home, e.g. through help with homework, and in school, e.g. through 
attendance at parents’ evenings, meeting the teachers and volunteering at school events 
(Blackledge 2001; Crozier 1996; Reay 2005). 32  As some qualitative research shows, the 
informal standard is to master the “middle-class white rules” which are, for instance, speaking 
the native language, reading stories to the children before they go to bed, practicing reading 
and vocabulary (Blackledge 2001: 365). Besides, teachers require the parents to respect their 
work, to actively contribute to the education of the children and not to leave the whole 
“education job” to the school (Blackledge 2001; Lareau and Horvat 1999). 
Providing evidence for the theoretical ideas of Hoover-Dempsey and Sandler (1997) 
and Lareau and Weininger (2003), qualitative studies reveal that parents who think that they 
do not have the abilities and resources that enable them a successful dealing with the school 
staff are afraid of talking to the teachers (Blackledge 2001; Lareau and Horvat 1999; Reay 
1999). Together with the results of quantitative studies, this research shows and argues that 
resources and abilities (i.e. cultural capital) that determine parents’ – notably mother’s – 
involvement in school are linguistic abilities (Blackledge 2001; Reay 1999), self-assurance 
(Lee and Bowen 2006; Reay 1999; 2005), trust in the educational system (Crozier 1996), 
informal and formal knowledge of the educational system (Crozier 1996; Lareau 1989; 
Masson 1997), the attitude that parents should be involved and support teachers’ work (Reay 
2005; Sheldon 2002) and social networks (Horvat, Weininger and Lareau 2003; Sheldon 
2002). Furthermore, the literature mentions time and economic resources to account for costs 
(e.g. child care arrangements and transportation costs) that come up when parents want to go 
to school to meet the teachers (Griffith 1998; Guryan, Hurst, Kearney 2008; Hoover-Dempsey 
and Sandler 1997; Lareau and Horvat 1999; Reay 2005). With regard to school 
characteristics, a welcoming and empowering school climate positively affects parent’s 
                                                 
32An important part of the literature that is presented in the following deals with the case of the U.S. and Britain. 
Notably in Britain the government has more and more requested parental involvement in the last decades and, 
partly as a consequence of this, a lot of research on parental involvement has emerged. The following sections do 
not claim to give a full overview of the literature on this topic. They rather provide significant examples. One 
insightful review is that of Hoover-Dempsey et al. (2005). 
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involvement in the school (e.g. Griffith 1998 and studies presented in Hoover-Dempsey et al. 
2005). 
It was found that social class and socioeconomic status are considerably related to 
relevant abilities and resources and to involvement of different kinds. While British working-
class mothers report that meeting teachers is a great psychological effort for them and that 
they don’t feel “listened to”, middle-class mothers show certainty and entitlement and 
communicate more criticism (Reay 1999). Parents with higher educational attainment find 
more efficient ways to cope with problems occurring with teachers (e.g. meet the teachers 
very regularly, mobilize other parents or ‘professionals’ in their personal network); in such 
situations lower educated parents do not intervene at all or act on their own (Lareau and 
Horvat 1999; Horvat, Weininger and Lareau 2003; Sheldon 2002). Generally, it appears that 
parents belonging to higher status and native groups possess the linguistic abilities and 
educational knowledge that enable them to be involved in school, while parents in less 
favorable social positions opt for involvement at home (e.g. Lee and Bowen 2006; Reay 
2005). For French parents of students in lower secondary school, Caille (1992) shows that 
social classes differ with regard to membership in parent associations (PA), initiation of 
meetings with teachers and the likelihood of generally having met a teacher during the last 
school years. O’Prey’s (2004) findings moreover link French parents’ involvement with 
“classical” measures of students’ cultural capital as she shows that more involved parents are 
more likely let their children attend school-external cultural activities such as music lessons. 
With international data on time use, Guryan, Hurst and Kearney (2008) show that higher 
educated parents spend more time on childcare including meetings with teachers than parents 
with lower educational attainments, even when employment-status is held constant. Sui-Chu 
and Willms (1996) only found small but significant effects of parents’ socioeconomic status 
on their involvement in school. Still, they show that overall levels of parental involvement 
(e.g. attendance at school events, volunteering) are higher in schools with a high average 
socioeconomic status. This could be because in such schools the climate is better in terms of 
empowerment and the staff is more helpful and friendly (Griffith 1998; Hoover-Dempsey et 
al. 2005).  
In the French institutional context, parental involvement is formally promoted and 
thereby defines standards (see Chapter 2). For instance, regular parents’ evenings and 
informatory events signalize that parents are required to come to school regularly and to get 
informed about their children. Therefore, I assume that in France parents are “required” to be 
involved and will get preferable treatment by teachers if they meet these requirements. I 
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further assume that parents’ cultural capital and their involvement play an important role 
because staff meetings make virtually binding secondary school track propositions: If parents 
want to have their school track request accepted, they may have higher chances if they are 
involved. Since the French institutional context puts emphasis on parental involvement, the 
theoretical suggestion on cultural capital in family-school-interactions appears to be 
appropriate to understand how families and the school staff make decisions within the 
institutionalized dialogue. 
3.2 Rational action and status maintenance 
Over the last decades more and more sociologists from diverse fields and from 
sociology of education and social mobility have decided to make use of Rational Action 
Theory (RAT)33. Initially, RAT became prominent because sociology was seeking for theories 
that were powerful and concrete enough to explain, instead of only describe (Boudon 2003). 
Recently, its popularity has increased because it was shown to be successful in solving 
important questions regarding many core domains of sociology (Boudon 2003; Kroneberg 
and Kalter 2012).  
RAT can roughly be defined as a theoretical approach to individual behavior that is 
based on the assumption that individuals form expectations about the consequences of 
alternatives that are available to them (Kroneberg and Kalter 2012). More specifically, 
individuals evaluate the costs and the benefits of these available alternatives and, based on 
this evaluation, they choose the alternative that best satisfies their preferences. An RAT 
generally consists of three components: First, the “starting point” are actors (most often 
individuals, sometimes firms, nations, organizations); second, these actors hold resources (or 
– negatively formulated – have to act under constraints), have preferences and have to choose 
among alternatives; third, a “decision rule” determines which action an actor will perform 
under given preferences and constraints (Diekmann and Voss 2004: 15; Kroneberg und Kalter 
2012: 76).  
Social sciences are generally interested in explaining regularities on the macro- or 
“societal”-level. For instance, the theoretical approaches presented in this chapter are 
concerned with explaining (trends in) the social stratification of education. Hence, the 
explanandum of these approaches is a social or macro-phenomenon, namely the “collective 
effect” of social class on educational attainment. RAT follows the postulate of 
                                                 
33 It is also termed “Rational Choice Theory”. 
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methodological individualism, i.e. the method of explaining or describing phenomena or 
regularities on the macro-level as a result of the actions of individuals (e.g. Diekmann and 
Voss 2004; Esser 1999a: 96-98)34 The application of methodological individualism requires 
assumptions of three types: First, bridge or context-hypotheses link the macro- to the micro-
level. More specifically, they connect the specific social situation an actor is in with his goals, 
with his individual perception of available resources and alternatives and hence with his 
evaluation of subjective probabilities. In the following I also label them more generally 
“bridging hypotheses”. Second, auxiliary assumptions define how an actor assigns utility 
values to different available alternatives and hence which alternative he will choose (Brüderl 
2004). Third, rules of aggregation link the micro-level again with the macro-level. They 
define how the actions of the individuals aggregate and “build” the explanandum, i.e. the 
social phenomenon or regularity that they shall explain (Esser 1999a: 96-98, Diekmann and 
Voss 2004). In sum, the three steps (macro-micro, micro-micro and micro-macro) lead to the 
explanation of the fourth element, namely the “collective explanandum”, social regularity or 
phenomenon on the macro-level (Esser 1999a: 96-98, Diekmann and Voss 2004: 21). 
Early sociological RAT-approaches to educational decision-making are the seminal 
models by Gambetta (1987) and Boudon (1974). Following from Boudon’s theory, the well-
known models by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997; Goldthorpe 1996b) and Erikson and Jonsson 
(1996) were developed more than two decades later (see also Esser 1999b). Recently, these 
models were refined (e.g. Becker 2000; Holm and Jæger 2008; Jaeger 2007) and different 
RAT-approaches based on human capital theory (e.g. Hillmert and Jacob 2003) or integrating 
psychological arguments (e.g. Morgan 1998; Morgan 2002) were developed. This subchapter 
presents Boudon’s approach and the models by Breen and Goldthorpe and Erikson and 
Jonsson. Moreover, it briefly addresses human capital theory, Gambetta’s theory and recent 
RAT-approaches providing arguments on the impact of institutional circumstances on 
educational choices.  
                                                 
34 In fact, RAT variations with very strong rationality requirements are based on six postulates (see e.g. Boudon 
2003). “Minimal” or weaker versions of RAT are characterized by three assumptions (Kalter und Kroneberg 
2012): (i) individuals select from out of alternatives, (ii) individuals’ beliefs, preferences, and constraints 
determine their actions, and (iii) individuals choose the alternative that appears to them as optimal with regard to 
their beliefs, preferences, and constraints. The weaker versions neglect the assumption that “actors are optimally 
informed rational egoists who care only for the tangible consequences of their actions and take into account only 
objective constraints” (Kroneberg and Kalter 2012: 81). A well-known example for a narrow RAT is human 
capital theory (Becker 1993[1964]; Subchapter 3.2.4) and one for a wider RAT is Boudon’s cognitivist model 
(1996), which follows the notion of subjective rationality. According to Boudon’s model, individuals may act in 
line with beliefs that have been produced in their minds in perfectly sound ways but that, from the outside, 
appear to be mistaken. 
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3.2.1 BOUDON’S APPLICATION OF RAT TO EDUCATIONAL CHOICES 
With Boudon’s work from 1974 the terms of primary and secondary effects of social 
stratification became prominent (see also Girard and Bastide 1963). They are based on the 
idea that a “two-component process” generates inequality of educational opportunity (or 
social class differentials in educational attainment). The first component – the primary effects 
– consists in the relationship between social class and school achievement; the other 
component – the secondary effects – is the impact of social class on educational choices, even 
when school performance (and other factors) are held constant (Boudon 1974: 37).   
Boudon’s differentiation between the primary and secondary effects and his theoretical 
proposition for the explanation of the secondary effects follow from his review of different 
micro-sociological approaches to the intergenerational reproduction of educational inequality. 
He rejects the “value theory” (Hyman 1953), which explains that students from different 
social background vary with regard to their educational and occupational aspirations because 
social class shapes what young people perceive as social achievement (for instance, a job that 
suits one’s personal interests as opposed to a well-paid and secure position). But he adopts the 
work by Keller and Zavalloni (1964) who argue that aspiration is a function of student’s 
social origin, meaning that students from lower class who want to attain high educational and 
occupational levels have to “travel a longer social distance” (Boudon 1974: 23). From this 
notion, Boudon implies that “reaching a given educational level or a given status means being 
exposed to costs and benefits that are going to differ according to social background” 
(Boudon 1974: 23). Further, he addresses “cultural theory” which became prominent in the 
1960s. This theory embraces the assumptions and findings of authors such as Coleman 
(1966), Jencks (1972) or Bernstein (1961) and the controversial above presented theory of 
Bourdieu and Passeron (1964, 1970). The “cultural theory” emphasize that skills and values 
that help children in school are unequally taught in families from different social classes and 
that the school system is not able to fulfill its function of compensating for these social 
inequalities in cultural resources. Boudon concludes that “neither the value theory nor the 
cultural theory gives a complete picture of the effects of social stratification” (1974: 24), but 
proposes that social differences in “cultural background”, i.e. the core argument of “cultural 
theory”, explain the primary effects (see also Erikson and Jonsson 1996; Van de Werfhorst 
and Hofstede 2007). 
Boudon’s separation of primary and secondary effects of social stratification is based on 
ideas of Keller and Zavalloni (1964; Boudon 1974: 29-31). In order to explain the secondary 
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effects, Boudon postulates that families from higher social classes attach higher benefits to the 
track that supposedly leads to higher social class positions. Besides, families associate 
monetary and social costs with the different educational tracks and their capacities to account 
for these costs depend on their social class. “Social costs” include psychological and socio-
psychological consequences of social mobility. These imply, for instance, that students from 
higher social class suffer from not attending a higher school track because most of the 
student’s friends do; by the same token, attending that higher track is costly for a working-
class student because none of his friends does so. Since families’ financial resources vary by 
social class, also differing monetary costs drive social class effects on families’ choices. 
Finally, the utility of choosing one track (rather than another) increases when the perceived 
costs that are attached to it decrease and the corresponding benefits increase. As a 
consequence of the association between social class and these costs and benefits, choosing 
one track rather than another is a function of family’s social class.  
3.2.2 THE ERIKSON AND JONSSON-MODEL 
Following Boudon (1974), Erikson and Jonsson (1996) differentiate between primary 
and secondary effects. However, as opposed to Boudon, they do not use this distinction to 
explain social inequalities in education, but as a “strategy of analyzing” them (Erikson and 
Jonsson 1996). Their seminal work from 1996 has the aim of finding out why the 
development of educational inequality is different in Sweden as opposed to most other 
European countries.35 They provide assumptions and empirical results on general mechanisms 
that cause social class differentials in educational outcomes. They advance five explanations 
for the association between social class and “academic ability and performance”, i.e. the 
primary effects (Erikson and Jonsson 1996: 10). First, genetic factors account for a part of this 
association. However, relying on own empirical results, they emphasize that this part must be 
relatively small and hence that other factors must play a more important role. Second, they 
advance a “socialization-argument”: social class is related to academic ability because 
children’s home environment (in terms of parent-child interactions) has a considerable impact 
on their development. Third, they point at the distinction between “academic ability” and 
“school performance”, which is ignored in Boudon’s general theory: Social class differentials 
in children’s school performance (as opposed to their academic ability) may be reinforced by 
                                                 
35 The well-known work by Blossfeld and Shavit (1993) showed that social inequality in educational attainment 
has persisted in most economically advanced countries except Sweden. Today, the state of research is that social 
inequality in educational attainment has decreased also in most other of these countries (Breen, Luijkx, Müller 
and Pollak 2009). 
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middle-class biases in teachers’ subjective evaluations of their students’ achievement. They 
do not suppose that teachers consciously discriminate against lower class children, but they 
expect that “teachers also tend to reward proper behaviors and adjustment to the ‘cultural 
values’ prevailing in school” (Erikson and Jonsson 1996: 11). Hence, when social class 
differentials in subjective achievement measures – e.g. marks – instead of objective measures 
– e.g. scores in standardized ability tests – are considered, the primary effects can be 
reinforced through teachers’ grading behavior. Finally, they propose that, fourth, health and 
nutrition, and fifths, number of siblings contribute to the association between social class and 
academic ability. However, they object that thanks to improved general living conditions, 
health and nutrition may play a minor role today.  
Erikson and Jonsson conclude that international differences in these five factors are not 
large enough to explain why educational inequality varies over countries. Hence, they move 
further and attempt to explain social class differentials in educational choices. In keeping with 
Boudon (and Becker 1993 [1964], they say), they generally assume that students and their 
parents rationally consider costs and benefits they associate with alternative educational 
courses. With regard to the benefits, students and their parents make rough estimates of the 
income and other working conditions of positions and occupations the different educational 
tracks supposedly will lead to. As opposed to the assumptions of economic theory, individuals 
are not capable of taking into account “lifetime earnings”. Further, individuals consider the 
benefit of following the chosen educational track itself (e.g. joy of general learning, meeting 
peers with the same attitudes and interests). As to the costs, Erikson and Jonsson suggest that 
these include monetary charges but psychological burdens as well. They denote the benefits 
with B and the costs with C. Moreover, they introduce the parameter P, which represents the 
probability that the student successfully completes the chosen educational course (“likelihood 
of success”). The estimated utility of a certain course is then U=PB-C (Erikson and Jonsson 
1996: 14). Students and their parents roughly estimate the utility of every alternative they 
have, rank these utilities and choose the alternative that promises the highest utility.  
In a next step, Erikson and Jonsson outline whether and how social class differences in 
economic, cultural and social resources as well as aspirations may cause social class 
differentials in educational choices. That is to say, they define the “bridging hypotheses”. Due 
to the costs of schooling, families’ economic background has an effect on the child’s 
likelihood of transition to different educational tracks (Erikson and Jonsson 1996: 17-22). 
Family’s economic circumstances contribute to the generation of social class differentials in 
their decisions via two mechanisms: First, since families from higher social classes tend to be 
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better equipped than families of lower social status, they can more easily bear the costs of 
schooling. Second, variations and interruptions of parents’ earnings (e.g. because of periods 
of unemployment) or their sensation of an increased risk of job loss have a negative influence 
on their evaluation of their economic possibilities, too. Relying on empirical results, the 
authors conclude that economic background is not a major factor driving the social class 
effect on educational decisions.  
With regard to the role of cultural and educational resources in educational decision-
making, they suggest that social class differences in culture and life-styles have an impact on 
students’ evaluation of the benefits of different educational courses. They posit that “[…] 
higher classes reap more benefits from higher education because the consumption value of 
such education is high for them – in short, they like being in school better” (Erikson and 
Jonsson 1996: 22). This argument, they say, is based upon a weaker interpretation of the strict 
conflict-theoretical ideas of Bourdieu (1977) and on literature dealing with “status cultures” 
(Bourdieu 1979; Collins 1971). Moreover, they emphasize the impact of social class 
differences in families’ knowledge about the school system. Since parents from higher social 
classes have higher educational degrees, they know for instance which school tracks lead to 
prestigious, well-paid and secure occupations and positions or which choices constraint the 
subsequent attendance of other educational courses. Higher-class families have also more 
informal but highly relevant knowledge such as “that you do not have to be particularly clever 
to succeed at university” (Erikson and Jonsson 1996: 23). This type of cultural resources 
enables families of higher social status to give accurate advices to their children on crucial 
decisions along their educational career. Further, they address empirical literature on trends in 
educational inequality and infer that – in strong opposition to the arguments of Bourdieu – 
class differences in cultural resources in terms of “status culture” are not the reason why in 
some industrial countries inequality has persisted and in others, such as Sweden, it has 
decreased. They rather believe that social class variations regarding the (informal) knowledge 
about the school system have become increasingly important and can, due to the varying 
complexity of educational systems, account for international differences in the development 
of educational inequality. 
Erikson and Jonsson (1996: 27-30) propose that, apart from social class differences in 
economic, cultural and educational resources, social origin effects on educational choices are 
generated by social class differentials in educational and occupational aspirations. In 
accordance with Keller and Zavalloni (1964) and Boudon (1974), the benefit a student 
attaches to a certain educational track depends on whether the track will lead to the degree or 
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occupation that corresponds to his parents’ social status. Therefore, regardless of their social 
background, students may have the same (relative) level of aspiration, but as they start from 
different original status levels, they have to aspire after different levels of education or 
occupation. Students of higher social background aspire after higher educational attainment 
because if they do not reach these higher educational levels, they risk status decline; if 
students from lower class attain the same educational level, they socially move upward.36 
As to the process through which the unequal distribution of social resources causes 
social class differentials in educational choices, Erikson and Jonsson (1996) argue again that 
more educated parents possess more and better understand relevant information on the 
educational system and can help their children take the “right choice”. In addition, this 
knowledge is further spread among children’s friends and hence parents’ educational 
resources “are diffused within the social circles the children belong to” (Erikson and Jonsson 
1996: 30). Moreover, social resources may influence the perception of the benefits. Students 
may want to attend the same track as their friends and may adopt the same higher aspirations 
as they have. Third, regarding especially the choice of elite schools, families reinforce each 
other’s consideration of benefits such as prestigious occupations that can be acquired through 
attending a specific school or track. They conclude that social resources – like educational 
and cultural resources – supposedly vary little among countries and therefore cannot be 
valued as an explanatory factor for international inequality differences. Consequently, they 
look for explanations on the institutional level of educational systems.37 
Institutional factors  
Erikson and Jonsson (1996: 33-43) identify five institutional factors that should be 
considered when (cross-country differences in) transition rates from one educational level to 
the next are investigated. First, the length of different educational courses is important. When 
various educational tracks a student can choose have the same lengths, the choice of the 
                                                 
36 As will appear in the following section on the theoretical model by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997; Goldthorpe 
1996b), this mechanism of social class differences in aspirations corresponds to the well-known “relative-risk-
aversion”-hypothesis. This assumption – roughly formulated – postulates that all students and parents want to 
maintain their family’s social status and as higher educational tracks lead to occupations of higher status, 
students from higher classes have to complete higher educational tracks than students from lower classes.  
37 Additionally, Erikson and Jonsson (1996) propose that work-related class differences and contextual effects 
play a role in the generation of social class effects on educational choices. Due to weak empirical evidence, 
however, they reject the assumption that parent’s working conditions influence children’s educational and 
occupational aspirations in such ways that the children wish to attain certain educational or occupational levels. 
They rather admit that parent’s working conditions influence the children’s wish to do a certain type of school, 
study or job. With regard to the contextual effects, they suggest that the social context in school and 
neighborhoods influences students’ probabilities of attending certain tracks, but that social class effects and 
contextual effects interact in ways that off-set each other. 
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student will hardly be affected by the costs of schooling since the costs will not differ between 
the tracks. Second, reforms that aimed at “removing barriers (or increasing opportunities)” 
have to be considered. For instance, Sweden owes its reduction of educational inequality to 
the comprehensive school reform in the 1950s that postponed the first crucial educational 
decision point.38 Another removing of barriers is the “elimination of dead ends” (Erikson and 
Jonsson 1996: 36): Inequality can be reduced if students have the chance to correct previous 
decisions by changing tracks at later times, for instance. The third factor is the “size of the 
educational system”. Addressing this factor means questioning whether a specific country has 
undergone an educational expansion and, consequently, an increase of the relative number of 
students in higher education has occurred.39  
In view of the research topic of this thesis, the fourth factor is especially interesting: the 
principles on which the transition from one level of the educational system to another is based. 
More specifically, one has to consider whether the choice of subsequent educational pathway 
corresponds to a meritocratic selection (e.g. through standardized tests) or a subjective choice 
(e.g. when parents have the freedom of choice). They emphasize the special case of England 
where inequality of educational opportunity is relatively low although income inequality is 
relatively high, job security is not the best and selection of students into different educational 
tracks happens at early age. Despite these circumstances predict a relatively high impact of 
social class on educational attainment, social class differentials in transition rates are low 
because, as claimed by Erikson and Jonsson (1996), these are based on shown performance of 
the student rather than on their parents’ wishes. Further, they argue, if fifty percent of the 
association between social class and educational attainment are due to choice, replacing 
choice by actual performance can have a considerable reducing effect on that association. 
However, they see some possible risks coming with meritocratic decisions, too. Even when 
                                                 
38  According to Erikson and Jonsson (1996), the time point of tracking considerably affects social class 
differences in educational choices through three mechanisms: First, since it may be relatively difficult to assess a 
child’s chances of success (P) when the child is young, higher class parents will be more optimistic in estimating 
these chances because they think that they are more confident that they will be able to help their child or because 
they simply believe that high educated parents have bright children. Second, in line with the argument on class 
differences in aspirations, since the risk of social demotion is greater the earlier a student drops out of school, 
parents from higher social classes will place even more value on their child’s attending a higher track  (or not 
leaving school). Third, the time point of tracking may influence family’s decision-making through the cost-
parameter: on early decisions regarding tracks that imply long and, thus, costly educational careers, social class 
has a stronger effect (than on later decisions where the various educational courses appear shorter). 
39  They suggest that educational expansion can be successful if it is caused through postponing the first 
important point of (self-) selection, lowering requirements of access (e.g. required scores on standardized tests, 
numerus clausus), study grants for students of low economic background were introduced or expanded, and 
fourth, when expansion leads to a ceiling effect in the sense that almost hundred per cent of students from the 
higher classes are attending a higher school track and, hence, when student from lower classes follow, social 
inequality in the attendance of that higher track will be reduced. 
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the transition is based on performance, not continuing school remains a free choice. Hence, if 
the costs of further education appear high to a family, they can still deliberately let their child 
drop out through failure in the tests. Therefore, meritocratic selection should happen at early 
transitions where school continuation seems not as costly. This feature of educational systems 
– the processes of selection at crucial transition points – is the core of the research questions 
of this dissertation. However, while Erikson and Jonsson concentrate on the differentiation 
between selection based on a family’s choice and on actual performance, I investigate the 
consequences of a third way of selection, namely selection based on teacher (and headmaster) 
choice. 
Finally, as a fifths institutional factor that has to be considered when analyzing social 
inequality in educational transitions, Erikson and Jonsson (1996: 42-43) propose “elite 
institutions and private schools”. Elite schools may drive social class differentials in 
educational choices because they are associated with high costs and benefits and possibly 
with higher chances of success because of low teacher-student-ratios. Additionally, direct 
costs may be reduced through student grants but still the “life-style” in the social circles may 
be costly. In sum, high rates of elite and private schools may discourage children from lower 
classes. 
In respect to the research question of this dissertation, Erikson and Jonsson’s model 
qualifies for a basic theory on families’ decision-making and provides an idea that has the 
same “cultural theory”-roots as the suggestion by Lareau and Weininger (2003): They argue 
that cross-country differences in social inequality in education could partly be explained 
through differences in the complexity of educational systems because more complex systems 
require knowledge of the educational system. Since parents from higher social classes are 
more likely to have such knowledge, they know for instance which school tracks have “dead 
ends”. Even though this thesis is not concerned with explaining cross-country differences, this 
argument hints at a mechanism that might contribute to social class effects on families’ school 
track requests within the institutionalized dialogue: for instance, if families from higher social 
classes are more likely than families from lower classes to know that they have the right to 
reject the staff meeting’s proposition and if families who know their right to reject are more 
likely to choose the general track even though the child has relatively poor marks, social 
classes effects on families’ requests are reinforced through social class differences in families’ 
knowledge of the educational system. However, as the French government incites 
headmasters and teachers to inform families about the full details of the dialogue, it seems 
quite improbable that families do not know their rejection right. Still, the French educational 
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system is complex enough to assume that particularly informal knowledge of the educational 
system – e.g. which schools have a “favorable” social composition – is important (Duru-
Bellat 1996; Karsten, Visscher and De Jong 2001). 
Moreover, they draw attention to some general institutional aspects that may also affect 
social inequality in secondary education in France (as compared to other countries). Even 
though these arguments do not directly refer to the research question of this thesis, they 
should be mentioned: On the one hand, the prevalence of private schools possibly increases 
social class effects on the transition from lower to upper secondary education because higher-
class families enroll their children in private schools to improve their performance and 
therefore increase their chances to get access to the general upper secondary track (e.g. Caille 
2004). On the other hand, reforms that have removed “dead ends” and strongly increased the 
rates of students in higher education supposedly have reduced social inequality in educational 
transitions (see Chapter 2, e.g. Brauns 1998; Ichou and Vallet 2011). 
Finally, reforms have modified the transition regulations and implemented the dialogue 
between family and school in order to reduce social inequality in the transition to upper 
secondary school. This institutional specificity of the French educational system completes 
Erikson and Jonsson’s list of selection regulations (i.e. “meritocratic” selection and “freedom 
of choice”) and provides the opportunity to gain new insights in institutional differences that 
may contribute to cross-country differences or trends in social class effects on educational 
attainment. 
3.2.3 THE BREEN AND GOLDTHORPE-MODEL 
Almost at the same time when Erikson and Jonsson developed their theory to explain 
the “Swedish exceptionalism”, John Goldthorpe advanced a resembling rational action theory 
to explain trends in educational inequality. He adopts a notion of rationality that is weak: 
actors have goals and “tend in some degree to assess the probable costs and benefits rather 
than, say, unthinkingly following social norms or giving unreflecting expression to cultural 
values” (Goldthorpe 1996b: 485). Besides, actors know – to some extent – about their 
situation and about their opportunities and constraints. All individuals have this knowledge 
and are perfectly aware of what they want and what they can, but they act rationally by 
tendency and especially given high numbers of individuals. They opt for specific courses of 
action depending on the resources that they hold and they adapt to the constraints and 
possibilities that provides their actual situation. Social class position is defined by 
employment status and the regulation of employment, which means the distinction between 
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employees that work under a “labor contract” and in a “service relationship” (Goldthorpe 
1996b: 487). Importantly, classes are not characterized by class cultures, values, norms or 
“forms of consciousness”.40 
Like the Erikson and Jonsson-model, the model by Goldthorpe (1996b) and Breen and 
Goldthorpe (1997) is based on Boudon’s distinction of primary and secondary effects (1974) 
and Keller and Zavallonis’ theory of aspirations (1964) or “positional theory”. It focuses on 
the secondary effects in order to explain why families actually do not exploit the opportunities 
that have become more equal thanks to increased rates of educational participation and 
reforms. His initially formulated explanation for this phenomenon is  
“Class differentials in educational attainment have persisted because, even though with 
educational expansion and reform, the general balance of costs and benefits associated with more 
ambitious options has steadily changed so as to encourage their take-up, little concurrent change 
has occurred in the relativities between class-specific balances: that is, between such cost-benefit 
balances as they are on average assessed from the standpoints represented by different classes of 
origin. What needs then further to be shown – or at all events hypothesized – is why, in this latter 
respect, such stability should have prevailed” (Goldthorpe 1996b: 492). 
Together with Breen, Goldthorpe refined this theory and expressed it in a formal model 
(Breen and Goldthorpe 1997). This model aims, again, at explaining the rise in educational 
participation, the relatively low change of social class differentials in educational attainment 
despite the expansion and the quick and sharp decrease of gender differences in educational 
attainment. The recent finding that actually social inequality in education has not persisted 
does in no means devaluate the theory. It still is “ultimately” a model of educational choice, 
although it has been developed to explain trends in social inequality in education (see e.g. 
Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish 2010) 
The model starts from the assumption that a student can choose between leaving or 
staying in education. If the student stays, he has to take an examination at the end of the 
educational track he is attending and he can pass or fail this examination. The student and his 
family base their decision to stay or to leave on the evaluation of three factors: The likelihood 
of succeeding in education, i.e. passing the examination, direct and indirect costs of staying in 
school (e.g. tuition fees, forgone earnings) and the value of utility that the student and her 
parents associated with the three possible outcomes “leave”, “pass” and “fail” (Breen and 
                                                 
40 The definition of social class according to Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) will be outlined in subchapter 7.3 
along with the presentation of the variables used in this dissertation’s empirical analysis. 
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Goldthorpe 1997: 279, 281). Regarding the costs, these are greater than zero if the student 
stays in education and equal zero if she leaves. The utility of the three outcomes depends on 
their probabilities to lead to one of three social classes, which can be arranged in a 
hierarchical order: (i) the service class being the highest class, (ii) the working class as 
intermediate class and (iii) the underclass representing the lowest class. The likelihood of 
entering the service class is higher if the student stays in education and successfully passes the 
examination than if he fails or leaves school (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997: 282). Continuing 
education but failing at the exam increases the probability of ending up in the underclass; 
hence, staying in school is risky. Those who leave education are more likely to enter the 
working class than to enter the service class and the same is for students who have stayed in 
school but failed. Still, for those who remained in school but failed the odds of entering the 
working class instead of the service class may be smaller. Finally, staying in education and 
succeeding with the exam increases the chance of entering the service class instead of the 
working class. 
Further, the three classes differ with regard to their average ability and the resources 
which they hold and which they can make use of the account for the costs of education (Breen 
and Goldthorpe 1997: 283-287).41 Three mechanisms generate social class differentials in 
families’ decision to remain in school instead of leaving it: The first mechanism is the well-
known assumption termed “relative risk aversion”: Families from the service class and 
families from the working class, to the same degree, aspire to maintain the social status of the 
family. That is to say, all families want the child to attain at least the same social class 
position as the family has (through parents’ occupation) because they seek to avoid downward 
social mobility. For families from the underclass the relative risk aversion is zero since it is 
the lowest class and they cannot move downward any further. It is important to stress that 
every class has the same level of this aspiration or, in other words, that all families put the 
same value on maintaining their social status. Breen and Goldthorpe give a lot of weight to 
this mechanism of relative risk aversion and assume that the other two mechanisms – social 
class differences in average ability and level of resources to account for the costs of education 
– reinforce its impact. The relative risk aversion mechanism is in direct line with the 
“positional theory” of Keller and Zavalloni (1964). As indicated before, the second 
mechanism operates through social class differences in academic abilities. It corresponds to 
                                                 
41 They further assume a normal distribution of the ability in every class and that the average ability is higher in 
the service class than in the working class. Moreover, they suggest that the resources have a logistic distribution 
and that the mean level of resources is higher in the service class than in the working class. 
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the primary effects of social stratification (Boudon 1974) and influences families’ decision-
making through the “likelihood of success”-parameter. The better the academic performance 
of a student the more probable it seems that the student will pass the examination. Since 
academic performance varies by social class, social classes differ regarding their average 
evaluation of their children’s likelihood of success. The likelihood of success is higher on 
average in the service class than in the working class. The third mechanism operates through 
the association between social class and level of resources to account for the costs of 
education. Since families from the service class are better equipped than families from the 
middle class, they are more likely to decide to let their child stay in education instead of leave 
school.  
After the presentation of their basic decision-making model, Breen and Goldthorpe 
(1997) address the fact that, in reality, more than one crucial decision has to be made along an 
educational career until the diploma is attained that provides access to a specific social class. 
Therefore, actual choices may be made in the light of subsequent choices. For instance, given 
entering university is only allowed to students who successfully completed secondary 
education, a student may decide to stay in secondary education because he wants to gain 
access to university. Assuming such sequence of decisions, the theoretical model to explain 
the first choice must be based on “backward induction”, i.e. starting with the explanation of 
the final decision in order to explain the previous decision. Applying this strategy to the 
before mentioned example, one would start with the analysis of social class effects on 
families’ decision to send their child to university (instead of not sending the child there) and 
would, subsequently, analyze families’ decision to let their child continue secondary 
education (instead of quitting it). A family’s subjective assessment of the child’s chances of 
successfully completing university influences their decision on whether to let the child carry 
on with secondary school. This implies that, holding constant academic ability and resources 
to account for the costs of education, actual choices will be influenced by expectations about 
choices at higher levels of the educational career. Moreover, social class differences will be 
lower in choices at higher levels than at lower levels because the difference in abilities will 
have been reduced and because the risk of downward social mobility will be lower or even 
zero. I suggest that the same could be assumed for a sequence of subsequent decisions at one 
transition such as families’ and teachers’ choices within the dialogue at the transition to upper 
secondary education in France. 
Even though this dissertation is not concerned with the explanation of more than one 
transition along students’ educational careers, it analyses subsequent choices that may affect 
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each other. Breen and Goldthorpe’s (1997) assumption that actors take into account future 
choices could be applied to families’ decision-making within the dialogue. Families make 
school track requests prior to staff meetings’ school track propositions and prior to their 
decision to reject these propositions. Following the “backward induction”-argument, families’ 
future decision to reject and attend the talk with the headmasters may influence their actual 
school track request. More specifically, families may take more “risky” school track requests 
(i.e. general track requests even though the student has poor marks and the likelihood is high 
that the staff meeting does not accept this request) if they think that they have good chances to 
persuade the headmaster in the talk. Hence, their evaluation of their decision to reject might 
influence their request.  
3.2.4 VARIATIONS OF RATIONAL ACTION APPROACHES TO EDUCATIONAL DECISION-
MAKING 
This subchapter summarizes differences between Boudon’s theory, the Erikson and 
Jonsson-model (E&J-model) and the Breen and Goldthorpe-model (B&G-model). Moreover, 
it presents core arguments of other RAT-approaches to educational decision-making in order 
to evaluate whether and how important former RAT-applications and more recent ones adress 
the impact of the institutional context on families’ decision-making.  
Differences 
The core similarities between the presented theories of Boudon (1974), Erikson and 
Jonsson (1996) and Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) are: the aim to explain (trends in) social 
inequality in education, the RAT-foundation, the conceptualization of primary and secondary 
effects, the adaption of Keller and Zavalloni’s (1964) “social position”-argument and the 
definition of the three mechanisms social class differences in performance, social class 
differences in economic resources and social class differences in the “need” to attain a certain 
educational level to maintain the family’s social status. Although the theories are very similar, 
they differ in some respects. Notably, they vary with regard to the emphasis they put on the 
different parameters (e.g. Kristen 1999: 36). The E&J-model does not emphasize risk 
aversion (Erikson and Jonsson 1996: 15), while in the B&G-model relative risk aversion is 
the core mechanism driving the reproduction of educational inequality and causing its 
persistence over time (Holm and Jaeger 2008; Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede 2007). As 
Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish (2010) put it, the relative risk aversion mechanism is the 
“centerpiece” of the B&G-model. Another difference between the E&J-model and the B&G-
model is that the former more emphasizes the primary effects and outlines mechanisms 
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behind them. Moreover, Erikson and Jonsson advance the role of the institutional context and 
do not expect that any component of the decision-making model is most relevant. They rather 
leave open to further research to find out which of the determinants is most relevant (Becker 
2000; Kristen 1999). 
Moreover, Boudon assumes that the secondary and not the primary effects become 
increasingly important at higher stages of educational careers. However, this assumption 
could not be supported by empirical evidence (e.g. Halsey, Heath and Ridge 1980: 128-133) 
and Breen and Goldthorpe propose the opposite. They assume that social class differences are 
generally lower in later educational transitions and the secondary effects are smaller because 
families can loose less because they have already attained a certain educational level. 
However, with regard to the trends in secondary effects over time, Goldthorpe (1996b) argues 
that the secondary effects become increasingly important as educational expansion develops. 
This is where he sees the advantage of Boudon’s differentiation between primary and 
secondary effects. 
The three theories clearly vary with regard to their use of “cultural arguments”, i.e. 
arguments that are more or less directly related to the theories by Bourdieu and other 
proponents of the idea that classes differ with regard to their norms, values and life-styles. 
Generally, Boudon, Erikson and Jonsson apply such arguments while Breen and Goldthorpe 
strictly refrain from it. For instance, Boudon (1974: 30) argues that higher education has 
become a social norm that students feel they should follow because their families and peers 
did so and put pressure on them. However, Goldthorpe rejects this argument as it concerns 
only little groups and milieus and hence has not the power to explain “regularities as 
extensive, temporally and spatially, as those here in question” (Goldthorpe 1996b: 494). 
Breen and Goldthorpe (1997: 283) do not assume any “class-specific cultural values or social 
norms nor any class differences” in the subjective evaluation of the probabilities of entering a 
specific social class with specific educational degrees. Erikson and Jonsson emphasize the 
difference between “academic ability” and “school performance” and advance arguments that 
could have been derived from Bourdieu’s conflict-theoretical ideas. They argue that teacher 
evaluations of students may be affected by middle-class biases and, even though the teachers 
do not consciously discriminate against children with lower class origin, teachers may reward 
students’ abilities and behaviors that meet schools’ “cultural values” (Erikson and Jonsson 
1996: 11-12). 
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Another difference refers to the role that social costs play in student’s decision-making. 
While Boudon, Erikson and Jonsson assume that students’ educational choices may be 
influenced by the decisions of their peers, Breen and Goldthorpe explicitly reject this 
assumption. Again, they do so since they do not believe that this minor “cost-parameter” 
could explain the “major” persistence of the association between social class and education 
although educational expansion has happened (Goldthorpe 1996b: 495).  
At least the difference regarding cultural arguments and social costs seem of minor 
relevance in view of this dissertation’s research question as they concentrate on trends in 
social class differences in educational attainment while this dissertation investigates the 
generation of social class differences in educational choices at one time point. 
Human capital theory 
All three models do not only focus on monetary costs and returns but integrate 
“sociological” components such as the status-maintenance aspiration. By contrast, human 
capital theory, which represents a classical economic approach to educational decision-
making, focuses on monetary components. Human capital theory is highly relevant 
advancements of neoclassical labor economics and was mainly introduced by Gary Becker’s 
(1993 [1964]) work.  
According to neoclassical economists, the wage an employee receives for her work is 
determined by labor supply and demand (Sesselmeier and Blauermel 1997). To achieve the 
state of equilibrium between labor and supply, several preconditions such as perfect 
competition on the labor market, perfectly mobile workers, and perfect and symmetric 
information about wage offers and wage demands must be fulfilled.42 Another premise is that 
employees are perfectly homogeneous meaning that all workers are equally productive and 
hence they are replaceable. Since the marginal productivity determines wages, all employees 
are paid the same wages and hence a persons’ educational attainment does not affect her 
returns on the labor market.  
Human capital theory gives up the strict premise of perfectly homogeneous workers 
(Becker 1964). Instead, it adopts the assumption that the productivity of workers depends on 
their human capital endowment. In order to increase their productivity and, as a consequence, 
to achieve higher wages, individuals invest in human capital (i.e. knowledge and skills). 
Individuals invest in education and training whereby they take into account “investment 
                                                 
42 For an outline of all preconditions and the theory in general see Sesselmeier and Blauermel 1997 or Hinz and 
Abraham 2005. 
 
71
costs” such as direct training costs (e.g. tuition fees, time, intellectual efforts) and opportunity 
costs that emerge because of foregone earnings and leisure time, for instance (Sesselmeier and 
Blauermel 1997: 66). Individuals’ decisions on how long to stay in education are based on a 
comparison of discounted expected returns and opportunity costs of different educational 
choices (Davies, Heinesen and Holm 2002). Returns mainly include expected lifetime 
earnings. Opportunity costs consist of foregone earnings and possible direct costs are, e.g., 
tuition fees. In economic terms, individuals do not cease investing until the marginal costs of 
the investment exceed the benefit of the marginal returns to the human capital. In analogy to 
monetary capital, human capital can amortize since knowledge can become obsolete (Hinz 
and Abraham 2005: 33). 
Individuals may also consider social status and occupational prestige as returns to 
investment in education (Maaz et al. 2006). Moreover, human capital theory yields 
assumptions on the impact of social origin. Simply, due to the costs of investment, individuals 
with more economic resources, i.e. students with a higher social background, are more able to 
account for the cost of investment. Davies, Heinsen and Holm (2002) confront a hypothesis 
derived from the model by Breen and Goldthorpe with one derived from human capital 
theory: While the sociological model suggests that the function of the benefits of education 
and parents’ education has a “kink” or discontinuity at the point where the child reaches the 
educational level of the parents (prior to the point, the slope sharply increases; beyond, it 
remains constant), human capital theory yields that there should be no kink and that the effect 
of parent’s education should vanish when income (and ability) are controlled. 
Preferences 
Like human capital theory, the seminal approach by Gambetta (1987) is based on 
rational action theory. Moreover, the core of Gambetta’s model takes an economic 
perspective as it assumes that students evaluate their ability and possible labor market returns 
in order to assess which available choice will maximize their labor market or, simply, material 
benefits. Individuals evaluate the three elements rationally, but on the basis of personal 
preferences. Hence, Gambetta’s theory contains – other than human capital theory – 
assumptions dealing with unconscious and intentional mechanisms.  
He assumes that aside from economic constraints, institutional and cultural constraints 
have an impact on educational choices. Institutional constrains are, for instance, the number 
and length of alternative educational tracks, selection procedures and public programs to 
support students of disadvantaged backgrounds. Gambetta (1987: 169) posits that 
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“educational institutions shape the set of feasible options for everyone, irrespective of their 
social background” and they therefore do not generate social class differences in educational 
behavior. However, he maintains, institutions indirectly contribute to the generation of social 
class differences when they do not provide economic support for disadvantage students. 
Therefore, Gambetta argues that an institutional context that is formally accessible for 
students from all social classes but that requires unequally distributed resources such as 
economic capital promotes the generation of social inequality. When addressing cultural 
constraints, Gambetta makes use of the term “cultural capital” but without referring to 
Bourdieu. He argues that this type of constraint has considerably less impact on educational 
choices than economic constraints.  
As compared to Boudon’s theory, he emphasize that his model integrates the effects of 
cultural resources. Boudon would explain a net effect of social class on educational choice 
(i.e. a social class effect that remains when economic and cultural constraints as well as 
ability and expected labor market returns are taken into account) by means of the “social 
position”-argument by Keller and Zavalloni (1964). However, Gambetta assumes that class 
differences in individuals’ preferences cause this remaining social class effect: For instance, 
students with parents who are very highly or very poorly educated take less into account labor 
market returns and among working-class students those with higher educated parents are more 
likely to go to university as compared to those with lower educated parents. From these 
findings Gambetta concludes that cultural resources rather influence the formation of 
preferences than that of learning ability. 
More recent approaches 
In a relatively recent study, Becker (2000) extends the rational action approach by Esser 
(1999b).43 Esser’s approach is a variation of the RAT-models of Breen and Goldthorpe and 
Erikson and Jonsson that puts considerable emphasis on families’ evaluation of costs and 
expectations regarding status decline. Becker argues that Esser’s model ignores the micro-
macro-link, i.e. the association between educational decisions of individual families and 
transition rates of students. He claims that the aggregation of many individual decisions does 
not fully account for the transition rates in the German educational system because teacher 
recommendations influence these transitions. Therefore, the models cannot claim to fully 
explain the macro-patterns in transition rates. Becker suggests splitting families’ decision-
                                                 
43 Esser’s approach will be presented in detail in Chapter 5 as it is the basis of the model I develop to explain 
families’ decision-making within the dialogue. 
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making process into two “sub-processes”: the first process consists of families’ making of 
their educational intentions and the second process includes the selection through the school 
system, negotiations of parents with the schools and institutional regulations. As a 
consequence, he maintains, parents’ educational intentions do not correspond to their actual 
decisions anymore. This is because parents may take teacher recommendations into account 
and differ in terms of their believe that they have power over the final transition decision. 
Moreover, they may differ in their abilities to carry through their will against the educational 
institution. He concludes that only when parents’ will is not “restricted” by institutional 
regulations, educational intentions will correspond to the actual decisions. 
Becker’s approach is an important attempt to integrate an institutional component into a 
theory on families’ decision-making. Similarly, I will differentiate families’ decision-making 
into two stages: first, a family’s independent decision, i.e. how a family would decide if there 
was no dialogue and in particular if there was no subsequent school track proposition by the 
staff meeting; second, a family’s actual school track request. The actual school track request 
is affected by the institutional setting. The drawback of Becker’s extension is that it does not 
elaborate the micro-mechanisms that cause the differences between families’ educational 
intentions and their actual decisions. That is to say, he does not explain how families’ actual 
decisions are affected by the teacher recommendations, by parents’ attempts to influence 
teachers and by their belief in their power to influence the actual transitions of their children. 
Moreover, he does not outline how social class differentials operate through these 
mechanisms. By contrast, my refinement of Esser’s model formulates such mechanisms and 
explicates how social class differences emerge through specific institutional aspects of the 
French institutionalized dialogue.    
Other RAT-approaches draw attention to the impact of institutional circumstances on 
families’ educational decisions, too, but they focus on other aspects. For instance, Hillmert 
and Jacob (2003) advance a model that addresses social class differentials in access to higher 
education and the impact of the set of available tracks. The model integrates a human-capital 
approach: it assumes that the benefits students assign to different educational pathways are 
determined by the labor market income they will earn after completion of the pathway. As 
they consider a decision that is made at a transition close to labor market entry, they argue, it 
makes sense to emphasize the impact of labor market returns. Their decision-making model 
includes two “individual parameters”: the subjective expectation of success and the “time 
horizon” which represents the time point up to when the expected income will be cumulated. 
Three “system parameters” include expected level of income, depending on the attained 
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qualification, the average duration of university studies and vocational training, and a general 
rate of discount to calculate the actual value of future income. According to the model, a 
student opts for one of the alternatives if the expected income, depending on individual 
likelihood of success and time horizon, is the highest of all alternatives. Social classes 
differentials arise because of two mechanisms: First, because classes differ with regard to 
their equipment with social and cultural resources and therefore differ in their evaluation of 
expectations of success; second, class-specific distribution of economic resources causes 
differing calculations of the time horizon.  
To assess the effect of varying sets of alternative educational tracks, Hillmert and Jacob 
apply their decision-making model to student’s choice within three different educational 
systems: First, a system providing the alternatives (i) university studies and (ii) entering the 
labor market; second, a system additionally proposing the alternative vocational training; 
third, a system giving also the possibility to combine university studies and vocational 
training by entering university after having completed vocational training. In a system with 
vocational training (as compared to a system without this alternative), students of lower social 
origin would rather enter vocational training than university because of their “shorter time 
horizon”. By contrast, in a system that additionally provides the opportunity to attend 
university after having completed vocational training, students whose expectations of success 
have increased through educational training will finally decide to attend university. However, 
students with relatively high chances of success but a low time horizon will decide against the 
combined pathway. In such an institutional context, students of lower social origin who could 
succeed in university will not attend it because their families have not enough economic 
resources. 
Pfeffer (2008) suggests a mechanism that explains why differences in the stratification 
of educational systems can explain cross-country differences in social inequality in 
educational attainment. He argues that highly stratified systems require families to have more 
knowledge of the educational system than systems with few educational tracks. As highly 
stratified systems are complex because there are many tracks with “dead-ends” students and 
parents must be well informed about which educational choices cannot be corrected later on. 
Since parents with higher educational attainments spent more time in the educational system, 
they are better equipped with such relevant knowledge and hence they can better help their 
children to take the “right decisions”. Even though Pfeffer (2008) does not provide a direct 
empirical test of this mechanism, he generally finds that social class differences on 
educational attainment are stronger in countries with highly stratified educational systems.  
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Pfeffer’s (2008) suggestion that social class differences in the knowledge on the 
educational system contribute to the generation of social class differences in school success is 
not new (see e.g. Erikson and Jonsson 1996). However, as opposed to other contributions he 
puts it forward as a central mechanism for the explanation of the impact of a specific 
institutional aspect (i.e. stratification of the school system). Knowledge of the educational 
system plays an important role in the explanation of social class differences in families’ 
capacities to meet schools’ standards (e.g. parental involvement), too. More specifically, 
knowledge of the educational system is a facet of “school relevant” cultural capital (Lamont 
and Lareau 1988; Lareau and Weininger 2003). Since I suggest that the institutionalized 
dialogue between family and school requires parents to be involved and to know how the 
dialogue functions, I will integrate a similar mechanism in the model on families’ decision-
making within the dialogue.  
The approaches by Becker (2000), Hillmert and Jacob (2003) and Pfeffer (2008) 
provide theoretical suggestions for the effect of specific institutional circumstances on 
families’ decisions. A theory by Morgan (2002) does not consider the institutional context but 
provides an argument that can contribute to understanding families’ educational behavior and 
generation of social class differences in their educational choices within the French 
institutionalize dialogue. Morgan (2002) follows RAT and argues that individuals act in their 
best interest, i.e. they try to “maximize their utility”. Relying on theories from social 
psychology, Morgan further proposes that students select a prefigurative commitment to a 
future action such as “enrolling in college after high school” and internalize this commitment 
until it becomes almost unconscious. The prefigurative commitment defines an individual’s 
preparatory commitment, i.e. everyday behavior that an individual undertakes to prepare for 
the prefigurative commitment. With regard to student’s educational decision-making, it is the 
student’s (and parents’) preparation for the enrollment in college and its successful 
completion.  
Morgan’s (2002) model yields the assumption that the better individuals are equipped 
with information that forms their beliefs on the probabilities of success and on attaining 
“payoffs” (which are not defined in more detail), the clearer is the selection of a prefigurative 
commitment, the more this is internalized and the more it affects an individual’s everyday 
behavior. One interesting potential Morgan sees in his model is that it allows the 
formalization and empirical evaluation of vague concepts such as those of Bourdieu. He 
argues that the model enables addressing Bourdieu’s claim that social class should be treated 
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at the aggregate level and that educational attainment is a function of an unconscious 
estimation of success chances (see also Subchapter 3.1.1).  
In view of the research topic of this thesis, Morgan’s (2002) approach is interesting 
because it draws attention to families’ preparatory behavior. Given an institutional setting 
such as the French dialogue between family and school, preparatory behavior can be supposed 
to play an important role: Since the staff meeting makes a school track proposition that is 
virtually binding, families have to find ways to influence that decision. Possibly, families will 
try to influence this decision by meeting the standards of the school. Again, as I will explicate 
in Chapter 5, I suggest that families believe that if they meet schools’ standards (e.g. by being 
involved), they get preferable treatment. According to Morgan’s theory, French parents whose 
prefigurative commitment is “my child will attend the upper secondary school general track” 
will early become involved (e.g. through PA-membership or as parent representative). This 
involvement is part of their preparatory commitment. 
3.3 Confrontation of the two approaches 
3.3.1 CRITICISM 
This chapter has presented the “cultural approach” to social class differences in 
educational attainment as mainly consisting of the theory of “social reproduction via cultural 
reproduction” by Bourdieu and Passeron and cultural capital literature that arose from it. To 
lead to the arguments on cultural capital in family-school interactions (Subchapter 3.1.3), I 
have presented criticism of cultural capital literature further above (Subchapter 3.1.2). By 
contrast, I outline the criticism of Bourdieu’s original theory (and of similar arguments 
referring to class-specific norms and values) at this point since these final sections have the 
goal to evaluate the “cultural approach” and the “RAT-approach”. 
It is argued that “cultural theories” – i.e. theories that, according to Goldthorpe, are 
based on the assumption that class is strongly associated with culture and that the culture of 
some classes positively influences school success – cannot provide a solid explanation for the 
temporal persistence of social class differentials in education (Goldthorpe 1996b; 2007a). 
This is because actual developments such as the educational expansion and “equalizing” 
reforms of the educational system give reason to expect that social class differentials in 
cultural resources were considerably reduced. The theory of Bourdieu and Passeron – which 
is called by Goldthorpe a “stronger” form of cultural theory – and “weaker” forms of it fail 
 
77
because of educational expansion.44 The fact that children from all social classes became more 
likely to achieve higher educational attainments discounts the main assumption of “cultural 
reproduction theory” that the school system deliberately excludes children from lower class 
(or makes them exclude themselves). Goldthorpe presents extensive results to show that 
Bourdieu’s arguments could not be supported empirically and even point in the opposite 
direction of what his theory would imply (2007a: 90-93, 99). For instance, Bourdieu argues 
that the school simply reproduces cultural capital meaning that children of favorable social 
classes “receive” cultural capital from their parents, cultivate it and are rewarded for it in 
school. But actually, empirical findings show that in school cultural resources are created, 
even for students of less favorable background (Goldthorpe 2007a refers to Halsey, Heath and 
Ridge 1980). Moreover, cultural theory yields the hypothesis that social class differentials in 
education have widened and this assumption neither was supported empirically (Goldthorpe 
1996b: 490; 2007a: 91).  
Erikson and Jonsson (1996: 31) more generally criticize normative explanations for 
social class differentials in educational choices. They argue:   
“[…] if educational choices were governed by (class-specific) norms, the dramatic 
expansion of higher education would not have occurred. Similarly, as mentioned above, if it were 
a norm for working-class children not to attain higher education, it is difficult to understand why 
they do in fact largely go on to higher educational if they perform well in school.”45   
Nash (2003) emphasizes that socialization processes have to be an important part of a 
comprehensive theory on social class differentials in educational attainment, but he rejects 
Bourdieu’s argument that all social class differences in “ability” are produced by the habitus 
(i.e. here, class specific interactions within the family) and are fixed before the child enters 
school. Empirical evidence suggests that other family resources than cultural capital and the 
school context play an important role in the generation of primary effects. In line with this 
point of criticism, Goldthorpe (2007a: 89) maintains that the concept of habitus implies an 
exaggerated perception of the importance of socialization within the family. 
Passionate opponents of Bourdieu as well as researchers who see potential in his work 
and adopt some of his ideas criticize that his theory lacks clarity and, partly as a consequence 
                                                 
44 The “stronger” version of the cultural approach is also represented by the work of Willis (1977) and Bowles 
and Gintis (1976). 
45 However, they object that social norms can have a strong impact in communities or circles of high social 
closure in which succeeding in school is of very high relevance (Boudon 1974; Coleman 1988). This could be, 
for instance, a group of parents who are friends and who are all involved in their children’s schooling (e.g. 
through organizing school events, being parent representatives). 
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of this, is difficult to apply. Bourdieu is accused to be not clear on the role of the state in 
social and cultural reproduction (Goldthorpe 2007a). Furthermore, it is argued that his class 
analysis is not systematic, not enough exact and, hence, slippery (Nash 2003; Savage, Warde 
and Devine 2005). With regard to the “micro-mechanisms”, which are particularly important 
in view of the research topic of this dissertation, the original theory is continuously criticized 
for being too vague about the concept of cultural capital, its transmission from parents to 
children and its translation into educational success (e.g. Becker 2010; Dumais 2002; Jaeger 
2009b; Lamont and Lareau 1988; Lareau and Weininger 2003; Sullivan 2001). As a 
consequence, cultural capital literature varies with regard to the operationalization of cultural 
capital and provides ambiguous results (see Subchapter 3.1.2 and, e.g., Dumais 2002; Sullivan 
2001). At the same time, the proponents of the concept and of the theory make use of the 
ambiguity of the arguments to confront critics with the accusal of misunderstandings and 
misrepresentations (Goldthorpe 2007a: 83). Indeed, for example, Nash (2003: 235) states that 
Goldthorpe’s critique of the socialization theory is “both redundant and misguided”. Finally, 
it is interesting to note that Bourdieu himself did not provide a convincing empirical test of 
his theory (Sullivan 2001).  
In respect to the rational action approach a lot of criticism refers to RAT in general. It is 
argued that RAT cannot be tested empirically and does not yield assumptions that concern 
“substantive fields of application” (Kroneberg and Kalter 2012). Moreover, RAT is criticized 
for not being comprehensive, i.e. being capable of fully explaining all social phenomena (e.g. 
Boudon 2003). This critique calls into question the core assumptions of RAT (e.g. the 
postulate termed “egoism” which assumes that the actor is mainly taking into account 
consequences that concern only her-self). One reason for this critique is that these 
assumptions could not be supported by empirical evidence (Kroneberg and Kalter 2012).46 
Critics of the RAT-approach to educational stratification do not acknowledge that it is 
capable of explaining trends of social class differences in education and that it yields 
hypotheses that are open to test (e.g. Nash 2003; Savage, Warde and Devine 2005; Scott 
1996). They generally call into question RAT as a foundation of an explanation of the 
secondary effects. They say it is not solid and, more specifically, they criticize the application 
of methodological individualism. Goldthorpe (1996b) proposes that one does not have to 
assume that all individuals act rationally and that it is sufficient to assume that rational action 
is a “common factor” influencing individuals’ behavior. Therefore, he maintains, when 
                                                 
46 This is the reason why “softer” RAT-versions were developed. 
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analyzing large groups of individuals, macro-sociological phenomena can be explained with 
RAT. The critics object that there is no empirical method that can identify this “common 
factor” and measure its influence on the generation of the macro-sociological phenomena in 
question (Nash 2003). The theory’s considerable limitations, it is argued, are due to its 
foundation on economic reductionism and methodological individualism (Savage, Warde and 
Devine 2005). Moreover, Goldthorpe’s approach to social class is rated as unprogressive for 
its “rather conventional emphasis on the division of labor […] without any real theoretical 
foundations for explaining how the division of labor comes to be the way it is” (Savage, 
Warde and Devine 2005: 39). 
Another point of criticism is Goldthorpe’s argument that social classes differ with 
regard to their values, norms and “forms of consciousness” and that, therefore, such social 
class differentials need not be integrated in the theoretical model (Nash 2003; Savage, Warde 
and Devine 2005). On Goldthorpe’s explanation that such discrepancies between classes 
might be difficult to validate empirically Nash replies that even if a theory that attempts to be 
realistic will be hard to test empirically, this is no reason for not developing it. Interpreting 
Goldthorpe’s argument alternatively, namely that there is no empirical evidence for normative 
class differentials, Nash objects that there is plenty of evidence showing such differences. 
Ditton and Krüsken (2009: 75-76) mention that it is questionable whether educational 
decisions are rational choices, i.e. whether they are “real calculations” or rather based on 
heuristics. Similarly, Nash (2003) argues that theories such as that of Boudon, meaning RAT 
in general, are not realistic and can be rejected since they assume that people can make cost-
benefit calculations when they actually are not able to (e.g. because of missing information). 
His core critique is that the RAT-approach lacks realism. As shown by empirical evidence, he 
claims, individuals sometimes act rationally, sometimes follow seemingly thoughtless the 
actions of their community and most often act in ways with reasons that are not identifiable 
(Nash 2003: 449). 47  Maaz et al. (2006) see as a disadvantage of RAT-approaches to 
educational decisions that they do not factor in personality traits of the decision-makers such 
                                                 
47 By contrast, Nash’s (2003) explanation for the secondary effects is based on class-specific norms and values: 
He claims that, given the same school performance level, students from the working-class and lower class are 
less likely to choose higher educational tracks than children from the service-class because they have other 
attitudes towards education, because they are more afraid of losing contact with their friends and because they 
feel more uncomfortable in the context of school and education in general. These attitudes and beliefs, Nash 
says, have been produced by the students contact with their family, teachers, peers and the wider society. 
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as their academic self-concepts and locus of control. Therefore, they would suggest an 
integration of psychological models and the rational action approaches. 
Pollak  (2009: 62-63) finds a weakness in the integration of the primary effects into the 
decision-making model that explains the secondary effects. Since the parameter p (likelihood 
of success) is supposed to be a function of student’s school performance, the primary effects 
seem to be an inherent part of the theoretical model that is developed to explain the secondary 
effects. More specifically, the multiplicative association between p and B (benefits) yields an 
interaction between the primary and secondary effects. This is why it is difficult to quantify 
the explanatory part of each of these two effects. Further, this quantification is difficult 
because the primary and secondary effects influence each other reciprocally: Since the school 
type a student attends has an impact on his school performance, the previous choice of that 
school type (secondary effect) influences the performance (primary effect).  
Another point of criticism is that the models do not capture teachers’ role in the 
generation of primary and secondary effects (Pollak 2009: 62-63). As will be outlined in the 
following chapter, it can be supposed that teachers – consciously or unconsciously – “bias” 
school performance evaluations and educational decisions in accordance with student social 
background. Consequently, they reinforce the primary effects (if teacher evaluations are used 
as indicators of school performance) and the secondary effects (if teacher evaluations are used 
to assess students’ chances of success). Further, if they make school track decisions – like in 
France – they directly generate the secondary effects. Erikson and Jonsson however have 
addressed this latter point: They mention that teachers’ subjective evaluations of students’ 
performance can capture a middle-class bias (Erikson and Jonsson 1996: 11-12).   
Finally, it is argued that the theory is wrong in assuming that educational decisions are 
spontaneously made or made at one point in time (Ditton and Krüsken 2009). As these 
decisions have extremely important consequences, it is maintained, students and their parents 
(and even the teachers) start making their decisions years before the actual transition. In fact, 
Goldthorpe and Breen (1997) do take account of this fact as they argue that later educational 
decisions, e.g. the choice to attend university, affect earlier choices, e.g. the choice to 
complete secondary education. Morgan’s (2002) approach takes into account families’ early 
decision-making as he proposes that families early form prefigurative commitments.  
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3.3.2 UTILITY AND INTEGRATION 
Proponents of the cultural approach and the rational action approach to social class 
differences in educational attainment emphasize several advantages of one approach over the 
other. However, some proponents of the one movement also recognize the utility of the other 
branch of theories and, ultimately, some develop integrations of the two approaches. This 
section briefly presents which advantages literature highlights and how arguments of both 
approaches can be combined.  
In their analysis of theories of class Savage, Warde and Devine (2005) clearly confess 
to Bourdieu’s approach to class. They appreciate that Bourdieu does not follow the economic 
reductionism, i.e. he does not conceptualize class through employment relations and 
economic exploitation. At the same time, he does not ignore the importance of economic 
resources as he introduces the concept of economic capital in his theory; economic position, 
however, he considers “only in its articulation with culture and politics” (Savage, Warde and 
Devine 2005: 41). Bourdieu refuses purely “objectivist” social science and does not intent to 
develop a class scheme but analyses class “as an emergent effect of the structuring of many 
specific fields” (Savage, Warde and Devine 2005: 42).  
Another advantage that researches who “prefer” Bourdieu over Goldthorpe’s RAT-
approach put forward is that Bourdieu does not ignore or marginalize the importance of class 
culture and, thereby, of norms and values shaping the actions of individuals (Nash 2003; 
Savage, Warde and Devine 2005). Bourdieu’s conceptualization, they maintain, is not 
economically reductive and does not remain descriptive, without concentrating on 
exploitation and different groups trying to gain relative advantages over each other. Many 
researchers appreciate Bourdieu’s theory for emphasizing that family context is highly 
relevant for the explanation of social class differences in educational achievement and 
maintain that “Socialization-theory” – as Nash (2003: e.g. 435) calls the cultural approach – 
provides a set of arguments that are absolutely necessary for the explanation of social class 
differences in educational success. 
Moreover, Bourdieu’s concept of capital is highly valued for being original and 
progressive as it explains the generation and reproduction of social class and social inequality 
through processes of accumulation, storage and retention of advantages (Savage, Warde and 
Devine 2005: 43). It enables researchers to understand culture as a resource that provides 
access to scarce rewards, is subject to monopolization, and, under certain conditions, may be 
transmitted from one generation to the next (Lareau and Weininger 2003). Through this 
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conceptualization Bourdieu applies economic logic to non-economic fields such as social 
relationships and culture (Savage, Warde and Devine 2005). Again, this economic logic 
implies that individuals can accumulate, save and invest the different forms of capital. 
Besides, some authors value Bourdieu’s emphasis on the institutionalization of the different 
capital types as it improves the understanding of how resources link the micro- with the 
macro-level (Savage, Warde and Devine 2005). 
Finally, even those researchers who criticize the RAT-approach for the methodological 
individualism recognize that Bourdieu’s approach is a structural one, meaning that it takes 
account of the shaping effect of social structures on individuals’ actions (Nash 2003: 447). 
Even rigorous critics of Bourdieu find similar value in his work: they appreciate Bourdieu’s 
“innovative” and “original” approach to the broader phenomenon of social reproduction 
through integrating the link between social class and educational attainment (Goldthorpe 
2007a: 85, 89). Moreover, they admit that “weaker versions” of cultural theories (i.e. theories 
that assume that classes strongly differ with regard to their culture and that the culture of 
some classes positively influences school outcomes) contribute to the explanation of social 
class differentials in educational attainment (Goldthorpe 1996b: 488). 
With regard to the advantages of the rational action approach, the literature especially 
emphasize advantages of RAT in general and even breaks these down to one clear and strong 
utility: RAT yields exact and parsimonious assumptions that can be tested empirically. This 
utility has made it so popular. As Kroneberg und Kalter (2012: 86) put it:  
“The strengths of RCT [RAT] lie in the development of precise theoretical models that 
allow hypotheses to be derived and empirically tested in theory-driven research. […], RCT [RAT] 
has successfully entered into and to some extent transformed the mainstream of core sociological 
fields of study”. 
Goldthorpe (1996b: 485) speaks of “the most satisfactory terminus of any sociological 
theory” and cites Coleman (1986: 1) who says that RAT has a “unique attractiveness” as a 
basis for theory because it explains action in a self-explanatory manner and one has no more 
questions to ask about. Similarly, Hollis (1977: 21) argues that “rational action is its own 
explanation”. It yields very specific hypotheses and more specific hypotheses have the 
advantage of being more easily testable with data. Therefore, the theories they are derived 
from can be valued for having more “informational content”, i.e. they are easier falsifiable, 
(Maaz et al. 2006; Need and De Jong 2002). Accordingly, the “positional theory” of Keller 
and Zavalloni (1964) and Boudon’s adaption are valued for being parsimonious and for 
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enabling researchers to explain trends in social stratification in education (Goldthorpe 1996b: 
490). 
It appears that the number of advantages of the cultural approach outweighs that of the 
RAT-approach but a closer evaluation of the arguments and of the above-mentioned criticism 
will modify this picture. Already, integrations of ideas of both movements provide an 
evaluation and a preliminary conclusion: (some) theories of the cultural approach can account 
for the primary effects while RAT can explain the secondary effects. Integrations of both 
approaches differ with regard to the degree and the exact ways in which they combine their 
arguments but they agree on this differentiation. Moreover, it is important to note that they 
shift the explanandum from temporal persistence (or change) of social inequality in 
educational attainment to the actual generation of social inequality in educational attainment 
(see also Gabay-Egozi et al. 2010; Nash 2003; Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede 2007). This is 
the exact same research topic of this dissertation. 
Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede (2007) argue that the concept of cultural capital and the 
idea that class differences in education emerge through cultural differences between these 
classes can account for the primary effects while RRA-theory (i.e. relative risk aversion-
theory mainly meaning the Breen and Goldthorpe-model) can explain the secondary effects. 
They rely not directly on Bourdieu’s theory but on a study by Kalmijn and Kraaykamp (1996) 
that clearly belongs to cultural capital literature (see Subchapter 3.1.2). The theoretical 
considerations in that study, Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede argue, imply that the effect of 
cultural capital on schooling is mainly one of cultural capital on school performance. By 
contrast, the theory of relative risk aversion yields no direct explanation for social class 
differences in school performance. One may expect that students who wish to maintain their 
family’s social status are more ambitious and, thus, achieve better marks. However, they 
further say, if school performance is defined by “ability” measured in terms of scores on 
standardized tests, no direct effect of relative risk aversion seems plausible.  
Furthermore, the authors claim that making use of cross-sectional data (and 
operationalizing relative risk aversion through being concerned with downward social 
mobility) for the analysis of the effect of aspirations on school performance bears a causality 
problem: If the badly performing students get more concerned this yields a negative 
correlation between relative risk aversion and performance. While RRA-theory seems not 
appropriate for explaining social class differences in performance, it seems to suit the 
investigation of social class effects on “ambitions” very well. The assumption that social 
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classes do not differ with regard to their desire of status maintenance implies that the social 
class effect is not mediated by “being concerned with downward social mobility”; the effect 
of this concern adds to the impact of social class. In contrast, according to Van de Werfhorst 
and Hofstede (2007: 397), the concept of cultural capital yields no direct influence of cultural 
resources on ambitions. They deduce from Bourdieu’s idea that cultural capital operates in 
“unconscious and hidden ways” and therefore that students from higher social classes have no 
clear educational ambitions. Hence, cultural capital is not an appropriate concept for 
explaining social class differences in such ambitions. 
Holm and Jaeger (2008) provide another integration of the rational action and the 
cultural approach. They rely on the B&G-model and firstly extend it by differentiating 
between instantaneous as opposed to future utilities. The former type of utility includes for 
instance the immediate pleasure of having chosen a school track that provides general 
knowledge or attending university because it pleases one’s parents. Future utility refers to 
common benefits of education such as status maintenance and income or occupational 
prestige. Through the differentiation of instantaneous and future utility, Holm and Jaeger 
(2008) integrate “cultural values” in the rational action model. Their assumption of the 
existence of social class differences in “tastes” for educational choices contradicts the ideas 
beyond the model by Breen and Goldthorpe. However, to strengthen their additional argument 
they cite empirical analyses that find social class differences in educational values and norms 
(e.g. Gambetta 1987). 
3.4 Evaluation and conclusion 
In this final subchapter, I present the selected arguments and ideas of both approaches I 
adopt. To support this choice, I evaluate the criticism, advantages and empirical evidence I 
have outlined up to here. The core theoretical foundation of this dissertation is RAT and the 
educational decision-making models that were developed to explain the secondary effects 
(Boudon 1974; Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Erikson and Jonsson 1996). To provide a model 
that is adapted to the French institutionalized dialogue between family and school, I refine a 
formalization advanced by Esser (1999b). I have settled for RAT because it is parsimonious 
and yields clear testable assumptions. Notably, as will show the hypotheses I derive in 
Chapter 5 and the hypotheses that previous research has tested, which will be presented in 
Chapter 6, RAT is a beneficial tool to derive precise and therefore testable hypotheses on the 
decision-making of families and teachers. I refrain from adopting strong or “narrow” versions 
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such as human capital theory and go for the weaker varieties that assume subjective 
rationality (see e.g. Boudon 2003).  
In regard to the original theory by Bourdieu and Passeron, I agree with the critics that 
their arguments are very vague and partly contradictory. This clearly disqualifies it as a 
general theory that can be used to derive precise and testable hypotheses. However, as I 
investigate the actual generation and not trends of social inequality in education, I ignore the 
criticism that presents empirical results that contradict Bourdieu’s arguments regarding trends 
in educational stratification. I rather adopt the idea that his theory or ideas of the cultural 
approach in general can explain the primary effects in the generation of actual social class 
differences in education (Erikson and Jonsson 1996; Nash 2003; Van de Werfhorst and 
Hofstede 2007). Even though it is sharply criticized for several reasons, cultural capital 
studies that analyze social class differences in ability and school performance show that 
mechanisms such as social class differences in reading behavior can contribute to the 
explanation of the generation of the primary effects (e.g. De Graaf 1988; De Graaf, De Graaf 
and Kraaykamp 2000; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 1996; Roscigno and Ainsworth-Darnell 1999, 
Sullivan 2001). Moreover, I agree with the researchers who argue that subjective evaluations 
by teachers may contain a middle-class bias because schools reward abilities and behaviors 
that prevail in higher social classes (e.g. Erikson and Jonsson 1996: 11-12; Farkas et al. 1990; 
Lareau and Weininger 2003; Pollak 2009: 62-63). 
Most importantly, I follow the suggestion by Lareau and Weininger (2003) and thereby 
advance an integration of “cultural arguments” into decision-making models that are in the 
RAT-tradition. I rely on two aspects: First, Lareau and Weiniger’s assumption that social 
classes differ with regard to their cultural resources to meet the standards of the school and, 
second, empirical evidence showing that, indeed, social classes differ with regard to their 
interactions with the school (see Subchapter 3.1.3). I propose that, in the French institutional 
context, the secondary effects on families’ educational decisions are reinforced because of 
social class differentials in parents’ cultural capital (linguistic abilities, knowledge of the 
educational system, self-assurance) and in parental involvement. The institutionalized 
dialogue between family and school and other legal regulations and promotions of parental 
involvement (e.g. presences of parent representatives in various important meetings, school’s 
support of parent associations) are supposed to integrate parents in the school but at the same 
time they define standards that parents have to meet if they want preferable treatment for their 
children. For instance, schools organize regular parents’ evenings and thus give parents the 
chance to acquire information on their children’s performance. Since one of teachers’ 
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standards is that parents are interested in their children’s education (Blackledge 2001), parents 
who do not come to meetings may be disapproved. Finally, since cultural capital (i.e. 
knowledge of the educational system, abilities in dealing with school staff and familiarity 
with the school context) strongly influences parental involvement and varies by social class, it 
appears to be a key mechanism that can contribute to the explanation of social class 
differences within the institutionalized dialogue.  
What I adopt from Bourdieu’s original theory (and from cultural capital literature) is 
that the culture of the school is similar to the culture of the higher social classes. For instance, 
the school is supposed to teach French and therefore will give good marks to students with a 
broad vocabulary and the ability to build correct and meaningful sentences; since higher 
social classes use a more “sophisticated” langue, children who are socialized in these classes 
are equipped with abilities that provide advantages in school. The children may participate 
more in class, too. Moreover, parents who have such linguistic abilities feel more confident in 
the school context, will communicate more with the teachers, be more involved and hence 
meet the standards of the school. 
With respect to cultural capital literature, I agree with most of the criticism of these 
studies but I see considerable benefits, too. They refine the concept of cultural capital by 
applying operationalizations such as reading behavior and cultural knowledge and provide 
theoretical mechanisms that explain the link between social class, parental cultural capital, 
children cultural capital and educational success. Again, these works contribute to the 
understanding of the generation of primary effects (Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede 2007). 
Moreover, the finding that parental cultural capital affects (especially early) educational 
decisions and transitions supports my assumption that parental cultural capital and 
involvement contributes to the generation of the secondary effects (e.g. Aschaffenburg and 
Maas 1997; De Graaf 1988). For instance, these results may indicate that parents’ use their 
cultural capital to influence teacher recommendations (see e.g. De Graaf 1988).  
Finally, given the criticism that cultural capital is applied in other countries than France, 
one could argue that its application to the institutionalized dialogue is even more appropriate. 
However, I suggest that this is no additional argument for utilizing the concept of cultural 
capital because important reforms and political and public discussions of Bourdieu’s work 
and social inequality of educational opportunity have raised parents’ and teachers’ awareness 
and thereby altered their behavior. For instance, teachers will not – if they have ever done so 
– reward students’ highbrow activities and parents neither think that teachers will do so. 
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Moreover, schools’ standards in France appear to correspond to standards in other countries 
such as Britain or the U.S. (see Blackledge 2001; Crozier 1996; Reay 2005 and Subchapter 
3.1.3). At the same time, I do not assume that teachers and families are more aware of social 
inequality in education than teachers and families in most other economically advanced 
countries since reforms to reduce inequality were undertaken in many countries (see e.g. 
Erikson and Jonsson 1996 on Sweden) and inequality in educational opportunity is a topic 
certainly discussed in all economically advanced countries. 
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4 Theoretical considerations on teacher decision-making 
This dissertation addresses the decision-making of two actors: families and schools. The 
previous chapter has evaluated a cultural and a rational action approach to social inequality in 
education in the light of families’ decision-making. The present chapter focuses on theoretical 
considerations on teacher decision-making. More specifically, it summarizes theoretical 
arguments that have been put forward in previous studies on teachers’ school track decisions 
and grading-behavior. On the one hand, there are researchers who – as Bourdieu and his 
colleagues – take a more “conflict-theoretical” perspective and assume that teachers act as 
gatekeepers; on the other hand, there is less “normative” literature that explores the 
determinants of teacher decisions. This chapter gives a brief overview over these arguments in 
order to provide a theoretical foundation for the teacher decision-making model that will be 
developed in Chapter 5. 
4.1 Cultural capital and non-cognitive traits 
In the original work by Bourdieu and Passeron, it is argued that when teachers assess 
the performance of students, they just rate the distance of the student’s “culture” to the culture 
of the school (Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 39). Moreover, there are hints at the existence of 
a teacher bias or a middle-class bias, i.e. a social class effect net of student ability on 
subjective performance assessments by teachers. Bourdieu claims that, in every stage of a 
student’s educational career, teachers will – consciously or unconsciously – take the linguistic 
aptitudes of the student into account (Bourdieu 1966: 330). Further, teacher assessments are – 
most often unconsciously – affected by “little perceptions”, i.e. indicators of student’s social 
origin such as physical bearing and vesture, style of expression and accent (1966: 338). Also, 
when giving advices on educational decisions, teachers take into account student’s social 
origin (Bourdieu 1966: 331). 
Teachers conceal how they make marks and they devaluate how to acquire good ones 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 96). By this way, teachers reinforce lower class students’ 
feelings of powerlessness, arbitrariness and predestination to failure. Furthermore, teachers 
require a language and culture that only students of higher social origin master and this 
common language and culture creates a sort of “complicity” between students of higher social 
origin and the school staff (Bourdieu 1966: 339). As the teachers (and students) pretend that 
this communication and complicity does not depend on social origin but on “talents” and 
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“intelligence”, the teachers do not have to make the effort to take account of the needs of 
poorly performing students. For the same reason they do not perceive it as unfair that the 
evaluation criteria are based on the “elite culture”.  
Numerous studies that analyze middle-class biases in subjective evaluations by teachers 
(e.g. marks) directly refer to Bourdieu or to other arguments of the cultural approach (e.g. 
Ditton 2007; Ditton and Krüsken 2006; Rolff 2007; Stahl 2007). They argue that teachers act 
in the interest of the dominant social classes: Teachers function as gatekeepers who keep 
students of lower social origin from following educational pathways that lead to higher social 
class positions. They do so by giving better marks or higher school track recommendations to 
students from higher social classes even when they actually perform the same as students 
from lower classes. Teachers are not absolutely supposed to do so consciously. In fact, it is 
argued, they take into account students’ cultural capital and since the school’s culture 
resembles the culture of the higher classes, they give better marks to students from higher 
classes. Typically, regressions of teacher performance assessments on student social origin, 
objective measures of ability and cultural capital variables (e.g. highbrow activities, reading 
behavior) analyze this line of thoughts (e.g. DiMaggio 1982). However, as pointed out in 
Chapter 3, some critics argue that this is not an appropriate approach because Bourdieu’s 
theory yields that “objective” ability and cultural capital cannot be separated (see e.g. Lareau 
and Weininger 2003 and Subchapter 3.1.2).  
Not all researchers who conduct such regression analyses intend to test Bourdieu’s 
theory. The seminal work by Bowles and Gintis (1976) gave rise to similar – particularly U.S. 
– studies. Bowles and Gintis argue that intergenerational social class reproduction is driven by 
differential socialization of behaviors in school and that these behaviors – typically termed as 
“non-cognitive traits” – are more rewarded by teachers and employers than cognitive skills. 
The required non-cognitive traits generally consist of work habits that enable individuals and 
organizations to function efficiently (e.g. focusing on task at hand, being energetic) and they 
vary by skill level. At higher skill levels of the organizations (e.g. in general secondary 
schools or high-skills occupational positions) teachers and employers reward especially 
“initiative under control of internalized behavior” and creativity; at lower skill levels more 
emphasis is put on keeping rules and respecting authority (Farkas 2003: 541). 
Empirical analyses found that teachers reward habits and traits such as perseverance, 
dependability, docility, consistency, homework completion, participation in class, effort and 
organization (e.g. Bowles and Gintis 1976; Bressoux and Pansu 2003; Ditton and Krüsken 
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2006; Farkas et al. 1990; Rosenbaum 2001; see also Maaz and Nagy 2009 for effects on 
different subjects). As predicted by Bowles and Gintis (1976), these non-cognitive traits 
explain very large parts of social class effects and effects of gender or ethnicity on marks and 
other subjective teacher evaluations, net of cognitive skills (measured e.g. through 
standardized test scores). Some studies also found that teachers’ own social origin plays an 
important role: teachers of higher social origin are more likely to reward such traits than 
teachers with lower social background (e.g. Alexander, Entwisle and Thompson 1987). It is 
argued that the “social distance” between teacher origin and student origin makes the 
communication more difficult and creates an atmosphere that derogates lower-class students’ 
learning.48  
4.2 Determinants of teacher school track decisions  
Making school track decisions is a complex, responsible and demanding task (Arnold et 
al. 2007; McElvany 2009). Within an institutional framework defined by legal regulations, the 
teacher has to collect and process diverse information on his students, at best over years. 
Based on this information, he has to prognosticate the student’s future performance 
development. Moreover, teachers are supposed to make their decisions in rational ways since 
they further have to evaluate costs, benefits and risks; wrong judgments can cause costs for 
the student, the educational system and the society (Arnold et al 2007; McElvany 2009). 49 
The factor that is uniformly expected to have the greatest impact on teacher 
recommendations is a student’s marks. Following SEU-theory, teachers consider students’ 
marks as they indicate their chances of successfully completing different school tracks 
(Neugebauer 2010). Consequently, teachers perceive the making of recommendations for 
students with performances in the middle range as very difficult (Ditton and Krüsken 2006). 
Another reason advanced in the literature is that law and other official regulations explicitly 
                                                 
48 This result could be interpreted as support for Bourdieu’s theory: He argues that teachers find it convenient to 
evaluate student’s performance with the “culture of the elites” as a yardstick because the teachers belong to the 
“elite” (Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 39, Bourdieu 1966: 337-388). Throughout their work, Bourdieu and 
Passeron emphasize that teachers are influenced by their own social origin and by the social class position they 
attained through their occupation. They embody the school success and take their own knowledge and skills as 
natural “talents” although they have laboriously acquired them. As they often originate from the middle class, 
they are even more attached to the norms and values of the school system (Bourdieu and Passeron 1964: 107). 
They owe their social success and position to the educational system and therefore they tend to adopt its values 
with more vigor (Bourdieu 1966: 337, see also 1979: 96). 
49 Indeed, it was found that German primary school teachers perceive the making of the secondary school track 
recommendation as difficult and sometimes doubt the correctness of their decision (McElvany 2009). However, 
teacher personality traits such as a high “belief of self-efficiency” and a high perception of freedom of choice 
have a negative effect on teacher’s perception of the decision-making as being difficult and burdensome. 
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require the teachers to base their recommendation upon student’s academic performance (e.g. 
Neugebauer 2010; Schneider 2011).  
Similar to the arguments advanced in the literature dealing with middle-class biases in 
marks and other performance evaluations (see Subchapter 4.1), researchers investigating 
teacher school track recommendations argue that teachers take into account student behavior, 
linguistic and other more or less school relevant abilities, attitudes towards education in 
general and learning as well as interest in the subjects taught in school (e.g. Ditton and 
Krüsken 2006; Schneider 2011; Neugebauer 2010). This may be because legal texts require 
them to take into account students’ “aptitude, will and affinity for intellectual labor” 
(Schneider 2011: 373). Students’ linguistic and other “academic” abilities, participation in 
class and schoolwork mastery may reflect the required aptitudes and affinity; motivation and 
effort certainly manifest students’ “will”. Accordingly, if was found that teacher reports of 
students’ participation in class and motivation strongly affect school track recommendations 
(Ditton and Krüsken 2006). Moreover, following again SEU-theory, teachers may use such 
“school-relevant” behavior, abilities and attitudes as indicators of students’ chances of success 
(Neugebauer 2010).  
Another distinct factor that is expected to influence teacher decisions is parents’ 
capacity to support their children with regard to educational issues (Ditton 1992; Ditton, 
Krüsken and Schauenberg 1995; Ditton and Krüsken 2006; Duru-Bellat 1996; Duru-Bellat 
2002: 80; Neugebauer 2010; Schneider 2011). Teachers consider whether a student can be 
helped with her homework by her parents or other family members, whether at home she can 
discuss her problems in school, whether the family can account for private couching, and so 
on. Apart from marks and work-habits, this factor is supposed to indicate to teachers the 
likelihood that a student will succeed in different school tracks. 
As a fourth determinant of teacher decisions, German studies dealing with teacher 
recommendations mention parental aspirations (Arnold et al. 2007; Ditton and Krüsken 2006; 
Schneider 2011). It is argued that parents who aspire after their child’s attending the higher 
secondary school track and who soon recognize that the child may not have good enough 
marks to get the corresponding recommendation put pressure on the teachers. In terms of 
SEU-theory, it can be assumed that the pressure by parents represents costs to the teachers 
(Ditton 2007: 252). Moreover, parents’ and students’ aspirations may directly influence 
teacher decisions since legal regulations require them to take into account students’ “will” 
(Schneider 2011). In France, before the implementation of the dialogue – i.e. when teachers 
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still had full decision-making power – parents’ aspirations were supposed to have a strong 
influence on students’ transitions to secondary school. Girard and Bastide (1963) argued that 
parents’ aspirations are, in addition to student performance and teacher evaluations, one of 
three factors that determine which secondary school track a student will attend. Today, within 
the French dialogue, families’ official school track requests formalize families’ aspirations 
and legal texts and the administrative authorities strongly encourage teachers and headmasters 
to consider families’ requests (Duru-Bellat and Mingat 1989; Duru-Bellat, Jarousse and 
Mingat 1993; see also Chapter 2).  
Another factor that is supposed to have an influence on teachers’ school track decisions 
is the number of available places in surrounding (upper) secondary schools and firms that 
provide apprenticeships. This fifth determinant plays an important role in literature on the 
transition from lower to upper secondary education in France and is mentioned in research on 
other countries, too (see Ditton 2007: 252; Ditton and Krüsken 2009: 78). In France, teachers 
and especially headmasters are well informed about available places in surrounding general 
upper secondary schools (lycée général et technologique), vocational upper secondary schools 
(lycée professionnel) and firms that provide apprenticeships (Briand and Chapoulie 1993; 
Masson 1997). When they help children to work out their educational plans and when they 
make school track propositions, they consider whether students’ educational plans are 
realizable under the given circumstances. This leads to regional difference in transition rates 
and – as will be explained below – to varying social class effects on these transitions (e.g. 
Ballion 1986; Duru-Bellat 1996; Duru-Bellat 2002: 103-104; Duru-Bellat and Mingat 1988; 
Duru-Bellat and Mingat 1989; Duru-Bellat, Jarousse and Mingat 1993): On the one hand, in 
regions with strong industrial or agricultural sectors (i.e. mostly rural regions), this leads to 
comparatively high rates of student transitions into vocational tracks; on the other hand, in 
urban areas with more and larger general upper secondary schools (which are often locally 
affiliated to lower secondary schools), students are comparatively more likely to attend the 
general track. Moreover, it is argued that the impact of surrounding available places is 
reinforced because they affect also families’ aspirations and students further influence each 
other’s aspirations (Duru-Bellat 1996; Duru-Bellat 2002: 103-104). This mechanism leads to 
regional effects and school effects on educational decisions. 
Given teachers do factor in these five determinants – marks and other performance 
indicators, non-cognitive (more or less school-relevant traits), parents’ capacities and 
resources to support their child’s schooling, parents’ (formalized) aspirations and places in 
surrounding schools – how do social class differentials in teachers’ school track decisions 
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emerge? First, social class differences in students’ marks correspond to the primary effects. 
Moreover, since marks are affected by middle-classes biases, too, social class effects may 
even be reinforced (Erikson and Jonsson 1996; Pollak 2009). 50  Second, class-specific 
socialization generates social class differences in students’ linguistic abilities, behavior in 
school and other non-cognitive traits and since teachers take into account these factors, social 
class effects on teacher decisions emerge and remain even when marks are controlled. Third, 
as shown by studies dealing with family-school interactions (see Subchapter 3.1.3), social 
classes vary with regard to their capacities to help their children with school issues. Hence, if 
teachers consider students’ social class to assess these parental capacities, net social class 
effects on their decisions emerge (Duru-Bellat 2002: 80; Duru-Bellat 1996). Fourth, for 
“cultural” as well as for “rational” reasons higher social classes have higher educational 
aspirations (see Chapter 3). Therefore, since teachers (and headmasters) directly take into 
account parents’ (formalized) aspirations and parents with high aspirations may put more 
pressure on teachers, student social class affects school staffs’ decisions. Fifth, since given 
few places in surrounding general upper secondary schools and many places in vocational 
schools or apprenticeships providing firms, teachers and headmasters are less likely to 
propose the general track to lower class students, net social effects are stronger in rural 
regions than in urban areas. However, regional and school variations were found to explain 
little of individual social class effects on students’ transitions to upper secondary education; 
individual factors (i.e. the four other determinants) seem more important (see Duru-Bellat and 
Mingat 1989). 
4.3 Theories of discrimination 
Within German research on teacher recommendations, studies dealing with the impact 
of student’s immigration and social class background have started to apply theories of 
                                                 
50 Maaz and Nagy (2009) provide an adaption of the concept of primary and secondary effects to the German 
case. In Germany, the transition from primary to secondary school is affected by school track recommendations 
of the primary school teachers that families are advised to take into account when they decide on the secondary 
school track their children will attend. Maaz and Nagy (2009: 160) differentiate six types of effects: First, 
primary effects on marks (social class effects that are fully mediated by student’s actual performance); second, 
primary effects on the teacher recommendation (social class effects that are fully mediated by student’s actual 
performance); third, secondary effects on marks (social class effects that remain when student’s actual 
performance is controlled); fourth, secondary effects on teacher recommendations (social class effects that 
remain when student’s actual performance is controlled); fifth, primary effects on actual enrollment meaning 
parent’s school track decision (social class effects that are fully mediated by student’s actual performance); sixth, 
secondary effects on actual enrollment meaning parent’s school track decision (social class effects that remain 
when student’s actual performance is controlled).  
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discrimination to teachers’ decision-making (see e.g. Kristen 2006; Schneider 2011). 
Discrimination occurs in many different aspects of society, e.g. in intermarriage and 
residential location (Arrow 1998: 91). In economics, researchers speak of “discrimination in 
the labor market” when employers hire or pay employees not only because of their 
productivity but (also) depending on ascriptive traits such as gender or ethnicity. In terms of 
quantitative analysis, discrimination exists when members of two different social groups (e.g. 
men and women) receive unequal wages, are hired at different chances, etc., even after 
adjusting for observable differentials in human capital and other “productivity”-indicators 
(Arrow 1998: 94).  
To explain this phenomenon, two theories of discrimination are mentioned: The theory 
of statistical discrimination (Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972) and the theory of discrimination 
preferences (Becker 1971). The former assumes that employers, for instance, will 
discriminate against women or blacks if they believe that they are, on average, less 
productive, less qualified, etc. (Phelps 1972: 659). They are individuals who seek to 
maximize utility and hence if the costs of gaining information about the person they want to 
hire are very high, they will refrain from looking for that information and rely on their 
“statistical experience”.51 The theory of discrimination preferences by Becker assumes that 
individuals’ discrimination-behavior is driven by their preference in favor or against certain 
social groups. Prominently, this preference is termed “taste for discrimination” (Becker 1971). 
Becker does not specify through which mechanisms individuals adopt such preferences; he 
introduces them as exogenous factors (Kristen 2006: 82). As an example, speaking of ethnic 
discrimination, Arrow (1998: 94) refers to “some special disutility, which whites attach to 
contact with backs”. He criticizes Becker’s theory for directly contradicting the basic 
assumption that employers are “simple profit maximizers” (Arrow 1998: 94). 
Applications of the theory of statistical discrimination to teachers’ making of decisions 
such as secondary school track propositions consider that individuals are assumed to make 
use of their “statistical experience” when they lack information and when acquiring 
information is costly (Kristen 2006; Schneider 2011). This is the case when teachers do not 
know a student at all. Such situation occurs, for instance, when teachers have to decide 
whether a new student is “good enough” to be accepted at a school that requires minimum 
levels of performance and ability. By contrast, when teachers decide on a school track a 
                                                 
51 This experience might be based, for instance, on employers’ observation that blacks and women are typically 
less likely to be hired or paid lower incomes (Phelps 1972: 659) or his or her own “actual” experience that blacks 
or women are, on average, less productive (Arrow 1973: 96). 
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student should attend, they usually know the student very well. Therefore, it is assumed that 
statistical discrimination will not affect teacher school track decisions (Kristen 2006; 
Schneider 2011). However, tastes for discrimination appear to be likely to cause teachers to 
recommend higher secondary schools to students of one social group (e.g. students with 
higher social origin) rather than to students from the other social group (e.g. lower social 
classes). While employers only want to maximize the profit of their company and, as Arrow 
puts forward, seem not likely to follow discrimination preferences, teachers might be, 
according to Kristen (2006: 83, 94), more likely to follow discrimination preferences. 
4.4 Evaluation and conclusion 
This chapter has described theoretical approaches to teacher decision-making that are 
mainly concerned with explaining why student social class affects teacher decisions even 
when school performance is controlled. The common perception of the presented approaches 
is that the net social class effect emerge because teachers take into account more or less 
“meritocratic” student traits such as linguistic abilities, docile behavior, effort, work habits 
and background characteristics (e.g. parental support) that are related to student social class 
origin. However, the approaches differ with regard to the explanations they propose for this 
teacher behavior. While “cultural” theories argue that teachers act as gatekeepers and quite 
unconsciously select students with “high-status signals” (e.g. linguistic ability) into higher 
school tracks because these students “fit in” schools’ culture, other theories provide more 
“rational” arguments such as: teachers take into account student traits that indicate students’ 
chances of succeeding in the different available school tracks. The latter theories also argue 
that parent educational aspirations influence teacher decisions and thereby these theories 
indicate that teachers try to avoid costs such as conflicts with ambitious parents. As I reason 
in Chapter 3, parents indeed attempt to meet school standards to get teachers to act in their 
will. Moreover, since higher-class parents are better equipped with abilities and knowledge 
that enable them to meet these standards, their aspirations are more considered by the teachers 
than lower-class parents’ aspirations. Hence, student social class affects teacher decisions 
even when student achievement is taken into account. 
In the specific context of the institutionalized dialogue between family and school, this 
mechanism – parents with high aspirations influence teacher decisions – can be supposed to 
be very important. This is because teachers (i.e. the staff meeting) make a school track 
proposition that can be rejected only with some effort (attendance at talk with headmaster). 
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Given these institutional circumstances, parents who want their child to attend the general 
upper secondary school track have to find ways to affect the staff meeting’s proposition. One 
preliminary way is of course their school track request since this formal declaration clearly 
indicates parents’ educational aspirations. However, as the above-presented theories argue, 
teacher decisions are not only affected by parents’ and students’ aspirations: Since teachers 
mainly seek to evaluate a student’s chances of success, they consider student performance and 
other “future-performance indicators” such as parental support. Therefore, I propose that in 
the context of the dialogue parents put effort in showing teachers their ability and willingness 
to support their children. Finally, this parental preparatory behavior is reinforced because the 
dialogue is embedded in a context that formally promotes parental involvement (e.g. through 
regular parents’ evenings, parent associations). 
With regard to discrimination theories, I suppose that no statistical discrimination 
affects teacher decisions within the French institutionalized dialogue. As argued in the 
literature, teachers only take into account ascriptive student traits such as social origin when 
they lack information on the student. However, in the context of the dialogue, the teachers in 
the staff meeting very well know their students since they taught them in class in the years 
before. By contrast, teachers’ tastes for discrimination could still be at work. Yet, since there 
is no detailed explanation for the mechanisms behind these tastes and since they seem not in 
line with the idea of teachers’ rational action behavior, they seem no powerful theoretical 
approach to explain teacher decisions within the dialogue. 
Given this preliminary theoretical reasoning on teacher decision-making and the 
arguments on families’ decision-making developed in Chapter 3, the following chapter 
designs a detailed theoretical approach to families’ and teachers’ decision-making within the 
institutionalized dialogue. More specifically, the approach will separately address each step of 
the dialogue: family’s school track request, staff meeting’s subsequent school track 
proposition, family’s decision to reject the staff meeting’s proposition, the headmaster’s 
decision that follows from family’s rejection, family’s decision to reject also the headmaster’s 
decision and finally the decision of the recall meeting. 
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5 Decision-making within the institutionalized dialogue 
Henceforth, I develop two theoretical models based on Subjective Expected Utility 
(SEU) Theory that explain how social class differentials emerge in families’ school track 
requests and staff meetings’ school track propositions. Subsequently, I apply these models to 
investigate social class effects on families’ rejection decisions and both actors’ grade retention 
decisions. The formalized models concentrate on the most popular school track: the general 
upper secondary school track (LGT). I focus on the situation in which the actors have the two 
mutually exclusive alternatives (1) LGT or (2) not LGT; the second alternative includes the 
two vocational tracks (LP and A) and grade repetition (GR).52 I have settled for mathematical 
formalization in order to provide a clear overview over the parameters I add to the existing 
rational decision-making model. Moreover, mathematical formalization facilitates the logical 
deduction of hypotheses, augments the explanatory power of the theory and facilitates 
empirical testing (Diekmann and Voss 2004: 19; Kroneberg and Kalter 2012: 75). 53  
 
                                                 
52 LGT means lycée général et technologique, LP stands for lycée professionnel, A indicates apprenticeship (i.e. 
the track that leads to the certificates CAP and BEP) and GR means grade retention. For purposes of simplicity 
and in line with the empirical analysis that follows, I will speak of one vocational track and not differentiate 
between the higher vocational track (LP) and the lower vocational track (A). 
53 Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Theory is one variation of rational action theory (RAT). As emphasized by 
Diekmann and Voss (2004), SEU-theory is not identically equal to RAT as it is sometimes perceived in the 
literature. It is a specific decision theory and hence another variety of RAT. The father of SEU-theory is the 
statistician Leonard J. Savage (1954). He refined the “expected utility theory” of von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944). As for all “decision rules” or decision theories, the explanandum is a specific action of an individual 
(Esser 1999b: 251-259) and the aim of the theory is to model normatively the way in which individuals make a 
choice among uncertain alternatives (Duncan Luce 1992). To do so, researchers assume that an actor considers 
all the – mutually exclusive – alternatives he could choose. The alternatives can consist of all sorts of actions 
including to not act, to endure, to perceive, to communicate, to act “internally” or “externally”, to learn, to 
imitate, and so on. With each alternative the actor associates consequences and to each of these consequences 
she assigns subjective values. The consequences that are assigned with positive values are labeled utility or 
benefits; consequences that are ascribed with negative values are labeled negative utilities or costs. Actually, the 
consequences could be assigned with objective values. However, as a matter of course, individuals differ with 
regard to the degree to which their subjective evaluation corresponds to the actual objective value. The 
“subjective utility function” describes the relationship between the objective and subjective values; it represents 
an individual’s utilization of information (Esser 1999b; Diekmann and Voss 2004: 17). Another crucial 
parameter in the SEU-theory is the expectation. This is the subjectively expected probability that a specific 
consequence will occur. As they are probabilities, expectations can range from 0 to 1; 0 means that the specific 
consequence (cost or benefit) will not emerge and 1 indicates that it will. The expectations tell the actors how 
probable it is that a specific alternative leads to a specific positive or negative utility. Again, there is the actual or 
objective probability that a utility will occur and the more or less deviating subjective expectation. For every 
alternative the actor multiplies the positive and negative utilities with the corresponding expectations. By this 
way, he obtains a “subjectively expected utility-value” for every alternative. Finally, the actor selects the 
alternative that promises the highest expected utility. That is to say, the actor chooses an action so as to maximize 
the subjective expected utility.  
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5.1 Family’s decision-making 
5.1.1 INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKING: THE MODEL BY ESSER 
To develop a model on families’ making of their school track requests in the context of 
the institutionalized dialogue, I refine the SEU-model on educational decision-making that 
has beend advanced by Esser (1999b). It is a variation of the models by Breen and Goldthorpe 
and Erikson and Jonsson that is more general and that puts emphasis on the status 
maintenance motive by introducing distinct parameters (Becker and Hecken 2009b). I have 
chosen Esser’s model since it is more parsimonious than the formalized model by Breen and 
Goldthorpe (1997) even so it is more detailed than the model by Erikson and Jonsson (1996). 
According to Esser (1999b: 266-272), the family considers the following consequences 
or utilities of choosing LGT: direct and indirect costs of further general education C (books 
and other learning material, longer duration of the education, foregone earnings, etc.), the 
benefit B of it (satisfaction of general learning, access to diplomas that lead to higher class 
positions, higher levels of income etc.) and costs of status decline SD. This negative utility 
labeled with “SD” represents the possible loss of social appreciation and self-esteem that 
emerges when the child does not preserve the family’s social class position. Depending on 
family’s social class these costs can be zero or more. Besides, families assess two kinds of 
expectations:  p, the probability that the child will successfully complete the chosen school 
track (here the general track) and c, the probability that in case the child does not succeed in 
the general track, the family will face the costs of status decline.  
The costs of status decline and the probability of its emergence correspond to the notion 
of “relative risk aversion” and the ideas adopted from Keller and Zavalloni’s (1964) 
“positional theory” that are integrated in Boudon, Erikson and Jonsson and Breen and 
Goldthorpes’ approaches: Students and their parents evaluate their educational options and 
the benefits of these with the family’s social class position as a yardstick. Hence, higher class 
families have more to loose from having children not following the higher school tracks than 
lower class families who might have nothing to lose at all (Boudon, 1974; Erikson & Jonsson, 
1996: 27 f.). Put differently, given the same desire to maintain one’s family’s social status, 
completing the vocational track would satisfy a working class family, for instance, but not one 
from the service class. Esser’s model and the B&G-model put considerably more emphasis on 
the motive of status maintenance than the E&J-model (Becker 2000) and the main difference 
between Esser’s model and that of Breen and Goldthorpe is that Esser “specifically provides 
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for an effect on educational choice of parental concern to minimize the risk of children’s 
downward mobility” (Goldthorpe 2007a: 269; see also Becker 2000; Kristen 1999). 
I make use of Esser’s (1999b) model in order to formalize a family’s subjectively 
expected utility of choosing LGT. Equation 1a, 1b and 1c address an independent decision-
making of the family, i.e. how they would make their school track choice if they were the 
only one to decide and hence not dependent on the decision of the school. The subscript F 
generally stands for family’s decision-making and “LGT” in parentheses indicates that the 
evaluated option is the general upper secondary school track. 54 
Families’ choosing LGT yields the following SEU (see Esser 1999b: 267): 
SEUF (LGT) = pB + (1 – p) c (–SD) – C         (1a) 
The expectation c is a weight that is attached to the costs SD. It tells the family how 
likely it is that the certain amount of costs of social decline will occur and, hence, it indicates 
how “necessary” it is that a child completes the general track in order to maintain the family’s 
social status.  Whether the family will experience these weighted costs of status decline also 
depends on the probability that the child fails in the general track (1 – p). In turn, whether it 
will receive the benefits B depends on p, the child’s chances of successfully completing the 
general track. The general costs of the child’s attendance at the general track occur in any 
case.  
Equation 1b formalizes a family’s SEU of not choosing LGT. Then, only the weighted 
costs of status decline are important (see Esser 1999b: 267): 
SEUF (notLGT) = c (–SD)          (1b) 
The family chooses the alternative that yields the higher SEU-value. Hence, if there was 
no institutionalized dialogue and the family could make an independent decision, they would 
choose the general track if 
SEUF (LGT) > SEUF (notLGT)                    (1c) 
                                                 
54 As outlined in Subchapter 2.5.5, Becker’s (2000) theoretical suggestion of dividing families’ decision-making 
into two “sub-processes” resembles that approach. He suggests that a first “sub-process” generates families’ 
educational intentions and a second “sub-process” produces their actual educational decisions. The latter are 
affected by institutional circumstances which he such as teacher recommendations. Within the French 
institutionalized dialogue families’ decision-making is affected by the institutional context of the dialogue (e.g. 
the fact that the staff meeting subsequently makes a virtually binding decision). 
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Moreover, Esser (1999b: 269-272) brings “face to face” Equation 1a and Equation 1b 
(or, correspondingly, states Equation 1c in more detail) and after mathematical transformation 
he obtains: 55 
B + cSV > C/p            (1d) 
He terms the left part of Equation 1d “educational motivation” and the right part is 
labeled “investment risk”. The educational motivation increases as the weighted costs of 
status decline and the benefit of attending the general track increase. Given the same costs of 
attending the general track, the investment risk increases as students’ likelihood of success 
decreases. Equation 1d further yields assumptions on the likelihood that families choose LGT 
over “not LGT”: As the chances of success (p) decrease (i.e. the investment risk increases, if 
C would remain the same), the educational motivation and the benefits (B) must increase so as 
to keep the likelihood-level of choosing LGT. For example, if a student’s chances of 
succeeding in the general track are very low, his family must have a very high educational 
motivation so as to still opt for LGT (see also the figure presented in Esser 1999b: 271). This 
demonstration of how only the likelihood of success and the weighted costs of status decline 
(or, formulated in positive terms, the educational motivation) could produce differences in 
educational decisions reveals the central importance of the status maintenance motive in 
Esser’s model. The costs C and benefits B only add to the differences. 
5.1.2 FAMILY’S SCHOOL TRACK REQUEST 
To adapt this preliminary model to the institutionalized dialogue between family and 
school, another parameter has to be added which I denote with l. It stands for family’s 
subjectively expected likelihood that the staff meeting will propose the general track as well. 
A family additionally anticipates what decision the school staff will make since the utility 
they associate with having their child attend the general track (SEUF (LGT)) depends on 
whether the staff meeting agrees with their request. Since the school has the final word, 
whether the family will benefit from having their child attend the general track, whether it 
will have to account for the costs of education and for those of status decline depends on 
whether the school staff opts for the general track. The following equation reformalizes 
families’ SEU of choosing the general school track: 56 
SEUF (LGT) = l [pB + (1 – p) c (–SD) – C] + (1 – l) [c (–SD)]       (2) 
                                                 
55 For more details on the reformulation see Esser (1999b: 269-270). 
56 Like the other small letters, the parameter l represents a probability that determines the emergence of positive 
or negative utilities (usually signified by capital letters). It can range from 0 to 1. 
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Equation 2 explicates that the benefits of education (i.e. status maintenance and benefits 
such as joy of learning) do not only depend on the chances that the student will successfully 
complete the general track, but on the likelihood that the teachers let the student attend the 
general track, too. For instance, if l equals 0, a student that would successfully complete the 
general track (p = 1) will never benefit from that success since the teachers will not have let 
him attend that track. The second part of the equation implies that even if the staff meeting 
agrees with sending the student to LGT, the family will experience the costs of status decline 
if the student fails (p = 0). The costs C of attending the general track only emerge if the staff 
meeting admits the student to the general track. Benefits of attending the general track depend 
in the same ways on l but on having success in the general track (p), too. The last part of the 
equation implies that, if the staff meeting does not opt for the general track (1 – l), the family 
will experience downward social mobility even if the student would have been able to 
succeed in the general track (p = 1).57  
According to studies dealing with educational decision-making, p is generally a 
function of typical school performance indicators such as student’s marks (e.g. Jonsson 1999; 
Breen & Yaish 2006), number of repeated school years (Roux and Davaillon 2001), scores on 
standardized tests (e.g. Breen and Yaish 2006; Jonsson 1999; Van der Werfhorst and 
Hofstede 2007) or teacher recommendations (e.g. Becker 2003; Stocké 2007). This means 
that parents use these indicators as information to subjectively evaluate p.58 
The expectation c, i.e. the likelihood of status decline if the student does not complete 
the general track, is a function of family’s social class. To assess whether their children’s 
completion of the general school track will cause status decline, families estimate whether the 
                                                 
57 Moreover, if the staff meeting does not propose LGT, the family might experience “psychological costs” 
because of being rejected – to some families being rejected could demonstrate a mismatch of the teachers’ and 
their own perceptions of the student’s abilities and this could irritate some families severely. I do not suggest that 
such anticipated psychological stress causes strong social class differentials in families’ school track request. 
Since these costs are of minor importance they are not integrated in the equation. 
58 There may be “biases” in the subjective assessments of parents such as higher-class parents perceive the same 
marks as higher chances of success than lower-class parents would perceive the same marks, but I assume such 
biases to be very small. Given the fact that SEU-theory specifically considers that individuals may differ with 
regard to their subjective evaluation of the same objective information, such an assumption may seem 
inappropriate. However, empirical evidence obtained by direct tests of the rational action approaches reveal that 
no significant social class effects on families’ subjective evaluation of their children’s chances of success remain 
when objective indicators such as marks and teacher recommendations are controlled (Stocké 2007). 
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educational attainment the child will acquire through the specific school track (here, the 
general track) is necessary for maintaining the family’s social class position.59 
As families were found to feel unaware about the precise factors on which the staff 
meeting bases their school track decisions (Masson 1997), I assume that parents can only 
make use of school performance indicators that are visible to both actors the families and the 
school staff. Hence, they consider indicators such as marks and repeated school years not only 
to assess p, but to estimate l, too. Regardless of their own perception of their child’s 
performance and likelihood of success, they assume: the better the child’s marks and other 
visible performance indicators, the higher is the probability that the staff meeting agrees with 
their request of sending the child to the general track.  
Moreover, as suggested by Lareau and Weininger (2003) and supported by a range of 
quantitative and qualitative studies (see Subchapter 3.1.3), parents “strategically” use their 
cultural capital (e.g. knowledge of the educational system, linguistic abilities, self-confidence 
in the school context). Therefore, l is also determined by additional effort parents have put 
into talking to school staff, telling the teachers what school track they want their child to 
attend, and their visible involvement in their child’s schooling (e.g. parent association-
membership, attendance at parents’ evenings, initiation of meetings with teachers). The 
parents assume that the more involved they are and the better they have utilized their cultural 
capital (e.g. in talks with teachers), the more likely it is that the staff meeting will accept their 
LGT-request. Parents who are involved in school (e.g. as parent representative) think that the 
teachers consider them to be very interested in their child’s schooling and to have the 
capacities and resources to help and practice with them. In brief, involved parents assume that 
they meet the school’s standards and therefore will receive preferable treatment. Moreover, 
parents who are member in a parent association (PA) may be persuaded that the staff meeting 
will accept their school track request because either the parent representatives (who mostly 
represent a PA) or the parents themselves will attend the staff meeting (see Subchapter 2.3.2). 
Also, some parents may have put pressure on the teachers when talking to them (e.g. by 
saying that they will reject the staff meeting’s proposition) and now believe that the teachers 
                                                 
59 Evaluating whether the general track will lead to an occupation that preserves the family’s social status is a 
difficult task for students (Breen and Yaish 2006; Jacob and Tieben 2009). However, since the upper secondary 
school track choice takes place early in a student’s school career and does not fix the way to occupations of a 
certain status (like tertiary education choices or even bac type – “S”, “ES”, and “L” – would), I assume that, at 
that stage, students know enough to estimate whether the general track will preserve a family’s social status. 
Moreover, they can use their parents’ educational attainment as yardstick (Jacob and Tieben 2009) and their 
parents – who might better know the labor market value of different educational attainments – take the decision 
together with them. 
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will decide in their interest (see e.g. Masson 1997). Finally, regarding the function of l, I 
suggest that a family first considers the student’s marks (and repeated grades) and if these are 
in the middle range and therefore the family is unsure about l, it additionally factors in 
parents’ involvement and cultural capital.60 
5.1.3 FAMILY’S REJECTION DECISIONS 
When families decide whether they want to reject the staff meeting’s proposition, they 
evaluate an additional parameter: the costs of rejection. These costs consist of filling in the 
dossier and, most importantly, of going to the school and talking with the headmaster. For the 
parents, this may be time and money consuming and, most importantly, for some parents this 
may be psychologically stressful. As the literature on family-school interactions reveals (see 
Subchapter 3.1.3), some parents feel uncomfortable in the school context and prefer to avoid 
talking with school staff. Talking to the head of the school may bother them even more than 
communicating with the teachers. Hence, all families face the same costs of rejection but 
some families subjectively perceive them as greater than they are. However, I suggest that this 
factor plays only a minor role when families decide about rejecting. 
Although the costs and benefits of having their child attend LGT are exogenous and 
remain the same, the parents might reevaluate p since now they know the staff meeting’s 
school track proposition. This implies that p is now a function of marks, repeated school years 
and the staff meeting’s proposition. Moreover, families also differently evaluate l – the 
likelihood that in the subsequent decision the school will accept the LGT-request – because 
the headmaster instead of the staff meeting takes this decision. This time, parents might take 
less account of the meetings they have initiated with teachers since the headmaster did not 
attend these meetings and might even not know about them. By contrast, their membership in 
a PA is still very importance since the headmaster usually knows which parents are engaged 
in that way.61 
Families’ making of their decision to reject the decision of the headmaster is slightly 
different. As compared to the first rejection, families do not have the same costs of rejection: 
They do not have to talk with the headmaster but they have to make an official demand via a 
                                                 
60 Another factor that parents may take into account is their social capital in terms of personal relations to 
teachers, the headmaster or other members of the staff meeting (see Coleman 1988). However, I suppose that 
this determinant is of minor relevance because the number of parents with such specific personal contacts must 
be small. 
61  However, as parents who are PA-members are very likely to receive a staff meetings’ proposition that 
corresponds to their request, I assume that very few parents who are PA-members have to think about rejecting. 
Marks might play a minor role or even no role at all since these already have been considered by the staff 
meeting and are captured by their proposition. 
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letter to the minister and they typically have to attend the recall meeting (see Subchapter 
2.3.1). Like the talk with the headmaster, some families may perceive attending he recall 
meeting as psychologically stressful. It appears that it is difficult for a family to assess 
whether the recall meeting will accept their request (i.e. the expectation l) because they do not 
know the members of the recall meeting (e.g. external teachers). However, since the 
concerned student and her parents are typically present in the recall meeting, I assume that 
families who reject a second time assess their abilities to persuade the other members of the 
recall meeting. Therefore, I suggest that when assessing l, the parents take into account their 
cultural capital in terms of linguistic abilities, knowledge of the educational system and self-
assurance in such a specific school context. 
The impact of future expectancies on actual decisions 
In fact, a family’s school track request may be affected by their evaluation of their 
future rejection decisions. That is to say, when a family makes its request, it already considers 
its chances to persuade the headmaster and the recall meeting. These future expectancies can 
be integrated in the model on families’ request: When the staff meeting does not agree with a 
family’s LGT-request (i.e. 1 – l), the weighted costs of status decline (c * SD) only emerge if: 
- the family does not reject; 
- the family rejects, the headmaster does not accept the LGT-request and the family 
does not reject the headmaster’s decision; 
- the family rejects, the headmaster does not accept the LGT-request, the family 
rejects the headmaster’s decision and the recall meeting does neither accept the 
LGT-request. 
Therefore, when families make their school track request, they also have to assess their 
chances to persuade the headmaster and possibly the recall meeting. This reasoning yields a 
complex SEU-function since the evaluation of these expectancies becomes relevant if the 
family has to reject (i.e. when 1 – l = 1). However, in order to keep the model on families’ 
decision-making within the dialogue as parsimonious as possible, I suggest that a family’s 
subjective evaluation of the likelihood that it can persuade the headmaster or the recall 
meeting is captured by its evaluation of the likelihood that the staff meeting will accept an 
LGT-request (l). “Integrating” these future expectancies into the parameter that represents 
family’s evaluation of the likelihood that the staff meeting agrees, seems even more 
reasonable since the factors families consider to assess the likelihood that the staff meeting 
will accept their request (i.e. their cultural capital, involvement in school, student’s marks) 
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correspond to those that tell them their chances to persuade the headmaster and the recall 
meeting. However, as pointed out above, I assume that marks play a minor role when parents 
assess the likelihood that the headmaster or the recall meeting accepts their request while 
parents’ cultural capital strongly influences the evaluation of this expectancy.  
Moreover, in the same ways, the costs of rejection may affect families’ school track 
request. That means, when a family makes a school track request, it not only considers its 
chances to persuade the headmaster and the recall meeting but also takes into account whether 
it is able to bear the “psychological” costs of rejection. Yet, I do not assume that these costs 
are of major importance. Rather, it is a family’s belief in its capacity to have its will – at least 
in the recall meeting – that already affects a family’s making of its request.  
In conclusion, families’ requests are affected by their anticipation of the staff meeting’s 
proposition and the decisions of the headmaster and the recall meeting. The common factors 
that families use to anticipate the school staffs’ decisions are their skills, knowledge and 
experience in dealing with school staff, visible indicators of their commitment to their 
children’s education (i.e. their involvement in school) and student’s school performance (i.e. 
marks and repeated school years). Hence, if “backward-induction” is taken into account, the 
parameter l can more broadly be defined as likelihood that the school staff (i.e. the staff 
meeting or the headmaster or the recall meeting) will accept an LGT-request.62  
5.1.4 THE GENERATION OF SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENTIALS 
Esser (1999b) proposes similar mechanisms (i.e. bridging hypotheses, see Subchapter 
3.2) as Erikson and Jonsson (1996) and Breen and Goldthorpe (1997): social class 
differentials in student’s average performance, social class differences in families’ economic 
resources to account for the costs of education, and social class differences in families’ need 
to have their child attend the general track to preserve the family’s social status. The first 
mechanism causes social class differences in families’ subjective evaluation of the likelihood 
of success (p); the second mechanism explains social class differences in the assessment of 
resources to account for C; the third mechanism corresponds to the relative risk aversion-
mechanism or the educational motivation (c*SD).  
Breen and Yaish (2006) explain the relative risk aversion-mechanism as follows: “[…], 
because young people from different class origins have different threshold levels of education 
                                                 
62  The argument that future expectancies affect actual decisions corresponds to the “backward-induction”-
argument of Breen and Goldthorpe (1997; see Subchapter 3.2.3). 
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that they seek to reach as a minimum, they will differ in the marginal utility they attach to 
higher educational levels, giving rise to different propensities to choose alternative 
educational and non-educational options” (Breen and Yaish 2006: 253). To explain 
educational motivation or the weighted costs of status decline, one must differentiate between 
the costs and the likelihood of status decline. Since children from the lowest social classes 
cannot move downward socially (because they are already at the bottom), they cannot face 
any costs of status decline (-SD). However, the higher the social class a child comes from, the 
higher are the costs of status decline that the family can experience. Furthermore, there are 
social class differences in c the likelihood that the costs of status decline emerge if the child 
does not attend the general track, too: The higher the social class, the more important it is that 
the child attends the general track in order to preserve the family’s social status and hence to 
avoid the costs of status decline.  
According to Esser (1999b) and Breen and Goldthorpe (1997), social classes are not 
supposed to vary with regard to their evaluation of the general benefits (B) they attach to 
attending the general track (see e.g. Becker 2000 for empirical support of this assumption). 
However, Erikson and Jonsson (1996: 22) assume that social classes vary with regard to the 
“consumption value” they attach to certain educational tracks (see also Gambetta 1987 or 
Holm and Jaeger 2008). In line with Esser, I do not assume that there are considerable social 
class differences in families’ subjective evaluation of general joy of learning and attending the 
general track. 
The institutionalized dialogue between family and school claims another mechanism to 
contribute to the generation of social class effects on families’ decisions: social class 
differentials in parents’ cultural capital and involvement in school. I derive this mechanism 
from the suggestion by Lareau and Weininger (2003).63 This mechanism operates through the 
expectation l (i.e. the likelihood that the school accepts the LGT-request) and the costs of 
rejection. Since parents from higher social classes are more likely to have the skills and 
abilities, educational knowledge, trust in the educational system, experience in dealing with 
school staff, etc. (see the literature presented in Subchapter 3.1.3), they are more likely to be 
involved and meet the schools’ standards (i.e. parents’ interest in their child’s education, 
capacities to support the child). Moreover, since they assume that the staff meeting, the 
headmaster and the recall meeting will take into account their involvement and cultural 
                                                 
63 See also, e.g., Pfeffer (2008) or Erikson and Jonsson (1996) on the role of knowledge of the educational 
system. 
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capital (e.g. their knowledge of the educational system), they are more likely to believe that 
the school will accept their LGT-request (l = 1). Furthermore, since parents from higher social 
classes feel more confident in the school context, have the (linguistic) abilities to successfully 
deal with school staff, have experience in communicating with staff, have more knowledge of 
the educational system, etc., they feel less stressed by the talk with the headmaster or their 
attendance at the recall meeting. That is to say, higher-class families have no costs of 
rejection while lower-class families may have.  
5.1.5 HYPOTHESES 
The refined decision-making model yields a set of general and some more specific 
hypotheses on the generation of social class differentials in families’ school track requests 
(H1 to H4c) and their decisions to reject (H5, H5a, H6). The first general hypothesis is:  
H1: The higher the social class position of a family, the higher the likelihood that it 
requests the general upper secondary school track (LGT) instead of the vocational 
school track.64 
The second hypothesis addresses the mediating effect of the core of the decision-making 
model, i.e. the independent decision-making model, which corresponds to the formalized 
model by Esser (1999b): 
H2: The positive effect of social class on requesting LGT is strongly (but not fully) 
mediated by a family’s subjectively expected  
i. Costs of sending the child to the general track (C), 
ii. Likelihood that the child will successfully complete the general track (p) and  
iii. Their educational motivation regarding the general track (c * SD). 
 
The following hypotheses take into account the effects of a family’s subjectively 
expected likelihood that the staff meeting will accept the family’s LGT-request and thereby of 
a family’s subjectively expected chances that the headmaster and possibly the recall meeting 
will accept the LGT-request: 
H3: Apart from the parameters in the core model, a family’s subjectively expected 
likelihood that the staff meeting will propose the general track (l) – represented by 
student’s visible performance, parents’ cultural capital and involvement in school – 
                                                 
64 Even though the formalized model differentiates between the two mutually exclusives alternatives “LGT” and 
“not LGT”, I formulate the hypothesis in view of the empirical analyses that follow. These will separately 
investigate families’ decision between the general and the vocational track and between grade retention and the 
vocational track. 
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also mediates the social class effects on families’ requesting LGT instead of the 
vocational track.65 
Further, the multiplicative relationship between l and the core model yields the 
hypothesis that the effect of the SEU-value that a family would calculate if it were the only 
one to decide (see the independent decision-making model) depends on the likelihood that the 
staff will accept an LGT-request. In testable terms this means:  
H4: As a student’s marks increase (indicating to the family that the staff meeting is 
increasingly likely to accept LGT), the effects of the likelihood of success and of the 
general costs increase,  
and 
H4a: As a student’s marks decrease (indicating to the family that the staff meeting is not 
very likely to accept LGT) the effect of the educational motivation increases.  
The multiplicative terms also yield a hypothesis on a three-way interaction of the 
likelihood that the staff meeting agrees, the chances of success and the weighted costs of 
status decline: 
H4b: Given students have relatively good marks but their parents think they have low 
chances to succeed in the general track, the negative effect of the weighted costs of 
status decline (or, the positive effect of the educational motivation) is greater than if the 
parents estimate the chances of success to be high. 
Moreover, since families take into account their cultural resources and involvement 
especially when it is unclear whether the staff will accept their request, I also hypothesize:  
H4c: Parental involvement and cultural capital have a greater effect when a student’s 
marks are in the middle- and lower-range and have no or very little effects when a 
student’s marks are very high (or near zero).   
With regard to a family’s decision to reject the staff meeting’s proposition, 
hypothesize: 
H5: Given the staff meeting did not accept the LGT-request, families from higher social 
classes are more likely to reject than families from lower classes. 
Addressing the mechanism that generates this social class effect, I posit: 
H5a: This social class effect is mediated by educational motivation, parental cultural 
capital and parental involvement. 
                                                 
65 To directly refer to the formalized model on families’ school track request (Subchapter 5.1.2) and specify most 
concrete hypotheses, I refer to the parameter l as likelihood that the staff meetings accepts an LGT-request. Still, 
taking into account possible “backward-induction”, I also refer to the more general likelihood that the school 
staff will finally accept the family’s LGT-request. 
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Regarding families’ decision to reject the decision by the headmaster, I make the 
similar assumptions. However, I suppose that social class differences are smaller than 
on families’ first rejections because the lower-class families who reject a first time are 
more similar to higher-class families in terms of educational aspirations and cultural 
capital. I hypothesize: 
H6: Given the headmaster did not accept the LGT-request, families from higher social 
classes are slightly more likely to reject the headmaster’s decision than families from 
lower classes. 
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5.2 School’s decision-making 
5.2.1 STAFF MEETING’S SCHOOL TRACK PROPOSITION 
Although the staff meeting consists of several individuals that may have different 
motives, I suggest that it basically acts as a unity. Clearly, the “dominant” members are the 
teachers, class teachers and the headmaster (Masson 1994; Masson 1997). If the teachers 
disagree, they usually find a compromise. Formally, the orientation advisors have an 
important role but in practice the headmasters try to restrict their power because they do not 
act in the same interests (Masson 1994). With regard to parents’ and students’ representatives, 
formally they can object and ask questions but actually they behave rather “passively” 
(Masson 1994).  
I assume that the staff meeting acts rationally. The staff meeting subjectively evaluates 
costs and benefits of choosing LGT for a student and the probabilities that these costs and 
benefits will emerge. Choosing LGT can have positive or negative consequences for the staff 
meeting (mainly for the teachers): The benefits G consist of a good reputation vis-à-vis 
colleagues and the headmaster and professional self-esteem for having taken an appropriate 
decision; the costs (D) consist of a bad reputation, lowered professional self-esteem and 
disapproval by the headmaster.  
A bad reputation and disapproval by the headmaster can be caused because the school 
staff, and in particular the headmaster, try to accomplish low numbers of rejections because 
the educational authorities of the government request schools to do so (e.g. Masson 1994; 
Masson 1997; see also Subchapter 2.3.1). Furthermore, a rejection is only valid if the parents 
attend the obligatory talk with the headmaster. Hence, a rejection implies that the parents 
bother the headmaster and possibly initiate other meetings with the teachers to persuade them. 
Regardless of the rejection, the school staff generally “suffers” from having sent a child to a 
school track he or she will not be able to succeed in. Finally, if the information is spread that a 
school makes inappropriate school track propositions, this could severely harm a school’s 
image. 
The emergence of the benefits and costs depends on probabilities or expectations. The 
staff meeting evaluates the likelihood that the student will succeed in the general track (a) and 
the probability that the family will reject its proposition (r). To assess a, the school staff 
considers visible performance indicators such as a student’s marks and previous grade 
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repetition. Moreover, the staff may factor in ascriptive student traits such as social 
background, different abilities and habits, effort and motivation (see Chapter 4). Finally, I 
assume that the staff factors in traits of the parents such as their competency and willingness 
to support their child’s education and their involvement in school. As argued in the qualitative 
studies presented in Subchapter 3.1.3, teachers “interpret[ed] parental involvement as a 
reflection of the value parents placed on their child’s educational success” (Lareau, 1987: 
81).66  
In order to evaluate r – i.e. the likelihood that the family rejects – the staff meeting 
factors in a family’s school track request, parents’ involvement in school and their cultural 
capital in terms of self-assurance and familiarity with the educational system. The staff 
meeting considers a family’s request because certainly only a family who is proposed a school 
track that not corresponds to its request is likely to reject. Parental involvement generally 
shows the teachers that parents are willing to and experienced in communicating with 
teachers. Moreover, the effect of PA-membership could be due to the fact that the parent 
representatives in the staff meeting very often are members of a PA and teachers perceive 
them as cooperative (Masson 1994).   
The SEU-function for the staff’s decision to choose LGT is: 
SEUS (LGT) = r (–D) + (1 – r) [aG + (1 – a) (–D)]                      (3) 
Equation 3 explicates that if the parents do not reject the staff meeting’s proposition (r = 
0), the emergence of the costs (D) and of the benefits (G) depends only on the likelihood that 
the student succeeds in the general track (a). If the student will succeed, the staff and the 
school will receive the benefit G; if the student will fail, the school has to bear the costs D 
(bad reputation, lowered professional self-esteem, etc.). 67  If the family rejects the staff 
meeting’s proposition (r = 1), the school has to bear the costs D, too. Then, the costs are 
somewhat different because they imply families’ talk with the headmaster, possible meetings 
with the staff and an increase of the rate of rejections (which has to be reported to authorities). 
For purposes of simplicity, I define the costs as one general concept. 
                                                 
66 The staff may also consider the family’s request to assess a: If a family does not request the general track, they 
may not be willing to support their child or they may have not requested the general track because they know 
that they are not able to do so. However, I suppose that this is an indicator of minor importance regarding a but 
of very high importance regarding r. 
67 Indeed, the benefit G does also depend on the probability that the student will actually successfully complete 
the general track. However, for the sake of simplicity, I assume that the staff meeting is very good in predicting a 
student’s chances of succeeding in the general track and, thus, if the teachers think a equals 1, the student is very 
likely to truly succeed. Actually, teachers report to be better than the parents in evaluating students’ future 
chances of success (Masson 1994). 
 
112
The likelihood that a family actually rejects the general track can be supposed to be very 
low, even if it initially has demanded the vocational track or grade retention. Therefore, I 
assume that r is practically always 0 and thus the staff meeting concentrates only on the 
assessment of a when evaluating the subjective expected utility (SEU) of choosing the general 
track. This actually yields the following SEU for choosing LGT: 
SEUS (LGT) = aG + (1 – a) (–D)          (3a) 
By contrast, when assessing the SEU of opting against LGT, the staff is very concerned 
with evaluating the likelihood of rejection (r). While families would rather not reject a 
“higher” proposition by the staff meeting, they are likely to reject a proposition that is 
“lower”.68 The SEU of not choosing LGT is:  
SEUS (notLGT) = r (–D) + (1 – r) [(1 – a) G + a (–D)]        (4) 
Equation 4 outlines that if the staff meeting decides to opt against the general track, it 
will experience the costs D in case the family rejects (r=1). If the family does not reject (r=0), 
the staff meeting will receive the benefits G in case the student succeeds in the lower track (or 
improves during grade repetition); in case the student does not succeed or appears to be too 
good for the vocational track (or grade retention), the school suffers from the costs D.69 
The staff meeting chooses LGT over “not LGT” if:  
SEUS (LGT) > SEUS (notLGT)                       (5) 
or, in more detail: 
aG + (1 – a) (–D) > r (–D) + (1 – r) [(1 – a) G + a (–D)]       (5a) 
Including combinations of a- and r-values in Equation 5a reveals that a student’s 
chances of success (a) only fully determine the staff meeting’s decision if the likelihood that 
the family rejects (r) is very small (see Table A1 in the appendix). By contrast, as the risk that 
a family rejects increases, a student’s chances of success become less relevant. Hence, 
                                                 
68 For this reason, I suppose that the staff meeting reflects on r and a in the following order: Firstly, the teachers 
assess a in order to check whether – if there was no rejection right for the family – they would send the student 
to the general track or not. As outlined before, one can assume that the lower the student’s marks and other 
performance indicators, the more likely the staff would be to opt for a lower track or grade repetition. If the staff 
thinks that it would rather propose a lower track or grade repetition to a student (if there was no rejection 
option), it, secondly, considers whether the family might reject this proposition (r). The theoretical model 
presented in Barg (2012) follows this line of thoughts considering the “order” of the evaluation of a and r.  
69 Since a represents the likelihood that the students succeeds in the general track, 1-a is the “reverse” likelihood 
which corresponds to the likelihood that the student succeeds in the vocational track (or improves during grade 
repetition). In fact, the student could also fail in the vocational track (or during repetition), but I define 1-a that 
way for purposes of simplicity and since the staff meeting actually can choose “only” between LGT and 
notLGT. 
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students whose parents are likely to reject will be proposed the general track at a lower 
performance-level than students whose parents are not likely to reject.  
5.2.2 HEADMASTER’S DECISION AND THE DECISION OF THE RECALL MEETING 
I propose that the model of staff meeting’s decision-making can explain headmasters’ 
decision-making, too. However, the functions of the different parameters differ in some 
respects because the circumstances are somewhat different and headmasters tend to have 
other interests than the teachers (Van Zanten 2002). For instance, headmasters try to 
accomplish low numbers of rejection rates (since these have to be reported to the regional 
authorities and are published), while teachers are more concerned with “student issues” such 
as teaching, evaluating students and placing them in tracks that correspond to their capacities.  
To assess a – the student’s chances of success – the headmaster considers not only the 
student’s marks and other performance indicators, but the content of the mandatory talk with 
the parents as well. The better the parents could persuade the headmaster that they are able to 
support the educational career of their child, the higher the headmaster estimates the student’s 
chances of success. The headmaster might also consider parental involvement and the 
parent’s social class position to assess a student’s probability of success. In order to evaluate 
r, the likelihood that a family rejects his decision and thus initiates the recall meeting, the 
headmaster considers the content of the talk with the parents, too. If the parents were not 
convinced by the headmaster’s arguments and may have directly said that they will reject 
again, the headmaster will be less likely to opt against LGT. Moreover, to assess r, he 
considers their involvement in school and cultural capital in terms of self-assurance in the 
school context, knowledge of the educational system, and so on. Since the headmasters wants 
to keep rejection rates low, I further assume that the likelihood of rejection weighs more than 
the student’s chances of succeeding in the general track. 
The final possible step of the dialogue is the recall meeting. Its decision-making 
considerably differs from the decision-making of staff meetings and headmasters. Since the 
recall meeting’s decision is binding and the family cannot reject it, the members do not have 
to consider a probability such as r. Second, as the recall meeting is attended by external 
teachers who have a lot to say in the decision-making procedure, costs and benefits 
concerning a school’s image, disapproval by the school’s headmaster and teachers of the 
school have no impact. However, the external school staff may subjectively evaluate possible 
costs such as lowered professional self-esteem for having taken an inappropriate decision or 
the unpleasant feeling of not having accomplished the requirements of the educational 
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authorities. Therefore, a recall-meeting’s decision-making is mainly driven by its evaluation 
of a student’s chances of success. To evaluate these, I maintain, the recall meeting not only 
considers student’s performance but parents’ cultural capital and other indicators of their 
capacities to support the student. Finally, parental involvement in terms of PA-membership 
may play a role since representatives of PAs attend the recall meeting. 
5.2.3 THE GENERATION OF SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENTIALS 
I argue that social class differentials in the staff meeting’s decision-making emerge 
through three mechanisms. The first mechanism is social class differences in families’ school 
track requests. According to the rational action approach to social inequality in educational 
attainment (see Subchapter 3.2) and in line with the model developed in the first part of the 
present chapter, families from higher social classes are supposed to be more likely to request 
the general track. This mechanism affects r, i.e. school staff’s subjectively evaluated 
probability that the family will reject their decision: The higher a family’s social background, 
the higher the probability that the family requests LGT and hence the higher the likelihood 
that the family will reject the staff meeting’s proposition (if this is not LGT). The second 
mechanism refers to the primary effects. Teachers consider a student’s school performance to 
evaluate the student’s chances to succeed in the general track (a). Since social class is 
strongly associated with school performance, teacher evaluations of students’ chances to 
succeed in the general track strongly depend on students’ social origin.  
The third mechanism operates through social class differentials in parents’ cultural 
capital and involvement in school. Like in the model on families’ decision-making, the basis 
of this mechanism is Lareau and Weininger’s (2003) suggestion of using the concept of 
cultural capital in family-school interactions: Since families from higher social classes are 
better equipped with linguistic abilities, self-assurance, knowledge of the educational system, 
etc., than parents from lower classes, they are more capable to meet the standards of the 
school and therefore teachers “reward” them with preferable treatment. In fact, I argue that 
teachers and the headmaster perceive such parents as better able to support their children (see 
the literature presented in Subchapter 3.1.3). Hence, parents’ cultural capital and involvement 
affects the staff meeting’s evaluation of students’ chances of success (a) and thereby 
generates a middle-class bias in their evaluation. At the same time, the staff meeting considers 
parents’ cultural capital and involvement to assess the likelihood of rejection (r), too. Parents 
who are involved, act self-confident in the school context, show their knowledge and 
experience of the educational system or their abilities to deal with school staff appear to be 
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more willing to reject the staff meeting’s and the headmaster’s decision. Therefore, school 
staff tends to assess higher-class parents as more likely to reject than lower-class parents. 
5.2.4 HYPOTHESES  
I advance a number of general and more specific hypotheses that deal with staff 
meetings’ propositions (H7-H9). I keep short assumptions on the decisions of the headmaster 
and the recall meeting (H11). 
The first hypothesis on staff meetings’ decision-making addresses the general impact of 
student social class: 
H7: The higher the social class position of a family, the more likely is the staff meeting 
to propose the general track (LGT) instead of the vocational track. 
The second hypothesis takes into account the parameters the staff meeting subjectively 
evaluates. It posits that the positive effect of student’s social background on the probability 
that the staff meeting proposes LGT operates through the staff meeting’s subjectively 
expected benefit of student success (G), costs of an “inappropriate” decision and parent 
rejection (D), likelihood that the child will successfully complete the general track (a) and 
likelihood that the family rejects the staff meeting’s proposition (r). Since a staff meeting 
mainly takes into account student’s performance and the family’s school track request to 
assess student’s chances of success and the likelihood of rejection, I hypothesize: 
H8: The positive effect of student’s social background on the likelihood that the staff 
meeting proposes the general track is mediated by student’s school performance and 
the school track request of the family.  
Since the staff meeting also takes into account parents’ cultural capital (i.e. knowledge 
of the educational system, linguistic abilities, etc.) and their involvement in school to assess 
the likelihood that the family rejects (r) and a student’s chances of success (a), I further posit: 
H9: The positive effect of student’s social background on the likelihood that the staff 
meeting proposes the general track is also mediated by parents’ cultural capital and 
involvement in school. 
The theory yields an interaction of indicators of the likelihood of rejection (r) and the 
chances of success (a): When a student’s performance is relatively high, the staff meeting 
does not have to worry about rejections because it will anyway propose the general track. 
However, the poorer the performance of a student, the more the meeting tends to not propose 
the general track and thus the more it is concerned with the likelihood that the family rejects. 
Therefore, I hypothesize: 
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H10: Positive effects of indicators of the likelihood that a family rejects (family’s school 
track request, parental involvement and cultural capital, family’s social class) are 
greater when the student’s performance is in the lower- or middle-ranges; when the 
student is performing very well, the effects are low or even zero. 
As the staff meeting is worried about keeping rejection rates low, it takes even more 
account of the requests of families who are likely to reject than of families who are not likely 
to reject.  Since parents’ cultural capital and their involvement indicate to the staff meeting 
whether they are likely to reject, I assume: 
H10a: The staff meeting takes more account of a family’s request when the parents 
appear to be well equipped with cultural capital or are involved in school. 
Finally, with regard to headmasters’ and recall meetings’ decisions, I assume that social 
class differences are relatively small because families are more similar in terms of cultural 
capital and other relevant factors. I posit: 
H11: Student social class has a small effect on a headmaster’s and recall meeting’s 
decision. 
5.3 Grade retention decisions 
Within the French institutionalized dialogue, families, staff meetings, headmasters and 
the recall meeting can also opt for grade retention (see Subchapter 2.3.1). It is argued that the 
retention option is used as a compromise (e.g. Duru-Bellat 2002; Duru-Bellat, Jarousse and 
Mingat 1993; Roux and Davaillon 2001): If a student has rather low marks indicating that the 
general track might not be the appropriate educational path for him, families and school staff 
may prefer to let him repeat the school year in order to give him the chance to catch up. 
Moreover, previous research found that families of higher social origin are more likely to opt 
for grade retention instead of a lower track (e.g. Kloosterman and de Graaf 2010). This 
finding indicates that families who have more to loose from not sending their child to the 
general track and who can bear possible costs of grade repetition make use of the grade 
retention option. Likewise, families’ from higher social classes are more likely to receive a 
grade retention proposition than working-class families (Roux and Davaillon 2001).  
In the following sections, I apply the theoretical arguments developed in Subchapter 5.1 
and 5.2 to families’ and school staffs’ decisions between grade retention and the vocational 
track. The goal of this application is to explain why families from higher social class are more 
likely to request grade retention instead of the lower vocational track and why school staff – 
notably, the staff meeting – is more likely to propose grade retention (instead of a lower track) 
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to higher-class families. From this application of the theoretical model developed above, I 
derive hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical analysis of this dissertation. 
5.3.1 FAMILY’S GRADE RETENTION REQUEST 
The model refined in Subchapter 5.1.2 can be applied to families’ choice between grade 
retention and the vocational track. However, the family additionally takes into account costs 
of grade retention and the likelihood that the student improves during grade repetition. 
Moreover, a family differently evaluates the likelihood that the staff meeting agrees with the 
grade retention request. The costs of retention consist of direct and indirect economic costs 
(e.g. forgone earnings because of a later labor market entry; see Jacob and Tieben 2009: 751) 
and of social, psychological and educational costs, too. Students who repeat a grade lose their 
peers and have to find new friends. Moreover, they lose self-esteem and motivation because 
grade retention indicates academic failure (Cosnefroy and Rocher 2004; Holmes and 
Matthews 1994).70 Yet, the social and psychological costs were found mostly for students who 
involuntarily repeat. Hence, they may be less important when students and their parents 
voluntarily choose retention. By contrast, economic and educational costs emerge in any case. 
Educational costs are a lowered educational achievement in the long run (Holmes and 
Matthews 1994; Jimerson 1999; Jimerson, Anderson and Whipple 2002; Roderick 1994). 
In the very short run, however, grade retention can have positive effects on a student’s 
performance (e.g. Hong and Raudenbush 2005). Usually, during the repeated grade students 
get better marks than in the year before because they are taught the same learning content. 
Therefore, I assume that families demand grade repetition in order to give their children the 
chance to improve during the repeated grade. More specifically, the family hopes that the 
student’s performance increases enough so that he is admitted to the general track. This 
likelihood that the student improves enough during grade repetition so as to be admitted to the 
general track determines whether the family ultimately will have to face the costs of status 
decline or whether the student will get access to the general track and possibly will finally 
maintain the family’s social status. If the student does not improve during the repeated grade, 
he will not be admitted to the general track and thus the costs of status decline will emerge. If 
the student improves, he will be admitted to the general track and the costs of status decline 
                                                 
70 Caille and O’Prey (2005) however provide contradicting evidence: they show that among students attaining 
the end of secondary school those who repeated grades during primary or secondary education have only 
marginally less self-confidence than students who did not report. 
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then depend on student’s chances to successfully complete the general track (i.e. the 
parameter p in Equation 2). 
I propose that the most important indicator of a student’s chances to improve during 
grade repetition is previous grade repetition: If a student who already repeated grades is still 
poorly performing when he attains the transition to upper secondary school, the family sees 
that the previously repeated grades obviously have not led to an improvement of the student’s 
achievement. From this perception, they deduce that another repeated grade would probably 
not further increase the student’s performance. Moreover, this indicates that the student is not 
very likely to successfully complete the general track. 
As outlined above, since the school has the final say, families have to consider the 
likelihood that the staff meeting will accept their request. According to the literature, they 
demand grade retention when the risk is high that the staff meeting not accepts an LGT-
request. Therefore, I assume that families demand grade retention when students’ marks are 
relatively low or in the middle-range. Moreover, if a student has marks in the middle-range, 
the family is not sure about his or her chances of succeeding in the general track and hence an 
additional year can help the family to better evaluate the student’s chances of success. With 
regard to the specific likelihood that the staff meeting accepts a grade retention-request, I 
argue that previous grade repetition is the major indicator again: If a student has repeated 
grades before the family thinks that the school will strongly advise against another repetition 
because the student is already older than the other students and because previous grade 
repetition did obviously not help the student to improve.  
Three main mechanisms generate social class differentials in families’ decision to 
request grade retention instead of the vocational track: First, as higher social classes hold 
more monetary resources, they are more capable of bearing the direct and indirect economic 
costs of grade retention. Second, since families from higher social classes need their children 
to attend the general track to preserve their social status, they have more to loose from letting 
their child attend the vocational track (instead of using grade repetition as a second chance). 
In other words, since the educational motivation or the costs of status decline of families from 
higher classes are stronger, they are more willing to let their child repeat a grade so as to get 
access to the general track one year later. Third, social class differences in previous grade 
repetition cause social class differences in families’ assessment of their children’s chances to 
improve during grade repetition. Since children from lower classes are more likely to have 
repeated grades previously (i.e. the primary effects), they and their parents are more likely to 
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think that they will not improve during another repeated grade. This mechanism also affects 
families’ evaluation of the chances that the staff meeting accepts a grade retention request: If 
a student has repeated grades before, the staff meeting is very likely to not accept another 
repetition. 
This reasoning yields the following hypotheses: 
H12: Families from higher social classes are more likely to request grade retention 
(instead of the vocational track) than families from lower social classes. 
H13: The effect of social class on families’ choice of grade retention over the lower 
track is mediated by families’ subjective assessment of their resources to account for the 
economic costs of retention, their educational motivation and students’ previous grade 
repetition. 
Since families demand grade retention when the risk is high that the staff meeting does 
not accept an LGT-request, I posit: 
H13a: When a student’s mark is low, the likelihood that a family chooses grade 
retention instead of the vocational track is the highest. 
5.3.2 STAFF MEETING’S GRADE RETENTION PROPOSITION  
To address staff meetings’ decision between grade retention and the vocational track, I 
apply the model developed in Subchapter 5.2. The staff meeting makes its grade retention 
proposition in the same way as its LGT-proposition except that the parameters are defined 
somewhat differently: The staff meeting takes into account specific costs and benefits of 
grade retention and the probability that the student improves during the repetition. The costs 
of grade retention consist of the “burden” of having to teach the low-performing student again 
and of disapproval by colleagues, the headmaster and other parents. Teachers and 
headmasters want to avoid high rates of grade repetitions because these indicate that a school 
system is poorly performing (Ryan and Watson 2006). Moreover, high numbers of retained 
students increase economic costs for the school and for higher administrative institutions 
because they lead to higher class sizes and more need for teachers and learning material (Bali, 
Anagnostopoulos and Roberts 2005; Schnurr, Kundert and Nickerson 2009). Finally, similar 
to the rejection rates, the French government requires the schools to keep retention rates low 
(Masson 1997).  
According to interviews with school psychologists who are involved in the decision-
making process, the benefit of grade retention is that it “gives immature students the chance 
to grow up” (Schnurr, Kundert and Nickerson 2009: 414). In other words, teachers retain 
students so that they can improve their performance during the repeated year. In view of the 
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transition to upper secondary school, I suggest that teachers also propose retention when they 
are not sure about a student’s chances of succeeding in the general track. After another school 
year the teachers will know better which school track is appropriate.   
To evaluate students’ chances to improve, the staff meeting considers – like the families 
– previous grade repetition. If the student has repeated grades previously and still is not 
performing very well, repetition of another school year will probably not help her improve. 
Moreover, the staff meeting takes into account parental involvement and cultural capital to 
assess whether a student’s parents are capable of supporting the student to improve during 
grade repetition. These factors also influence the staff meeting’s evaluation of the likelihood 
that the family rejects their proposition. Another important indicator of the likelihood of 
rejection is, again, family’s request: If a family has requested grade retention, it will not 
reject; if it has requested the general track, it is very likely to reject an LPA-proposition but 
less likely to reject a retention-proposition because this implies that the child has the chance 
to get access to the general track one year later. 
Four mechanisms generate effects of students’ social class on the likelihood that the 
staff meeting proposes grade retention instead of the vocational track: First, since students 
from higher social classes are more likely to request the general track and grade retention, 
they appear more likely to reject if the staff meeting proposes the vocational track. Second, as 
students from higher social classes have, on average, better marks and, most importantly, are 
less likely to have repeated grades before, they appear to be more likely to improve during 
grade retention. Third, due to social class differences in the “cultural capital that meets the 
standards of the school” and in parents’ involvement, the staff meeting thinks that families 
from higher social classes will better support their children during the repeated school year. 
Also, these social class differences may cause the staff meeting to think that parents from 
higher social classes are more likely to reject. 
In view of this theoretical reasoning, I hypothesize: 
H14: The staff meeting is more likely to propose grade retention instead of the 
vocational track to families from higher social classes than to families from lower 
classes. 
H15: The positive effect of student social class on the probability that the staff meeting 
proposes grade retention instead of the vocational track is mediated by previous grade 
repetition, families’ school track request, parental involvement and cultural capital.  
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6 Previous Research 
This chapter presents selected empirical studies on families’ and teachers’ making of 
school track decisions. The findings of these studies address theoretical assumptions similar 
to the hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical part of this dissertation. To gain insights 
in the detailed decision-making processes of families, I give an overview over the theoretical 
arguments, empirical applications and results of most direct well-known empirical tests of the 
RAT-models on educational choices. In order to outline the state of knowledge of teachers’ 
decision-making, I present qualitative and quantitative studies that indicate why teachers take 
into account students’ social origin and factors that are related to students’ social origin. 
Finally, I describe procedures and results of selected studies that analyze grade retention 
decisions. 
6.1 Family’s decision-making 
For the last ten years a set of attempts has been made to empirically test the RAT-
models on educational decision-making. These previous analyses vary with regard to the 
specific hypotheses they derive and the findings they provide. In particular, they are not 
equally capable of testing the most detailed hypotheses or the full explanatory power of the 
model. This is because most available secondary data does not enable researchers to directly 
operationalize all of the decision-making parameters that are required by the theoretical 
model. As the empirical analysis presented in this thesis attempts to be a most appropriate test 
of the theoretical model developed in Subchapter 5.1, it is important to outline how previous 
research has addressed this task. Therefore, the following sections not only provide 
summaries of the theoretical assumptions and findings of these previous analyses, they also 
focus on the operationalization of the decision-making parameters. 
6.1.1 TESTED THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
In the last decade, numerous studies provided empirical tests of the Breen and 
Goldthorpe-model (B&G-model). These studies are mainly concerned with testing 
assumptions that follow from the relative risk aversion-mechanism or from the theoretical 
foundation of this mechanism, i.e. the “positional theory” by Keller and Zavalloni (1964). As 
a most general assumption following from this mechanism some authors suggest: students 
want to attain an educational level that is at least the same as the educational level of their 
parents’ (Holm and Jaeger 2008; Need and De Jong 2002). Further, the basic testable 
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hypothesis that is typically derived posits: given the same subjectively evaluated likelihood of 
success and costs of education, families from higher social classes are more likely to choose 
higher educational tracks or continuation in education than families from lower classes (Breen 
and Yaish 2006; Davies, Heinesen and Holm 2002; Holm and Jaeger 2008; Need and De Jong 
2002). An empirical test of this hypothesis implies that a social class effect on educational 
choices remains after controlling for a family’s economic resources and the student’s school 
performance. By contrast, according to human capital theory for instance, no such effect of 
social background remains (Davies, Heinesen and Holm 2002). 
More specific hypotheses derived from the relative risk aversion-mechanism deal with 
the shape of the relationship between social origin and the utility assigned to different 
attainable educational levels. Davies, Heinesen and Holm (2002), for instance, confront the 
B&G-model with human capital theory: On the one hand, they argue, the B&G-model posits 
that the function of the benefits of educational choices and parent’s education has a “kink”, or 
discontinuity, when the child reaches the parents’ educational level. Before reaching this 
point, the slope increases sharply; beyond it, the function remains constant. On the other hand, 
human capital theory suggests that there should be no such kinks. Accordingly, Holm and 
Jaeger (2008) argue that the points or thresholds (in an educational career) at which the costs 
of attaining a certain educational level outweigh the benefit vary by individual’s social 
background. They maintain that individuals gain a utility “bonus” when they reach the same 
class as their parents and, since the marginal costs of going even further in the educational 
system may increase faster than the utility of that additional education, individuals from some 
classes do not wish to attain a class that is higher than that of their parents. Therefore, the 
desire to avoid downward social mobility has a much stronger impact than the wish to move 
socially upward. Also Breen and Yaish (2006) give considerable attention to the shape of the 
function of the utility of educational choices and social origin as they provide detailed 
hypotheses on the associations between each EGP-class of origin and specific levels in the 
educational system. 
Another hypothesis derived from the relative risk aversion-mechanism is that students 
and parents from all social classes fear social decline to the same extent (Gabay-Egozi, Shavit 
and Yaish 2010; Stocké 2007; Van de Werfhorst and Hostede 2007). In testable terms this 
means that social class should have no effect on a family’s desire to have the child maintain 
the family’s social status. Similarly, it is assumed that social classes do not vary with regard 
to the utility they assign to income, unemployment protection or occupational prestige and 
their assessment of their own performance net of their actual ability (e.g. Gabay-Egozi, Shavit 
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and Yaish 2010). In other words, there should be no net social class effect on parents’ and 
students’ subjective evaluation of objective conditions and events. For example, if a student 
coming from a family belonging to an intermediate social class does not manage to attain an 
occupation that assigns her to the intermediate social class, the student and her family will be 
as sad and unhappy as would be a higher class family whose child does not attain a job in the 
higher class. In the same line, a working-class student and a higher-class student will assign 
the same level of likelihood of success to a specific mark, for instance. 
Moreover, the available secondary data determines the deduction of hypotheses on 
whether the theoretical models are capable of explaining the full social class differences. For 
example, Becker and Hecken (2009b) try to operationalize all the components of Esser’s 
model to explain social class differences in tertiary education decisions. They hypothesize an 
“exhaustive explanation of social origin effects” (Becker and Hecken 2009b: 30; see also 
Becker 2000). Stocké (2007) who provides a very comprehensive test of the model by Breen 
and Goldthorpe investigates whether the model is a “valid and complete theory for explaining 
educational choices and class inequality herein” (Stocké 2007: 506, highlighting like in 
original). As Stocké uses data that enable a direct test of the model, he can test the hypothesis 
that no mechanisms contrary to those advanced by the B&G-model (e.g. social class 
differences in norms and values) generate observed social class effects. Gabay-Egozi, Shavit 
and Yaish (2010) provide another comprehensive empirical analysis of the model and analyze 
whether the mechanisms underlying the theoretical model can fully explain why students’ 
choices of subjects that are more or less relevant for their future educational career vary by 
their social background.  
Some studies additionally refine the theoretical model and derive hypotheses that go 
beyond those typically deduced from the B&G-model. For instance, Jaeger’s extension (2007) 
disentangles economic and social returns and yields the assumption that the social returns to 
educational choices do not only consist of maintaining the social status of one’s family but of 
staying in contact with peers, too. Holm and Jaeger (2008) put forward the role of 
instantaneous as opposed to future utility (see Subchapter 3.3.2). From this refinement of the 
original model follows the hypothesis that social class differences in the immediate pleasure 
of following a general educational track contribute to the generation of secondary effects. 
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Few studies test Esser’s model (1999b).71 Becker (2000) tests both the model by Erikson 
and Jonsson (1996) and Esser’s model (1999b). As outlined in Subchapter 3.2.4, he moreover 
extends the models by factoring in the institutional context. In this extended model, he 
assumes that teacher recommendations and parents’ effort to influence the teachers cause 
discrepancies between families’ educational intentions and their actual choices. In a later 
study, Becker (2003) applies Esser’s model to explain why social class differences in 
educational attainment have pertained over the last decades in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, despite of the overall educational expansion. Notably, he hypothesizes that the 
impact of the educational motivation (c*SD) has increased: Since educational expansion has 
depressed the relative value of educational credentials, the subjectively expected costs of 
status decline have become more important and this particularly may be the case for families 
with parents who have profited from educational expansion.  
Even though Stocké (2007) tests the B&G-model, his elaborate approach to the relative 
risk aversion-mechanism could be interpreted as a test of the effect of Esser’s concepts of 
costs and likelihood of status decline. Stocké specifies two components: First, the importance 
parents attach to their child’s maintaining the family’s social status and second the 
instrumental value they assign to different educational attainments with regard to labour-
market outcomes. This value is the basis for parents’ expectations of the likelihood that each 
of the educational attainments will preserve the family’s social status. Stocké assumes that 
this value increases with the educational attainment that is considered; for the same 
educational credential, it increases the lower the social class of the family; and, it is more 
differentiated between the attainments the higher the social class of the family. 
6.1.2 OPERATIONALIZATION AND DEGREE OF DIRECT TESTING  
Previous studies considerably vary with regard to their capacities to directly test the 
theoretical models. Generally, there are two strategies for the testing of theoretical models 
with survey data.72 The direct strategy requires the measurement of the utilities that the actor 
assigns to each of the alternatives that she has and the decision that she actually takes (Brüderl 
2004: 167-169). To capture these utilities, researchers must measure respondents’ 
                                                 
71 This could be due to the fact that the original work is written in German and no comprehensive outline of the 
theory is available in English. 
72 Here, the term “theoretical models” indicates that not only models based on RAT but decision theories in 
general can – in principle – be tested with these two strategies. However, since models based on RAT are very 
precise and, hence, generally suit empirical tests, while it is basically more difficult to test most competing 
decision theories, the presentation of the two strategies will focus on the testing of models based on RAT 
(Brüderl 2004: 166). 
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expectations and their perceived costs and benefits (Kroneberg and Kalter 2012). For 
instance, Stocké (2007) uses a measure of the likelihood of success that is based on a question 
that asked the parents how likely they think it is that their child will successfully complete 
different educational degrees. To measure costs and benefits, respondents are typically asked 
how good or bad, or how important specific consequences would be for them (Kroneberg and 
Kalter 2012). As it is often impossible to observe the rational decision-making processes 
directly (Hedström and Swedberg 1996), other ways must be found to evaluate theories 
empirically. 
The indirect strategy does not use measures of respondents’ expectancies, costs and 
benefits and requires the introduction of additional assumptions (Brüderl 2004: 169-170). 
These hypotheses can correspond to the “bridging hypotheses” (Kroneberg and Kalter 2012; 
see Subchapter 3.2). They assume that in a certain social situation the utility of one alternative 
is greater than the utility of another alternative and hence actors will choose the first 
alternative if they are in that certain social situation. The indirect strategy consists of using 
survey data to test these introduced hypotheses. To do so, survey data has to provide measures 
of the social situations the actors are in and the decisions they actually take. Consequently, 
one finds evidence supporting the theoretical model if the data reveals that an actor chooses 
the decision that is predicted by the introduced assumption. For instance, if a researcher wants 
to empirically examine the effect of individuals’ subjective assessments of their economic 
resources to bear the costs of a certain educational pathway on choosing that certain pathway, 
he could use income as a measure of individuals’ social situations. He would then introduce 
the assumption that if an individual has a high income, the individual thinks that she can bear 
the costs of the educational pathway and consequently she chooses that pathway. If the 
empirical test reveals that income has a positive effect on choosing the certain educational 
pathway, the test provides support in favor of the theoretical model.  
Actually, a lot of economists (and some social scientists) are not convinced that RAT 
can be tested with survey data (Brüderl 2004: 164). Then again, it is argued that the utilization 
of survey data enables sociologists who do quantitative research to go beyond the mere 
“lumping together” of variables and to do sophisticated empirical analyses of specific theories 
(Brüderl 2004; Goldthorpe 1996a; Goldthorpe 2001). Survey data is supposed to suit the 
analysis of RAT very well since RAT does not assume that an actor’s decision is determined 
by his or her characteristics. Instead, it maintains that an actor’s choice of an alternative 
depends on the restrictions of the social situation the actor is in (e.g. social class position or 
available economic resources). Survey data can easily provide information on such 
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restrictions but has more problems in validly measuring individuals’ characteristics (Brüderl 
2004: 165). Therefore, applying survey data to RAT enables quantitative researchers to do 
more than “variable sociology” and, at the same time, this “alliance” provides RAT with 
efficient data (Goldthorpe, 1996a, Brüderl, 2004).73 
In my view, the study by Stocké (2007) and the study by Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and 
Yaish (2010) provide very direct tests of the B&G-model. Yet, some contributions make use 
of variables that come considerably close to some theoretical decision-making components 
(e.g. Becker 2003; Becker and Hecken 2009b; Van de Werfhorst and Hostede 2007). 
It is a difficult endeavor to directly operationalize relative risk aversion or the costs and 
likelihood of status decline. Consequently, there are a variety of such attempts. To measure 
the costs of status decline, Becker (2000, 2003) used parents’ wish that their child reaches the 
same educational attainment as their own, the discrepancy between the occupation of the head 
of the household and the occupation anticipated for the child, and the correspondence of 
parents’ “educational affinity” and that of the higher social class. Becker and Hecken (2008, 
2009a, 2009b) also employed students’ answers to the general question “how good are 
chances in the labor market for graduates of vocational training without university degree?”. 
To operationalize the likelihood of status decline Becker (2003) used student’s subjective 
assessment of the impact of education on status decline and attitudes towards insuperable 
barriers between social classes. Also, he constructed a variable that indicates whether the 
parents aspire after a certificate for their child that is lower than their own. Becker and 
Hecken (2009b) used the question “do you think that vocational qualification and further 
education will provide you with the same occupational opportunities as a university degree?” 
to operationalize the likelihood of status decline that students associate with not attending 
university studies.  
To analyze the effect of family’s relative risk aversion, Stocké (2007) simultaneously 
used two variables: With parents’ answers to the question “would you please tell me how 
strongly it would bother you if your child reached a less prestigious occupation than yourself” 
(Stocké 2007: 517) he operationalized the importance parents attach to status maintenance. To 
measure the “status maintenance-value” parents associate with different educational 
attainments, he used information on whether parents think that different attainments will 
enable their child to reach an occupation that is at least as prestigious as their own. In my 
                                                 
73 Lately, experiments have increasingly been lead to analyze RAT. However, the disadvantage of these projects 
is that its results are only hardly generalizable (Brüderl 2004: 165). 
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view, these two measures would suit the operationalization of the costs and likelihood of 
status decline, too.  
Need and De Jong (2002) examined the relative risk aversion-mechanism by means of 
student’s aspiration after the same educational level as that of their parents. Subsequently, 
authors employed elaborate item batteries including wordings such as “I find it important to 
achieve a better job than my parents”, “I want to achieve a higher level of education than my 
parents”, “my parents would dislike it if I found a worse job than they have” and “I am afraid 
to achieve a lower position than my parents later in life” (Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede 
2007, Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish 2010). Some authors further split such items in those 
that measure relative risk aversion and others that represent the aspiration after upward social 
mobility (e.g. Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish 2010). 
Some authors moreover operationalize benefits that students and parents attach to 
certain educational diploma. 74 The evaluation of these benefits Moreover, Breen and Yaish 
(2006) operationalize the information that the young men in their analysis sample use to form 
their beliefs on the utilities of educational attainments by a variable that indicates the 
association between educational attainment and class position of older men. Becker (2003) 
employs student’s assumption that the upper secondary school certificate (Abitur) is needed to 
realize occupational opportunities and status and Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish (2010) who 
analyze social class differences in curricula choice use students’ assessments of the 
likelihoods that success in each of the different subjects will admit to university studies.  
Measures of students’ and parents’ subjective evaluation of the likelihood of success 
differ mainly on whether subjective or “objective” performance indicators are used. I put the 
word objective in quotation marks since some indicators such as marks or other teacher 
evaluations could be affected by middle-class biases (see Chapter 4). The most direct 
operationalization is based upon parents’ or students’ evaluation of the likelihood that the 
student completes a certain school track (Becker 2003; Need and De Jong 2002; Stocké 
2007). Another quite direct measure is students’ expectation that they would get a good or bad 
mark in a certain educational track (Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish 2010) or their self-
reported ability (Davis, Heinesen and Holm 2002). Some studies partly rely on performance 
indicators such as marks and teacher evaluations (Becker 2003) while most use (students’ 
                                                 
74 In fact, class-specific norms, values and knowledge could produce social class differences in the perception of 
the benefits of educational attainments such as access to university. This is no core benefit-mechanism; the 
important benefit that creates social class differences in families’ decisions is the “maintenance of family’s 
social status”. 
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reports of) scores on standardized tests (Breen and Yaish 2006; Holm and Jaeger 2008; Jaeger 
2007; Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede 2007). Authors that have on hand both types of 
measures find that they strongly correlate (e.g. Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish 2010; Need 
and De Jong 2002; Stocké 2007). 
The most direct measurements of the subjectively evaluated costs of education are 
parents’ report of how strongly the child’s attendance at the different available tracks would 
be a financial burden for the family (Stocké 2007) or whether the child’s transition to further 
secondary education would cause the family to make savings (Becker 2003). Indirect 
measurements, which generally consist of evaluations of families’ economic situations, can be 
further divided into direct and indirect measurements of families’ economic situations: On the 
one hand, family income is a quite direct indicator of families’ resources to account for the 
costs of education (Davis Heinesen and Holm 2002; Need and De Jong 2002). On the other 
hand, more indirect variables are number of siblings, presence of household objects such as 
computer or dishwasher, type of housing (e.g. rented, private) and number of rooms in that 
accommodation (Becker 2003; Breen and Yaish 2006; Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish 2010). 
There is evidence in favor of the “measurement assumptions” that link such objective 
circumstances (e.g. number of siblings and household income) with families’ subjective 
evaluation of the costs (Stocké 2007).  
Finally, concerning the central explanatory variable student social origin, previous 
operationalizations vary on whether they use parents’ social class (e.g. Breen and Yaish 2006; 
Stocké 2007) or educational attainment (e.g. Davies, Heinesen and Holm 2002; Gabay-Egozi, 
Shavit and Yaish 2010; Need and De Jong 2002; Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede 2007) and 
on whether they observe the higher degree among both parents (e.g. Davies, Heinesen and 
Holm 2002; Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish 2010; Need and De Jong 2002; Stocké 2007) or 
only that of the head of the household (e.g. Becker 2003; Breen and Yaish 2006; Holm and 
Jaeger 2008). In my view, the most appropriate operationalization is clearly the one that is 
suggested and realized by the designers of the theoretical model, i.e. EGP-class. Moreover, 
taking account of both parents’ social class appears to be the method that is most up to date. 
Chapter 7, which generally presents the research design, gives a detailed outline of the EGP-
schema and the reasons for using information on both parents’ class. 
6.1.3 FINDINGS  
Only the very direct empirical tests can provide evidence in favor or against the 
assumption that the theoretical models are able to explain the “full amount” of social class 
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differentials in families’ educational choices. The study by Stocké (2007), which analyses 
social class effects on German students’ transitions from lower to upper secondary education, 
appears to be the most direct test up to now. It reveals that the expected mechanisms cannot 
fully account for the social class effects: Even when the elaborate measures of subjective 
costs, subjective likelihood of success and the status maintenance motive are factored in, 
families from the service class are more likely to choose higher school tracks. Gabay-Egozi, 
Shavit and Yaish (2010) who provide another quite direct test of the B&G-model analyze 
students’ choices between subjects that strongly determine their subsequent school career. 
Like Stocké, they find that the theoretical model cannot fully explain social class differentials 
in these choices. The same is for Becker (2000) who tests Esser’s (1999b) model: The 
variables he uses to operationalize the decision-making parameters produce only a low model 
fit and do not fully account for the social class effects on families’ educational intentions (i.e. 
their planned educational decisions). By contrast, Becker and Hecken (2009b) find evidence 
in favor of their hypothesis on an “exhaustive explanation of social origin effects on higher 
education access”. 
The finding that most direct tests cannot fully explain the secondary effects is very 
important: it indicates that more mechanisms than those suggested by the theoretical models 
generate social class effects on educational decisions. Stocké (2007) suggests that these are 
social class differences in information search strategies, values attached to education or 
systematically biased perceptions of returns to educational attainments and the likelihood of 
reaching these. As they find that no social effect on curricula choice remains when they 
control for economic resources and school performance, Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish 
(2010) conclude that the primary effects are more important than the model assumes. Finally, 
the interpretation by Becker (2000) corresponds to the assumptions of the theoretical model 
developed in Chapter 5: The institutional context in which families make their decisions 
produces additional mechanisms that contribute to the generation of social class effects. In the 
German system such additional mechanisms could be a family’s evaluation of the teacher 
recommendation, the effort they have put in influencing the teachers and other family 
resources (Becker 2000: 465). 
Even though previous research does not show that the theoretically expected 
mechanisms explain the full extent of social class effects, it provides evidence in favor of 
some specific hypotheses derived from the decision-making models. For instance, Davies, 
Heinesen and Holm (2002) find, as they hypothesized, a “kink” in the function of some of 
students’ educational choices and their parents’ education when students attain the 
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educational level of their parents. Moreover, Becker’s (2003) results indicate that Esser’s 
SEU-model can explain a considerable part of the development of social stratification in 
Germany since the 1950s: As expected, for instance, the effect of educational motivation has 
considerably increased over time and the effect of costs of education has decreased. With 
regard to the relative risk aversion-mechanism, Need and De Jong (2002) show that students 
aspire after the same educational level as that of their parents and Breen and Yaish (2006) 
interpret net effects of certain EGP-class on choices at specific educational levels as evidence 
supporting the mechanism.  
While some of the basic mechanisms are found to have the expected impacts on 
educational choices, the most important – relative risk aversion – is only partly supported. 
Gabay-Egozi and colleagues (2010) find that school performance, the benefit-evaluation and 
relative failure expectations have strong effects on curricula choices, but relative risk aversion 
has no such effect. Similarly, the analysis of secondary school track choices by Stocké (2007) 
detects no impact of the importance attached to status maintenance but strong positive effects 
of subjective likelihood of success and the suitability of the educational degrees for the 
preservation of family’s social status. Using these findings to evaluate the model by Esser, 
one could cautiously infer that Stockés’ results do not support the effect of the costs of status 
decline but those of the likelihood of status decline. Becker (2000) and Becker and Hecken 
(2009b) who explicitly test Esser’s model find strong effects of the concept of educational 
motivation. Van de Werfhorst and Hostede (2007) find that their relative risk aversion 
measure does not reduce the social class effect that remains after controlling for school 
performance. Moreover, in contrast to their theoretical expectations, they find no significant 
effect of mobility concerns on school track type. Still, the relative risk aversion-variable has a 
significant, quite strong, impact on educational choices, when social class, parental 
background, school type actually enrolled in, school performance and cultural capital are 
controlled. 
The hypothesis that social classes do not vary with regard to their general desire to 
maintain family’s social status cannot be supported either. It is found that parents from lower 
social classes attach more importance to status maintenance than parents from higher classes 
(Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish 2010; Stocké 2007). By contrast, the finding that higher 
social classes believe that only higher educational attainments will guarantee status 
maintenance and intermediate and lower attainments will not, represents evidence in favor of 
the model B&G-model (Stocké 2007). To explain the negative class effect on relative risk 
aversion, Gabay-Egozi and colleagues argue that students of higher social origin may be less 
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concerned because they belief that the resources of their parents can back them up, or because 
they see their social status as given. This interpretation seems in line with arguments of 
Bourdieu (see Subchapter 3.1.1).  
Other important findings relate to social class differences in the subjective perception of 
objective circumstance and the role of the cost-parameter. Need and De Jong (2002) show 
that even when marks are controlled students with higher educated parents have higher 
expectations of success. This result implies that students of higher social origin tend to 
“overestimate” their performance. By contrast, Stocké (2007) and Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and 
Yaish (2010) do not detect such a “perception bias”. With regard to the effect of subjectively 
evaluated costs of education, previous research provides ambiguous evidence. Whether 
studies find the expected effect depends on the kind of observed educational decision. For 
instance, there is no effect regarding choice of secondary school track (Need and De Jong 
2002; Stocké 2007), but one for the decision on university studies (Becker and Hecken 2009b; 
Need and De Jong 2002) or dropping out of education after higher secondary school levels 
(Davies, Heinesen and Holm 2002). 
6.2 School’s decision-making 
This subchapter presents quantitative and qualitative studies that provide insights in the 
decision-making of teachers. More specifically, the findings of these studies shed light on the 
determinants of teachers’ school track decisions. The presented literature deals a lot with 
school track recommendations of German primary school teachers as this area of research 
provides very recent and comprehensive findings on teachers’ decision-making. In Germany, 
the crucial school track choice is made after primary education. The procedure that provides 
the secondary school track decision varies over federal states. In some federal states, teachers 
make secondary school track recommendations that are binding. There, students can be 
enrolled in a school type that was not recommended by the primary teachers only if the 
student passes an entry examination. In most of these states, law does also tell the teachers 
which marks a student must have to be recommended a certain school type. In the other 
federal states, the teacher recommendation is not binding and students’ parents can enroll 
their child in the school type they wish to.  
6.2.1 COMPARISONS OF SECONDARY EFFECTS ON TEACHER AND FAMILY DECISIONS  
According to previous research, by far the most important determinant of teachers’ 
school track decisions is student’s school performance. In view of the research topics of this 
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dissertation, the question is whether student’s social origin has an effect, too, and – most 
importantly – whether this effect remains after controlling for school performance. Some 
studies make use of the variation of the legal frameworks over German federal states to 
compare the size of these secondary effects on teachers’ school track choices and parents’ 
school track decisions. One core hypothesis of these studies is that secondary effects on 
family decisions are larger than on teacher decisions. They basically test this hypothesis by 
quantifying the relative sizes of the primary and secondary effects on school transitions in 
federal states where teacher recommendations are not binding and federal states where teacher 
recommendations are binding (e.g. Neugebauer 2010) or take advantage of a reform of the 
decision procedure in one federal state (Dollmann 2011). The studies apply a decomposition-
method that was first advanced by Jackson et al. (2007) to generally quantify the primary and 
secondary effects of social stratification.75  
Neugebauer (2010) hypothesizes that secondary effects on teacher decisions are smaller 
than on family decisions because the relative risk aversion-mechanism has an impact only on 
family decision-making. Still, little secondary effects on teacher decisions will appear since 
teachers consider class-specific student traits such as motivation, effort and linguistic abilities 
or parents’ capacities and willingness to support the student. Indeed, using data obtained from 
a national longitudinal survey, Neugebauer finds that in federal states with binding teacher 
recommendations 54 percent of the social class differentials are due to secondary effects, 
while in states with no binding recommendations it is 61 percent. However, the total social 
class effect is the same in every state indicating that lower relative secondary effects do no 
imply lower social class differentials. As an explanation the author proposes that in states 
where teachers have the final say parents invest more in their children’s performance 
development or put pressure on the teachers resulting in better marks and thereby boost the 
primary effects.  
While the study by Neugebauer (2010) cannot surely rule out that other institutional 
differences between the federal states have an impact, Dollmann’s (2011) analysis can do so 
as it is based upon a natural experiment: In 2006, the government of a federal state changed 
and modified the regulation of the transition from primary to secondary school. Up to the 
reform, teachers made non-binding secondary school track recommendations. After the 
reform, teacher recommendations had become binding. Dollmann shows that the secondary 
                                                 
75 For other studies using this method to decompose primary and secondary effects see for instance Erikson and 
Rudolphi (2009), Kloosterman et al. (2009), Schindler and Reimer (2010) and Ichou and Vallet (2013).  
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effects on transitions into the general secondary schools track are more than five times higher 
when the teacher recommendation is not binding as compared to when it is binding. 
Regarding the operationalization of student’s social origin, both studies have to rely on 
parents’ highest educational attainment and can differentiate only between few categories. 
While Neugebauer uses marks as an indicator of students’ school performance, Dollmann 
employs scores on a test that is adapted to students’ curricula and assesses performance in 
reading, writing and mathematics. Moreover, Dollmann factors in a measure that is based 
upon student’s score on a “basic-intelligence test”.  
Gresch, Baumert and Maaz (2009) also make use of the differences between federal 
states to analyze differences in families’ and teachers’ school track decisions. In contrast to 
the former presented studies, they do not factor in student’s school performance since their 
goal is not to disentangle the primary and secondary effects. In accordance with the findings 
of other studies, their results reveal that social origin effects are stronger in federal states 
where the teacher recommendation is not binding. Moreover, three-way interactions of the 
teacher recommendation, the bindingness of the recommendation and student social origin 
reveal that the institutional framework cannot reduce social class effects on the transition 
probabilities.  
Maaz and Nagy (2009) specify the primary and secondary effects on family decisions 
and teacher recommendations, too, but they do not take advantage of the institutional 
variations over federal states.  In the theoretical part of their work they modify the common 
specification of the primary and secondary effects by taking account of the fact that teachers 
may increase the secondary effects through middle-class biases in marks and school track 
recommendations (see Subchapter 3.3.1 and 4.1). They find “secondary effects on marks” as 
student social background has a significant positive effect on marks, even when scores on 
standardized tests are held constant. Similarly, their results show that – controlling for the 
scores and marks – teachers are significantly more willing to recommend the highest 
secondary school track to students of higher social origin. This represents evidence in favor of 
“secondary effects on recommendations”. Furthermore, Maaz and Nagy (2009) find that 
secondary effects on teacher decisions are smaller than on family decisions and that 54 
percent of the secondary social origin effect on the transition probabilities is driven by 
secondary effects on marks and recommendations, i.e. secondary effects “produced” by the 
teachers. 
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6.2.2 DETERMINANTS OF TEACHER DECISIONS  
Qualitative studies provide interesting findings that support the above-developed 
assumptions on teachers’ rational decision-making, i.e. their evaluation of costs, benefits and 
the likelihood of student success. Masson’s (1994) analysis of the institutionalized dialogue 
between family and school at the end of grade 9 reveals that teachers consider themselves to 
be very good in assessing students’ future chances of success. They state that they are able to 
take into account long-term consequences while the families are not. Moreover, they 
categorize parents according to three types: The first type of parent is well informed and has 
an exact educational plan for his child. In line with theoretical model developed in Chapter 5, 
these parents are very likely to reject and typically belong to higher social classes (many of 
them are secondary school teachers). The second type consists of parents who are PA-
members or parents’ representatives. The interviewed teachers say that these parents are not 
likely to reject. Rather, they respect and support the teachers’ work (many of them are 
primary school teachers). The third parent-type includes lower-class parents who never come 
to school to meet the teachers even though their children have the most difficulties. Perier 
(1994: 71-73) asked French teachers in lower and upper secondary schools whether they 
believe that only students who have “real chances of success” should be admitted to the 
various educational tracks. Most teachers strongly agreed but there were differences 
according to which secondary school type a teacher is working in: Teachers in lower 
secondary and vocational upper secondary schools seemed more “tolerant” since less of them 
agreed strongly than teachers in general upper secondary schools. This reveals that teachers 
who have to decide on the upper secondary school track are more willing to let students attend 
the general track even though their chances of success are not guaranteed. Correspondingly, 
lower secondary teachers and vocational secondary teachers more believe that “as many 
students as possible should be given the chance to attain a long educational track” than 
general secondary teachers. However, since French students are supposed to be sensitive to 
the subject of inequality in educational opportunity (see Meuret and Alluin 1998 and 
Subchapter 3.1.1), such results must be interpreted with caution since social desirability could 
distort them.  
Hollstein (2008) who led 15 narrative guided Interviews with teachers of primary 
schools in seven districts of Berlin also finds that teachers calculate “likelihoods of success” 
and make assumptions on the possible consequences of inappropriate recommendations. Such 
costs of inappropriate decisions could be, Hollstein finds, that a student who received a 
recommendation for the general secondary school later has to change to a lower secondary 
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school. By contrast, sending a child to a lower secondary school is no real disadvantage since 
later – if a student appears to be good enough – he or she can still attend a higher school. 
Moreover, the interviews reveal that teachers are always concerned with the wealth of a 
student. For instance, some of the interviewed teachers say that they refrain from 
recommending a higher school track to children because they want to protect the child from 
failure and letdowns. 
Nölle, Hörstermann, Krolak-Schwerdt and Gräsel (2009) led half-standardized guided 
interviews with 52 primary school teachers in two German federal states to find out which 
information they use to form their school track decisions. As the two federal states differ with 
regard to the bindingness of the teacher recommendation, the authors moreover examined 
whether this institutional regulation influences the decision-making. They derive hypotheses 
from a model of social judgment and decision-making (Fiske and Neuberg 1990) that assumes 
that individuals choose one of two strategies to form judgments and decisions: Either, they 
put a lot of effort in information search and processing, or they use simple heuristics. As 
previous research has shown that the extent to which individuals have to take charge of their 
decisions has a positive effect on the likelihood that they choose to put effort in information 
search and processing, the authors hypothesize that teachers’ decision-making will not be the 
same in both federal states. Their results reveal that teachers’ decision-making is affected by 
the institutional context but do not necessarily support the specific hypotheses derived from 
the psychological model.  
The results of various studies support the theoretical considerations that were addressed 
in Subchapter 4.2 and 5.2. First, there is evidence for effects of students’ habits, behaviors, 
effort and characteristics on teachers’ school track recommendations. For instance, Perier 
(1994: 70-71) shows that teachers in French lower secondary schools believe that the staff 
meeting’s proposition has to take into account students’ effort. For Germany, Schneider 
(2011) finds that teacher evaluations of students’ motivation, effort, willingness to learn and 
school work mastery partly mediate the effect of student social class on teachers’ school track 
recommendations. Hollstein’s (2008) qualitative analysis reveals that they consider students’ 
work habits and motivation and available places at secondary schools in the district. Teachers 
report to take into account the latter factor because they do not want to recommend a “rough” 
lower secondary school to a student with “delicate” personality. Arnold et al. (2007) show 
that given the same actual reading ability, students who evaluate themselves as being good in 
understanding texts and as generally knowing how to achieve good marks are more likely to 
receive a teacher recommendation for the highest secondary school track. Similarly, given the 
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same marks or scores on ability tests, parents’ reports of their child’s motivation and of their 
fear of exams and teacher assessments of student effort and talent (e.g. intelligence, creativity) 
considerably affect teacher recommendations (Arnold et al. 2007; Stubbe and Bos 2008; Stahl 
2007).  
Stahl (2007) also finds that teachers take more account of student’s social behavior (e.g. 
politeness) and talent when a student is of higher social origin than when he has a less 
favorable social background. She interprets this result as evidence in favor of Bourdieu’s 
argument of “social reproduction through cultural reproduction”. Teachers may report to have 
taken into account social behavior and talent when making the recommendation for students 
of higher social origin because they experience “cognitive dissonance” as they have made 
better recommendations for these students than for students of less favorable background with 
the same performance. 
Second, previous research supports the assumption that teachers take into account 
parents’ capacities to help their children. It is assumed that, given the same school 
performance, students of higher social origin are more likely to receive recommendations for 
higher secondary school tracks because they perceive the parents of these students to be more 
capable of supporting their children with school issues (e.g. Duru-Bellat 1996; Duru-Bellat 
2002: 80; Neugebauer 2010; Schneider 2011). Quantitative as well as qualitative studies 
provide evidence in favor of this assumption. For instance, in the analyses of Schneider 
(2011) and Stahl (2007), marks, test scores and teacher assessments of parental support 
mediate strong effects of student social origin on the teacher recommendations. Ditton and 
Krüsken (2006) find that teachers consider parents’ assistance when students are poorly 
performing and the qualitative analysis by Hollstein (2008) shows that teachers consider 
whether the student’s parents are capable of helping when they are not sure about the 
appropriate school track for a student (see also Nölle et al. 2009). In one specific interview, a 
teacher says that she considers whether the student’s parents are “interested in education” and 
whether the student has a space to work at home. Furthermore, teachers seem to take into 
account whether there are older siblings attending higher school types or peers who can help. 
Third, parents’ aspirations are found to have an impact. Dollmann (2011) shows strong 
effects of parents’ answers to a question on whether they would appreciate their child’s 
attending various school types and finds that parental aspirations have a stronger effect on 
transition rates in federal states with binding teacher recommendations. This result indicates 
that teacher decisions are considerably affected by parents’ aspirations and that parents 
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possibly put pressure on teachers in view of the binding recommendation. Accordingly, 
Schneider (2011) hypothesizes that if a student of higher social origin has poor marks, his 
parents will put pressure on teachers and that parents’ exertion of influence increases as the 
date on which the teachers make their recommendation approaches. To test this assumption, 
Schneider includes interaction terms of student’s social origin and teacher reports of parents’ 
aspirations in analysis of teacher recommendations. He finds that when teachers do not know 
parents’ aspirations, student’s social origin has no effect on the recommendation and – in 
keeping with this result – increasing aspirations of the parents increase the likelihood that the 
teachers recommend higher secondary school. The coefficients of the interaction terms 
indicate that parents with high aspirations but more pressure on the teachers.  
Ditton and Krüsken (2006, 2009) show that for more than half of the students the 
planned teacher recommendation does not match parents’ aspiration. For one quarter of all 
students, the teachers modify their planned recommendations and, in turn, for half of these 
cases, the teachers opt for a “higher” actual recommendation. Overall, parents’ aspirations 
have a strong positive effect on teachers’ planned, modified and actual recommendations. 
Moreover, teachers even seem to adapt the marks to parents’ aspirations. The results of 
Gresch, Baumert and Maaz (2009) show that in federal states where the recommendation is 
binding teachers more often recommend the higher school track than in states where the 
recommendation is not binding. Again, this effect may be driven by parents’ higher pressure 
on teachers in these states. 
In Hollstein’s (2008) interviews, teachers report that some parents start very early in the 
last school year before the transition to come to teacher meetings and discuss their child’s 
marks and the upcoming school track recommendation. These parents sometimes put 
considerable pressure on them and it happens that they meet the headmaster to complain or 
threaten with using a lawyer. When anticipating these cases, teachers prefer to adapt the 
marks to parent’s desires. Similarly, Masson’s (1997) qualitative analysis of the dialogue 
between family and school found that some parents make personal arrangements with the 
school principle in order to prevent undesired propositions by the staff meeting. 
Within the French institutionalized dialogue, families’ aspirations are formalized by 
their school track requests and legal texts incite the school staff to take into account families’ 
requests (see Chapter 2). Therefore and given the results on German teachers’ 
recommendations, families’ requests can be expected to have strong effects on school staffs’ 
decisions along the dialogue. Indeed, Roux and Davaillon (2001) reveal that the requests have 
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a strong effect on staff meetings’ propositions. Moreover, they find that no student social 
origin effect remains when family’s request is controlled and conclude that the staff meeting 
does not reinforce social inequality. However, since the effect of social origin is not negative, 
this indicates that the staff meeting does not reduce too ambitious requests either. This 
negative sign should appear because families from higher classes make more ambitious 
requests. Hence, the staff meeting helps the students with most ambitious parents or parents 
who are willing to reject (see also Duru-Bellat, Jarousse and Mingat 1993). Duru-Bellat and 
Mingat (1989) not directly analyze staff meetings’ propositions but final outcomes of the 
dialogue (i.e. the actual transition of the student to upper secondary school or grade retention). 
They find that even when student’s performance and family’s request are held constant, social 
class significantly affects the final outcome. This remaining social class effects could be due 
to social class differences in families’ use of their rejection right and the subsequent steps 
(e.g. headmasters’ decisions). 
The findings of previous research also support the assumption that certain determinants 
have stronger effects when student’s performance is in the middle-range and thus teachers 
have difficulties making unequivocal decisions. In respect to the staff meeting’s proposition, 
Perier (1994: 70-71) finds that a large majority of secondary school teachers believes that 
when students’ performance is in the middle-range, their effort must be considered. Dollmann 
(2011) finds that given high performance-levels neither student’s social origin nor the 
institutional context (binding vs. non-binding teacher recommendation) affects a student’s 
chance to attend upper secondary school. By contrast, given middle and lower performance 
levels, students with higher educated parents and students who experienced the transition to 
secondary school when teacher recommendations were non-binding have significantly higher 
chances to be enrolled in upper secondary school. Ditton and Krüsken’s analysis (2006) of 
teachers’ answers to the question on whether making the recommendation was difficult 
reveals that this is particularly the case when a student’s performance lies in the middle range. 
Moreover, they find that when a student’s marks are in the middle-range, teachers 
additionally take into account students’ linguistic and reading abilities as well as their 
participation in class, motivation and effort. If a student is poorly performing, teachers 
consider whether parents are supportive. In their study from 2009, they show that it is difficult 
to form final school track recommendations for students whose performance varied over the 
last school years. Hollstein’s (2008) results indicate that a student’s family background is not 
a core determinant of teacher recommendations but plays a considerable role when a student’s 
performance does not self-evidently tell which secondary school track is most appropriate. 
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6.3 Grade retention decisions 
Literature on the consequences of grade retention and on the traits of retained students 
is vast. However, there are only few studies that analyze whether families demand grade 
retention for “strategic” reasons and how teachers react to such demands. The study by 
Davies, Heinesen and Holm (2002) mentioned above also investigates Danish families’ 
choices between letting their child attend an extra year in lower secondary education (10th 
grade) or letting him directly proceed to upper secondary school. Following the relative risk 
aversion-mechanism, the authors hypothesize that children whose performance lies in middle- 
and higher-ranges and children of intermediate and higher social origin are less likely to 
choose attending 10th grade instead of directly entering upper secondary school. This is 
because they need upper secondary attainments to preserve their families’ social status. For 
the same reason, if these children have low abilities they will probably opt for the 10th grade 
in order to improve their chances of succeeding in upper secondary school. By contrast, 
children of parents with low educational levels will – regardless of their academic abilities – 
be very likely to choose 10th grade because they may be not sure about whether to attend 
upper secondary school or vocational education or, if they are sure about vocational 
education, they may not be certain about which type of vocational education to choose. 
Interactions of parents’ education and ability indicate that the likelihood of choosing the extra 
year increases with parent’s educational level, when the child has low abilities and decreases 
with parents’ education when the ability is moderate or high. Davies et al. interpret this 
finding as support of RRA-theory and conclude from it “that less able children of more highly 
educated parents appear to choose an extra year at lower secondary school presumably to 
increases their probability of eventually passing upper secondary school” (Davies, Heinesen 
and Holm 2002: 700). 
Kloosterman and de Graaf (2010) analyze whether social background of Dutch families 
has an impact on their choices of grade retention over enrolment in a lower track. They 
observe families’ decisions at two levels in secondary school and for three cohorts of 
students. Distinguishing between the three cohorts enables them to assess the impact of a 
reform that integrated a lower and a higher vocational track into one comprehensive 
vocational track. From the B&G-model they derive the assumption that higher-class families 
are more likely to choose grade retention instead of the lower track than families from lower 
classes. Their findings support their hypothesis that families from higher classes are more 
likely to choose grade retention over a vocational track. Moreover, they find a positive effect 
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of school performance on families’ choice of grade retention over the lower track and a 
negative effect of families’ choice of grade retention over the higher track. They find no 
evidence in favor of their assumption that families take into account a specific lower track the 
student will end up in (i.e. whether this is a track enabling later university studies or not). 
When the chosen type of school is too demanding, students from higher classes opt for 
retention to improve while students from lower classes move to a lower track. 
Jacob and Tieben’s (2009) study on social origin effects on intra-secondary transitions 
in Germany and the Netherlands addresses grade retention, too. Even though the study does 
not explicitly focus on grade retention decisions, it examines these indirectly since Dutch 
students have to repeat a grade if they want to attain a supplement diploma after graduation 
from a lower track. Moreover, if students have to think about downgrading during secondary 
education (e.g. because they are poorly performing), they consider the possibility to stay in 
the same demanding school track and repeat a grade. Following the relative risk aversion-
mechanism, the authors posit that parents will choose grade retention instead of enrollment in 
a lower track, if the lower track would lead to an educational attainment that is lower than that 
of the parents and hence if status decline would occur. By contrast, students who already are 
in a higher track than their parents would not choose grade retention because of indirect and 
direct costs of an additional school year. In the same way, higher class families will choose 
the supplement diploma even if this implies costs of an additional grade. For both countries 
the study finds similar strong effects of parental education and the status maintenance motive 
on choosing the supplement (which implies grade retention in the Netherlands) but no social 
origin effects on staying in the same track instead of downgrading. 
Roux and Davaillon’s (2001) analysis of the institutionalized dialogue between family 
and school shows that only 4 per cent of all families demand grade retention while 11 per cent 
of the staff meetings propose this option. In the end, 12 per cent of the students have to repeat. 
Grade retention is proposed especially to students with performance in the middle range. The 
authors argue that grade repetition is a strategy to avoid the vocational track but still families 
try to avoid repetition as long as possible. Their multivariate analysis reveals that the staff 
meeting is more likely to propose grade retention to students of higher social origin (i.e. 
students whose fathers are e.g. chief executives) than to students with working-class 
background. Holding constant student’s social background and performance, family’s school 
track request and other family characteristics, also father’s educational attainment has a 
positive effect on being proposed grade retention. 
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A recent study by Cayouette-Remblière and De Saint-Pol (2011) also examines whether 
parents use grade retention to avoid an orientation in lower tracks. The authors explicitly 
distinguish three types of grade retentions: First, retentions in grades that are no “transition 
grades”. These retentions have the aim to give students the chance to generally improve their 
performance. Second, retentions in transition grades, i.e. the 3ème at the transition to upper 
secondary school and the 2nde. These have the aim to avoid orientations in lower school 
tracks. Third, retentions after failed exams (at the end of the terminale and at the end of the 
grade that leads to the CAP/BEP). Cayouette-Remblière and De Saint-Pol analyze the 
secondary school careers from grade 6 to the baccalauréat and identify 11 types of careers. 
This typology reveals that students who have repeated several grades and finally attend the 
general bac (curriculas “S” or “ES” and “L”) are very likely to have repeated grade 9 and thus 
to have used grade retention to gain access to the general track. The same seems for students 
who belong to the career-type “attendance at the general track but dropped out of school 
before the end” and “attendance at the academic general track (that leads to a general bac) but 
reorientation into the vocational general track (that leads to the technological bac). In order to 
find out whether students are forced to repeat or required grade repetition, the authors also 
have a look at the dialogue between family and school. Among the type of students who 
finally attain a general bac after having repeated several grades there are comparatively many 
whose requests did not correspond to the propositions by the staff meeting and who accepted 
a grade-repetition proposition. Among the students of the type “attendance at the general track 
but dropped out of school before the end” there are also relatively many who accepted grade 
repetition proposition. 
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7 Research framework 
7.1 General description of the data and basic sampling 
The data I use have been collected in a representative longitudinal study commissioned 
by the French ministry of education.76 The “panel d’élèves du second degré” (also called 
“panel 1995”) observed students who entered lower secondary education in 1995 up to their 
transition to upper secondary school in 1999 (2000 or 2001, depending on whether they have 
repeated school years). Since the beginning of the 1970s four surveys of similar kind were 
initiated by the ministry (DEPP 2008: 11). One survey from 1973 and one from 1980 
observed students who entered lower secondary school during up to 11 years along their 
school careers. Another survey was conducted in 1978 that gathered information during 7 
years on a cohort of students who entered primary school. In 1989 another survey started to 
follow students from their entering into secondary education to their labor market entry. This 
last survey was filled up in 1995 with a large cohort of students beginning primary school and 
a cohort of 17 830 students starting secondary education. The survey of the 17 830 students is 
the “panel 1995” and represents the data I use for the empirical analyses of this dissertation. 
One aim of this latest survey was to evaluate reforms that had been conducted in the early 
1990s. As compared to the “panel 1989”, it provides new important variables such as 
student’s marks in the brevet, i.e. the exam at the end of lower secondary school (see 
Subchapter 2.2). 
Since the French ministry of education does not possess exhaustive records of students 
that could be used for sampling, all French public and private lower secondary schools 
(collèges) were asked to select students according to predefined criteria (DEPP 2008: 11-12). 
In particular, among the students who were entering the 6ème (i.e. 6th grade) at the end of the 
summer 1995, they had to select students born on the 17th of each month (except March, July 
and October).77 The selected students were up to complete the 6ème during the school year 
1995-1996. This sampling gathered 19 770 students of which those who were not attending 
grade 6 for the first time – i.e. students that actually were starting a repetition of grade 6 – 
were excluded. Excluding these repeating students lead to a final sample size of 17 830. 
                                                 
76 The following description of the “panel 1995” is closely based on its 2008-documentation by the “direction of 
the evaluation, the prospective research and the performance” (DEPP), which is the statistical research 
department of the Ministry of Education that conducted the survey. The documentation is provided together with 
the data by the Centre Maurice Halbwachs, Paris.   
77 Not only students starting the ‘ordinary’ 5th grade but students in classes called “SES” or “SEGPA” were 
selected. These classes are integrated in some lower secondary schools to affiliate students whose academic 
abilities are too low to keep up with the other students.   
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The “panel 1995” consisted of seven survey parts (DEPP 2008: 12-16). In 1995, the 
first survey part took place: headmasters of all secondary schools had to fill in a questionnaire 
that inquired the address of the school and whether it is located in a ZEP (see Subchapter 
2.4.2). The headmasters also had to report nationality, gender and other “identifying” 
characteristics of the selected students, their “school situation” including chosen foreign 
language course, living in a boarding home, size of the class the student attends, and their 
score on the national standardized tests that are taken at the entry into grade 5. Moreover, the 
headmasters were able to provide information on the student’s primary education such as 
repetition of grades as they typically receive such information from the primary school the 
student has attended. Finally, they reported – as far as they knew – family characteristics such 
as parent’s profession, educational attainment and nationality.  
The second part of the “panel 1995”-survey is the update of the “school situation” from 
1996 onwards. For every school year it refreshed the reports of, for instance, type of the 
school students attend, class size, number of immigrant students in the class, chosen foreign 
languages and specializing classes. One way to update the information was to look at student 
files in the central administrative databases called Bases Académique d’Élèves.78 If there was 
no information on the student, the second way was to send a questionnaire to the headmaster. 
If the headmaster did not return the questionnaire, the families received one. 
The third part of the survey – termed family survey – provides core variables for the 
analyses presented in this thesis. Between Mai and September 1998, i.e. around the time when 
students finished the school year 1997-1998 and grade 8 or the so-called 4ème (if they had not 
repeated grades), the parents of students that were still followed in the survey had to answer a 
range of questions regarding (i) the situation of the family (e.g. number of siblings, nationality 
and place of birth of the student and the parents, parents’ educational attainment, occupation 
and employment status), (ii) the child’s primary education (e.g. performance in primary 
school, grade repetition in primary education), and (iii) the child’s secondary education (e.g. 
performance in secondary school, opinion on parent-teacher relationships, parental 
involvement such as attendance at official meetings with the teachers, membership in a parent 
association).  
In this part of the survey, data was collected through three steps. In a first step, the 
schools sent a questionnaire to 17 684 families (DEPP 2008: 13). In a second step, the DEPP 
                                                 
78 Typically, these databases are only accessible to the local municipalities. The data is generated as schools 
yearly provide information on their students. Not all schools do so. 
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(i.e. the statistical research department of the Ministry of Education) directly sent the 
questionnaire to families that had not returned the first questionnaire and, in a third step, 
telephone interviews were conducted with those who even had not returned the second paper 
questionnaire. Overall, the response rate of the family survey attained 85.6 per cent: 15 290 
families generally took part in the survey, 12 980 (85 per cent) of them filled in the paper 
questionnaire and 2 310 (15 per cent) completed the telephone interview. On the phone, the 
families were interviewed on a shorter version of the questionnaire. This, as will be outlined 
below, led to considerable numbers of missing values on some variables.  
Another survey part that provided data that is highly relevant for this dissertation’s 
empirical analyses deals with the dialogue between family and school (DEPP 2008: 13). In 
June 1999, it observed the transition from lower to upper secondary education of students 
who had not repeated grades since their entry into secondary school in summer 1995. 
Correspondingly, in June 2000 and 2001, it observed students who had repeated either one or 
two grades up to then. To gather information on the dialogue, questionnaires were sent to the 
headmasters. With a response rate of 90 per cent (in 1999), they reported families’ school 
track requests, staff meetings’ school track propositions, families’ rejections of staff 
meetings’ propositions, headmasters’ decisions, families’ second rejections and recall 
meetings’ decisions. Moreover, headmasters reported students’ marks in the “continuous 
examination” (contrôle continu) of the brevet. In 2000 and 2001, the response rate decreased 
to 79 respectively 77 per cent. 
Three survey parts followed: First, in summer 2002, all students whose secondary 
school career had been observed were contacted to respond to questions on their occupational 
plans, their plans of tertiary education, their experiencing of their secondary education and 
their self-perception in terms of their ability to find friends, for instance (DEPP 2008: 15). 
Second, in March 2003, the students who had attained either a “bac technologique” or a “bac 
general” and entered tertiary education received a questionnaire that surveyed their perception 
of the first year in higher education, their educational and occupational plans and the 
resources they held. Third, the seventh part of the “panel 1995”-survey focused on students 
who could not be observed during their whole secondary education. Those who had refused to 
answer the survey in 2002 and those who had reported to have quit education and hence were 
not questioned in the higher-education survey were contacted again and asked to respond to 
questions on their actual educational, occupational and personal situation. The data gathered 
by these three last survey parts is not used in this dissertation’s analysis. 
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In order to generate the samples that I use for the analysis, I exclude students whose 
families did not receive the questionnaire of the family survey in 1998. This reduces the initial 
sample of 17 830 students by 1 per cent to 17 684 (see above). The exclusion of students 
whose families did not take part in the family survey leads to a reduction of 13.5 per cent and 
a sample of 15 290 students. Since the central explanatory variable is social class of students’ 
parents, I exclude students who do not live at least with one parent. This causes another 
decrease of 1 per cent and a reduction of the sample size to 15 123 cases.79 Moreover, I 
exclude cases for which the headmaster did not report the dialogue (2.529 students; 17 per 
cent). Finally, the basic sample consists of 12 594 students living with at least one parent, 
whose family participated in the 1998 family survey and for whom the headmaster reported 
the course of the dialogue in 1999 (or in 2000 or 2001 if a student has repeated grades).80 
7.2 Variables 
The presentation of the variables consists of four parts. In part one I list the main 
dependent variables: families’ and the school staffs’ decisions along the dialogue. In part two, 
I outline core explanatory variables such as student’s social origin and mark on the brevet. 
These independent variables are used in most of the analyses. Part three of the presentation 
deals with specific variables that are employed only for the test of the theoretical model on 
families’ decision-making. In part four I present the control variables. Table 1, 3, 5 and 6 
indicate descriptive statistics of all variables. These descriptive statistics are based on the 
basic sample (N=12594) and show the varying numbers of missing cases. Moreover, the 
tables report the survey parts that have gathered the information that is used to construct each 
variable. 
7.2.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
Choices at each step of the dialogue 
As described in Chapter 2, a family’s school track request and a staff meeting’s proposition 
can be the general upper secondary school track (LGT), the vocational upper secondary 
school track (LP), the lower vocational track, i.e. an apprenticeship (A), or grade repetition 
                                                 
79 Using information from the family survey in 1998, I excluded students who live with a legal guardian that is 
not one of the parents, students who live in a foster home and students for whom “other situation” was reported.  
80 The “panel 1995” is not designed for multilevel analyses that take into account the nesting of students in 
classes or schools since too few students were surveyed per school. For instance, in 1995 headmasters of 5686 
lower secondary schools reported information on 17830 students implying around 3 students on average per 
school. To still factor in that school effects could affect the multivariate analyses’ results, I computed standard 
errors that are adjusted for school-level clustering. 
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(GR). In line with French research on the transition from lower to upper secondary school, I 
combine the two vocational tracks (now abbreviated as LPA). For the analysis of family’s 
exact decision-making and the staff meeting’s making of the school track proposition, I firstly 
only distinguish between the general track (LGT) and the vocational track (LPA). For the 
analysis of both actors’ grade retention decisions, I employ a binary variable that 
distinguishes between GR and LPA. All of the variables observe students’ first traversing of 
the dialogue. Table 1 indicates that clearly most parents demanded the general track (67 per 
cent) and in fewer cases staff meetings proposed the general track (60 per cent). The least 
popular request and proposition is grade retention. The staff meetings proposed it more often 
(6 per cent) than the families demanded it (2 per cent).81 
A family’s decisions to reject and to attend the talk with the headmaster are represented 
by one common binary variable indicating whether the family has rejected and attended the 
talk (i.e. value 1) or not rejected and not attended the talk (i.e. value 0). Those families who 
have rejected but not attended the talk are not considered since only families who have 
attended the talk can obtain a revision of the staff’s school track proposition. These 
exceptional families who have rejected but not attend the talk are few (49 cases). Table 1 
shows that 1242 families are entitled to reject the decision since the staff meeting did not 
accept their request and 30 per cent of them actually rejected.82 
                                                 
81 I do not differentiate between families’ and staff meetings’ preliminary and definite requests or propositions. 
In fact, the survey on the dialogue reported families’ and staff meetings’ “first choice” and “second choice” 
without clearly indicating what is meant by these choices. I use the first choice information. Second choices of 
families and staff meetings are reported for only around 10 per cent of the students in the basic sample. A close 
analysis of both choices indicates that some headmasters have reported families’ and staff meetings’ preliminary 
and definite choices while other headmasters have reported families’ and staff meetings’ first and second 
preferences (i.e. the several options they can indicate at one time). In my view, the second choice information is 
ambiguous and hence I do not make use of it. Still, I have conducted several robustness analyses with variables 
taking into account both choices. These variables are based on the assumption that headmasters reported 
preliminary and definite decisions. The variables indicate families’ respectively staff meetings’ “second choice” 
instead of the “first choice” if information of the “second choice” is available. Hence, these variables represent 
families’ and staff meetings’ “definite” decisions (even though this could be their second preferences, too). 
Overall, the results of these robustness analyses are similar to the results of the analyses with only the “first 
choice” information. Relevant variations are that grade retention decisions are more prevalent among families’ 
“second choices” and slightly more prevalent among staff meetings’ “second” propositions, too. Moreover, the 
sample for the analysis of families’ rejections (i.e. a sample consisting of families whose LGT-requests were not 
accepted by the staff meeting) would be smaller. However, the social class effects (and effects of the other 
explanatory variables) correspond in terms of significance and effect size.  
82 There are 9 families that rejected and attended the talk although the staff had accepted their demand. These 
cases were coded as “missing values” so as to have only “valid” cases for families who are formally entitled to 
and have a reason to reject. These were coded as “missing values” on the rejection-variable. Families who have 
valid information regarding their attendance at the talk with the headmaster but none regarding their rejection are 
still valued as having rejected. I assigned a “missing value” on the rejection -variable also to families who have 
rejected but for whom information on their attendance at the talk is missing. Moreover, while the variables for 
family’s request and staff’s proposition aggregate LP and A to LPA, the request -variable considers them 
separately: Families who demanded LP and were proposed A are taken into account by this variable since they 
are entitled to reject.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and survey source of the dependent variables (basic sample) 
 Mean  Min Max Number 
of valid 
cases 
Survey part 
Family’s school track request 
LGT 0.67  0 1 12591 Report on the 
dialogue (June 
1999, 2000, 2001) 
LPA 0.31  0 1  
GR 0.02  0 1  
Staff meeting’s school track proposition 
LGT 0.60  0 1 12593  
LPA 0.34  0 1   
GR 0.06  0 1   
Family’s rejection & talk with 
headmaster 
0.30  0 1 1242  
Headmaster’s school track decision 
LGT 0.19  0 1 392  
LPA 0.37  0 1   
GR 0.44  0 1   
Family’s second rejection (i.e. 
rejection of headmaster’s decision) 
0.72  0 1 284  
Recall meeting’s decision 
LGT 0.42  0 1 205  
LPA 0.12  0 1   
GR 0.46  0 1   
Final outcome of the dialogue 
LGT 0.61  0 1 12593  
LPA 0.33  0 1   
GR 0.07  0 1   
Note: Due to rounding to two decimal places, means do not always sum up to 1. Source: Panel national 1995 
d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
The decision of the headmaster, families’ second rejections and recall meetings’ 
decisions are not analyzed by means of regression analyses. They are addressed only in 
descriptive univariate and bivariate statistics that give an overview over social class 
differences in students’ pathways through the dialogue (e.g. Figure 3). The decisions of the 
headmasters and those of the recall meetings were operationalized so as to distinguish 
between LGT, LPA and GR. There is valid information on headmasters’ school track 
propositions for 392 families (Table 1). Regarding the decisions of the recall meetings, the 
basic sample provides valid information for 205 cases. One can note that at these points of the 
dialogue grade retention is the most popular option. However, while the headmasters 
reservedly propose LGT (19 per cent), the recall meetings choose this option quite often (42 
per cent). With regard to families’ second rejections there is valid information for 284 cases 
and 72 per cent of these actually rejected the headmaster’s proposition.83 
                                                 
83 Again, in a few cases the dialogue proceeded in untypical ways or information to understand the whole 
proceeding was missing. 6 families did not attend the talk but obtained a decision by the headmaster and for 10 
families information on the attendance at the talk is missing but the headmaster’s decision is known. For this 
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Another variable is used for the more general analyses of the dialogue: the dialogue’s 
final outcome. Again, this variable distinguishes between LGT, LPA and GR. It corresponds 
to the decision that has been taken by the staff meeting if there was no first rejection by the 
family. However, if a family rejected the staff meeting’s proposition, the final outcome is the 
decision of the headmaster and, in the same fashion, the final outcome is the recall meeting’s 
decision if a family rejected a second time, i.e. if it rejected the headmaster’s decision. 
Consequently, the final outcome indicates which school track a student will ultimately attend 
or whether he has to repeat grade 9. Table 1 indicates that for 61 per cent of the families in the 
basic sample the outcome of the dialogue is the general track; 33 per cent end up with access 
to the vocational track and 7 per cent of the students have to repeat grade 9.84 
7.2.2 CORE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Family’s social class  
I operationalize social class according to the EGP-class schema (Erikson and 
Goldthorpe 1992; Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero 1979). The schema is based on the 
differentiation of occupations according to their labor-market and work situations (Erikson 
and Goldthorpe 1992: 41). More specifically, in the EGP-schema, social classes group 
occupations that are similar regarding income, employment conditions, economic security and 
promotion prospects (Breen 2005: 36-37). Moreover, they take into account whether 
occupations imply the possession of means of production or not. Among those who do not 
hold production means, they differentiate according to the type of relationship between the 
employer and the employee. Generally, as a consequence of this distinction, classes are 
defined according to the market resources of their members and hence according to the life 
chances that depend on these resources (Breen 2005). 
Following up on Weber and Marx, the schema undertakes a distinction of class 
positions along three types of employment relations (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 37-38): i) 
                                                                                                                                                        
reason, Table 1 presents more decisions by the headmaster (392) than there were entitling rejections (372 
approximately corresponding to 30 per cent of 1242). Still, the headmaster’s decision was coded as “missing 
value” if a family’s request, the staff meeting’s proposition and the final outcome of the dialogue were the same 
and if there is no information on the first rejection and no second rejection occurred. Then, the dialogue must 
have ended right after the staff’s proposition. I recoded “missing-values” on the second rejection variable when a 
family’s request and the headmaster’s decision were the same. I did so because only families who obtained a 
decision by the school that does not correspond to their request are entitled to and have a reason to reject for the 
second time. 
84 For one per cent of the families the request and the proposition are the same but the final outcome is different 
and no information on rejections or headmaster’s decision is existent. In these cases it is not clear whether the 
information on the request, the proposition or the outcome is not correct or what happened between these 
decisions and the ending of the dialogue. Robustness analyses reveal that these cases do not alter the findings on 
social class effects on the final outcome (see Subchapter 8.1 in the following).  
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employers, ii) self-employed without employees and iii) employees. The first group buys 
labor from others, while the third group sells their labor to employers. Consequently, the first 
group, the employers, has some authority and control over the third group, the employees. 
The second group neither sells nor buys labor. Among the large group of employees, another 
important distinction is made between relationships with the employer that are either 
regulated by a labor contract or by a so-called “service relationship” (Breen 2005; 
Goldthorpe 2007b). Typically, the positions of manual and lower-grade non-manual workers 
are regulated under labor contracts. In these short-term employment relationships the 
employee is paid in wages per hour or “per piece” for “more or less discrete amounts of labor, 
under the supervision of the employer or of the employer’s agents” (Erikson and Goldthorpe 
1992: 41). Service relationships are typically found in private and public organizational 
bureaucracies among the professional and managerial staff (Goldthorpe 2007b: 103). These 
relationships are rather long-term and are characterized by a “generally more diffuse 
exchange” of work and money between the employer and the employee (Erikson and 
Goldthorpe 1992: 41). Notably, the employee is not only paid with specific amounts of money 
for specific amounts of labor, he or she moreover receives “prospective” returns such as 
career opportunities, pension rights and pay rise on an established scale. 
The full version of the EGP-class schema consists of eleven classes that can be 
collapsed to versions of seven, five or three classes (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 38-39). 
For the present analyses, I distinguish six classes. Table 2 presents the EGP-classes the way 
they are grouped for the present analyses, together with the employment relationship that 
defines them. My grouping of the initial eleven classes to six classes is in line with the 
suggestions in the original literature and with recent investigations of social inequality in 
educational attainment in France. I keep the higher and the lower salariat (EGP-class I and II) 
separate while I collapse routine non-manual workers of lower and higher grade (EGP IIIa 
and IIIb) as suggested by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). In accordance with Ichou and 
Vallet (2011) who provide a recent large-scale analysis of trends in educational inequality in 
France, I add the lower grade technicians and supervisors of manual workers (EGP-class V). 
The reference category in the following multivariate analyses will be the “working-class” 
consisting of skilled manual workers (EGP-class VI) and semi- or unskilled manual workers 
(EGP-class VIIa).  
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Table 2 Categories of the EGP class schema and form of employment regulation 
EGP-Class  
Form of employment 
regulation 
I 
Higher-grade professionals, administrators and officials; 
managers in large industrial establishments; large proprietors 
Service relationship 
II 
Lower-grade professionals, administrators and officials; higher-
grade technicians; managers in small industrial establishments; 
supervisors of non-manual employees 
Service relationship 
IIIa, IIIb, V 
Routine non-manual employees, higher grade (administration 
and commerce) (IIIa), Routine non-manual employees; lower 
grade (sales and services) (IIIb), Lower-grade technicians; 
supervisors of manual workers (V) 
Mixed types of 
relationships* (IIIa, 
V), labor contract 
(IIIb) 
VI, VIIa 
Skilled manual workers (VI), Semi- and unskilled manual 
workers (not in agriculture, etc.) (VIIa) 
 
Labor contract 
IVc, VIIb 
Farmers and smallholders; other self-employed workers in 
primary production (IVc), Agricultural and other workers in 
primary production (VIIb) 
No regulation of 
employment (IVc), 
agricultural workers 
(VIIb) 
IVab 
Petty bourgeoisie: small proprietors, artisans, etc., with 
employees (a) and without employees (b) 
No employment 
regulation 
   
Note: *Mixed types of relationship are “typically associated with positions intermediate between bureaucratic 
structures and rank-and-file workforces: for example, those of clerical or sales personnel or of lower-grade 
technicians and first-line supervisors” (Goldthorpe 2007b: 103-104). Source: Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 38-
39; Goldthorpe 2007b: 104. 
As the theoretical model requests a hierarchical ordering of social classes, the class of 
farmers and agricultural workers (EGP IVc and EGP VIIb) and the class containing (non-
agricultural) self-employed and the petty bourgeoisie (EGP IVa and IVb) must be observed 
separately (Breen and Yaish 2006; Ichou and Vallet 2011). Since farmers, smallholders, small 
proprietors and artisans have no regulation of employment, they cannot be located in a 
hierarchical rank order of employees (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: e.g. 266). Moreover, it is 
argued that self-employed and the petty bourgeoisie rather make use of financial capital to 
maintain their social class position than of education (Ishida, Müller and Ridge 1995). 
Besides, especially in France where the primary production still constitutes a comparatively 
important sector, the group of farmers and agricultural workers is characterized by particular 
educational aspirations, attitudes and careers of their offspring (Brauns et al. 1999; Ichou and 
Vallet 2011; Roux and Davaillon 2001).  
The EGP-class schema is held to be a valid instrument for the operationalization of 
social class in empirical analyses (Brauns, Haun and Steinmann 1997; Goldthorpe 2007b: 
102): On the one hand, studies mostly based on British data could provide evidence that 
supports its criterion validity (Evans and Mills 1998; Evans and Mills 2000). They found that 
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the operationalization of class based on occupation and employment status captures the 
differences in employment relationships that it is supposed to capture. On the other hand, 
applications of the class schema to investigate social stratification in various economic and 
life outcomes could confirm its construct validity. It provided evidence in favor of 
theoretically expected differentials in health, voting behavior, earnings, risk of 
unemployment, work orientation and class identity (Evans and Mills 1998). In view of this 
dissertation’s the research questions, it is notable that many studies for different countries 
found the theoretically expected differentials in educational attainment (e.g., Brauns 1998; 
Ichou and Vallet 2011 as specific examples for France). This underlines the suitability of the 
schema for the analysis of educational choices.  
Moreover, the schema qualifies for the present analyses as it accomplishes the 
requirements of the theoretical model (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997: 281): First, leaving apart 
the occupations with no employment regulation (e.g. the petty bourgeoisie and the self-
employed), the classes can be hierarchically ordered and, second, this ordering is equally 
recognized in all classes.85 Besides, it is widely acknowledged for the operationalization of 
social class in European comparative research on social stratification (Brauns, Haun and 
Steinmann 1997; Ichou and Vallet 2011). Finally, the decision-making models applied and 
tested in this dissertation and the EGP-schema have the same theoretical rationale: Rational 
Action Theory. The class schema draws, for instance, on the idea that employers and 
employers’ agents draw up employment contracts so as to maximize profits (Goldthorpe 
2007b). 
For the construction of the EGP-classes using the “panel 1995”-survey, I use a variable 
that was constructed by the DEPP. As it is common for French data sets, it categorized 
occupations according to the French official scheme of “professions et catégories socio-
professionnelles” (PCS).86 The DEPP primarily based the PCS-code on information from the 
                                                 
85 To support this argument, in their presentation of their theoretical model, Breen and Goldthorpe (1997: 281) 
refer to Goldthorpe and Hope (1974). This study on occupational prestige in Britain showed that people do, 
regardless of their class position, indeed perceive occupations as hierarchically ranked. The study was, at the 
same time, a basis for the construction of the EGP-schema (see Goldthorpe 1980: 40, 64). For France, Chambaz, 
Maurin and Torelli (1998: 193) find that socioeconomic status has only a very low impact on the evaluation of 
the prestige of different occupations while age and secondary school attainment have.  
86 The PCS-schema is an occupation classification employed in the French official statistics. A predecessor 
version of it – the CSP-schema – was developed in the 1950s for a population census and after some substantial 
modifications the PCS-classification was introduced in 1982 in the official statistics (Brauns, Haun and 
Steinmann 1997: 32-41; Desrosières and Thévenot 1996). While the CSP-codes were mainly based on “simple” 
tabulations of individual professional activity or profession (activité individuelle or métier) and employment 
status (statut), the final PCS-scheme assigns a four-digit code based on a distinction of 489 categories grouping 
occupational situations (situations professionnelles) that are similar regarding professional activity, employment 
status, position within the company, industrial sector, etc. (see INSEE 1983 for a more detailed description). The 
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family survey in 1998. However, when this was missing, it used the reports of the 
headmasters from 1995. I follow Brauns, Haun and Steinmann (1997) to assign these 
categories to the EGP-classes (see Table A2 in the appendix for a detailed description of the 
assignment). Moreover, I identify the one parent with the “higher” social class position using 
a dominance order proposed by Erikson (1984) and (1992: 266).87 In case information for one 
parent is missing (e.g. for one-parent families), I use information on the other parent.88 Table 3 
                                                                                                                                                        
schema has no theoretical foundation of any specific theoretical school. Yet, one of its founders, Jean Porte, 
speaks of a correspondence between the categories in the schema and “social classes” (Brauns, Haun and 
Steinmann 1997 referring to Porte 1961). 
87 The dominance order requires that the occupation of the parent who is full-time employed “dominates” the 
occupation of the parent who is working part-time and, in turn, that part-time employment has to be considered 
over no-employment (Erikson 1984: 506; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992: 265-266). The idea behind this 
preliminary sorting is that the market situation of a family (which is assumed to define a family’s social class 
position) depends on the work situations of the family members and that the work situation of the family 
member that is the most involved in his or her work has the greatest influence on the family’s situation. 
However, I identify the parent with the higher occupation without considering whether he or she is working full-
time, part-time or not at all. I do so for two reasons: First, I suggest that families’ educational decision-making, 
in particular the relative risk aversion-mechanism, is oriented towards the higher occupation regardless of 
whether the parent concerned is actually working in that occupation. And nevertheless, for reasons of efficient 
intra-couple division of labor, typically the parent with the higher occupation is working more than the one with 
the occupation that provides fewer earnings. Hence, the number of cases with a non-working parent with the 
higher occupation can be expected to be quiet small. Second, as the employment status can be supposed to 
strongly influence the economic situation of a family and since this affects the educational decision through the 
cost-parameter C in the model, I make use of the employment status as a proxy for the family’s economic 
resources. Hence, parents’ employment status is taken into account but utilized for other purposes. The 
employment status-variable is presented further below. Besides, information on whether employed parents work 
full-time or part-time is provided only by the paper questionnaires of the 1998 family survey; in the telephone 
interviews the question was not asked. Therefore, using this information would have led to many additional 
missing cases. Finally, the dominance order by Erikson and Goldthorpe combines EGP I and II, EGP V and VI 
as well as EGP IIIb and VII which I need to keep separate to be able to generate class combinations that form the 
six classes presented above. Hence, the dominance order I apply is more detailed but still in line with the 
suggestion in the literature. The exact order is: I, II, IVab, IVc, IIIa, V, VI, IIIb, VIIa, VIIb. 
88 The traditional way to assign a social class to a family was – and partly still is – to uniquely use the occupation 
of the father (or male “head” of the household) and not of the mother. This was the case since for long the father 
or husband was perceived to be the “breadwinner” and the mother or wife, even when employed, was supposed 
to be more oriented towards childrearing and housekeeping (Erikson 1984). With the sharp raise of female 
employment in some countries and the decline of the rate of housewives, it appeared increasingly important to 
take into account the wife’s occupation when a family’s social class is defined. Today, it is argued whether it is 
correct to use the “dominant” class position among the parents to operationalize social origin of a child. An 
argument against the assignment based on the “dominant” class is that due to the fact that the EGP-classes 
cannot be ranked in a strictly hierarchical order, it is not possible to identify the parent with the higher class (e.g. 
Van de Werfhorst and Hofstede 2007: 400). However, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 237, 265) advance that 
they “regard the conjugal family as being class unitary…this does not necessarily mean adhering to the practice 
of automatically referring to the class of the conjugal family by reference to that of the husband/father” and that 
taking account only of the father’s class implies that he is the “head” of the household and results in ignoring all 
families without a father or with an employed mother being the “head”.  
Proponents of a “joint measurement of shared family class position” advance that defining a family’s class 
position only by the one parent with the higher occupation neglects the accumulation of relevant economic and 
cultural resources through both occupations of the parents (Beller 2009). For instance, they advance that a family 
with one parent belonging to a lower class and one parent belonging to a higher class possesses fewer resources 
than a family with two parents from a higher class. Although there is convincing empirical evidence supporting 
this argument (see Beller 2009), I hold on to the “dominance-approach” for two reasons. First, as pointed out by 
Erikson (1984: 512) and others, a joint measurement would lead to a “rather incomprehensible set of categories”. 
Second, and most importantly, I agree that the accumulation of cultural resources is relevant for the generation 
of social class differentials in ability and school performance, i.e. the primary effects, and that a family evaluates 
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reveals that 20 per cent of the students in the basic sample belong to EGP I, 12 per cent are 
from EGP II, 32 per cent belong to EGP III and V, 4 per cent are farmers and agricultural 
workers (EGP IVac VIIb), 9 per cent are self-employed and petty bourgeoisie (EGP IVa, b) 
and 23 come belong to the working class or have no profession (EGP VI, VIIa and no 
profession).89  
School performance 
I use marks and repetition of school years as general measures of school performance. 
Marks will not only be used for a general operationalization of school performance, but as 
proxies for family’s subjective evaluation of the likelihood that the school will accept their 
LGT-request (i.e. the parameter l in the model of family’s decision-making) and for staff 
meeting’s evaluation of a student’s chance of succeeding in the general track (i.e. the 
parameter a in the staff meeting’s decision-making model). 
The survey on the dialogue in summer 1999 (2000/2001) provides information on 
students’ results on the first part of the brevet-exam, i.e. the “continuous exam” (see 
Subchapter 2.2). This first part consists of a summing up of the marks the student received in 
grade 8 and 9. Hence, the measure I employ already is the average of the student’s marks 
from grade 8 and 9.90 In France, marks usually range from 0 (lowest) to 20 (highest). The 
average of every student’s mark in French and in mathematics is calculated. Information on 
the mark in first foreign language is provided in the data, but due to many more missing 
values on this variable as compared to the other two (which, moreover, have missing values 
on the same cases), I make no use of it. Missing information on marks in mathematics and 
French would reduce the basic sample to a size of 11 877 (Table 3).  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the costs of education based on its joint economic resources, but I give more importance to the assumption that 
the core part of educational decision-making, namely the desire to maintain the family’s social status, is driven 
by the family members’ evaluation of the one higher occupation and the status that the family associates with it. 
This evaluation of one’s class position, I suggest, is not one of an “amount” of resources. 
89  Parents with “no profession” consist of those who never worked, generally have no occupation, whose 
occupation cannot be assigned a PCS-code to or who are not known or died. Very few students have two parents 
with “no profession”. Sensitivity analyses reveal that assigning them to the working class does not alter the 
results at all. 
90 At first sight, it seems unfavorable that the marks cannot be disentangled for every grade. However, I argue 
that this is exactly the indicator of student’s performance that the schools are requested to consider when making 
their school track propositions. I assume that the school staff thinks that considering the marks of two grades 
provides a better general picture of the student’s performance than looking at marks at only one time point. 
Apart from that, as the students take the second part of the brevet at the end of the school year, neither the 
families can consider the results of the second part when they make their request (in January), nor the schools 
can it consider when they make the school track propositions in spring.  
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Table 3 Descriptives and survey source of the core explanatory variables (basic sample) 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Number 
of valid 
cases 
Survey part 
Social class       
EGPI 0.20  0 1 12594 
Family survey (1998), 
completed with 
headmaster survey 
(1995)  
EGPII 0.12  0 1  
EGPIII, V 0.32  0 1  
EGPIVc, VIIb 0.04  0 1  
EGPIVa, IVb  0.09  0 1  
EGPVI, VIIa, no-EGP 0.23  0 1  
Mark 11.03 (2.78) 0.85 19.5 11877 
Report on the dialogue 
(June 1999, 2000, 
2001) 
Previous grade repetition 0.22  0 1 12591 
Report on the dialogue 
(June 1999, 2000, 
2001) 
Parental education 
Lower 0.37  0 1 12342 Family survey (1998) 
Intermediate  0.33  0 1   
Higher 0.30  0 1   
Education of parent who attends meetings 
Tertiary degree 0.23  0 1 12044 Family survey (1998) 
Baccalauréat 0.16  0 1   
Vocational qualification 0.36  0 1   
Elementary education 0.17  0 1   
Other or no person involved 0.09  0 1   
Parents’ evenings 0.85  0 1 12525 Family survey (1998) 
Parents’ initiation of meetings 0.33  0 1 12471 Family survey (1998) 
Teachers’ initiation of meetings 0.18  0 1 12466 Family survey (1998) 
PA-membership 0.16  0 1 12537 Family survey (1998) 
Parent representative in staff 
meetings 
0.10  0 1 10759 
 
Family survey (1998) 
N 12594      
Note: Due to rounding to two decimal places means of some categorical variables not sum up to 1. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
As a second indicator of student’s school performance, the variable “previous grade 
repetition” tells whether a student has repeated 1 or 2 years in lower secondary school. This 
variable does not capture grade repetitions that were decided through the dialogue since the 
analyses concentrate on students’ first traversing of the dialogue. For purposes of simplicity, I 
do not distinguish between repetition of one 1 year and of 2 years. I recode with “1” students 
who repeated 1 or 2 years up to grade 9 and with “0” students who did not repeat any grade in 
that time. Table 3 shows that 22 per cent of the students in the basic sample have repeated 1 
or 2 grades during lower secondary school.91  
                                                 
91 To identify the students who have repeated grades, I used the information on students’ traversing of the 
dialogue: When a student attained the dialogue for the first time, i.e. when his family made a school track request 
in summer 1999, I labeled him as “not having repeated any grades”; when the family of a student made its first 
request one or two years later, I labeled the case as “having repeated one or two grades” (i.e. “0”). Consequently, 
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Parental education 
As proxies for parents’ cultural capital or, more specifically, their ability, knowledge, 
experience and confidence in dealing with school staff, I build two variables using parents’ 
educational attainment. The first variable combines the father’s and the mother’s highest 
educational degrees; the second variable indicates the educational degree of the parent who 
attends meetings with the teachers. The information the two variables are based on stems 
from the family survey in 1998.  
I argue that parents’ educational attainment is a reasonable indicator for the cultural 
capital that parents can make use of in their interactions with the school because it indicates 
how much time they have spend in the educational system and how successful they were. The 
higher their educational attainment, the more time they have spent in school, the more 
experience in communicating with teachers and other school staff and the more formal and 
informal knowledge they have acquired. By contrast, parents who were unsuccessful and 
made negative experiences in school feel uncomfortable in the school context, do not trust the 
educational system and even may perceive interactions with teachers as “painful” (see e.g. 
Lee and Bowen 2006; Reay 2005 and other literature presented in Subchapter 3.1.3).92  
As opposed to the social class-variable, the parental education-variable combines 
information on both the father and the mother and hence it takes into account the 
accumulation of resources through both parents (see Beller 2009). This operationalization is 
in line with the original theory (see e.g. Bourdieu 1966: 326). Moreover, I suggest that it is 
appropriate for analyses of family-school interactions: for instance, two higher educated 
parents will be more successful in dealing with the school staff than a higher educated single-
parent or a couple with “mixed” educational attainment because they can exchange their own 
knowledge and better support each other.  
Following Caille (1992) who examined social class differences in parental involvement 
with a similar data set (the “panel 1989” survey conducted by DEPP), I combine the highest 
educational attainment of the mother and the father so as to build three categories: (1) “higher 
                                                                                                                                                        
the number of “missing values” on the repetition-variable corresponds to that on the variable of family’s request 
(12 591). Moreover, one has to note that repetition in primary school or delayed enrolments in primary school 
are not taken into account. I suggest that families and the school staff mainly concentrate on indicators of school 
performance that reach back only in secondary education. 
92 In a recent study Bukodi and Goldthorpe (2012) show that parental education, social status and social class are 
no interchangeable social origin measures and argue that parental education represents “educational resources” 
such as knowledge of the educational system when it is included in analyses together with social origin and 
social status. As social status represents an individual’s perception of social superiority, equality or inferiority 
and social status is not included in the analyses of this dissertation, I assume that the education effect also 
captures parents’ feeling of social superiority, equality or inferiority towards the school staff and other parents. 
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education” including students with two parents having at least a bac and students with one 
parent having a tertiary diploma; (2) “intermediate education” containing students whose both 
parents have a CAP, BEP or BEPS and students with one parent having a bac; (3) “lower 
education” consisting of students with two parents with no attainment and students with one 
parent who is equipped with a CAP, BEP or BEPC.93 Table 3 shows that, in the basic sample, 
30 per cent of the students live in a family with a “higher” educational level, 33 per cent of 
the families have an “intermediate” educational level, and 37 per cent of the students have a 
“lower” educational background. In the multivariate analyses “lower education” will be the 
reference category. 
In order to construct an alternative variable that operationalizes the cultural resources 
that parents make use of in dealing with school staff, I combine information on which one of 
the parents attends meetings with the teachers with information on the highest educational 
attainment of that parent. In the 1998 family survey parents were asked whether, since the 
beginning of the school year, they have had the chance to talk to their child’s teachers at one 
or more of the following three opportunities: first, at meetings with the teachers they have 
initiated themselves, second, at meetings that were initiated by the teachers and, third, at the 
official parent-teacher meetings or “parents’ evenings”. Those parents who agreed on one of 
these three options were asked which family member went to the meetings. Combining this 
answer and information on the educational attainment of the concerned family member(s), I 
generate a variable with 5 categories: The first category “tertiary degree” includes students of 
whom the parent that came to the meetings has a tertiary degree. The second category 
“baccalauréat” consists of students with an involved parent having a general, technological or 
professional bac. The third category “vocational qualification” includes students whose 
involved parent has a CAP, BEP, BEPC (see Chapter 2). The fourth category “elementary 
education” includes students with an involved parent who either has no educational degree at 
all or a diploma of elementary education. Finally, the fifth category consists of students of 
whom neither the mother nor the father went to the meetings but possibly another person 
came to the meetings. It is labeled “other or no person involved”.94 
                                                 
93 If information on one parent is missing, I assign the students with the one parent having a tertiary diploma to 
category (1), students with the one parent having a bac to category (2) and students whose one parent has at most 
a CAP, BEP or BEPC to category (3). 
94 If both of the parents came to the meetings, I identified the parent with the “higher” attainment. Consequently, 
a student is assigned to the “baccalauréat”-category if, for example, both of her parents attend the meetings and 
her mother has a BEP, while her father attained a bac. Moreover, the variable concentrates on the involvement of 
the father and the mother. If, for instance, the mother is attending meetings and another family member (e.g. a 
sibling), the variable only takes into account the mother’s educational degree. The idea behind this construction 
is that the involvement of a parent typically “dominates” that of other persons who are not parents, if both are 
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Among the families in the basic sample, 9 per cent have another family member 
involved or no person at all is involved (see Table 3). For 23 per cent of the students a parent 
with a tertiary degree is involved, while for fewer students a parent with a bac or at most an 
elementary degree attends the meetings. Most of the parents who are involved have a 
vocational qualification (36 per cent among all families). 
Parental involvement 
I make use of five variables that identify five different kinds of parental involvement: 
(1) attendance at parents’ evenings (i.e. the regular official parent-teacher meetings), (2) 
parents’ initiation of meetings with the teachers, (3) attendance at punctual meetings that were 
initiated by the teachers (i.e. meetings of only parents of one student and her teacher(s)), (4) 
attendance at staff meetings as parent representative, and (5) membership in a parent 
association (PA). Each of these variables is a dummy-variable indicating with “1” that a 
student’s parents are involved in the specific way and denoting with “0” that they are not. 
Information to operationalize the first three involvement types were obtained from a measure 
that was described above: In 1998, parents reported whether, since the beginning of the school 
year, they have talked to their child’s teachers at meetings that they have initiated, at meetings 
that were initiated by the teachers and/or at the parents’ evenings. To construct the other two 
variables – “parent representative (in the staff-meeting)” and “PA-membership” – I used also 
the data obtained from the family survey in 1998. The person who filled in the questionnaire 
was asked whether he or she is member in a PA and whether he or she is parent representative 
at the staff meetings.95  
As indicated in Table 3 “attendance at official meetings” is a very common involvement 
type: 85 per cent of the families with valid information on this variable have at least one 
parent attending these events. Since the beginning of the school year (i.e. 1997/1998) 
considerably fewer parents have initiated meetings with the teachers or attended meetings that 
were initiated by the teachers (33 per cent respectively 18 per cent). Moreover, 16 per cent of 
the cases with valid information on the corresponding variables indicate a membership in a 
PA and 10 per cent indicate being parent representative. The high number of missing values 
                                                                                                                                                        
involved. First, the parents – who typically make the school track choice – will take more account of their own 
encounters with the teachers than of those of the grandmother, for instance. Second, the teachers certainly see the 
parents as more responsible for the student than his siblings, for example, and, hence, their school track decision 
would be more affected by the parents’ involvement than by that of another person, if both were involved. 
95 Since the question is formulated in a way that does not clearly indicate whether both parents are meant or only 
the parent who is filling in the questionnaire, one cannot surely infer that no one is involved when “n” was 
answered. However, I assume that if the parent who is not filling in the questionnaire would be member in a PA 
or parent representative, still the answering parent would tick “yes”.  
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on the latter variable (10 759 valid cases) is due to the fact that the question was only asked in 
the paper questionnaire and not in the subsequent telephone interviews that were lead to 
reduce the non-response rate (DEPP 2008: 50). Since including this variable in the regression 
models will considerably reduce the sample size, it will not always be taken into account.  
Table 4 reveals the inter-correlations of the different kinds of involvement. All 
associations are highly significant. Taking into account the strengths and the signs of the 
correlations, one can discover a pattern: On the one hand, initiations of meetings by teachers 
and by parents are highly positively correlated with each other, while they are negatively 
correlated with all other types of involvement. On the other hand, PA-membership and being 
parent representative are highly positively correlated.96 Attendance at parents’ evenings seems 
to stand somewhat apart as it is only marginally correlated with the other involvement types. 
Still, it is more correlated with PA-membership and being parent representative. Moreover, 
this association is positive while its relationship with the other two involvement types is 
negative and weaker.  
I suggest that the pattern indicates two groups of involvement. One group includes 
involvement types that are motivated by student’s school performance. When a student is 
performing poorly, either the parents or the teachers may think that it is important to talk with 
each other, in particular as the transition to upper secondary school is approaching. The 
second group consists of ways of involvement that gives parents the chance to actively 
influence their child’s schooling environment and career. Chapter 8 will present analyses of 
social class differences in the different involvement types and “reasons” for parents to 
become involved in these ways. 
                                                 
96 Notably, 85 per cent of the parents who are parent representative are also member in a parent association, or 
50 per cent of the parents who are PA-members are parent representatives attending the staff meetings. 
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Table 4 Pairwise spearman correlations of the five types of parental involvement (number of 
observations in parentheses) 
 
Parents’ 
evenings 
Parents’ 
initiation of 
meetings 
Teachers’ 
initiation of 
meetings 
PA-
membership 
Parent 
representative 
in staff 
meetings 
Parents’ evenings -     
 (12525)     
Parents’ initiation of 
meetings 
-0.0306* -    
 (12459) (12471)    
Teachers’ initiation of 
meetings 
-0.0888* 0.2507* -   
 (12459) (12461) (12466)   
PA-membership 0.1271* 0.0733* -0.0365* -  
 (12486) (12431) (12427) (12537)  
Parent representative in 
staff meetings97 
0.1066* 0.0856* -0.0379* 0.6173* - 
 (10708) (10653) (10648) (10738) (10759) 
Note: Significance: * p<0.00. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation 
nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
 
7.2.3 VARIABLES “DIRECTLY” TESTING THE MODEL ON FAMILY’S DECISION-MAKING  
Given the large sample size, the “panel 1995” can be valued as a rich data set that suits 
ambitious multivariate analyses. However, it does not provide variables that enable a direct 
operationalization of all decision-making parameters. As shown in Subchapter 6.1.2 on 
previous tests of the decision-making models, it is generally very difficult to directly test 
decision-making processes with secondary data. Therefore, most suitable proxies have to be 
used. In this section, I present the variables that I use to approximate a “direct” 
operationalization of the parameters that are required by the model on family’s making of the 
school track request. Since none of the parameters was measured in an ideal way, I have to 
make relatively strong assumptions linking the measures and the theoretical constructs. 
Moreover, the results of the “direct” tests will have to be interpreted with caution (e.g. Becker 
and Hecken 2009b; Stocké 2007). 
Subjective probability of success (p) 
As a proxy for parents’ subjective evaluation of their child’s chances to succeed in the 
general track, I use parent’s assessment of their child’s school performance. In 1998, parents 
had to rate their child’s performance in the actual school year by answering whether they 
                                                 
97 For purposes of simplicity, in the following I only term this variable with “parent representative”. 
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think that their child is (1) “a student that has a lot of difficulties”, (2) “a student that has 
some difficulties”, (3) “a good student”, or (4) “an excellent student”. Based on this question I 
generate a variable with a 4-point scale. In the basic sample, the mean subjective performance 
assessment by the parents is 2.6 (Table 5). 
Ideally, to measure parents’ evaluation of their child’s chances of success, I would use 
parents’ answers to a set of items such as “how likely do you think that your child is to 
successfully complete the general upper secondary school track?”, “how likely do you think 
that your child is to successfully complete the vocational secondary school track?”, and “how 
likely do you think that your child is to successfully complete the lower vocational track?” 
(see Becker 2003; Becker and Hecken 2009b; Need and De Jong 2000; Stocké 2007). 
According to Manski (2004) researchers should use self-reports of subjective probabilities for 
the empirical identification of decision-making processes. He bases this assumption on his 
research revealing that the common approach (in economics) – which does not employ such 
direct measures – has several difficulties: Since individuals’ observed behavior can often 
easily be explained with alternative mechanisms, the common approach has to rest on strong 
assumptions linking individuals’ observed behavior with their non-observed subjective 
expectations. Defending these “measurement-assumptions” is often not easy as a lot of 
evidence usually can contradict them (see Manski 1994 as an example for such evidence). 
Even though I have no “ideal” measure of parents’ subjective expectations of success, I 
still can use a subjective performance assessment instead of the typical objective measures 
(e.g. test scores and marks). This has advantages: It takes into account that there may be class-
specific deviations of a student’s perceived performance from her actual performance and, 
consequently, of perceived likelihood of success from actual likelihood of success. Although 
there is no strong evidence for such “biases” (e.g. Stocké 2007) and objective achievement 
measures were found to strongly determine student’s formation of schooling expectations 
(Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2012; Zafar 2011), I suggest that using a subjective measure 
of performance comes closer to the concept of “subjectively expected likelihood of success” 
as it would ideally be operationalized than objective measures. Moreover, the simultaneous 
use of marks and parents’ subjective performance assessment enables me to distinguish – to a 
certain degree – the effects of the likelihood that the teachers will propose the general track (l) 
and the chances of student’s success (p) on families’ school track demands. 
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Table 5 Descriptives and survey source of the variables exclusively used in the analysis of 
family’s decision-making (basic sample) 
 Mean SD Min Max Number of 
valid cases 
Source: survey 
part 
Parents’ performance assessment (p) 2.60 (0.80) 1 4 12487 Family survey 
(1998) 
Number of siblings (C) 1.86 (1.38) 0 16 12516 Family survey 
(1998) 
Employment status (1=no parent 
working; 0=at least on parent 
working) (C) 
0.07  0 1 12586 Family survey 
(1998) 
Educational motivation (c*SD) 
None 0.50  0 1 12344 Family survey 
(1998) 
Intermediate 0.13  0 1   
High 0.37  0 1   
Knowledge of right to reject 
0.81 
 0 1 12505 Family survey 
(1998) 
Opinion on parent-teacher relationship 
Better not meet 0.12  0 1 10455 Family survey 
(1998) 
Meet when problem 0.37  0 1   
Meet frequently 0.51  0 1   
N 12954      
Note: Due to rounding to two decimal places means of some categorical variables not sum up to 1. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
 
Family’s financial resources to account for C 
Since the data do not provide a measure of parents’ subjective evaluation of their 
economic possibilities to bear the costs of sending their child to the general track, I use 
number of siblings (Becker 2000; Becker 2003) and parents’ employment status to capture 
family’s financial background. Both variables are generated using information obtained from 
the 1998 family survey.98 The theoretical background of this proxy is the “resource dilution 
hypothesis”. This hypothesis argues that the empirically established negative association 
between number of siblings and educational outcomes is due to the fact that more children 
imply less available economic, social and cultural resources per child (e.g. Blake 1981; Blake 
1985; Blake 1989; Downey 1995; Downey 2001; Jæger 2009a). Notably, it was found that 
                                                 
98 In fact, in the 1998, family survey parents were asked about the adequacy of the family’s financial resources to 
bear the costs of the educational career that their child has planned (DEPP 2008: 44). This variable is not 
appropriate as it already captures the child’s specific educational plans and hence the family’s planned 
educational decision. Ideally, the survey would have asked whether the family’s resources are adequate for 
letting their child specifically attend the general track or university (see Stocké 2007, for instance). As I have to 
indirectly test the effect of C, I need a measure of family’s economic means to pay for the child’s education. A 
very good variable for this purpose would be family income. Unfortunately, the “panel 1995” does not provide 
such information either. 
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parents of many children are less able to fund their children’s higher educational careers 
(Steelman and Powell 1989; Steelman and Powell 1991). In the basic sample the average 
number of brothers and sisters is 1.86 (Table 5).99 
The employment status-variable distinguishes between families with at least one parent 
who is working (value “0”) and families with no working parent (value “1”). The information 
used stems from the family survey in 1998. “Not working” or “not employed” defines parents 
who are – at the time of the survey, i.e. in spring or summer 1998 – students, non-paid interns, 
unemployed, early retired, retired who were (before retirement) employees or self-employed 
and parents in “another situation”. Single-parent families are treated as two-parent families. 
This implies that one-parent families in which the single-parent is working belong to the 
category of working parents and if a single-parent is not working the family is assigned to the 
category of non-working parents. As shown in Table 5, 7 per cent of the students in the basic 
sample live in a family with no working parent. 100  
Educational motivation (c*SD) 
To operationalize a family’s educational motivation which corresponds to a family’s 
“need” that the child attends the general track in order to preserve the family’s social class 
position, I use parent’s answer to the question “which educational attainment is necessary to 
find a job”. The idea behind the use of this item is that “not finding a job” – which means 
unemployment – represents the costs of status decline (SD) and the answer, i.e. the 
educational attainment that is necessary for finding a job, indicates the likelihood that the 
costs of status decline emerge if the general track is not completed (c=1).  
The variable I construct has three categories. The first category includes parents who 
answered “no attainment”, “CAP/BEP”, “professional bac” and “don’t know”. This category 
identifies families who have no educational motivation regarding LGT. I assume that the 
parents who gave these answers do not think that they need their child to attend the general 
track to maintain the family’s social status. The second category contains parents who 
answered “general bac” and “technological bac”. This category indicates parents to whom it 
                                                 
99 The variable I constructed to indicate number of siblings also includes brothers and sisters of the student who 
do not live in the household and half-siblings. It was not possible do identify only the number of biological 
siblings living in the household. Still, I argue that this measure is appropriate since parents often financially 
support children who do not live at home because they are studying, for instance. 
100 In the basic sample valid information on the employment status of 12 248 mothers and 11 232 fathers exists. 
Among the mothers 31 per cent are not employed and among the fathers only 8 per cent do not work. Of the not-
working mothers 71 per cent answered “other situation” what mainly seems to indicate that they are 
“housewives”; 21 per cent reported that they are unemployed; 3 per cent are (early) retired. Among the non-
working fathers 49 per cent answered being unemployed; 20 per cent reported “other situation” and 24 per cent 
said they were (early) retired. The other reasons for not working are very marginally represented. 
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is important that the child attends the general track and thus who have some educational 
motivation. The third category identifies parents with a high educational motivation. It 
contains parents who answered that a tertiary attainment is necessary for finding a job. I 
propose that these families see a very high need in having their children attend the general 
track because this is the very least diploma that is necessary for higher education. Table 5 
shows that 50 per cent of the families in the basic sample have no educational motivation, 
while 13 per cent have an intermediate level of educational motivation and 37 per cent have a 
high level of educational motivation. 
As concluded in the chapter on previous research, it is very difficult to analyze the 
relative risk aversion mechanism or the effect of the costs and likelihood of status decline 
with secondary data. The measure that I propose is certainly not better than those used in 
previous literature. One drawback of my operationalization is that only one variable is 
supposed to capture the interdependent effects of both parameters SD and c. An “ideal” set of 
items to measure the amount of costs SD would be “how much would it bother you if your 
child does not attain an occupation that implies a higher social class position?”, “how much 
would it bother you if your child does not attain an occupation that implies an intermediate 
social class position?” and “how much would it bother you if your child does not attain an 
occupation that implies a low social class position?” and so on. To measure the likelihood of 
status decline an “ideal” survey-question would ask “how likely do you think it is that a 
person who has not completed the general track attains an occupation that implies (i) a higher 
social class position, (ii) an intermediate social class position or (iii) a lower social class 
position?”.  
Still, the item I employ is a compact and sufficient proxy for the weighted costs of 
status decline or – in positive terms – the educational motivation because it is a subjective 
measure and because it contains an aspect that represents the costs of status decline and an 
aspect that represents the likelihood of status decline. I make the strong assumption that being 
unemployed means practically no costs of status decline to families from the lowest class but 
it means the full amount of costs to families from higher social classes. If a family answers 
that tertiary education or having a general or technological bac is necessary to find a job, it 
thinks that not attending the general track is very likely to cause the costs of status decline. By 
contrast, if the family answers that less than a general or technological bac is necessary, it 
says that not attending the general track will not cause the costs of status decline. To permit 
some more variation, I distinguish between families who think that a tertiary degree is 
necessary and families who consider only a general and technological bac to be necessary. In 
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the following, I speak of “educational motivation” (c*SD) as a positive parameter and not of 
the “weighted costs of status decline” (c*(-SD)) which represent a negative parameter because 
the original item in the survey and the constructed variable indicates a utility and, hence, a 
positive parameter that the families attach (or do not attach) to the general track. 
Opinion on parent-teacher relationships 
In the analyses of social class effects on parental involvement and families’ decision-
making I make use of an additional variable to capture parents’ resources for dealing with the 
school staff. I suggest that parents’ opinion on parent-teacher relationships can shed light on 
the reasons why parents get involved and on the degree to which they get involved. In turn, 
this information hints at parents’ cultural capital to become involved. 
In the family survey in 1998, parents had to choose one item (out of five) that 
corresponds the most to their opinion. I condensed the original variable to one with three 
categories: (1) “Better not meet teachers”, (2) “meet teachers when there is a problem”, and 
(3) “meet teachers frequently”.101 Table 5 indicates that in the basic sample only 12 per cent of 
the families think it is better to not bother the teachers, 37 per cent of the families believe that 
teachers should be contacted when the child meets problems in school and 51 per cent are of 
the opinion that parents and teachers should closely work together. Unfortunately, the 
question was asked only in the paper questionnaire and therefore in the basic sample there are 
only 10 455 cases with valid information on the variable. 
Parents’ knowledge of the right to reject 
As indicated before, one important facet of cultural capital is their knowledge of the 
functioning of the educational system. Notably, within the dialogue, families’ knowledge of 
whether they have the right to reject the staff meeting’s proposition can be expected to 
influence their decision-making and to contribute to the generation of social class effects on 
their school track requests and their decision to reject (see Subchapter 5.1.4). In 1998, the 
parents had to answer the following question: “Do you think that, at the end of grade 9, the 
parents have the right to recall a school track decision that is not all right with them?”. The 
answering options were “yes”, “no” and “don’t know”. I construct a binary variable indicating 
                                                 
101 The wording of the original five items is: (i) “The teachers have so much to do with their students that they 
cannot solve all problems. Meeting them does not change much.” (ii) “It is better to let the teachers do their work 
and to inconvenience them as rarely as possible.” (iii) “Parents should meet the teachers as soon as there is a 
problem.” (iv) “It is important for the parents that they build up a good communication with the teachers and 
meet them even when there is no problem.” (v) “Teachers can do their work only in close collaboration with the 
parents. Therefore, they should meet very frequently.” Category (1) of the newly build variable contains items (i) 
and (ii), category (2) includes item (iii), and category (4) combines items (iv) and (v). 
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whether the parents know their right to reject (i.e. they answered “yes”), respectively whether 
they do not (i.e. they answered “no” and “don’t know”). A very large part of the families 
knows its right to reject (81 per cent, Table 5). 
7.2.4 CONTROLS 
A first control variable operationalizes student’s immigration background. In France, as 
in other European countries, families of immigration origin have, on average, lower social 
class positions and children with immigration background reach lower educational 
attainments than native families and students (e.g. Brinbaum and Kieffer 2009; Brinbaum and 
Kieffer 2005). Moreover, in France as in several other countries, non-native families were 
found to have significantly higher educational aspirations when school achievement and 
social class is controlled (Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 2007; Brinbaum and Kieffer 2005: 
28, 29; Vallet and Caille 1996). Also, at the transition to upper secondary school, when marks 
are held constant, students with an immigration background are found to be significantly more 
likely to gain access to the general track than native students (Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado 
2007: 79; Brinbaum and Kieffer 2005; Duru-Bellat 2002; Vallet and Caille 1996). Beyond 
that, immigration background is associated with central mediator-variables such as parental 
involvement: for instance, parents of students who have no French nationality are less likely 
to initiate meetings with teachers and to attend meetings that were initiated by the teachers 
(Caille 1992).  
Using information from the family survey in 1998 on parents’ nationality and country of 
birth, I construct a dummy-variable that denotes with “1” students who have two parents of 
French nationality who were born in metropolitan France and with “0” students with 
immigration background. This group consists of students with parents from the French 
overseas territories and the Maghreb, students with two parents of foreign nationality and 
born abroad, and students of mixed origin. The students with a “mixed” background are 
students with one parent of French origin and one parent from the French overseas territories 
and the Maghreb or of foreign nationality and born abroad.102 In the basic sample, 77 per cent 
of the students have a French origin (Table 6). 
                                                 
102 Studies focusing on ethnic inequalities in education typically further split up families with immigration 
background (see e.g. Brinbaum and Kieffer 2009 who use the ‘panel 1995’ and Barg 2012). They build a group 
labeled ‘French nationality, born abroad / foreign nationality, born in France’ including parents from the French 
overseas territories, and differentiate between European immigrants, notably from Portugal, and non-European 
immigrants being mainly from the Maghreb. Both immigrant-categories consist of students with two parents of 
foreign nationality and born abroad. Also, the studies look separately at students of mixed origin. I collapse all of 
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Table 6 Descriptives and survey source of the control variables (basic sample) 
 Mean  Min Max Number of 
valid cases 
Survey part 
French origin 0.77  0 1 12555 Family survey (1998) 
ZEP-school 0.10  0 1 12594 Yearly update of the 
“school situation” 
Private school 0.20  0 1 12594 Yearly update of the 
“school situation” 
City size (nb. of inhabitants) 
< 5,000  0.20  0 1 12594 Yearly update of the 
“school situation” 5,000-20,000 0.18  0 1  
20,000-200,000 0.27  0 1  
>200,000, Paris 0.35  0 1   
N 12594      
Note: Due to rounding to two decimal places the categories of some variables do not sum up to 100 and some 
percentages do not correspond to absolute numbers. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, 
Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
Two other control variables indicate what school type a student attends in the year he or 
she traverses the dialogue. One school-type variable denotes whether the student attends a 
school located in a ZEP, i.e. an “education priority zone”, and the other school-type variable 
indicates whether the student is enrolled in a private school. The used information is obtained 
from the survey-part that updates the every-year “school situation” of the students from 1996 
onwards. Table 6 indicates that 10 per cent of the students in the basic sample are enrolled in 
a ZEP-school and 20 per cent attend a private school. 
These school types should be considered for several reasons (see also Subchapter 2.4). 
Families’ relative freedom of school choice contributes to social segregation in schools 
because higher-class families try to enroll their children in schools with “favorable” social 
compositions (e.g. Van Zanten 2002). As one of families’ school choice strategies is to send 
their children to private schools, more children of higher social origin tend to attend private 
schools than children of lower social background (Héran 1996; Meuret, Broccolichi and 
Duru-Bellat 2001; Tavan 2004a; Tavan 2004b). Since ZEP-schools are located in districts 
with high rates of disadvantaged families, the average student social origin tends to be lower 
in ZEP-schools than in common public schools (e.g. Guillaume 2001). Schools’ social 
composition not only affects students’ performance but the selection procedures at the 
transition to upper secondary school, too: In schools with high rates of lower class children, 
secondary effects on the transition tend to be stronger (Duru-Bellat 2002: 105-106; Duru-
                                                                                                                                                        
the categories, because this book does not focus on differences in the educational behavior of different 
immigrant-groups. 
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Bellat, Jarousse and Mingat 1993; Duru-Bellat and Mingat 1988; 1989). Moreover, social 
class effects on the selection procedures could be different in ZEP-schools and private schools 
because teachers and headmasters have different interests than the school staff of common 
public schools (Van Zanten 2002). For instance, in private schools the staff may feel more 
obliged to act in the interests of the families because the families pay fees; in ZEP-schools 
teachers may actively try to reduce social inequality. Further, it has to be considered that 
parents who enroll their children in private schools have higher educational aspirations and 
are more involved (Caille 2004, Tavan 2004b).  
As a fourth control variable I take into account the size of the city, town or village 
where the student goes to school. In large cities and Paris there are more “elite”- and private 
schools and hence families have more possibilities to influence their children’s school career 
through specific school choices (e.g. Ballion 1986; Brauns 1999; Brauns 1998). At the same 
time, collèges are more likely to be locally and historically attached to general upper 
secondary schools (lycées) and therefore students attending schools in cities are more likely to 
attend the general track. Moreover, students in rural areas are more likely to attend vocational 
upper secondary schools (and do apprenticeships) because in these areas more places are 
available in vocational schools and firms (e.g. Duru-Bellat 1996; Duru-Bellat, Jarousse and 
Mingat 1993). Since given this availability working class students are more likely to choose a 
vocational education, secondary effect are expected to be stronger in rural areas. Beyond that, 
the social class distribution is not the same in French urban and rural areas and people differ 
in terms of attitudes and resources. This causes higher rates of working class students in rural 
schools and since – as indicated above – secondary effects are stronger in schools with high 
rates of lower class students, secondary effects can be expected to be higher in rural areas. As 
shown by Roux and Davaillon (2001), families from Paris and larger cities are more likely to 
request the general track than families that live in the countryside. To control for the urban-
rural discrepancies I employ a variable with four categories: (1) rural to 5,000 inhabitants, (2) 
5,000 to 20,000 inhabitants, (3) 20,000 to 200,000 inhabitants and (4) 200,000 to 2,000,000 
inhabitants and Paris. Table 6 shows that 35 per cent of the students in the basic sample attend 
a school in Paris or another large city, more than one quarter attends a school in a city with 
20,000 to 200,000 inhabitants and 18 to 20 per cent go to school in smaller towns and in the 
countryside.103 
                                                 
103 See also Moisan (2002) who shows that académies (see Subchapter 2.2.) differ with regard to rates of student 
transitions to vocational and general tracks. 
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7.3 Notes on the application of non-linear regression methods   
As I generally use linear regressions and binary logistic regressions, which are well-
established statistical methods, I refrain from giving an outline of the basics of these methods. 
As insightful and comprehensive explanations of the application of logistic regression (using 
Stata) I suggest for instance Wooldridge (2002), Long (1997) and Long and Freese (2006). 
Still, since recently more and more publications emphasize that the common interpretation of 
the results of non-linear regressions is problematic, I give here a very brief non-formal 
explanation of the discussed problems and present the solutions that I have settled for.  
Problems with the interpretation of results of non-linear regressions come up (i) when 
the coefficients of nested regression models are compared, (ii) when the coefficients of 
regression models that are based on different samples are compared and (iii) when the 
coefficients of interaction terms are interpreted. On the one hand, the literature proposes 
solutions that solve specific problems. For instance, the so-called KHB-method enables a 
correct comparison of coefficients of nested logit and probit regression models that are based 
on the same sample (Karlson, Holm and Breen 2012; Karlson and Holm 2011; Kohler, 
Karlson and Holm 2011). On the other hand, there are solutions that hold for the comparison 
of coefficients of nested same-sample models and of models that are based on different 
samples: the calculation of average marginal effects (AME) and of predicted probabilities 
(Allison 1999; Auspurg and Hinz 2011; Best and Wolf 2010; Best and Wolf 2012; Mood 
2010). Predicted probabilities moreover enable the detection and comprehensible 
interpretation of interaction effects in non-linear regressions (Best and Wolf 2010). 
7.3.1 COMPARING REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF NON-LINEAR MODELS 
Typically, to analyze to which extent the effect of X on Y is mediated by Z, one 
estimates the effect of X on Y in a first regression model and adds the mediator variable Z in 
a second regression model. Then, one compares the coefficients in the two models to see to 
which extent the effect of X on Y was reduced by the inclusion of Z. Applied to nonlinear 
probability models this method is problematic because the change of the coefficients can be 
due not only to the mediation or confounding but also to a rescaling of the model (Best and 
Wolf 2012; Karlson, Holm and Breen 2012; Karlson and Holm 2011; Kohler, Karlson and 
Holm 2011; Mood 2010).  
To outline the rescaling problem one must consider the “latent variable model for binary 
variables” (Long 1997: 40-48). The model is based on the idea that there is a latent 
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unobserved continuous variable Y* that generates the observed state of the binary dependent 
variable Y. In other words, whether the observed variable Y is “0” or “1” depends on the 
value of the latent variable Y*. More specifically, this depends on whether the Y*-value 
crosses a certain threshold. Not all researchers adopt the latent variable model. Some of them 
argue that its appropriateness depends on the theoretical problem that is analyzed. For the 
tests of rational choice theory it is regarded as appropriate (see e.g. Kroneberg, Heintze and 
Mehlkop 2010). Regarding the present analyses of families’ and teachers’ educational 
decision-making, Y* represents a family’s or a staff meeting’s willingness to make a certain 
school track choice, e.g. LGT instead of LPA. Like the willingness, Y* is continuous 
indicating for instance that some families or teachers who chose LPA were “closer” to opt for 
LGT than others. Y* is assumed to be linearly related to the independent variables. However, 
as it is unobserved and its variance is unknown, no ordinary least square method can be 
applied and the maximum likelihood approach must be used. 
Explained in elementary non-formal terms, the rescaling problem occurs because the 
latent variable Y* is not known and hence the coefficients in the latent variable model cannot 
be calculated (for more detailed and formal explications see e.g. Best and Wolf 2012: 383-
385; Best and Wolf 2010: 838; Karlson and Holm 2011: 224, 225; Kohler, Karlson, Holm 
2011: 422, 423). To enable the calculation of regression parameters (or coefficients) in the 
latent model one parameter has to be fixed. As indicated before, this is the variance of the 
residual term. The residual variance is fixed to a constant value via a “scaling parameter” 
(Auspurg and Hinz 2011).104 As the residual variance is fixed, the inclusion of an additional 
variable, e.g. the mediator Z, will always lead to an increase of the total variance of Y*. This 
leads to a different scale and hence to differently scaled regression coefficients. Consequently, 
one cannot know whether the difference between the coefficient of X in the model including 
Z and the coefficient in the model without Z is due to mediation or to rescaling. The 
“reduced” model – i.e. the model without Z – has a larger scale parameter or larger error 
dispersion than the “full” model including Z  (Winship and Mare 1984; Wooldridge 2002). 
The estimated logit coefficients are also affected by the rescaling because the term for the 
error dispersion is the denominator in the calculation of the coefficients (for a formal 
description of the problem see e.g. Karlson and Holm 2011: 232-233). The difference 
between the coefficients in the “reduced” and the “full” model is due to rescaling to the extent 
                                                 
104 The value depends on whether a logit or a probit model is defined. In logit regressions, the distribution of the 
residuals is assumed to be logistic; in the probit regression, the residuals are assumed to be normally distributed. 
In logit models the residual variance is fixed to π²/3 and in probit models it is fixed to 1.  
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that the “reduced” model has a larger residual standard deviation than the “full” model 
(Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011: 423). Hence, whenever Z has an effect on Y* that is 
independent of X, rescaling occurs.  
Because of the rescaling problem coefficients can neither be compared over models that 
are based on different samples, even when they include exactly the same variables (Allison 
1999; Auspurg and Hinz 2011). For instance, the coefficients of the same non-linear 
regression models calculated for different groups (e.g. men and women) or different time-
points cannot be compared.  
7.3.2 SOLUTIONS 
Up to now, several solutions to the problem of the non-comparability of coefficients of 
logit and probit regression models have been put forward and evaluated. I present only those 
that I use for the analyses conducted in this thesis. 105  Thereby, I do again refrain from 
repeating detailed and formal descriptions that can be found in more elaborate statistical 
literature. I rather emphasize for which purposes the different solutions will be employed in 
the analyses in this dissertation. 
Predicted probabilities and average marginal effects (AMEs) 
It is generally acknowledged that the graphical presentation and interpretation of 
predicted probabilities provides reasonable and correct conclusions (for an introduction see 
e.g. Long 1997: 64-79; Long and Freese 2006: 163-177). Probabilities are understandable and 
they can be compared over nested same-sample models and models based on different 
samples (Best and Wolf 2010; Best and Wolf 2012). The difficulty with the use of predicted 
probabilities is that they depend on the values of the explanatory variables. Hence, one must 
decide for which specific “case” or combination of values of the explanatory variables the 
predicted probabilities shall be calculated. By means of conditional effect plots, i.e. the 
graphical presentation of predicted probabilities for different values of the explanatory 
variables, the results – at least of certain combinations of values of the explanatory variables – 
can be interpreted comprehensibly and vividly (e.g. Bauer 2010: 67, 68; Best and Wolf 2010; 
Long 1997).  
                                                 
105 Aside from average marginal effects (AME) and the KHB-method, the literature discusses the employment of 
y*-standardized coefficients, average partial effects, linear probability models and a recently advanced method 
by Breen, Karlson and Holm (2011) that intends to solve the problem of the non-comparability of coefficients 
obtained for different samples.  
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In the following analyses, I will present predicted probabilities in order to illustrate the 
magnitude of specific effects for specific cases. For instance, to illustrate social class effects 
on families’ school track requests (with a regression that includes social class, immigration 
background and school type), I will calculate the predicted probability that a student of 
French origin from the upper service class, attending a public school that is not located in a 
ZEP demands the general track and the probability that a student who similar expect that he 
belongs to the working class requests the general track. Further, I will not only verbally 
compare such two predicted probabilities but graphically present calculated differences 
between them. This difference or change in predicted probabilities that occurs when a 
categorical independent variable changes from 0 to 1 is called a discrete change effect (e.g. 
Long 1997). 
One coefficient that has been used for long in economics and that has become more and 
more popular among sociologists is the average marginal effect (AME). AMEs are 
comparable over nested same-sample models and over models based on different groups, 
time-points and other differing samples (Auspurg and Hinz 2011; Best and Wolf 2010; Best 
and Wolf 2012; Mood 2010: 582; Wooldridge 2002). To understand the interpretation of 
AMEs one should first think of the “marginal effect” or, in case of a categorical independent 
variable, the “discrete change effect”. Again, for a categorical explanatory variable this effect 
is the difference in P(Y=1) between a person for whom the explanatory variable is 1 and the 
exact same person (i.e. the values of all other variables are held constant at the same values) 
for whom the explanatory variable equals 0. If the explanatory variable is continuous, we 
speak of a “marginal effect”. This is the difference in P(Y=1) for a case with a certain value 
on the explanatory variable and for a corresponding case (all other explanatory variables are 
held constant at the same values) with a value on the explanatory variable that corresponds to 
a one-unit increase of the starting value (Long 1997). For example, in a regression model that 
includes only mark and social class as explanatory variables, a marginal effect would 
correspond to the difference in P(Y=1) for a student from the higher salariat who has a mark 
of 5 and another student from the higher salariat with a mark of 6. Obviously, because of the 
non-linear relation between the explanatory variable and the probability, the marginal effect 
varies over the level of the continuous explanatory variable. Computing the marginal effect 
for similar students with marks 12 and 13 would yield different results. 
The AME, then, is the average of the marginal effect or discrete change effect over all 
observations and hence over all observed combinations of values of the other variables. 
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Williams (2012) vividly describes the AME of a categorical variable (black vs. white) as 
follows:  
“Go to the first case. Treat the person as though s/he were white regardless of what the 
person’s race actually is. Leave all other independent values as is. Compute the probability (if he 
or she were white) would have diabetes [the binary dependent variable]. Now do the same thing, 
this time repeating the person as though they were black. The difference in the probabilities just 
computed is the marginal effect for that case. Repeat the process for every case in the sample. 
Compute the average of all the marginal effects you have computed” (Williams 2012: 325). 
One disadvantage of the AME is that it does not take into account the non-linear 
relationship between the explanatory variable and the probability. As it simply is an average 
effect, it does not tell the whole story. At the same time, it provides a single number for the 
effect of a variable that was computed using all of the observations. According to some 
researchers, another advantage is that the AME is “intuitively” interpretable (Best and Wolf 
2010; Best and Wolf 2012). At least for a categorical value, one can easily imagine what an 
AME represents.  
Throughout the analyses of this dissertation I will present AMEs as they are comparable 
over same-sample nested models and models for different samples. This enables the reader to 
see how coefficients change when confounding variables are taken into account. Moreover, it 
enables to compare coefficients based on different samples. Additionally, I will sometimes 
show logit coefficients. Although these are not easily interpretable and cannot be compared 
over models, I present them in order to document the regression coefficients that were used to 
compute presented predicted probabilities. To compute and graph AMEs, predicted 
probabilities and discrete change effects, I use the “margins”- and “marginsplot”-command 
implemented in Stata 11. 
The KHB-method 
Recently, Karlson, Breen and Holm (2012) advanced a method that solves the problem 
of non-comparability of coefficients of nested same-sample models. Summarized in few 
terms, the “KHB-method” calculates relative effects that are not affected by rescaling because 
they use ratios in their calculation of the regression coefficients that cancel out the scaling 
parameter. They calculate the residuals of an OLS-regression of X on the confounding 
variable Z and include these residuals as an additional explanatory variable in the “reduced” 
logit or probit model, which is the model that does not contain the confounding variable Z 
(Best and Wolf 2012: 388). The explained variances of the two compared latent variable 
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models are identical and the scaling parameters correspond. Consequently, the log odds-ratios 
(or logits) can be computed net of rescaling. 106 
The method, or rather its Stata-implementation (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011), 
decomposes the total effect of X on into a direct and an indirect effect measured on the same 
scale. The effects are measured in logits, but log odds-ratios and AMEs can be computed, too. 
The direct effect is the part of the total effect that remains after controlling for Z and the 
indirect effect is the part of the total effect that is mediated by Z. For instance, if one analyzes 
the effect of social class and school performance on families’ school track choices, the direct 
effect corresponds to the secondary effects and the indirect effect represents the primary 
effects (see Karlson and Holm 2011; Boudon 1974). Similarly, the decomposition can be 
applied to all other research questions that seek to quantify the extent to which a confounding 
variable explains the relationship between a continuous or categorical independent variable 
and a categorical dependent variable. 
Several Monte Carlo simulations evaluate the performance of AMEs, the KHB-method 
and other proposed solutions such as y*-standardization and linear probability models (Best 
and Wolf 2012; Karlson, Holm and Breen 2012; Karlson and Holm 2011). While AMEs and 
the KHB-method provide very robust results, the other approaches perform weakly when the 
explanatory variables are not normally distributed and do not correlate. Comparing the AMEs 
and the KHB-method, the coefficients obtained with KHB were found to be entirely 
unaffected by heavily skewed distributions of the explanatory variables while the AMEs are 
slightly biased. Yet, the AMEs are valued as a satisfying solution of the problem of non-
comparability of same-sample nested models (Best and Wolf 2012: 391) and, beyond that, 
they are comparable over different samples.  
In the following analyses I will apply the KHB-method when I compare nested same-
sample logit models and want to provide an exact quantification of a direct and indirect effect. 
In order to document the absolute size of every AME-coefficient in the model (including the 
confounding and the control variables), I moreover show AMEs for each variable in each 
distinct nested model. These AMEs are not obtained with the Stata-command “margins”. 
Presenting AMEs calculated with the “margins”-command and AMEs obtained from the 
KHB-model serves also as sensitivity analysis. 
                                                 
106 Aside from Karlson, Holm and Breen (2012), see Karlson and Holm (2011) and Kohler, Karlson and Holm 
(2011) for other comprehensive explanations of the method. 
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7.3.3 INTERACTIONS IN NON-LINEAR REGRESSION MODELS 
Due to the non-additive association between the explanatory variables and the 
probability in non-linear models, logit and probit models already contain “interaction effects”. 
In other words, the non-additivity means that the effect of an explanatory variable on the 
probability always depends on the values of the other explanatory variables that are included 
in the model. This makes the regression less sensitive to the direct specification of interaction 
terms (Best and Wolf 2010: 840). According to Ai and Norton (2003; Norton, Wang and Ai 
2004), the common specification yields four important implications for non-linear models: 
First, the coefficient in the model could indicate that there is no interaction effect, although 
there is one. Second, the t-test is no appropriate approach to test the significance of the 
interaction effect and hence the computed model may yield incorrect results regarding the 
significance of the interaction effect. Third, one has to consider that the effect depends on the 
values of all other explanatory variables and that consequently the interaction effect can hold 
only for certain combinations of values of the explanatory variables. Fourth, the coefficient in 
the model may indicate a sign that holds only for certain (combinations of) values of 
independent variables and not for all or for others. For instance, for certain cases the 
interaction effect may be positive and for others it may be negative. 
The use of conditional effect plots, i.e. graphical presentations of predicted 
probabilities, provides a remedy (e.g. Bauer 2010; Best and Wolf 2010; Long and Freese 
2006: 436-438). Therefore, when examining interaction effects, I will plot predicted 
probabilities respectively discrete change effects for various combinations of values of the 
explanatory variables. I will not do so however for every considered interaction term but only 
for those that increase the model fit (i.e. the explanatory power) of the respective regression 
model (see Best and Wolf 2010). Since the AME is no solution for a correct analysis of 
interaction effects in non-linear models, I present logits to document the regression 
coefficients on which the predicted probabilities are calculated. 
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8 Results 
 
To give a first idea of families’ and school staffs’ interdependent decision-making 
within the dialogue, Figure 3 presents different pathways through the dialogue. In most cases 
the staff meeting accepts a family’s school track request. However, the extent of acceptance 
slightly varies: While only 88 per cent of LGT-demands are accepted, 98 per cent of families 
who requested the higher vocational track or the lower vocational track (LPA) and 92 per cent 
of those who requested grade retention (GR) receive a corresponding proposition. Only 2 per 
cent of the families who requested a vocational track are proposed the general track (LGT). 
Among families whose demands were not accepted, those who requested the general 
track are more willing to take the trouble to reject and attend the talk with the headmaster than 
families who made more modest school track requests. While around 37 per cent of families 
who demanded LGT but were proposed a vocational track or GR decide to reject, only 17 per 
cent of families who requested LP or A and were proposed a different vocational track (132 
cases) do so. Among the 65 families whose request was LPA but who received an LGT-
proposition 13 families (i.e. 20 per cent) reject. If a family requested LGT, headmasters’ 
decisions are most likely to correspond to staff meetings’ propositions (60 per cent if the staff 
meeting proposed LPA and 72 per cent if it proposed GR). If a family opted for the vocational 
tracks or grade repetition, the headmasters are more likely to accept the request: For instance, 
if a family demanded GR but was proposed LPA by the staff meeting, the headmaster accepts 
all of the GR-demands. However, overall the frequencies are small. This seems to indicate 
that the school is stricter regarding the admission to the general secondary school track than 
regarding admission to the lower tracks and that the headmaster is willing to accept GR even 
if it increases grade retention rates.  
Furthermore, most of the families who have rejected but did not achieve a decision of 
the headmaster that corresponds to their request decide to reject a second time. However, 
overall less than 2 per cent of the families in the sample actually do that. Grade repetition 
appears to play a special role: The staff meetings propose it slightly more often than LPA to 
families who have requested LGT, and the headmasters choose this option very often, too. 
Similarly, the recall meeting decides grade retention for many of the families who have 
rejected a second time. These frequencies provide a preliminary support of the assumption 
that the school staff and the families handle grade retention as a compromise. 
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Figure 3 Students’ traversing of the dialogue: frequencies and shares (basic sample, N=12 591) 
 
Note: Percentages presented in parantheses; for more exact percentages 
see Table 1; due to rounding and missing values, percentages do not 
always round up to 100. Only “plausible” cases are listed: the very few 
Families who rejected (or attended the talk with the headmaster) although 
their demand was accepted are not listed. * 132 cases out of the 3803 
LPA-propositions are contradicting family requests; 17 out of the 132 
reject these propositions. ** For these 14 students, 10 headmasters choose 
the lower vocational track (A) and 4 the higher vocational track (LP). 
Except for 1 case, headmaster’s decision corresponds to families’ 
requests. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère 
de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Subchapter 8.1 addresses social class differentials in families’ school track requests, 
staff meetings’ school track propositions and final outcomes of the dialogue. It focuses on 
families’ and school staffs’ choice between the general track (LGT) and the vocational track 
(LPA). Subchapter 8.2 will present tests of the general “bridging hypotheses”, i.e. 
assumptions that link the social situation an actor is in with her subjective evaluation of this 
situation. These include the association between social class and school performance or 
between social class and the different types of involvement. I label them general bridging 
hypotheses because they hold for families’ and school staffs’ choices along the dialogue. 
Subchapter 8.3 will outline the test of the theoretical model on family’s decision-making. At 
the beginning of this subchapter, I test specific bridging hypotheses on social class differences 
in families’ decision-making parameters (e.g. educational motivation, c*SD). Subsequently, I 
present tests of the theoretical model on families’ school track request and rejection decisions. 
Again, the analysis of families’ requests focuses on their decision between LGT and LPA. In 
Subchapter 8.4, I investigate staff meetings’, headmasters’ and recall meetings’ decision-
making. As for families’ requests, I analyze staff meetings’ choice between LGT and LPA. 
Finally, Subchapter 8.5 deals with families’ and school staffs’ grade retention decisions and, 
to complete the picture, the last sections bring into line families’ and school staffs’ decisions 
between LGT, LPA and grade retention (GR). 
8.1 Social class differentials within the dialogue 
I begin with some descriptive results. Figure 4 presents absolute chances of opting for 
the general track, the vocational track or grade repetition by family’s social class. As 
expected, the chances of requesting, getting proposed and finally getting access to LGT 
augment with a family’s social class position. Among families belonging to EGP I, 92 per 
cent demanded the general track, 83 per cent of those belonging to EGP II did so, 62 per cent 
of those from EGP III and V and 45 per cent of EGP VI- and VIIa-families demanded LGT. 
As suggested in the literature, the class consisting of farmers and agricultural workers (EGP 
IVc, VIIb) and the class containing the petty bourgeoisie and the self-employed (EGP IVa, 
IVb) are considered outside the hierarchical order. Among the families from EGP IVa and 
IVb, 67 per cent requested the general track and among those from EGP IVc and VIIb 56 per 
cent did so. The relationship between staff meeting’s school track proposition and family’s 
social class highly resembles the corresponding association between family’s social class and 
its school track request. Though, generally chances that the staff meeting proposes LGT are 
lower than the probabilities that a family requests the general track.  
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Regarding the final outcome of the dialogue, the respective general chances of getting 
access to LGT lie in-between: For example, while 92 per cent of families from EGP I request 
LGT, staff meetings propose LGT to only 82 per cent of them and 85 per cent of these 
families finally attain access to LGT. For families in EGP-class II, EGP-class III and V and 
the class of self-employed and petty bourgeoisie (EGP IVa, IVb) the percentages act by the 
same pattern. In contrast, for the working class (EGP VI, VIIa) and the class of farmers and 
agricultural workers (EGP IVc, VIIb), the final outcomes of the dialogue correspond to the 
staff meeting’s proposition, at least regarding LGT. Generally, it seems that not much 
‘happens’ between a staff meeting’s proposition and the ending of the dialogue. There seem 
to be few rejections, or if there are rejections, the school staff seems to often hold on to its 
decisions. 
Figure 4 Social class differentials in family’s school track request, staff meeting’s school 
track proposition and the final outcome of the dialogue (absolute chances; basic 
sample) 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track, GR=grade repetition; due to rounding the absolute chances not 
always sum up to 1. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, 
DPD; own calculations. 
The following figures present predicted probabilities that correspond to the secondary 
effects. They are based on regressions of families’ school track requests, staff meetings’ 
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propositions and the final outcomes on families’ social class and school performance of the 
student. The regression models contain also the control variables. They focus on the decision 
between the general track (LGT) and the vocational track (LPA). The calculated predicted 
probabilities – obtained from the regression models presented in Table A3 in the appendix – 
represent students of French origin enrolled in public secondary schools that are not located in 
a ZEP. Moreover, the city size-variable is held constant at “200,000 to 2,000,000 inhabitants 
and Paris” and the variable indicating whether a student has repeated grades in lower 
secondary school is held constant at “0”.107 To illustrate how the social class effects on the 
three steps of the dialogue (i.e. family’s request, staff meeting’s proposition and the final 
outcome) vary by school performance level, the probabilities are calculated for every social 
class and for every mark. I additionally present discrete change effects that correspond to the 
difference between the predicted probability for each class and the predicted probability for 
the reference class (working class, or EGP VI, VIIa).  
The left column of Figure 5 lists graphs that present probabilities. The right column lists 
graphs that show the corresponding discrete change effects. The main purpose of Figure 5 is 
to illustrate how the extent of social class differentials varies by students’ performance level. 
As expected, predicted likelihoods of requesting LGT, of being proposed LGT and of finally 
gaining access to LGT generally increase with a student’s marks. For example, while a family 
from EGP I whose child has a mark of 5 has a likelihood of 0.5 to request the general track, a 
family from the same class whose child has a mark of 6 has a probability of more than 0.6 to 
request LGT. With regard to staff meetings’ propositions, the corresponding probabilities are 
considerably lower but they increase with students’ marks, too. 
The discrete change effects reveal that differences between social classes emerge in the 
lower and middle range of students’ performance.  For instance, given a child has an average 
mark of 7, the probability that an EGP I-family demands the general track (instead of the 
vocational track) is 50 percentage-points higher than the corresponding predicted likelihood 
that a family from the working class, i.e. the reference category, makes that choice. In the 
same fashion, the probability that an EGP II-family requests LGT is around 33 percentage-
points higher and that of a family belonging to EGP III or EGP V is 15 points higher.108 Given 
a student has a mark that is better than 16, there are no social class differentials, neither in 
                                                 
107 Predicted probabilities presented in the following will typically hold for students with these characteristics. If 
additional variables are specified, I will indicate so in the text or in figures’ footnotes.  
108 A presentation of confidence intervals would indicate whether the discrete change effects are significant. 
However, to keep the figure as clear as possible I have refrained from showing the intervals. The significance 
levels of the social class effect are listed in Table A3 in the appendix. 
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families’ requests nor in the staff meetings’ propositions or the final outcome of the dialogue. 
By contrast, if a student has rather low marks (e.g. a mark of 2), clear social class differences 
in families’ demands appear but none in staff meetings’ decisions. This indicates that staff 
meetings “correct” too ambitious requests of higher-class families with poorly performing 
children. As social class differences in the final outcome are slightly more pronounced, we 
can expect that small social class differences emerge through the steps between the staff 
meeting’s decision and the final outcome, i.e. families’ rejections and headmasters’ or recall 
meetings’ decisions. 
Figure 5 Social class effects on family’s school track request, staff meeting’s school track 
proposition and the final outcome of the dialogue by mark (predicted 
probabilities and discrete change effects; LGT vs. LPA) 
 
Note: LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; *reference category in the regression models; estimates 
obtained from regression models presented in Table A3; probabilities were calculated for French students 
who have not repeated grades, who are enrolled in public non-ZEP schools located in a city with at least 
200,000 inhabitants. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation 
nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 contain the exact same probabilities and corresponding discrete 
change effects but present them differently in order to illustrate the difference between 
families’ requests, staff meetings’ propositions and the final outcomes. Figure 6 clarifies that 
for all classes and at almost all performance levels the probability that a family requests LGT 
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(instead of LPA) is higher than the probability that the staff meeting proposes LGT. The 
likelihood that the final outcome of the dialogue is LGT slightly exceeds the likelihood that 
the staff meeting proposes LGT. The distances between the curves increase with family’s 
social class position. For instance, while the probability that an EGP I-family with a child 
whose mark is 7 requests LGT is nearly 0.8, the corresponding predicted probability that 
the staff meeting proposes LGT is only 0.4 and the respective probability that the final 
outcome is LGT is 0.5. Comparatively, for EGP II the corresponding probabilities are 
0.6 (family’s request), 0.3 (staff meeting’s proposition) and 0.4 (final outcome), or for 
the reference class EGP VI and VIIa they are 0.2 (family’s request), 0.1 (staff 
meeting’s proposition) and somewhat higher than 0.1 (final outcome). Again, if 
students have good marks, e.g. at least 16, the family and the staff meeting agree on 
LGT and consequently the final outcome is LGT. If a student has a mark in the middle 
range, the distance between the probabilities for families’ requests and staff meetings’ 
propositions is the greatest, in particular for higher social classes. If a student has very 
low marks, one can see distances between the curves only in the graphs for the higher 
social classes.109 
                                                 
109 Lowess smoothers reveal that the larger distance between the curves in the middle-ranges is not due to the 
logistic function. 
 182 
Figure 6 Predicted probability that family’s request, staff meeting’s proposition and final 
outcome of the dialogue are LGT instead of LPA by mark and social class 
 
Note: LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; *reference category in the regression models; estimates 
obtained from models presented in Table A3; probabilities were calculated for French students who have not 
repeated grades, who are enrolled in public non-ZEP schools located in a city with at least 200,000 inhabitants. 
Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own 
calculations. 
Again, the presentation of the discrete change effects in Figure 7 shall make the social 
class effects even clearer. The bumps of the curves indicate the maximal differences between 
the predicted probabilities for each class and the corresponding predicted probability for the 
reference category (i.e. the working class). The solid curve representing family’s request 
shows: the higher the EGP-class, the bigger are the bumps. Moreover, for higher social 
classes the bump is located more left on the x-axis. Hence, families from higher social classes 
are generally more likely to demand LGT and they are more likely to do so even though the 
child has relatively low marks. The bumps in the curves representing staff meetings’ 
propositions (i.e. curves with long dashes) increase with social class, too. This indicates that 
the school is highly influenced by families’ requests and therefore reproduces the size of the 
social class differentials. However, the maximum of the curves representing staff meetings’ 
propositions lie around 9 for all social classes. Hence, when families request the general track 
(LGT) although their child is poorly performing, the staff meeting disagrees with families, 
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regardless of their social class. In respect to the final outcome of the dialogue, social class 
differences resemble more those in families’ requests: especially for EGP I the maximum of 
the curve that represents the final outcome is somewhat more left than that of the curve 
representing the staff meetings’ decisions. Again, we can infer that some higher classes 
manage to get their way via the steps of the dialogue that lie between the school’s proposition 
and the final outcome. These steps are families’ rejections, and headmasters’ and recall 
meetings’ decisions. 
Figure 7 Discrete change effects of social class on family’s school track request, staff 
meeting’s school track proposition and the final outcome of the dialogue by mark 
(discrete change effect; LGT vs. LPA) 
 
Note: LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; discrete change corresponds to difference in probabilities of 
choosing LGT (instead of LPA) between each social class and the reference class (EGP VI, VIIa); estimates 
obtained from models presented in Table A3; probabilities were calculated for French students who have not 
repeated grades, who are enrolled in public non-ZEP schools located in a city with at least 200,000 inhabitants. 
Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own 
calculations. 
To shed light on the relative extent of primary and secondary effects on the two first 
steps of the dialogue and its ending, I apply the Karlson Holm Breen (KHB) method. This 
technique decomposes the total effect of social class on family’s request, staff meeting’s 
proposition and the final outcome of the dialogue into a direct and an indirect effect measured 
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on the same scale. The direct effect is the part of the total social class effect that remains after 
controlling for school performance; the indirect effect is the part of the total effect that is 
mediated by school performance. Hence, the direct effect represents the secondary effects and 
the indirect effect corresponds to the primary effects (Karlson and Holm 2011). 
Table 7 shows to which extent the effect of each social class (as compared to the 
reference class EGP VI and VIIa) is due to the primary and the secondary effects. The table 
also lists corresponding AMEs. The row labeled “Total effect” indicates the AMEs of the 
classes in the “reduced model”, i.e. the model only including social class and the control 
variables. The coefficient has been adjusted with the KHB-method so as to not be affected by 
rescaling (see Subchapter 7.3). The row that is labeled “Direct effect” shows the AMEs of 
social class that remain after controlling for mark and grade repetition. These are the 
coefficients of the so-called “full model”. The line labeled “Indirect effect” lists the 
differences between the “total AMEs” and the “direct AMEs”. Finally, the “confounding 
percentage” indicates how much of each class effect is mediated by school performance and 
hence it quantifies the primary effects’ relative size. 
Comparing the confounding percentages for family’s request, staff meeting’s 
proposition and the final outcome, one notes that secondary effects on families’ requests are 
stronger than on staff meetings’ decisions and final outcomes. Except for the class of farmers 
and agricultural workers and that of self-employed and the petty bourgeoisie, social class 
differentials in families’ LGT-requests are less mediated by student performance than social 
class differentials in staff meetings’ respective decisions. For instance, while 41 per cent of 
the total EGP I-effect on family’s request are due to performance differences between EGP I-
students and working-class students (i.e. the reference category), almost 54 per cent of the 
EGP I- effect on staff meeting’s decision is caused by the respective primary effects. 
Regarding EGP II and EGP III and V, the primary effects are considerably larger. This result 
is in accordance with the theory: Since for families from the highest class it is more important 
to have their children attend the general track, they are more likely to demand it even when 
their children have not too good marks. Staff meetings’ decisions follow the same pattern but 
magnitudes of the primary and secondary effects do not vary as much by social classes. The 
pattern corresponds because staff meetings take into account families’ requests; the 
differences however are slightly weaker because the staff is not willing to accept demands 
that are too ambitious.  
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With regard to the final outcome of the dialogue, Table 7 reveals that for most of the 
classes the secondary effects exceed those on the staff meetings’ propositions. This indicates 
that secondary effects slightly increase because of families’ rejections, and headmasters’ and 
recall meetings’ decisions. Beyond that, the difference of secondary effects on staff meetings’ 
propositions and the final outcomes is slightly greater for EGP I-families than for EGP II- or 
EGP III and V-families. This finding implies that higher classes are more likely to get their 
will through their rejections, headmasters’ decisions or recall meetings’ decisions. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the primary effects are very large on all three 
decisions for the class of farmers and agricultural workers. This indicates that sending their 
child to the general track is not very important to them – they seem to do so only when the 
child has very good marks. This is the only class for which the staff meetings’ decisions are 
more affected by secondary effects than the families’ demands: almost 90 per cent of 
families’ choices and 84 per cent of staff meetings’ decisions are due to students’ school 
performance. Finally, the decisions of the families belonging to the class of self-employed 
and petty bourgeoisie are even more affected by secondary effects than requests of EGP I-
families. They seem to assign a lot of importance to sending their children to LGT. 
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Table 7 Decomposing social class effects on family’s request, staff meeting’s proposition 
and the final outcome in direct effects and indirect effects via student performance; 
AMEs. 
Decomposing 
social class 
(Ref. EGPVI, VIIa) 
EGPI EGPII EGPIII, V 
EGPIVc, 
VIIb 
EGPIVa, 
IVb 
 
Family’s request (LGT vs. LPA) 
Total effect 0.451*** 0.370*** 0.182*** 0.149*** 0.227*** 
Direct effect 
(i.e. secondary effect) 
0.266*** 0.184*** 0.084*** 0.015 0.134*** 
Indirect effect 
(i.e. primary effect) 
0.184 0.186 0.099 0.134 0.094 
      
Confounding percentage 40.89 50.21 54.15 89.89 41.27 
N 11576     
 
Staff meeting’s proposition (LGT vs. LPA) 
Total effect 0.467*** 0.380*** 0.188*** 0.183*** 0.204*** 
Direct effect 
(i.e. secondary effect) 
0.216*** 0.153*** 0.072*** 0.029 0.096*** 
Indirect effect 
(i.e. primary effect) 
0.251 0.227 0.116 0.154 0.108 
      
Confounding percentage 53.72 59.84 61.69 84.08 52.77 
N 11071     
 
Final outcome (LGT vs. LPA) 
Total effect 0.473*** 0.390*** 0.195*** 0.178*** 0.217*** 
Direct effect 
(i.e. secondary effect) 
0.236*** 0.167*** 0.078*** 0.026 0.106*** 
Indirect effect 
(i.e. primary effect) 
0.237 0.223 0.117 0.152 0.111 
      
Confounding percentage 50.09 57.22 59.81 85.43 51.06 
N 10999     
Note: AME=average marginal effect, LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained with 
Stata-command “khb” (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011); concomitant variables are French origin, school types 
and city size. Standard errors are adjusted for school-level clustering. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
To complete the picture of the social class differentials along the dialogue, Table 8 
presents the results of nested binary logistic regressions of the final outcome of the dialogue 
(LGT vs. LPA) on social class, marks, family’s request, staff meeting’s proposition and 
family’s rejection decisions.110 Model 1 shows that, holding constant students’ marks, the 
likelihood that a higher service class family gets access to the general track is, on average, 26 
percentage points higher than the corresponding likelihood for a working class family 
                                                 
110 Regression models are nested if they have the same dependent and explanatory variable and one model 
contains at least one additional explanatory variable. 
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(p<0.001). Among families from the lower service class (EGP II), the average likelihood 
difference is 19 percentage points (p<0.001). Families from EGP III and V have an average 
likelihood advantage of 8 percentage points and families belonging to the class of self-
employed and petty bourgeoisie have one of almost 12 per centage points. The AME for the 
class of farmers and agricultural workers is significant only at a minor level.  
Unsurprisingly, including families’ school track requests boosts the model fit and 
dramatically decreases the social class effects (Model 2). Still, the AME of EGP I is highly 
significant and has a size of almost 0.03 AME-points. The AME of EGP II is almost 0.02 
points of size and significant at the intermediate level (p<0.01). Model 3 takes into account 
the staff meetings’ propositions. The model fit further strongly increases and the social class 
effects decrease. The effect of EGP I remains significant at the intermediate level (p<0.01); 
the effect of EGP II has the same size as that of EGP I but remains significant only at a minor 
level (p<0.05). This result clearly indicates that the steps between the staff meetings’ 
propositions and the ending of the dialogue contribute to the secondary effects. Indeed, as 
families’ rejection decision is included, the remaining effects of EGP I and II become 
insignificant. The variable for families rejection decision distinguishes three categories: 
families who were entitled to reject (i.e. families of whom the staff meeting did not accept the 
request) but did not reject, families who did reject and families who were not entitled to do so 
because the staff meeting had accepted their request. Families who have rejected and families 
who were not entitled to reject are more likely to finally get access to the general track than 
families who could have rejected but did not. As the effects of EGP I and II become 
insignificant, I conclude that no step past families’ rejections of staff meetings’ propositions 
contributes to the secondary effects on the final outcome, i.e. students’ ultimate transition to 
LGT. 
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Table 8 Social class effects on final outcome (results of binary logistic regressions; AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGP VI, VIIa)     
EGP I 0.257*** 0.025*** 0.009** 0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
EGP II 0.187*** 0.016** 0.009* 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
EGP III, V 0.082*** 0.009 0.002 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EGP IVc, VIIb 0.046* 0.021* 0.002 0.004 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EGP IVa, IVb 0.117*** 0.003 0.001 0.000 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
French origin -0.053*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Private school -0.075*** -0.026*** -0.004 -0.005* 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ZEP-school -0.014 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)  
< 5,000 inh. -0.087*** -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
5,000-20,000 inh. -0.069*** -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
20,000-200,000 inh. -0.025** 0.005 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Mark 0.095*** 0.021*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Family’s request (Ref. LGT)        
LPA  -0.779*** -0.230*** -0.178*** 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
GR  -0.262** -0.073*** -0.059** 
  (0.11) (0.01) (0.02) 
Staff meeting’s proposition (Ref. LGT)  
LPA   -0.506*** -0.494*** 
   (0.04) (0.05) 
GR   -0.151*** -0.215*** 
   (0.02) (0.03) 
Family’s rejection (Ref. Entitled but did not reject) 
Not entitled to reject    0.013*** 
    (0.00) 
Rejected    0.027*** 
    (0.00) 
N 10999 10999 10999 10999 
AIC 7967.3 2284.3 831.6 733.4 
Note: AME=average marginal effect, SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering, LGT=general track, 
LPA=vocational track, GR=grade retention. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 
d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
In sum, this first general presentation of social class effects on step one (family’s 
request), step two (staff meeting’s proposition) and the dialogue’s final outcome provide three 
main insights: First, as shown in previous studies, social class effects, notably the secondary 
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effects, are greater on families’ choices than on staff meetings’ decisions. However, the 
“patterns” are very similar indicating that the staffs’ propositions are strongly affected by 
families’ requests. Second, as expected, social class effects are the greatest when a student’s 
school performance is in the lower and middle range. Though, when a student has very low 
marks, the staff meeting seems less willing to accept ambitious requests by the families. 
Third, the secondary effects on the dialogue’s final outcome slightly exceed the secondary 
effects on the staff meeting’s proposition, at least for the higher social classes. This indicates 
that some families manage to carry through their requests. Indeed, as nested regressions of the 
final outcome reveal, social class differences in families’ rejection decision explain the little 
remaining effect. The following subchapters aim to shed light on the mechanisms that 
generate the social class effects on families’ and school staffs’ decisions along the dialogue. 
Thereby, most attention is addressed to the mechanisms that shape the first most important 
steps of the dialogue: families’ school track requests and staff meetings’ propositions. 
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8.2 General “bridging hypotheses” 
In the present subchapter, I analyze associations between social class and central 
mediating variables. More specifically, the aim of this analysis is to test the general bridging 
hypotheses on social class differentials in school performance (i.e. the primary effects) and 
parental involvement. These assumptions are the theoretically expected mechanisms that link 
families’ social class to families’ and school staffs’ decision-making.  
8.2.1 SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENTIALS IN SCHOOL PERFORMANCE 
Table 9 presents results of nested linear regression models of marks in the brevet on 
social class, the control variables, parental education and grade repetition in lower secondary 
school. This analysis reveals that there are important social class differentials in student’s 
performance in the brevet. Moreover, it shows how the social class effects are related to 
immigration background, school type, city size (Model 2), parental education (Model 3) and 
the other school performance measure grade repetition (Model 4).111 Model 1 indicates that, on 
average, EGP I-students have marks that are 2.3 points higher than working class students 
(EGP VI, VIIa). For EGP II-students the difference is 1.94 points and for students belonging 
to EGP III and V it is 0.87. Students from the class of famers and agricultural workers show a 
relatively high performance level while children of self-employed and the petty bourgeoisie 
perform worse.  
Including the control variables marginally decreases the social class effects (Model 2). 
Controlling for social class, school type and city size, students of French origin perform better 
than students with at least one parent of non-French origin. Students enrolled in private 
schools perform better than students enrolled in public schools and students attending ZEP-
schools perform worse than students attending a school that is not in the ZEP-program. 
Finally, it seems that in the country side and in smaller towns, students get better marks on 
average than students attending schools in Paris or in larger cities. The effects are relatively 
small. 
Model 3 analyses to which degree social class effects on marks are mediated by parental 
education. The EGP I- and EGP II-effects are reduced by more than half when parental 
education is included. The effect of the class of non-manual workers and supervisors of 
                                                 
111 The order in which the variables are added over the models may appear peculiar. One would possibly include 
parental education before school type and city size because this construct determines the school type in which 
parents enroll their child or the place they move to; in terms of a “chain of causation”, parents’ education even 
determines social class. However, as I employ parental education to test the mediating effect of parents’ cultural 
capital, I choose to include it after the control variables. 
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manual workers (EGP III and V) is reduced by almost one half, too. The highly significant 
coefficients of parental education show that – as expected – students who grow up in a home 
with a lot of accumulated educational resources perform better in school.  
Finally, Model 4 presents the impact of grade retention in the years before the brevet 
and its interplay with social class and the other explanatory variables. The results indicate that 
students who have repeated at least one grade in lower secondary school achieve considerably 
lower marks in the continuous examinations of the brevet than students who have not 
experienced grade retention. Furthermore, two “suppression-effects” appear: First, the private 
school coefficient becomes significant at a higher level and it increases. Second, the 
coefficient of the city size category “5,000-20,000 inhabitants” increases. This indicates that 
grade repetition happens more often in private schools and towns of intermediate size than in 
public schools and larger cities.  
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Table 9 Social class effects on student’s mark on brevet (results of linear regression) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGP VI, VIIa)     
EGP I 2.315*** 2.297*** 1.062*** 0.885*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) 
EGP II 1.941*** 1.862*** 0.813*** 0.670*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
EGP III, V 0.865*** 0.822*** 0.465*** 0.408*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
EGP IVc, VIIb 1.417*** 1.173*** 0.741*** 0.558*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) 
EGP IVa, IVb 0.741*** 0.663*** 0.196* 0.124 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
French origin  0.292*** 0.261*** 0.242*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Private school  0.165** 0.120* 0.199*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ZEP-school  -0.242* -0.131 -0.082 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)     
     
< 5,000 inh.  0.420*** 0.446*** 0.424*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
5,000-20,000 inh.  0.294*** 0.334*** 0.382*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
20,000-200,000 inh.  0.279*** 0.285*** 0.252*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Parental education (Ref. Lower)     
Intermediate   0.845*** 0.734*** 
   (0.06) (0.06) 
Higher   1.709*** 1.421*** 
   (0.08) (0.08) 
Previous grade repetition    -1.893*** 
    (0.05) 
Constant 9.941*** 9.534*** 9.301*** 9.909*** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
N 11623 11623 11623 11623 
R2 0.090 0.098 0.133 0.207 
Note: SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
The results of binary logistic regressions of having repeated grades in lower secondary 
school on social class, French origin and parental education are listed in Table 10. The models 
do not include the control variables private school, ZEP-school and city size because grade 
repetition during secondary school is an outcome that does not focus on one time point but on 
the period between grade 5 and grade 9. 112  Model 1 reveals considerable social class 
                                                 
112 I could, however, control for these factors in the different years the repetition occurs. I still refrain from doing 
so because this would get complicated when a student has repeated more than one grade. Furthermore, I am not 
interested in the confounding effects of these year-specific factors. As I test “bridging hypotheses” for an 
analysis that focuses on the time at which the dialogue takes place, I am only interested in the relationship 
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differentials in the average likelihood to repeat at least on grade during lower secondary 
school. Holding constant immigration background, students from the working class are 
significantly more likely than students from all other classes to repeat grades in lower 
secondary school. To an important extent, the social class effect is mediated by the 
educational attainment of students’ parents (Model 2). The higher parents’ cultural capital and 
hence the more accumulated “cultural resources” a student has at home, the lower is the 
probability that he has been retained. For instance, the probability that an average student with 
higher educated parents has repeated grades is, on average, 17 percentage points lower than 
the corresponding probability for a student with low educated parents (AME=0.17, p<0.001). 
When controlling for social class, immigration background appears to have no significant 
effect at all. 
Table 10 Social class effects on previous grade repetition (results of binary logistic 
regression; AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGP VI, VIIa)     
EGP I -0.215*** (0.01) -0.094*** (0.02) 
EGP II -0.178*** (0.01) -0.071*** (0.02) 
EGP III, V -0.066*** (0.01) -0.029** (0.01) 
EGP IVc, VIIb -0.126*** (0.02) -0.079*** (0.02) 
EGP IVa, IVb -0.077*** (0.02) -0.026 (0.01) 
French origin -0.014 (0.01) -0.012 (0.01) 
Parental education (Ref. Lower)      
Intermediate   -0.060*** (0.01) 
Higher   -0.170*** (0.01) 
N 12315  12315  
AIC 12596.7  12404.2  
Note: The dependent variable denotes with ‘1’ students who have repeated at least one grade in lower secondary 
school (up to grade 9) and with ‘0’ students who have not repeated grade in that period. AME=average marginal 
effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
 
8.2.2 SOCIAL CLASS DIFFERENTIALS IN PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOL 
This section has three aims: First, I test the bridging hypotheses on social class 
differentials in parental involvement. I do so by running logistic binary regressions of each 
type of involvement presented in Subchapter 7.2.2 (attendance at parents’ evenings, parents’ 
initiation of meetings with teachers, teachers’ initiation of meetings, PA-membership and 
holding the office as parent representative) on social class and the control variables. Second, I 
                                                                                                                                                        
between grade retention and the control variables that will be included in the analyses of the decisions along the 
dialogue. 
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shed light on some mechanisms that generate the social class effects on parental involvement. 
Notably, I investigate the mediating effect of parents’ cultural capital measured as parental 
education. Moreover, I have a look at the effect of parents’ subjective performance 
assessment on their involvement and at interactions between social class and parents’ 
performance assessment. The interaction effects test the assumption that higher-class parents 
become involved when their children perform poorly and therefore risk to not be proposed the 
general track. Third, I investigate social class differentials in parents’ opinion on parent-
teacher relationships.  
I start with presenting figures that address the first aim of this section: investigating 
whether there are social class effects on the different parental involvement types. Figure 8 and 
Figure 9 present predicted probabilities that were obtained from regressions of the five 
involvement types on social class and the control variables French origin, school type and city 
size (see Model 1 in Tables A4 to A8).113 The control variables school type and city size relate 
to the school year 1997/1998 in which the family survey took place. As outlined in 
Subchapter 7.2.2, information on parental involvement was collected through this survey. 
Regarding parents’ attendance at parents’ evenings, Figure 8 clearly shows that parents 
from the service classes (EGP I and II) are more likely to be involved in that way. For 
instance, parents attend official parent-teacher meetings with a probability of more than 90 
per cent if they belong to EGP I or II while similar parents belonging to the working class 
(EGP VI and VIIa) do so with a probability of around 70 per cent. The social class 
differentials are significant but not of very large size (see also Table A4). It appears that 
attendance at parents’ evenings is a prevalent way for parents to be involved.  
                                                 
113  I present the results for attendance at official parent-teacher meetings in a separate figure because the 
predicted probabilities are far higher than those for the other types of involvement and therefore no common y-
scale could be drawn. 
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Figure 8 Predicted probabilities of attending parents’ evenings 
by social class  
 
Note: Estimates obtained from Model 1 in Table A4; probabilities are 
calculated for students of French origin attending a public school that is 
located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP. Source: Panel national 1995 
d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own 
calculations. 
Figure 9 shows predicted probabilities for types of parental involvement that seem 
generally less popular: For example, the predicted probability to initiate meetings with 
teachers for parents who belong to EGP I is 40 per cent and, as another example, the predicted 
probability to be member in a parent association is around 35 per cent (see the two graphs on 
the left). Still, there are social class differentials regarding every type of involvement. 
Interestingly, some increase with social class and others decrease. The probability that parents 
initiate meetings slightly increases with social class and is the lowest for parents from the 
class of farmers and agricultural workers (EGP IVc, VIIb; Pr=0.25). By contrast, the 
likelihood that parents attend meetings initiated by teachers slightly decreases with their 
social class position. Hence, teachers are more likely to appoint parents from lower classes. 
Possibly, teachers are more likely to invite lower-class parents because parents from lower 
classes are less likely to initiate meetings by themselves. 
Both the probability of being PA-member and of being parent representative in the staff 
meetings are higher for parents from higher social classes than for parents with less favorable 
social status. The social class differentials are stronger for PA-membership than for being 
parent representative in the staff meetings (see the two graphs on the bottom of Figure 9). 
Figure A2 in the appendix shows corresponding discrete change effects. It further illustrates 
that social class effects on attendance at parents’ evenings, parents’ initiation of meetings and 
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teachers’ initiation of meetings114 are relatively small while social class differences in PA-
membership and holding the office as parent representative are more considerable. 
Figure 9 Predicted probabilities of parents’ initiation of meetings, teachers’ 
initiation of meetings, PA-membership and being parent representative 
in the staff meetings by social class 
 
Note: PA=parent association; estimates are based on Model 1 in Tables A5, A6, A7 and A8; 
probabilities are calculated for students of French origin attending a public school that is located in a 
large city or Paris and not in a ZEP. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, 
Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
 
The second aim of this section is to analyze mechanisms that generate the social class 
differentials in parental involvement. I apply the KHB-method to examine to which extent the 
total effect of social class on the different types of parental involvement is mediated by 
parental education. This analysis tests the assumption that parents from higher social classes 
are more likely to be involved because they are better equipped with cultural capital that 
makes them confident and successful in dealing with school staff. Table 11 reveals that social 
class differentials in parental education considerably explain the social class effects on 
                                                 
114 Actually, “teachers’ initiation of meetings” also implies that parents have attended these meetings. This is 
because the variable is based on a question that asked whether parents have had a chance to talk to teachers in 
meetings that were initiated by teachers. Consequently, there may have been meetings that teachers initiated but 
that parents did not attend. Still, for purposes of simplicity and as I assume that few parents do not come to 
punctual meetings initiated by teachers, I speak of “teachers’ initiation of meetings” and not of “parents’ 
attendance at meetings initiated by teachers”.  
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attendance at parents’ evenings. For instance, the AME of EGP I is reduced from around 0.12 
to 0.03 and loses its significance when parental education is included in the regression.115 
Hence, nearly 80 per cent of the EGP I-effect is due to parents’ education. Regarding the 
effects of EGP II and EGP III and V, it appears that parental education has less explanatory 
power. Still, almost 62 per cent (EGP II) and 56 per cent (EGP III and V) of these effects are 
due to parents’ cultural capital. 
Table 11 Decomposing social class effects on attendance at parents’ evenings in direct effects 
and indirect effects via parental education; AMEs. 
Decomposing 
social class  
(Ref. EGPVI, VIIa) 
EGPI EGPII 
EGPIII,  
V 
EGPIVc, 
VIIb 
EGPIVa,  
IVb 
      
Total effect 0.122*** 0.136*** 0.079*** 0.052** 0.081*** 
Direct effect 0.025 0.052*** 0.034*** 0.005 0.029* 
Indirect effect 0.097 0.083 0.044 0.048 0.053 
      
Confounding percentage 79.41 61.57 56.38 90.04 64.93 
N 12146     
Note: AME=average marginal effect, LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained with 
Stata-command “khb” (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011); concomitant variables are French origin, school types 
and city size. Standard errors are adjusted for school-level clustering. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
Table 12 addresses social class difference in the likelihood that parents initiate meetings 
with teachers and the probability that teachers initiate meetings with parents. Parental 
education has no mediating effect, but its inclusion causes a little increase in the effects of 
EGP I and EGP II (and EGP IVab). This very small suppression effect must be due to the 
positive correlation between social class and parental education and the negative correlation 
between parental education and initiation of meetings (see the negative sign of the parental 
education coefficient in Model 2 in Table A5). The notable finding is that parental education 
does not mediate the social class effect on initiation of meetings. As will be discussed below, 
student’s performance might be of importance. 
By contrast, the small social class effects on the likelihood that parents attend meetings 
initiated by teachers are considerably mediated by parental education. The negative AMEs are 
reduced when parental education is included in the regression model. The confounding 
percentages lie between 32 for EGP IVc and VIIb and 67 for EGP II. The effects of EGP II, 
                                                 
115 The specification of the models presented by Table 11 to 13 corresponds to that of Model 2 in Table A4 to A8 
– the considered explanatory variables include social class, the controls and parental education. The ‘total effect’ 
corresponds to the social class effect in Model 1 in Table A4 to A8, which does not include parental education. 
The small differences between this “total effect”-AME and the AMEs in Model 1 in Table A4 to A8 is due to the 
additional rescaling by the KHB-method (see Subchapter 7.3.2).  
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EGP III and V and of EGP IVa and b even become insignificant. I interpret this effect as the 
reverse side of the social class effect on parents’ initiation of meetings with teachers: Since 
lower-class parents do not have the cultural capital giving them the confidence and ability to 
get involved in school, they are less likely to attend parents’ evenings and initiate meetings 
with teachers than parents from higher social classes. Therefore, the teachers have to invite 
them to come to school. 
Table 12 Decomposing social class effects on parents’ initiation of meetings and teachers’ 
initiation of meetings into direct effects and indirect effects via parental education; 
AMEs. 
Decomposing 
social class  
(Ref. EGPVI, VIIa) 
EGPI EGPII 
EGPIII,  
V 
EGPIVc, 
VIIb 
EGPIVa, 
IVb 
 
Initiation of meetings by parents 
Total effect 0.055*** 0.069*** 0.022 -0.093*** 0.012 
Direct effect 0.055* 0.069*** 0.022 -0.093*** 0.011 
Indirect effect -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
Confounding percentage -0.49 -0.16 0.57 -0.08 0.84 
N 12099     
 
Initiation of meetings by teachers 
Total effect -0.087*** -0.067*** -0.039*** -0.076*** -0.040* 
Direct effect -0.040* -0.022 -0.017 -0.052 -0.013 
Indirect effect -0.047 -0.045 -0.022 -0.024 -0.027 
      
Confounding percentage 54.25 67.01 55.68 32.02 66.59 
N 12094     
Note: AME=average marginal effect, LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained with 
Stata-command “khb” (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011); concomitant variables are French origin, school types 
and city size. Standard errors are adjusted for school-level clustering. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
The patterns for PA-membership and being parent representative in staff meetings are 
similar (Table 13). The effects of EGP I and II on both involvement types are reduced by 
more than half when parental education is taken into account. However, none of the class 
effects becomes insignificant. Hence, other factors related to social class seem to play a part. 
In line with previous findings (see the literature presented in Subchapter 3.1.3), the results 
indicate that parents who are better equipped with cultural capital are more likely to be PA-
member and parent representative. The remaining social class differences could be due to 
parents’ aspirations for their children’s education and their educational motivation (c*SD). 
That is to say, parents from higher social classes may be more involved for “strategic” 
reasons. This assumption will be tested further below. 
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Table 13 Decomposing social class effects on PA-membership and being Parent 
representative into direct effects and indirect effects via parental education; 
AMEs. 
Decomposing 
social class  
(Ref. EGPVI, VIIa) 
EGPI EGPII 
EGPIII,  
V 
EGPIVc, 
VIIb 
EGPIVa, 
IVb 
 
PA-Membership 
Total effect 0.250*** 0.192*** 0.059*** 0.118*** 0.076*** 
Direct effect 0.112*** 0.090*** 0.045*** 0.103*** 0.051*** 
Indirect effect 0.138 0.102 0.014 0.015 0.025 
      
Confounding percentage 55.25 53.19 24.27 12.91 32.68 
N 12157     
 
Parent representative in staff meetings 
Total effect 0.159 0.132 0.041 0.091 0.050 
Direct effect 0.061 0.057 0.031 0.080 0.033 
Indirect effect 0.098 0.076 0.011 0.011 0.017 
      
Confounding percentage 61.59 57.22 25.67 12.01 34.57 
N 10415     
Note: AME=average marginal effect, LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained with 
Stata-command “khb” (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011); concomitant variables are French origin, school types 
and city size. Standard errors are adjusted for school-level clustering. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
To give an idea of the role of student’s performance, Model 3 in Tables A4 to A8 list 
the results of regressions of the different involvement types on social class, the control 
variables, parental education and parents’ assessment of their child’s performance. 116 
Student’s performance has a positive effect on the likelihood that parents attend parents’ 
evenings and on the likelihood that they are PA-member and parent representative. By 
contrast, student’s performance negatively affects the probability that parents initiate 
meetings with teachers and that teachers ask parents to meet them. It seems that parents of 
poorly performing students seek to meet the teachers. Parents may do so because they want to 
know why their child is poorly performing. Moreover, in line with the theory, these parents 
may want to meet the teachers in order to influence them in view of the transition to upper 
secondary school. In respect to teachers’ initiation of meetings, the negative sign indicates 
that teachers want to meet students’ parents when these have problems in school. 
                                                 
116 It would be interesting to investigate the effect of marks on the brevet, but since this information was gathered 
one year later, I prefer using parent’s subjective performance assessment which relates to the exact time point: 
The family survey in 1998 requested parents to evaluate their children’s performance in the actual school year 
and asked them about their involvement in the actual and hence in the same school year. 
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Furthermore, the social class effects on parents’ initiation of meetings increase when 
performance is taken into account. This suppression effect is due to the fact that social class 
and performance are positively correlated, and social class and initiation of meetings are 
positively correlated while performance and initiation of meetings are negatively correlated. 
That means parents of poorly performing children are more likely to initiate meetings than 
parents of children with good marks. At the same time, parents from higher classes are more 
likely to do so than parents from lower classes but children from higher classes perform better 
and give their parents fewer reasons for initiating meeting.  
As to teachers’ demanding to meet the parents, the negative social class effects and the 
negative effects of parental education decrease when performance is factored in. This 
indicates that parents from lower classes are more often invited to come to school to talk to 
the teachers than parents from higher classes because their children are performing worse and 
hence the teachers want to talk to the parents. This relationship may be strengthened by the 
fact that higher-class parents of poorly performing children are more likely to initiate the 
meetings themselves. 
Parents’ “strategic” use of their involvement 
In order to examine whether parents use their cultural capital and become involved in 
order to influence the school staff, I conduct two additional analyses. First, I examine 
interaction effects of social class and parents’ assessment of their child’s performance and, 
second, I identify the direct impact of parents’ educational aspirations and educational 
motivation (i.e. c*SD). The first analysis investigates whether parents reinforce their 
involvement when their child is poorly performing and therefore risks to not get access to the 
general track. The second analysis examines whether parents with high educational 
aspirations and parents who need their child to attend LGT to maintain the family’s social 
status – i.e. parent with a high educational aspiration with regard to LGT – are more likely to 
be involved than parents with lower aspirations and no educational motivation.  
Including interaction terms of social class and parents’ performance assessment in the 
regressions of the different involvement types on social class and parental education decreases 
each model’s explanatory power and the interaction terms are not significant (results not 
shown). Still, conditional effect plots based on regressions not containing interaction terms 
provide some weak support for the assumption that families from higher social classes 
become more involved when their children are poorly performing. For instance, Figure 10 
reveals that the discrete change effect of EGP II on attendance at parents’ evenings slightly 
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increases as parents’ performance assessment decreases.117 The same is found for the discrete 
change effects of EGP III and V and the class of self-employed and petty bourgeoisie (EGP 
IVa, IVb). 
Figure 10 Discrete change effects of social class on attendance at parents’ 
evenings by parents’ performance assessment 
 
Note: Estimates obtained from Model 3 in Table A4; parents’ performance assessment: 1=student 
with a lot of difficulties, 4=excellent student; discrete change corresponds to difference in 
probabilities of Y=1 between each social class and the reference class (EGP VI, VIIa); the 
probabilities are calculated for students of French origin with parents with intermediate education, 
attending a public school located in a large city or Paris and not in the ZEP-program; 95%-
confidence intervals. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de 
l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
The discrete change effects of EGP I and II on parents’ initiation of meetings with teachers is 
slightly lower when parents think their children are excellent students than when parents think 
their children are less good than that (Figure 11). This result points in the expected direction 
but seems not strong enough to support the assumption that parents of low performing 
children who have a lot to loose from not sending their children to LGT seek more contact 
with teachers than parents who have less to loose. Interestingly, working class families are 
more likely to initiate meetings than families from the class of farmers and agricultural 
workers (EGPIVc, VIIb) and this probability difference is considerably larger when a child is 
                                                 
117 The discrete change effect corresponds again to the differences in the predicted probabilities for one EGP-
class (e.g. EGP II) and the reference class EGP VI, VIIa (working class).  
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poorly performing. It could be that farmer-parents have less time than working-class parents 
or attach less importance to education. At least, this result confirms that the class of farmers 
and agricultural workers has to be observed separately. 
Figure 11 Discrete change effects of social class on parents’ initiation of 
meetings 
 
Note: Estimates obtained from Model 3 in Table A5; discrete change corresponds to difference in 
probabilities of Y=1 between each social class and the reference class (EGP VI, VIIa); 
probabilities are calculated for students of French origin with parents with intermediate education, 
attending a public school that is located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own 
calculations. 
Corresponding conditional effect plots for the three other involvement types teachers’ 
initiation of meetings, PA-membership and being parent representative are not presented. The 
results are available on request from the author. With regard to teachers’ initiation of 
meetings, they reveal that the social class effects do not vary by parents’ assessment of 
student’s performance. In respect to PA-membership and being Parent representative, 
conditional effect plots indicate that social class effects increase as parents’ performance 
assessment increases. Hence, PA-membership seems no type of involvement that parents 
from higher social classes become engaged in when their child is poorly performing and when 
they fear that the staff meeting will not let the child attend LGT. Instead, it seems that certain 
parents are particularly involved in their children’s education in various ways at the same 
time: They are member in PAs and support their children a lot in other ways (e.g. through 
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help with homework, private tutorials) that foster their children’s school performance. 
Another explanation could be that parents who are in PAs overestimate the performance of 
their children. However, corresponding analysis including marks as a more objective measure 
also shows that the discrete change effects of EGP I and II increase with students 
performance.118 
The following analysis examines effects of parental aspirations and educational 
motivation (i.e. parameter c*SD) on the different involvement types. It investigates whether 
the relatively small social class effects on parental involvement are mediated by educational 
aspirations and motivation and moreover what direct, independent, effects educational 
aspiration and educational motivation have. Table A9 and A10 in the appendix summarize the 
results of three nested regression models for each type of involvement. The first model always 
includes social class, the control variables (which are not listed), parental education and their 
performance assessment, the second model additionally contains the educational aspirations 
variable and the third model factors in educational motivation. 119 The first models correspond 
to Model 3 in Tables A4 to A8, but they are based on a considerably smaller sample because 
the educational aspirations-variable (and the educational motivation-variable) has many 
missing values. 
The nested regressions of attendance at parents’ evenings reveal that the little, mostly 
non-significant – social class effects are further reduced when educational aspirations are 
taken into account. Parents’ aspirations for their child’s education have highly significant 
positive effects on attendance at parents’ evenings. The highly significant positive effects of 
social class effects on parents’ initiation of meetings are only marginally mediated by 
educational aspirations. The aspiration’s impact is somewhat smaller and parents who plan 
that their child attains a general bac “L” or “ES” are, on average, even more likely to initiate 
meetings than parents who aspire after a bac “S”. This indicates that parents who already have 
specific relatively ambitious plans for their children seek to meet the teachers. The slight 
                                                 
118  As robustness checks, all the figures were generated with the mark-variable instead of the subjective 
performance assessment: The curves look very similar for all involvement types. Results are available on request 
from the author. 
119 The second and the third model reduce the sample size considerably because the aspiration-variable (“planned 
secondary school orientation”) was measured only in the paper questionnaire of the family survey. The high 
number of missing values is the reason why the effect of parents’ educational aspirations and educational 
motivation is analyzed separately in this subsection. The variable “planned secondary school orientation” has six 
categories: (1) “apprenticeship/CAP/BEP” including also parents who said their child should enter the labor 
market; (2) “professional bac”; (3) “technological bac”; (4) “general bac” combining parents who reported that 
they planned to let their child do a general bac, regardless of which curricula; (5) “general bac L/ES”; (6) 
“general bac S” (see Subchapter 2.2). To give an overview on the distribution of the categories in the basic 
sample: Among the 7906 valid cases 16 per cent are in category (1), 11 per cent in (2), 6 per cent in (3), 34 per 
cent in (4), 9 per cent in (5) and 24 per cent in category (6). 
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increase of the performance assessment coefficient is due to a positive correlation between 
performance and aspirations.120 Social class differentials in the likelihood that parents are PA-
member or parent representative are mediated to some small extent by educational aspirations. 
The direct positive effects of educational aspirations reveal that especially parents who want 
their child to attain a general bac (regardless of which general bac type) are on average the 
most likely to be PA-member. In respect to the likelihood of being parent representative, the 
educational aspirations effects are smaller and significant at a lower level. 
The impact of a family’s educational motivation – i.e. a family’s “need” to have the 
child attend the general track to preserve the family’s social status – is not the same for every 
involvement type. Regarding parents’ evenings, PA-membership and being parent 
representative, the model fit increases less when educational motivation is included as 
compared to when educational aspirations are considered. By contrast, in respect to parents’ 
initiation of meetings with teachers, educational motivation contributes comparatively more 
to the model fit. In the same line, educational motivation seems to explain slightly less – as 
compared to educational aspirations – of the social class effects on parents’ evening 
attendance, PA-membership and holding the office as parent representative but slightly more 
of the social class effect on parents’ initiation of meetings. The direct effects of educational 
motivation tell that parents with a higher educational motivation are more likely than parents 
with no educational motivation to be involved in the four ways. Intermediate motivation has 
only a weakly significant effect on attendance at parents’ evenings.  
In sum, it seems again that parents have different reasons to get involved in specific 
ways. While parents with high aspirations are generally involved in various ways, parents 
who believe that higher education is necessary to get a job are particularly likely to initiate 
meetings with teachers. Moreover, social class effects on parents’ initiation of meetings are 
more reduced when educational motivation is taken into account than when aspirations are 
factored in. This result could be interpreted as evidence in favor of the assumption that 
higher-class parents seek contact with teachers because they are concerned a lot with having 
their child attend the general track. Possibly, they want to meet the teachers to influence them 
in view of the approaching transition to upper secondary school.  
 
                                                 
120 The analysis of teachers’ initiation of meetings shows that parents’ higher aspirations reduce the probability 
that the school invites them for a talk (results are not presented). The reason for this effect could be again that 
parents with high aspirations initiate meetings by themselves. 
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Parents’ opinion on parent-teacher relationships 
Table 14 presents results of binary logistic regressions of two dummy variables based 
on the three categories of the variable “parents’ opinion on parent-teacher relationships”. The 
first binary dependent variable distinguishes parents thinking that they should meet the 
teachers when there is a problem from parents thinking that they should rather not bother the 
teachers; the second dummy variable differentiates between parents who think that they 
should meet the teachers frequently and parents who have the opinion that they should rather 
not bother the teachers. For each dependent variable there are three models: The first model 
includes only social class and the control variables to identify general social class differences; 
the second model additionally contains parental education; the third model factors in the 
different involvement types. 121 
Both first models reveal that, net of the effects of the control variables, parents from the 
service classes and from EGP-class III and V are more likely to think that they should meet 
the teachers at least when there is a problem than parents from the working class. Another 
interesting highly significant effect is that of private school: Parents who enrolled their 
children in a private school are significantly more likely to think that they should meet the 
teachers frequently (instead of not bother them at all) than parents with children attending a 
common public school. There is no such effect regarding the opinion that parents should meet 
the teachers when there is a problem. This indicates – as one would expect – that parents who 
enroll their children in private schools are very interested in working closely with teachers. 
The second models take into account parental education. As the social class effects are 
considerably reduced and most of them fully loose their significance, I conclude that parent’s 
cultural resources in terms of their knowledge of the school system and their capacities and 
confidence in dealing with school staff “mediate” the social class effects on their opinion on 
parent-teacher relations. In other words, parents who are more familiar with school issues 
because they have spent more time in the educational system are more likely to think that they 
should work together with the teachers or, at least, should confer with the teachers when their 
children have problems. This result could also be interpreted as support for the assumption 
that higher educated parents have the self-assurance and ability to approach the teachers. An 
                                                 
121 I generally refrain from applying multinomial regressions for the analyses presented in this book because – in 
my view – there is no reliable procedure implemented in STATA to calculate AMEs from multinomial 
regressions. I am aware of the statistical advantages of multinomial regression analyses but since I compare 
coefficients over models and need to interpret AMEs I prefer running separate binary regression models. 
Robustness analyses with the multinomial regression technique reveal that differences in the results are marginal. 
Results are available on request. 
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application of the KHB-method confirms that around 100 per cent of the effects of EGP I and 
II on the probability of thinking that parents should meet the teachers when there is a problem 
is due to parental education (see Table A11). Regarding the probability of thinking that 
parents should meet the teachers frequently, the confounding percentage is 94 for the EGP I-
effect and 69 for the EGP II-effect. 
The third models include parental involvement. Holding constant social class, parental 
education and the control variables, parents attending parents’ evenings and initiating 
meetings with teachers are significantly more likely to think that they should meet teachers 
when there is a problem (instead of never meet). The coefficients are highly significant 
(p<0.001) and of considerable size. PA-membership has a smaller effect that is significant at 
the lowest level (p<0.01). With regard to parents’ opinion that they should meet teachers 
frequently, all types of parental involvement – except teachers’ initiation of meetings – have 
positive highly significant effects. Only the effect of being parent representative is significant 
at an intermediate level (p<0.05). This result indicates, again, that the different types of 
involvement have different purposes: While PA-membership is associated with a general 
strong commitment to close parent-teacher relationships, initiation of meetings and attendance 
at parents’ evenings seem a “basic” level of involvement which implies that parents become 
engaged when there is a problem. 
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Table 14 Social class effects on parents’ opinion on parent-teacher relationships (results of binary logistic regressions; AMEs) 
  Meet when problem vs. better not meet  Meet frequently vs. better not meet 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE)  AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)       
EGPI 0.084*** (0.02) -0.004 (0.03) -0.022 (0.03) 0.103*** (0.02) 0.006 (0.02) -0.031 (0.02) 
EGPII 0.077** (0.02) 0.002 (0.03) -0.016 (0.03) 0.121*** (0.02) 0.038 (0.02) -0.002 (0.02) 
EGPIII, V 0.072*** (0.02) 0.038* (0.02) 0.024 (0.02) 0.071*** (0.02) 0.035* (0.01) 0.014 (0.01) 
EGPIVc, VIIb 0.023 (0.04) -0.011 (0.04) -0.009 (0.03) 0.034 (0.03) -0.009 (0.03) -0.011 (0.03) 
EGPIVa, IVb 0.057* (0.03) 0.021 (0.02) 0.010 (0.02) 0.055* (0.02) 0.012 (0.02) -0.012 (0.02) 
French origin 0.017 (0.02) 0.015 (0.02) 0.016 (0.02) 0.015 (0.01) 0.011 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) 
Private school 0.018 (0.02) 0.016 (0.02) 0.003 (0.02) 0.059*** (0.01) 0.056*** (0.01) 0.034** (0.01) 
ZEP-school -0.040 (0.02) -0.031 (0.02) -0.025 (0.02) 0.003 (0.02) 0.012 (0.02) 0.017 (0.02) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)       
< 5,000 inh. -0.037 (0.02) -0.037 (0.02) -0.037* (0.02) -0.006 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) 0.008 (0.01) 
5,000-20,000 inh. -0.031 (0.02) -0.028 (0.02) -0.022 (0.02) -0.011 (0.01) -0.010 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) 
20,000-200,000 inh. -0.014 (0.02) -0.015 (0.02) -0.013 (0.02) -0.007 (0.01) -0.007 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) 
Parental education (Ref. Lower)       
Intermediate  0.085*** (0.02) 0.060*** (0.02)  0.087*** (0.01) 0.050*** (0.01) 
Higher  0.117*** (0.02) 0.081*** (0.02)  0.129*** (0.02) 0.075*** (0.02) 
Parents’ evenings   0.159*** (0.01)   0.207*** (0.01) 
Parents’ initiation of meetings   0.089*** (0.02)   0.162*** (0.01) 
Teachers’ initiation of meetings   0.008 (0.02)   0.023 (0.01) 
PA-membership   0.069* (0.03)   0.078*** (0.02) 
Parent representative   0.039 (0.04)   0.071** (0.03) 
N 4917 4917 4917 6312 6312 6312 
AIC 5484.2 5448.6 5281.2 6115.4 6051.7 5462.0 
Note: AME= average marginal effect, SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second 
degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations.  
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8.3 Family’s decisions 
The following analyses address families’ decision-making within the dialogue. First, I 
test bridging hypotheses on social class differences in the subjective decision-making 
parameters such as likelihood of success (i.e. p) and in the proxies for certain parameters (e.g. 
employment situation for C). Second, I test the formalized theoretical model. This test 
consists of two parts: In the first part, I analyze the “core” of the decision-making model, i.e. 
the model advanced by Esser (1999b). In the second part, I examine the impact of parents’ 
evaluation of the likelihood that the staff meeting will accept their request. Hence, the second 
part takes into account the impact of the institutional context. Third, I analyze families’ 
rejection decisions. 
8.3.1 SPECIFIC “BRIDGING HYPOTHESES” 
Table A12 lists means of the variables used in the analysis of families’ school track 
requests by family’s social class. These descriptive statistics already provide insights in the 
associations between social class and the subjective decision-making parameters and thus 
represent a preliminary test of the bridging hypotheses. As expected, there are large social 
class differentials in parents’ subjective evaluation of their children’s performance. I assume 
that these social class effects represent social class differentials in parents’ subjective 
assessment of their children’s likelihood of success (i.e. the parameter p) and therefore capture 
the part of the primary effects that operates through families’ decision-making. 
Further, linear regressions reveal that EGP I-parents rate their children, on average, 0.48 
points better than parents from the working class – controlling for French origin, school type 
and city size (Model 1 in Table 15). The corresponding advantage of EGP II-students is 0.34 
points and that of students from the class of non-manual workers and supervisors of manual 
workers (EGP III and V) is 0.08. Parents belonging to the class of farmers and agricultural 
workers report their children to be better on average (b=0.29). All of these effects are highly 
significant. Only the effect of the class of self-employed and petty bourgeoisie is relatively 
small and significant at a lower level. 
In order to examine to which extent social class effects on the subjectively evaluated 
likelihood of success are driven by the primary effects or, more specifically, by the 
association between social class and “objective” school performance, I include marks in the 
regression (Model 2). This analysis also investigates whether there is a “bias” in parents’ 
subjective assessment of their children’s performance, i.e. whether parents from higher classes 
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tend to overestimate their children’s performance. The extended regression model shows that 
– as expected – the social class effects on parent’s subjective assessment are nearly fully 
mediated by marks. Still, a little “bias” appears: Parents from EGP I rate their children 0.05 
points better than working-class parents. However, this small effect is only marginally 
significant. The suppression effect for EGP-class III and V indicates that given the same 
actual performance level parents from this class rate their children lower than parents from the 
working class.  
Table 15 Social class effects on parents’ subjective performance assessment (results of linear 
regressions) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 b (SE) b (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)     
EGP I 0.483*** (0.03) 0.048* (0.02) 
EGP II 0.335*** (0.03) -0.017 (0.02) 
EGP III, V 0.081*** (0.02) -0.077*** (0.02) 
EGP IVc, VIIb 0.287*** (0.05) 0.046 (0.04) 
EGP IVa, IVb 0.099** (0.03) -0.032 (0.03) 
French origin -0.031 (0.02) -0.077*** (0.02) 
Private school -0.067*** (0.02) -0.082*** (0.02) 
ZEP-school -0.023 (0.03) 0.022 (0.02) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)     
< 5,000 inh. 0.023 (0.02) -0.065*** (0.02) 
5,000-20,000 inh. -0.006 (0.02) -0.057** (0.02) 
20,000-200,000 inh. 0.033 (0.02) -0.031 (0.02) 
Mark   0.193*** (0.00) 
Constant 2.490*** (0.03) 0.608*** (0.03) 
N 9002  9002  
AIC 20849.7  15814.0  
Note: SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
To analyze social class differentials in families’ subjective evaluation of their resources 
to account for the costs of education, I conduct a binary logistic regression of families’ 
employment situation on social class (Table 16). The dependent variable indicates whether 
both parents in the family are not employed (1) or whether at least one parent is working (0). 
Model 1 shows that controlling for French origin, school type and city size, the probability of 
being in such an unfavorable economic situation is, on average, for EGP I- and EGP II-
families around 10 percentage points lower than for working-class families. In the same 
fashion, the probability is around 7 percentage points lower for families from the class of non-
manual workers and supervisors of manual workers (EGP III, V). Further, students with no 
parent of French origin are more likely to have only non-working parents and so are students 
enrolled in ZEP-schools and living in larger cities or Paris. Students enrolled in a private 
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school are less likely to have only non-working parents than families whose children attend 
public schools (AME=-0.015; p<0.05).  
Model 2 takes into account number of siblings – the second variable I use as an 
indicator of family’s available economic resources – to analyze whether it partly explains the 
effect of social class on employment status.122 When number of siblings is included, the social 
class effects are somewhat reduced but remain significant at a high level (p<0.001). 
Moreover, the variable has a highly significant positive effect on the likelihood that a student 
has only non-working parents (AME=0.016; p<0.00). 
Table 16 Social class effects on family’s employment situation (results of binary logistic 
regressions; AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)     
EGP I -0.101*** (0.01) -0.075*** (0.01) 
EGP II -0.098*** (0.01) -0.072*** (0.01) 
EGP III, V -0.074*** (0.01) -0.046*** (0.01) 
EGP IVc, VIIb -0.075** (0.02) -0.055** (0.01) 
EGP IVa, IVb -0.078*** (0.01) -0.052*** (0.01) 
French origin -0.042*** (0.01) -0.023*** (0.01) 
Private school -0.015* (0.01) -0.013 (0.01) 
ZEP-school 0.035*** (0.01) 0.019* (0.01) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)     
< 5,000 inh. -0.020** (0.01) -0.017* (0.01) 
5,000-20,000 inh. -0.008 (0.01) -0.007 (0.01) 
20,000-200,000 inh. -0.004 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) 
Number of siblings   0.016*** (0.00) 
N 9002  9002  
AIC 3521.9  3383.5  
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, 
DPD; own calculations. 
With regard to the association between social class and number of siblings, I do not run 
a regression and refer to the bivariate analysis presented in Table A12 in the appendix. Table 
A12 indicates that there is no linear negative relationship between social class and number of 
siblings, but working-class families clearly have more children on average (mean EGP VI, 
VIIa=2.43) than families from all other EGP-classes (e.g. mean EGP I=1.63).  
Table 17 addresses social class differentials in families’ subjective evaluation of the 
costs and likelihood of status decline that they associate with LGT. As explained in 
                                                 
122 As I mentioned before, I am generally not able to detect causal effects or to take into account endogeneity. In 
this case, employment status could also be the reason for families to have a certain number of children and must 
not necessarily be a consequence of number of children. 
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Subchapter 5.1.1, this mechanism corresponds to families’ relative risk aversion and the costs 
and likelihood of status decline can be reformulated as a “positive” concept, namely the 
educational motivation (c*SD). As the variable that measures the educational motivation 
consists of three categories, I run one binary logistic regression of “high educational 
motivation” as compared to “no educational motivation” and another binary logistic 
regression of “intermediate educational motivation” as compared to “no educational 
motivation”. The results reveal that social class has a very strong positive and highly 
significant effect on having a high educational motivation as compared to having none. By 
contrast, social class has almost no effect at all on having an intermediate educational 
motivation as compared to having none. While the probability of an average EGP I-student in 
the sample to have parents who have a high educational motivation is 52 percentage points 
higher than for an average working-class student, the same probability-difference is only 5 
percentage points with regard to parents’ having an intermediate educational motivation. 
Families with immigration background have a higher educational motivation than French 
families. The result corresponds to the finding of previous research that – controlling for 
social class – parents and students with immigration background have higher educational 
aspirations. Moreover, families from larger cities and Paris are more likely to have a high and 
intermediate educational motivation than families from more rural regions. 
As social class effects on the differentiation between intermediate and no educational 
motivation are very small, it appears that the educational motivation-mechanism, i.e. the 
social class variation of families’ “need” to have their children attend the general track to 
preserve their social class position, is only weak. Still, the result is in line with the theory and 
does not challenge the variable’s operationalization since there are strong social class effects 
on the differentiation between high and no educational motivation. If we consider the original 
item on which the variable is based, the results indicate that social class has no effect on 
whether parents think that a general or technological bac is more necessary to find a job than a 
lower educational attainment or no attainment at all. By contrast, social class has a strong 
effect on whether parents think that a tertiary attainment is more beneficial than a lower 
educational attainment or no attainment at all. Possibly, all families think a general or a 
technological bac lead to similar “low” social class positions while a tertiary diploma gives 
access to positions that are a lot more favorable than the positions that are attainable with the 
secondary degrees. 
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Table 17 Social class effects on family’s educational motivation (results of binary logistic 
regressions; AMEs) 
 High vs. no educational 
motivation 
Intermediate vs. no 
educational motivation 
 AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGP VI, VIIa)     
EGP I 0.517*** (0.02) 0.049* (0.02) 
EGP II 0.343*** (0.02) 0.026 (0.02) 
EGP III, V 0.138*** (0.01) 0.016 (0.01) 
EGP IVc, VIIb 0.159*** (0.03) 0.025 (0.03) 
EGP IVa, IVb 0.182*** (0.02) 0.020 (0.02) 
French origin -0.077*** (0.01) -0.039** (0.02) 
Private school -0.006 (0.01) -0.016 (0.01) 
ZEP-school -0.006 (0.02) 0.003 (0.02) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)     
< 5,000 inh. -0.104*** (0.02) -0.054*** (0.02) 
5,000-20,000 inh. -0.081*** (0.02) -0.048** (0.02) 
20,000-200,000 inh. -0.015 (0.01) -0.011 (0.02) 
N 7913  5282  
AIC 9645.9  5361.7  
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, 
DPD; own calculations. 
Table 18 investigates social class differentials in parents’ knowledge of their right to 
reject the proposition by the staff meeting. The presented results of binary logistic regressions 
reveal that – as expected – parents from higher social classes are more likely to know about 
their rejection right than working-class parents (Model 1). Parents from EGP-class III and V 
are also significantly more likely to have that educational knowledge. Model 2 takes into 
account parental education to examine whether parents who have spent more time in the 
educational system know more about it because of their own experience and because they are 
more sensitive to such knowledge. 123  In fact, this analysis examines whether parents’ 
knowledge is part of their cultural capital. As expected, the social class effect decreases when 
parental education is taken into account. Moreover, parental education has a strong highly 
significant independent effect. Interestingly, parents with intermediate education are slightly 
more likely to know their right to reject than parents with higher education (AME=0.80 vs. 
AME=0.75, p>0.001). Generally, this analysis provides evidence in favor of the assumption 
that higher-class parents are better equipped with cultural capital that is beneficial in the 
school context. 
                                                 
123 Since only the 1989 Orientation Law effectively implemented the dialogue, I do not assume that students’ 
parents know their right to reject from their own time in the school system. However, I propose that parents’ 
more or less longish experience in the educational system has influenced their ability to understand and make use 
of its functioning. For instance, parents who have studied in university were more autonomous than parents who 
did an apprenticeship and therefore they had to learn how to understand the university system’s functioning to 
successfully complete their studies.   
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The aim of Model 3 is to investigate how different parental involvement types are 
related to parents’ educational knowledge and social class. Indeed, the social class effects and 
the effects of parents’ education are slightly reduced when parents’ involvement is taken into 
account. It appears that parents’ initiation of meetings with teachers has a highly significant 
positive effect. This indicates that parents who make the effort to contact teachers are aware 
that they can reject the staff meeting’s proposition while parents who are not active in that 
way are more likely to not know that they have this right. Attendance at parents’ evenings and 
PA-membership has also positive effects but these effects are significant at a lower level. 
Finally, taking into account parents’ opinion on parent-teacher relationships causes no further 
decrease of the social class effects (Model 4). The highly significant net effects of parents’ 
opinion on parent-teacher relations show that parents who believe that teachers and parents 
should meet frequently are the most likely to know their right to reject (AME=0.075; p<0.00). 
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Table 18 Social class effects on family’s knowledge of the right to reject the staff meeting’s 
proposition (results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGP VI, VIIa)     
EGP I 0.152*** 0.097*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
EGP II 0.151*** 0.099*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
EGP III, V 0.092*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EGP IVc, VIIb 0.068* 0.030 0.031 0.032 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
EGP IVa, IVb 0.071*** 0.034 0.031 0.030 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
French origin 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Private school -0.001 -0.004 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ZEP-school -0.016 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)     
< 5,000 inh. 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
5,000-20,000 inh. 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
20,000-200,000 inh. 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Parental education (Ref. Lower)     
Intermediate  0.080*** 0.075*** 0.072*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Higher  0.075*** 0.067*** 0.063*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Parents’ evenings   0.035** 0.021 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Parents’ initiation of meetings   0.034*** 0.027** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Teachers’ initiation of meetings   0.019 0.018 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
PA-membership   0.024* 0.019 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Opinion on parent-teacher relation     
(Ref. Better not meet)     
Meet when problem    0.055*** 
    (0.01) 
Meet frequently    0.075*** 
    (0.01) 
N 9002 9002 9002 9002 
AIC 8297.9 8239.5 8212.0 8183.4 
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; 
own calculations. 
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8.3.2 TESTING THE DECISION-MAKING MODEL 
The results of binary logistic regressions of family’s school track request are listed in 
Table 19. Model 1 contains only the EGP-classes and the control variables. Its results provide 
evidence in favor of Hypothesis H1 as they indicate strong social class differentials in the 
likelihood that a family demands the general track (LGT) instead of the vocational track 
(LPA). On average, families from the higher salariat (EGP I) have a probability that is 43 
percentage points higher than the corresponding probability for working-class families (EGP 
VI and EGP VIIa). EGP II-families have, on average, a probability that is 36 percentage 
points higher and families belonging to the class of routine non-manual workers and 
supervisors of manual workers (EGP III and EGP V) have an AME of 0.176.  
With regard to the control variables, it is interesting to note that French origin has a 
negative strongly significant effect indicating, again, the result that is in line with previous 
research: Given the same social origin, families with immigration background have higher 
educational aspirations than native families. Being enrolled in a ZEP-school decreases the 
likelihood of requesting LGT. Families living in larger cities or Paris are more likely to opt 
for LGT than families whose children attend schools in smaller towns. As suggested in the 
literature, this effect could be driven by more available places in vocational upper secondary 
schools of rural neighborhoods and higher rates of working class families in these areas (see 
Subchapter 7.2.4).  
With Model 2 I start testing families’ independent decision-making, i.e. how they would 
decide if the school would not have the final say. I thereby test Hypothesis H2. As outlined in 
the theory chapter of this dissertation, this part of the theoretical model corresponds to the 
model by Esser (1999b). Step-wisely, I include the different core decision-making parameters 
to observe their interrelation with the other variables and the dependent variable (Model 2 to 
Model 4). Additionally, Table A14 in the appendix presents the results of a KHB-application 
to the model that contains all the parameters of the independent decision-making model 
(Model 4 in Table 19). While the results of the KHB-approach tell to which extent the 
different parameters contribute to the gross social class differences obtained through Model 1, 
Table 18 shows how each coefficient changes as additional variables are included. 
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Table 19 Social class effects on family’s school track request (LGT vs. LPA): test of the model on family’s “independent decision-making” 
(results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)         
EGPI 0.433*** (0.01) 0.342*** (0.01) 0.328*** (0.01) 0.260*** (0.01) 
EGPII 0.363*** (0.02) 0.274*** (0.01) 0.259*** (0.01) 0.203*** (0.01) 
EGPIII, V 0.176*** (0.02) 0.146*** (0.01) 0.129*** (0.01) 0.101*** (0.01) 
EGPIVc, VIIb 0.184*** (0.03) 0.090*** (0.03) 0.081** (0.03) 0.055* (0.02) 
EGPIVa, IVb 0.209*** (0.02) 0.170*** (0.02) 0.155*** (0.02) 0.121*** (0.02) 
French origin -0.038*** (0.01) -0.027** (0.01) -0.037*** (0.01) -0.025* (0.01) 
Private school -0.010 (0.01) 0.001 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) 
ZEP-school -0.051** (0.02) -0.047*** (0.01) -0.036** (0.01) -0.034** (0.01) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)         
< 5,000 inhabitants -0.079*** (0.01) -0.084*** (0.01) -0.085*** (0.01) -0.067*** (0.01) 
5,000-20,000 -0.059*** (0.01) -0.058*** (0.01) -0.058*** (0.01) -0.045*** (0.01) 
20,000-200,000 -0.018 (0.01) -0.024* (0.01) -0.025* (0.01) -0.022* (0.01) 
Parents’ performance assessment (p)   0.222*** (0.00) 0.221*** (0.00) 0.199*** (0.00) 
Number of siblings (C)     -0.012*** (0.00) -0.013*** (0.00) 
No parent working (C)     -0.046** (0.02) -0.037* (0.02) 
Educational motivation (c*SD)  
(Ref. None) 
        
Intermediate       0.070*** (0.01) 
High       0.182*** (0.01) 
N 9002  9002  9002  9002  
AIC 9253.9  7425.4  7400.3  7017.5  
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves 
du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Including parent’s assessment of their child’s school performance reduces the social 
class coefficients to some extent but they remain highly significant (Model 2). Parent’s 
subjective evaluation of their child’s chances of success has a strong positive effect on the 
probability that a family demands the general track: the probability increases, on average, by 
22 percentage points with every additional point on the 4-point scale of the performance 
assessment. The sharp decrease of the AIC-value indicates that school performance or the 
subjective likelihood of success considerably enhances the explanatory power of the 
regression model. 
 Adding the variables that represent families’ economic resources (i.e. number of 
siblings and employment situation) causes no major decrease of the AIC-value (Model 3). 
Also, the social class effects are only slightly reduced. Still, the coefficients of number of 
siblings and “no working parent” have the expected signs and are significant at least at the 
intermediate level (p<0.01). Holding constant social class, parents’ performance assessment 
and the control variables, every additional sibling decreases the likelihood that a student’s 
family demands the general track by 1.2 percentage points, on average. Moreover, if there is 
no employed parent in a family the average likelihood is 4.6 percentage points lower than if 
there is at least one working parent. Finally, the inclusion of a family’s educational motivation 
(c*SD) yields a considerable decrease of the social class effects and importantly augments the 
model-fit. Both the effects of a high and an intermediate educational motivation (as compared 
to no educational motivation) are highly significant. On average, the likelihood that parents 
who have a high educational motivation demand the general track is 18 percentage points 
higher than the probability that parents who have no educational motivation make such a 
demand; the percentage difference is 7 for parents with intermediate educational motivation.124 
Applying the KHB-method reveals that social class differentials in families’ school 
track requests are due to more than 40 per cent to the independent decision-making model 
(Table A13). Only the effect of EGP IVc and VIIb (the class of farmers and agricultural 
workers) is even due to 69 per cent to the core part of the theoretical model. The indirect 
effect of the parameters of the theoretical model is driven mainly by social class differentials 
                                                 
124 The theoretical model yields an interaction between the educational motivation (c*SD) and the likelihood of 
success (p). This interaction suggests that when a child has low chances of success (1-p), the risk of status 
decline is very high for higher classes but for lower classes it is minor or zero. Hence, the effect of the 
educational motivation on the school track decision can be expected to be higher when the likelihood of success 
is low as compared to when the chances of success are high. This contributes to the generation of the secondary 
effects because higher classes have a higher educational motivation. To test this interaction, I have included an 
interaction term of performance assessment and educational motivation in the regression that already contains 
the core decision-making parameters, i.e. Model 4. The model fit does not increase and the interaction term is not 
significant. Therefore, I find no support for this assumption. 
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in parents’ assessment of their child’s performance (i.e. the “subjective part” of the primary 
effects) and parents’ educational motivation. Family’s economic resources have no important 
mediating effect.  
In sum, this first analysis shows that parents’ evaluation of the core parameters of the 
decision-making model (probability of success, costs of education, likelihood and costs of 
status decline) is far from explaining the whole social class differentials in families’ school 
track requests. This yields various conclusions. On the one hand, other mechanisms than those 
proposed by the “classical” RAT-models may contribute to the generation of the social class 
effects. Such mechanisms could be, for instance, class-specific norms and values or 
preferences. Alternatively, as suggested by the theoretical model developed in Chapter 5, a 
family’s evaluation of the likelihood that the staff meeting accepts their requests (i.e. the 
parameter l) could contribute to the generation of the social class effects. That is to say, social 
class differences in the indicators parents use to assess the likelihood that the staff meeting 
accepts their LGT-requests (e.g. parents’ cultural capital, involvement in school and student’s 
mark) reinforce social class effects on families’ requests. On the other hand, the 
operationalization of the decision-making parameters possibly misses to capture all of the 
subjective “calculations” of the parents. All in all, the results support Hypothesis H2: The 
social class differentials in families’ decisions are partly mediated by the core decision-
making parameters. However, 40 per cent is a comparatively low rate as this implies that 60 
per cent will have to be explained by social class differences in families’ evaluation of the 
likelihood that the staff meeting will accept their request and hence by cultural capital and 
marks. 
The following regressions test Hypothesis H3 and examine whether the remaining social 
class effects are due to the fact that the decision-making occurs in the specific institutional 
context of the dialogue. The relevant features of this context are the subsequent propositions 
by the staff meeting and families’ right to reject that proposition with some effort. This 
institutional context “requires” that I add to the model including the core decision-making 
parameters (Model 4 in Table 19) variables that represent the indicators parents use to 
evaluate l, i.e. the likelihood that the staff meeting will accept their LGT-request. The 
indicators consist of “objective” performance measures, parental education and parental 
involvement in school. The idea behind this analysis is that higher-class parents are better 
equipped with cultural capital in the form of abilities and knowledge and therefore are more 
involved in school. In turn, these beneficial cultural resources and their involvement make 
them more confident that the staff meeting will accept their request and, as a consequence, 
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parents from higher classes are more likely to demand the general track. “Objective” 
performance measures such as average mark on the brevet and previous grade repetition in 
lower secondary school are indicators that parents use to evaluate the child’s chances of 
success (p) and to assess the likelihood that the staff meeting will propose the general track 
(l). A regression that takes into account both measures – parents’ subjective assessment and 
objective measures such as marks – can indicate whether they have independent effects on a 
family’s school track request. I suggest that the direct effects of student’s mark and previous 
grade repetition which remain after controlling for parents’ subjective performance 
assessment represent families’ evaluation of the likelihood that the staff meeting accepts an 
LGT-request (l). The direct effect of parents’ assessment indicates their subjective evaluation 
of the student’s chances to succeed in LGT (a). 
Indeed, as Model 1 in Table 20 shows, all three performance-measures – parents’ 
performance assessment, marks, grade repetition – have highly significant effects. Holding 
constant social class, the control variables and the core decision-making parameters, the 
average probability to demand LGT increases by 6 percentage points with every additional 
point of subjectively assessed performance (on the 4-point scale); it augments by 5 percentage 
points when student’s mark increases by one point (on the 20-point-scale). Moreover, the 
corresponding average probability is 15 percentage points lower when the student has 
repeated grades as when he has not experienced grade repetition. The explanatory power of 
the model increases sharply as the AIC of 7018 (Model 4, Table 19) is reduced to 5718 
(Model 1, Table 20).  
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Table 20 Social class effects on family’s school track request (LGT vs. LPA): Test of the impact of the parameter l (results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)      
EGPI 0.193*** (0.01) 0.143*** (0.02) 0.182*** (0.01) 0.190*** (0.01) 0.139*** (0.02) 
EGPII 0.136*** (0.01) 0.088*** (0.01) 0.125*** (0.01) 0.132*** (0.01) 0.083*** (0.01) 
EGPIII, V 0.068*** (0.01) 0.051*** (0.01) 0.063*** (0.01) 0.066*** (0.01) 0.048*** (0.01) 
EGPIVc, VIIb 0.011 (0.02) -0.011 (0.02) 0.005 (0.02) 0.010 (0.02) -0.013 (0.02) 
EGPIVa, IVb 0.093*** (0.01) 0.071*** (0.01) 0.088*** (0.01) 0.091*** (0.01) 0.069*** (0.01) 
French origin -0.045*** (0.01) -0.046*** (0.01) -0.045*** (0.01) -0.045*** (0.01) -0.046*** (0.01) 
Private school -0.020* (0.01) -0.022* (0.01) -0.022* (0.01) -0.022* (0.01) -0.024** (0.01) 
ZEP-school -0.022 (0.01) -0.018 (0.01) -0.022 (0.01) -0.023 (0.01) -0.020 (0.01) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)      
< 5,000 inhabitants -0.090*** (0.01) -0.090*** (0.01) -0.091*** (0.01) -0.091*** (0.01) -0.091*** (0.01) 
5,000-20,000 -0.055*** (0.01) -0.054*** (0.01) -0.056*** (0.01) -0.055*** (0.01) -0.055*** (0.01) 
20,000-200,000 -0.037*** (0.01) -0.036*** (0.01) -0.037*** (0.01) -0.036*** (0.01) -0.037*** (0.01) 
Parents’ performance assessment (p) 0.061*** (0.01) 0.060*** (0.01) 0.060*** (0.01) 0.060*** (0.01) 0.059*** (0.01) 
Number of siblings (C) -0.008** (0.00) -0.007** (0.00) -0.007* (0.00) -0.008** (0.00) -0.007* (0.00) 
No parent working (C) -0.011 (0.01) 0.002 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01) -0.009 (0.01) 0.006 (0.01) 
Educational motivation (c*SD) (Ref. None)      
Intermediate 0.066*** (0.01) 0.065*** (0.01) 0.063*** (0.01) 0.065*** (0.01) 0.063*** (0.01) 
High 0.139*** (0.01) 0.129*** (0.01) 0.135*** (0.01) 0.137*** (0.01) 0.126*** (0.01) 
Indicators of parameter l: Mark 0.051*** (0.00) 0.050*** (0.00) 0.051*** (0.00) 0.051*** (0.00) 0.050*** (0.00) 
Previous grade repetition -0.151*** (0.01) -0.148*** (0.01) -0.149*** (0.01) -0.152*** (0.01) -0.147*** (0.01) 
Parental education (Ref. lower)      
Intermediate  0.042*** (0.01)   0.037*** (0.01) 
Higher  0.083*** (0.01)   0.074*** (0.01) 
Parents’ evenings   0.033** (0.01)  0.026* (0.01) 
Parents’ initiation of meetings   0.018* (0.01)  0.013 (0.01) 
Teachers’ initiation of meetings   -0.018* (0.01)  -0.019* (0.01) 
PA-membership   0.034*** (0.01)  0.025* (0.01) 
Opinion on parent-teacher relation (Ref. Better not meet)      
Meet when problem    0.003(0.01) -0.005 (0.01) 
Meet frequently    0.023* (0.01) 0.009 (0.01) 
Knowledge of right to reject    0.009 (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) 
AIC 5717.8 5671.7 5691.5 5712.7 5657.2 
Note: N=9002; AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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This result yields that “the objective part” of the primary effects has strong independent 
effects on families’ educational choices. I infer that this net effect emerges because families 
use marks to assess the probability that the school accepts their request. At the same time this 
effect indicates the likelihood that the family will have to reject. Families assume that – 
regardless of their personal opinion on their child’s abilities and chances of succeeding in 
general upper secondary education – the teachers will be more likely to accept an LGT-
request if the child has good marks (and has not repeated grades). Since the “objective” 
performance strongly depends on social class, families’ evaluation of the chances that the 
school accepts their request contributes to the generation of social class differentials in 
families’ school track choices. This reasoning is further supported by the major decrease of 
the social class effects. For instance, for EGP I the AME of 0.26 (Model 4, Table 19) 
decreases to an AME of 0.19 (Model 1, Table 20) when marks and previous grade repetition 
are taken into account. 
Model 2 additionally contains parents’ cultural capital operationalized through parents’ 
education. As expected, the social class effects decrease to some extent and parental education 
has a highly significant positive effect on the likelihood that a family opts for LGT instead of 
LPA. This result yields various explanations. First, as suggested by the theoretical model, 
parents take into account their cultural capital to assess the likelihood that the staff meeting 
will accept their request. More specifically, they assume that teachers know whether they have 
the abilities and educational knowledge to meet the school’s standards school and will 
consider these capacities when they make the school track proposition. Since parents from 
higher classes are better equipped with the relevant cultural resources, they are more confident 
that the staff meeting will accept their request and hence they are more likely to demand the 
general track. Moreover, I suggest that parents with higher educational attainment take into 
account their ability to persuade the headmaster and the recall meeting in case they have to 
reject.125  
Most types of parental involvement have positive significant effects on a family’s 
school track request (Model 3, Table 20). On average, the likelihood that parents who attend 
parents’ evenings demand the general track is 3 percentage points higher than that of parents 
who are not involved in that way (holding constant social class, the core parameters and the 
                                                 
125 As opposed to the basic assumptions of the theoretical model developed in Chapter 5, the mediating effect of 
parental education could also indicate that class-specific norms and values shape families’ educational decisions: 
Parents from higher social classes were socialized in the higher educational system where they internalized the 
general value of education and norms such as “children from higher classes have to attend higher education” or 
the like (see Subchapter 3.1.1 on the original theory by Bourdieu).  
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control variables). The effect is significant at an intermediate level (p<0.01). The respective 
average probability difference is 1.8 percentage points for parents’ initiation of meetings 
(p<0.05). Membership in a parent association (PA) has a positive marginally significant 
effect, too. By contrast, teachers’ initiation of meetings has a negative weakly significant 
effect that indicates that parents with lower educational aspirations (i.e. parents who do not 
request LGT) are not initiating meetings by themselves and, thus, are invited by the teachers.  
Model 4 alternatively takes into account parents’ opinion on parent-teacher relationships 
and their knowledge of their right to reject. It appears that parents who think that they should 
meet teachers frequently are slightly more likely to request LGT than parents who think that 
they should not bother the teachers. Knowledge of the rejection right has no significant effect. 
At least, the coefficient has the expected sign. The social class effects are less reduced than 
when parental education or involvement is factored in (see Model 2 and 3). Model 5 contains 
all the variables that represent parents’ cultural capital and involvement: The effects of 
parental education and involvement decrease and the small effect of parents’ opinion on 
parent-teacher relationships becomes insignificant. Still, parental education has a highly 
significant positive effect and attendance at parents’ evenings and PA-membership have a 
weakly significant positive impact.126 
In sum, the positive effects could indicate that parents take into account their 
involvement when they make educational decisions: they think that the staff meeting will be 
more willing to accept their request because they meet the school’s standards, i.e. they are 
involved in their children’s schooling. Also, this result could show that parents were more 
involved because they planned to make a higher educational choice. In other words, parents 
with high educational aspirations, i.e. parents who plan to demand the general track, start 
early to prepare for the teachers’ decision by being involved and consider this effort when 
they take the decision.127 
                                                 
126 An analysis that is not presented also takes into account being parent representative in the staff meeting. It 
reveals that this involvement kind has no significant positive effect, even when PA-membership is not included 
in the regression. Results are available on request from the author.  
127 One could criticize that an unobserved effect of planned educational decision on involvement confounds the 
observed effect of involvement on families’ requests. Therefore, I could not surely conclude that families take 
into account their involvement to assess the likelihood that the staff meeting accepts their request. However, 
even if this is the case, the result still strongly supports an important theoretical assumption: Families who have 
higher educational aspirations put more effort in meeting the standards of the school because the staff meeting 
makes a virtually binding proposition. In turn, this implies that the institutional circumstances make families get 
more involved. Moreover, if families planning to demand LGT get more involved, they are very likely to even 
more consider their additional effort when they make their school track choice. 
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With regard to the explanation of the social class effects, the results of a KHB-
application to the regression that takes into account all additional determinants (Model 5) 
reveals that 67 to 76 per cent of the total effects of EGP I, II and III and V are due to the core 
decision-making model and the parameters that shall represent families’ evaluation of the 
likelihood that the staff meeting accepts their demand and families’ capacities to possibly 
reject the proposition (Table A14). While the indirect effect is only marginally driven by 
social class differentials in parental involvement, it is caused to larger extents by marks, 
parental education and educational motivation (not shown in the table). Basically, these 
results support Hypothesis H3. However, a considerable part of the social class effects on 
families’ requests remains unexplained. This remaining social class effect could be due to an 
insufficient operationalization of the parameter l and the other “core” parameters. Moreover, 
still other unobserved mechanisms could be at work. 
The theoretical model on family’s decision-making yields several assumptions on 
interaction effects of the parameters. Hypotheses H4 to H4c formulate these assumptions. As 
predicted probabilities vary depending on the values of the explanatory variables, I first 
address these hypotheses with conditional effect plots that are based on regression models that 
do not include interaction terms. Generally, these plots show when students’ marks are above 
the average, subjectively expected chances of success, costs, educational motivation and 
indicators of parents’ cultural capital and involvement have almost no effects. However, when 
students’ performance is below the average level, most of these factors have a considerable 
impact on the likelihood that a family still requests LGT. In the following I briefly present 
three examples.  
First, as Hypothesis H4a expects, educational motivation has larger effects when 
students’ performance is low – i.e. when the staff meeting is likely to not accept an LGT-
request – than when students’ marks are relatively good (Figure 12). Moreover, as a family’s 
social class increases, the maximal effect of educational motivation, i.e. the “bump” in the 
curve, occurs at even lower mark-levels. This indicates that families who severely need their 
children to attend LGT are willing to request LGT even when the risk that the staff meeting 
does not accept this request is very high.    
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Figure 12 Discrete change effects of educational motivation on family’s school track request 
(LGT vs. LPA) by mark and social class 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 1 in Table 20; probabilities 
are calculated for students of French origin who have not repeated grades, attending a public school that is 
located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP, having an average number of siblings, parents rate them as 
good students (score 3) and they have at least one working parent; 95%-confidence intervals. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
Second, as Hypothesis H4c expects, parental education makes no difference when 
students have very good marks (Figure 13). By contrast, if students have marks in the middle- 
and lower range and therefore the families cannot be sure that the staff meeting will accept an 
LGT-request, parents with higher education are considerably more likely to request the 
general track than parents with lower educational attainment. According to the theory, this 
effect is due to the fact that parents with cultural capital enabling them to meet schools’ 
standards are more confident that the staff meeting will accept their LGT-request. Moreover, 
parents with these cultural resources are more willing to reject and hence they are more likely 
to take the risk of having their request not accepted. 
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Figure 13 Discrete change effects of parental education on family’s school track request 
(LGT vs. LPA) by mark and social class 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 2 in Table 20; probabilities 
are calculated for students of French origin with parents with intermediate educational motivation, having not 
repeated grades, attending a public school that is located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP, having an 
average number of siblings and at least one working parent; parents rate the student’s performance as good 
(score 3); 95%-confidence intervals. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de 
l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
  Third, also PA-membership appears to have considerable effects only when students’ 
marks are relatively low (Figure 14). Even though the effects are of small size, this result 
provides some support of Hypothesis H4c, which assumes that families take into account their 
involvement when the risk is high that the staff meeting will not accept their LGT-request. 
According to the theory, families consider their involvement because they think that the staff 
meeting will reward their additional effort. In the case of PA-membership, parents factor in 
this specific involvement because parent representatives in the staff meetings belong to these 
associations, too, and act in the interests of the other members. Possibly, these parents are 
themselves parent representatives in the staff meetings and hence they will be able to directly 
influence teachers’ decision. 
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Figure 14 Discrete change effects of PA-membership on family’s school track request 
(LGT vs. LPA) by mark and social class 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 3 in Table 20; probabilities 
are calculated for students of French origin with parents with intermediate educational attainment and 
intermediate educational motivation, having not repeated grades, attending a public school that is located in a 
large city or Paris and not in a ZEP, having an average number of siblings and at least one working parent; 
parents rate the student’s performance as good (score 3) and are attending parents’ evenings; 95%-confidence 
intervals. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; 
own calculations. 
Up to here, I have addressed Hypotheses H4 to H4c by means of “simple” conditional 
effect plots that are not based on regressions including interaction terms. Now, to directly 
examine the interactions postulated by Hypotheses H4 to H4c, I run logistic regressions of 
family’s school track request (LGT vs. LPA) that include the respective interaction terms. If 
the inclusion of the interaction term causes at least a small increase of the model fit, i.e. a 
decrease of the AIC-value, I further analyze the interaction with conditional effect plots that 
are based on the specific regression model. Table A15 presents results of regression models 
that include interaction terms that slightly improve the model fit of the respective regression 
models.128 
                                                 
128 Table A15 does not contain a regression model that takes into account an interaction of marks and parental 
education since including this interaction in the model decrease its explanatory power. The results are available 
on request. 
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Figure 15 presents predicted probabilities obtained from a regression that takes into 
account an interaction of marks and parents’ subjective performance assessment (Model 1 in 
Table A15). The predicted probabilities hold for French students whose parents indicated that 
they have an intermediate educational motivation, who are enrolled in a public school that is 
located in Paris or a larger city and that is not a ZEP-school. To keep the figure clearer, 
predicted probabilities are only presented for students whose parents rated them as “good 
student” (i.e. a score of 3) and “student with a lot of difficulties” (i.e. a score of 1). This 
interaction tests the multiplicative relation between p and l: families who know that the staff 
will accept their LGT-demand are even more concerned with evaluating their children’s 
chances of success since these chances ultimately determine whether the family can preserve 
its social status. 
Figure 15 provides some evidence in favor of this assumption and hence of Hypothesis 
H4. Indeed, the distance between the curves is larger in the higher levels of the marks-scale. If 
a student has low marks there is no difference and, although the curves move closer as marks 
increase, they are still distant. Nevertheless, the distance is the largest when students have 
marks in the middle range. This is due – to some extent – to the logistic function of the 
probabilities: Lowess smoother reveal that especially for EGP II, EGP III and V and EGP VI 
and VIIa the effect of performance assessment (i.e. the distance between the curves) strongly 
increases as student’s marks increase and is the largest when students’ marks are around 15. 
Further, Figure 15 shows that the effect of parents’ performance assessment seems 
largest for the working class. This result is also supported by lowess smoother and in line with 
the theory: Since families from lower classes have less to loose from sending their child to the 
vocational track, they must be really persuaded of their child’s likelihood of success to request 
the general track, especially when the chance that the staff meeting proposes the general track 
is uncertain. Moreover, even when the likelihood that the staff meeting accepts an LGT-
request is high, parents’ subjective assessment of their child’s chances of success has a greater 
impact because they have to factor in the costs of education. Overall, given a student has a 
mark of 11 and the family thinks he is a good student, still the likelihood that a working-class 
family demands LGT is 80 per cent while the corresponding likelihood for a higher service 
class family is more than 95 per cent. 
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Figure 15 Interaction effect of mark and parents’ performance assessment on family’s 
school track request (LGT vs. LPA) by social class, predicted probabilities  
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 1 in Table A15; probabilities 
are calculated for students of French origin with parents with intermediate educational motivation, having not 
repeated grades, attending a public school that is located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP, having an 
average number of siblings and at least one working parent; 95%-confidence intervals. Source: Panel national 
1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
Figure 16 addresses the interaction of social class and the likelihood that the staff 
accepts an LGT-request. This likelihood is operationalized via students’ average marks on the 
brevet. This analysis is a more general test of Hypothesis H4a, which assumes that the effect 
of the educational motivation increases as the likelihood that the staff meeting accepts an 
LGT-request decreases. That is to say, families who have a lot to loose from not having their 
children attend the general track – i.e. higher-class families – are significantly more likely to 
request the general track even though the risk is high that the staff meeting will not accept 
their request. By contrast, families from lower classes will not demand the general when their 
children have low marks because they would experience less or no costs of status decline at 
all if their child attends the vocational track.  
Figure 16 provides evidence that supports this assumption. The higher the social class, 
the stronger are the discrete change effects when students’ marks are in the middle and lower 
range. The effect is most striking for EGP I: Given a student has an average mark of 5, the 
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predicted probability that his family still requests LGT is almost 50 percentage points higher 
than when the family belongs to the working class (EGP VI, VIIb). Holding constant parents’ 
performance assessment at 1 (poor performance) reduces the discrete change effects at the 
very low mark-levels (see Figure A3 in the appendix).  
Figure 16 Interaction effect of mark and social class on family’s school track request 
(LGT vs. LPA); parents’ performance assessment held constant at 3; discrete 
change effects (reference: EGP VI, VIIa) 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 2 in Table A15; 
probabilities are calculated for students of French origin with parents with intermediate educational 
motivation and who think the child is a “good student”, having not repeated grades, attending a public school 
that is located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP, having an average number of siblings and at least one 
working parent; 95%-confidence intervals. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère 
de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
To directly investigate whether it is a higher level of educational motivation that causes 
families from higher social classes to take the risk of demanding LGT even though the child is 
poorly performing, I analyze an interaction between mark and educational motivation (Figure 
17). The predicted probabilities hold for the usual student. As expected, the conditional effect 
plots reveal that educational motivation has its largest effects when a student has marks in the 
lower and middle range. In line with the theory, this means that families who have a high 
educational motivation are more likely to request the general tack although the risk is high 
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that the staff meeting will not accept their request. The effect of educational motivation is 
stronger for lower than for higher social classes. This could be due to the fact that lower-class 
families have less economic resources to account for the costs of sending their child to the 
general track and therefore they need more educational motivation to take a risky decision. 
However, since the costs-parameter generally has only a minor impact, other social class 
differences must be at work. It could be that the educational-motivation variable is not capable 
of capturing the full impact of families’ need to have their child attend the general track and 
thus the stronger effect of educational motivation for working-class families still indicates that 
families who have less to loose from not sending their child to LGT need more educational 
motivation to take a risky demand. To detect this, I would need a better educational 
motivation-measure.    
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Figure 17 Interaction effect of mark and educational motivation on family’s school track 
request (LGT vs. LPA) by social class; discrete change effect, performance 
assessment held constant at 3 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 3 in Table A15; 
probabilities are calculated for students of French origin with parents who rate their children as “good 
student” (score 3), attending a public school located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP, having an 
average number of siblings and at least one working parent; 95%-confidence intervals. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
Hypothesis H4b postulates a three-way interaction between likelihood of success (p), 
educational motivation (c*SD) and the probability that the staff meeting accepts an LGT-
request (l): If the staff meeting is relatively likely to propose LGT but the family thinks the 
child has low chances of success, the effect of educational motivation is stronger than if the 
family thinks the child has high chances of success. Figure 18 corresponds to Figure 17 but 
parents’ performance assessment was held constant at “low”. A comparison of the effect of 
the educational motivation in both figures provides some support for Hypothesis H4b: When 
parents rate their children’s performance as low (Figure 18), their educational motivation has 
a greater impact than when their educational motivation is relatively high (Figure 17). 
However, this difference appears rather in the middle range of marks, i.e. when it is unsure 
whether the staff meeting will propose LGT, than in the higher range. This result does not 
support the hypothesis.  
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
P
(Y
=
1|
X
=
1
)-
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
0)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Mark
EGP I
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
P
(Y
=
1|
X
=
1
)-
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
0)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Mark
EGP II
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
P
(Y
=
1|
X
=
1
)-
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
0)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Mark
EGP III, V
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
P
(Y
=
1|
X
=
1
)-
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
0)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Mark
intermediate
high
Educational motivation (ref. none)
EGP VI, VIIa
 
 232 
Figure 18 Interaction effect of mark and educational motivation on family’s school track 
request (LGT vs. LPA) by social class; discrete change effects, performance 
assessment held constant at 1 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 3 in Table A15; 
probabilities are calculated for students of French origin with parents who rate their children as “student with 
a lot of problems” (score 1), having not repeated grades, attending a public school that is located in a large 
city or Paris and not in a ZEP, having an average number of siblings and at least one working parent; 95%-
confidence intervals. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation 
nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
The theoretical model further yields the assumption that parents who have the cultural 
capital to meet schools’ standards and to bear the costs of rejection (i.e. talk to the headmaster 
and recall meeting) are more likely to demand LGT even though the risk is high or unclear 
that the staff meeting will not accept their demand (Hypothesis H4c). Graphical analyses that 
correspond to those presented before reveal that there is hardly a significant interaction of 
marks and parental education and hence do not support Hypothesis H4c. This hypothesis also 
comes with the assumption that parents’ direct involvement in school has stronger effects on 
families’ requests when the child is poorly performing. The mechanism behind this effect 
could be, either, that they think that their effort increases the probability that the staff will 
accept their demand. Or, parents of students with relatively low performance early prepare for 
the dialogue by being involved. Conditional effect plots examining the interaction between 
marks and attendance at parents’ evenings, parents’ initiation of meetings and PA-
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
1
)-
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
0
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Mark
EGP I
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
1
)-
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
0
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Mark
EGP II
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
1
)-
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
0
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Mark
EGP III, V
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
1
)-
P
(Y
=
1
|X
=
0
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Mark
intermediate
high
Educational motivation (ref. none)
EGP VI, VIIa
 
 233 
membership reveal only one relatively weak interaction: When parents’ performance 
assessment is held constant at 1, attendance at parents’ evenings has a small significant effect 
when marks are in the middle range (Figure 19). By contrast, holding constant parents’ 
performance assessment at 3 (i.e. good student), I find no significant interaction effect (Figure 
A4). This result seems to indicate that parents only take into account their attendance at 
parents’ evenings when they are worried about their child’s chances of success and the child’s 
marks are in the middle range indicating that the staff may not accept an LGT-demand. 
Parents who think their child is a good student do not take into account their involvement, 
even when the child’s marks are relatively low and the risk is high that the staff would reject 
their demand. This result contradicts the theory. 
Figure 19 Interaction of marks and attendance at parents’ evenings on family’s school 
track request (LGT vs. LPA) by social class; discrete change effects, 
performance assessment held constant at 1 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 4 in Table A15; 
probabilities are calculated for students of French origin with parents with intermediate educational 
motivation, having not repeated grades, attending a public school that is located in a large city or Paris and 
not in a ZEP, having an average number of siblings and at least one working parent; 95%-confidence 
intervals. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; 
own calculations. 
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Other conditional effect plots that graphically examine interactions were drawn for 
varying performance assessments and varying educational motivation-levels (the plots are not 
shown). They provide very similar results: There is hardly any significant interaction between 
marks and attendance at parents’ evenings when parents’ performance assessment is held 
constant at 3, and between marks and parents’ initiation of meetings or PA-membership. 
Therefore, I conclude that parents do not even more consider their involvement when the risk 
is high that the staff meeting will not accept their LGT-request. Or, they do not become 
involved only when their children have poor marks. 
8.3.3 FAMILY’S REJECTION DECISIONS 
Only families whose school track request was not accepted by the staff meeting are 
entitled to reject the staff meeting’s proposition. Therefore, the analysis of families’ rejection 
decision is based on a sample that consists only of families whose requests do not correspond 
to the propositions by the staff meeting. More specifically, the sample contains only families 
who demanded the general track but did not receive an LGT-proposition by the staff meeting. 
Table A16 in the appendix lists means of the variables used in the analysis of families’ 
rejection decisions by social class. Table 21 presents the results of a logistic regression of 
family’s decision to reject and attend the talk with the headmaster. Model 1 contains only 
social class and the control variables. The effect of EGP I is significant at the 1 per cent-level 
and the EGP II-effect is significant at the 5 per cent-level. Corresponding AMEs indicate that, 
on average, the likelihood that higher service class families reject is 13 percentage points 
higher than the likelihood that working-class families reject. This result provides evidence in 
favor of Hypothesis H5.  
Model 2 tests Hypothesis H5a, which assumes that educational motivation and parents’ 
cultural capital mediate the effect of social class. This hypothesis follows from the assumption 
that parents who have a lot to loose (i.e. who will experience status decline) from not sending 
their child to the general track are willing to bear the costs of rejection. Moreover, parents 
who are equipped with cultural resources that facilitate their dealing with school staff are 
more willing to meet the headmaster. In fact, only including parental education produces an 
increase of the model fit; educational motivation does not augment the explanatory power of 
the model. For this reason, Table 21 presents only a regression model that contains parental 
education (Model 2). 
The results obtained by Model 2 provide some evidence in favor of Hypothesis H5a 
since the effects of EGP I and II considerably decrease and become insignificant. Moreover, 
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the model fit increases slightly and the effect of intermediate parental education is significant 
at a low level (p<0.05). Other than one would expect, it is not higher parental education but 
intermediate education that has a significant effect. The AME tells that parents with 
intermediate education are, on average, almost 10 percentage points more likely to reject than 
parents with lower education.  
Table 21 Social class effects on family’s rejection decision and mediating effect of parental 
education (results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)       
EGPI 0.126** (0.05) 0.069 (0.06) 0.117* (0.05) 
EGPII 0.139* (0.06) 0.085 (0.06) 0.135* (0.06) 
EGPIII, V 0.074 (0.04) 0.047 (0.05) 0.070 (0.04) 
EGPIVc, VIIb -0.059 (0.10) -0.103 (0.10) -0.063 (0.10) 
EGPIVa, IVb 0.068 (0.05) 0.041 (0.05) 0.066 (0.05) 
French origin -0.062 (0.04) -0.071* (0.04) -0.063 (0.04) 
Private school 0.036 (0.04) 0.030 (0.04) 0.037 (0.04) 
ZEP-school 0.078 (0.06) 0.091 (0.06) 0.081 (0.06) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., 
Paris) 
      
  
< 5,000 inhabitants 0.003 (0.05) 0.002 (0.05) 0.006 (0.05) 
5,000-20,000 -0.011 (0.04) -0.003 (0.04) -0.010 (0.04) 
20,000-200,000 0.019 (0.04) 0.020 (0.04) 0.019 (0.04) 
Parental education  (Ref. lower)       
Intermediate   0.095* (0.04)   
Higher   0.089 (0.05)   
Staff meeting’s proposition: GR 
(1) vs. LPA (0) 
    0.031 (0.03) 
N 982  982  982  
AIC 1263.9  1261.2  1264.9  
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, 
DPD; own calculations. 
Model 3 in Table 21 includes a variable that indicates the staff meeting’s proposition 
(GR vs. LPA) instead of parental education. This analysis tests whether families accept grade 
retention as a compromise and do not reject such proposition or whether it motivates families 
to reject. Taking into account staff meeting’s proposition reduces the model fit and its effect is 
insignificant. Still, the sign of the coefficient reveals that grade retention increases the 
likelihood of rejection. Moreover, the social class effects are reduced and become less 
significant. This indicates that families from higher social classes are more likely to receive a 
grade retention proposition but tend to not accept this compromise.  
Finally, Table 22 presents a bivariate analysis of the association between families’ 
social origin and their decision to reject a second time, i.e. to reject the headmaster’s decision. 
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There are 284 families in the basic sample that rejected the staff meeting’s proposition, 
attended the talk with the headmaster and did not get the school track decision they initially 
had requested. These families are entitled to reject a second time and to thereby initiate the 
recall meeting. A weak relationship between social class and the decision to reject a second 
time appears: Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau beta indicate a weak correlation that is 
significant at a marginal level (p<0.05). While 82 per cent of EGP I-families reject, 72 per 
cent of EGP II-families, 73 per cent of the families from EGP III and V and 61 per cent of 
working class families (VI, VIIa) do so. These results provide support in favor of Hypothesis 
H6. However, since the absolute numbers are very small, these results must be interpreted 
with caution. 
Table 22 Social class and family’s second rejection (frequencies; percentages in parantheses)  
EGP-class I II III, V IVc, VIIb IVa, IVb VI, VIIa Total 
        
Not reject 13 9 24 1 12 20 79 
 (18.06) (28.13) (27.27) (33.33) (31.58) (39.22) (27.82) 
Reject 59 23 64 2 26 31 205 
 (81.94) (71.88) (72.73) (66.67) (68.42) (60.78) (72.18) 
Total 72 32 88 3 38 51 284 
 (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
        
Spearman’s rho 0.151*       
Kendall’s tau beta 0.136*       
Note: * p<0.05. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; 
own calculations. 
8.4 School’s decisions 
8.4.1 STAFF MEETING’S SCHOOL TRACK PROPOSITION 
Henceforth, I analyze the impact of students’ social class, students’ school performance 
and families’ school track requests on staff meetings’ school track propositions. Table A17 in 
the appendix lists descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis of staff meetings’ 
propositions. The differentiation by student’s social class provides another bivariate test of the 
bridging hypotheses. Table 23 presents the results of nested logistic regressions of staff 
meetings’ propositions (LGT vs. LPA) on student social class, the control variables, marks on 
the brevet, grade repetition and families’ school track request. Model 1 reveals strong social 
class differentials in staff meetings’ decisions and provides support for Hypothesis H7. For 
instance, on average, the probability that an EGP I-student is proposed the general track 
(LGT) instead of the vocational track (LPA) is almost 48 percentage points higher than the 
probability that a working-class students receives such a proposition; EGP II-students have a 
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corresponding average advantage of 39 percentage points and students from EGP-class III and 
V have one of almost 18 percentage points. French origin has no significant effect. Being 
enrolled in a private school and in a school that is located in the countryside has small but 
highly significant negative effects (AME=-0.047 and AME=-0.051; p<0.00). Being enrolled 
in a ZEP-school and attending a school located in a town with 5,000 to 20,000 inhabitants 
have negative effects at the intermediate significance level (p<0.01). The negative effect of 
attending schools in more rural regions could be driven by the fact that more places are 
available in vocational upper secondary schools in these areas, while bigger general upper 
secondary schools are located in urban regions. 
Including student’s school performance in terms of marks and previous grade repetition 
strongly decreases the social class differentials and the AIC-value (Model 2). The AME of 
EGP I is more than halved to 0.21 and the AME of EGP II is strongly reduced to 0.15 
(p<0.001). On average, the likelihood that the staff meeting proposes the general track 
(instead of the vocational track) increases by 8 percentage points with every additional mark-
point. The probability to be proposed LGT is 21 percentage points lower for students who 
have repeated at least one grade in lower secondary school as compared to students who have 
not repeated grades in that time.  
Taking into account family’s school track request strongly increases the model fit and 
makes most of the effects of the EGP-classes become insignificant (Model 3). Only very 
small positive effects of EGP I remain significant at the intermediate level (p<0.01). On 
average and controlling for performance, French origin, school type and city size, the 
probability that a student from EGP I is proposed LGT is 2 percentage points higher than the 
corresponding probabilities for working-class students. The effects of mark and repetition of 
grades are strongly reduced but remain highly significant. This indicates that the effects of 
social class and student performance are not fully driven by family’s school track request. In 
other words, given the same request and performance, the staff meeting is more likely to 
propose LGT to students from EGP I (as compared to students from the working-class) and to 
students who have not repeated grades. Moreover, given the same request and holding 
constant the other variables, the likelihood to be proposed the general track increases as a 
student’s mark increases. Finally, coefficients of family’s school track requests show that the 
staff meeting follows families’ demands: If a family did not request LGT but LPA, the 
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likelihood is significantly lower that the family is proposed LGT. The probability is, on 
average, 67 percentage points lower if the family requested the vocational track.129 
The results provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis H8, which assumes that the effect 
of student social class is largely mediated by performance and families’ requests. According 
to the theoretical model developed in Chapter 5, a student’s performance affects the staff 
meeting’s proposition because teachers consider the performance to evaluate a student’s 
chances of succeeding in LGT (i.e. the parameter a). The effect of a family’s request on the 
staff meeting’s propositions operates through teachers’ evaluation of the likelihood that a 
family rejects (i.e. the parameter r). The small but significant remaining EGP I effect may 
emerge because the staff meeting either thinks that students from this class will be better 
supported by their parents and therefore have higher chances of success. Another explanation 
could be that families from the higher service class are more likely to reject and hence the 
school staff proposes LGT to them in order to prevent their rejection.  
                                                 
129 The family request variable does not take into account grade retention requests (GR) since only 19 families to 
whom the staff meeting proposes LGT or LPA have demanded grade retention. That is to say, the sample for the 
analysis of staff meeting’s decision between LGT and LPA would contain only 19 families (i.e. less than 2 per 
cent) who requested GR. To 15 of these families, staff meetings propose LPA and to 4 per cent they propose 
LGT. 
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Table 23 Social class effects on staff meeting’s school track proposition (LGT vs. LPA); 
results of binary logistic regressions; AMEs 
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation 
nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
Table A18 in the appendix presents results of an application of the KHB-method to 
Model 3. The numbers reveal that nearly all of the social class differentials in staff meetings’ 
school track propositions are due to social class differences in students’ performance and in 
families’ school track requests. Student’s mark, previous grade retention and family’s request 
mediate between 93 and 96 per cent of the effects of EGP I, II, III and V and IVab. The effect 
of belonging to the class of agricultural workers and farmers is mediated by 90 per cent by 
student’s school achievement and family’s request. Generally, families’ requests contribute 
more to the indirect effect (not shown in Table A18). 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)     
EGPI  0.476*** 0.214*** 0.021** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EGPII  0.393*** 0.153*** 0.010 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
EGPIII, V  0.184*** 0.073*** 0.010 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EGPIVc, VIIb  0.218*** 0.039* 0.023 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
EGPIVa, IVb  0.214*** 0.105*** 0.007 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
French origin  -0.019 -0.049*** -0.000 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Private school  -0.047*** -0.062*** -0.027*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ZEP-school  -0.047** -0.008 -0.004 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)     
< 5,000 inhabitants  -0.051*** -0.079*** -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
5,000-20,000  -0.042** -0.054*** -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
20,000-200,000  0.000 -0.022* 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Mark   0.082*** 0.029*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Previous grade repetition   -0.210*** -0.063*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Family’s request: LGT (1) vs. LPA (0)    0.669*** 
    (0.02) 
N  10466 10466 10466 
AIC  12000.2 6817.0 2629.1 
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To illustrate the impact of family’s school track request on the staff meeting’s 
proposition by student’s mark and social origin, Figure 20 presents predicted probabilities. 
They are based on Model 3 in Table 23 and represent French students who have not repeated 
grades in lower secondary school and who are attending a public school located in a larger 
city or Paris that is not a ZEP-school. Given the same mark, the staff meeting is more likely to 
propose the general track to families who requested LGT than to families who demanded 
LPA. However, even when a family requested the vocational track, the staff meeting 
increasingly proposes the general track when a student’s marks are better than the mean mark 
(i.e. around 11). For instance, if a student from EGP III and V requested LPA and has a mark 
of 10, the predicted probability that the staff proposes LGT is slightly more than zero. In 
contrast, when the student has a mark of 18 the likelihood is more than 90 per cent.130 
At first sight, it appears that the effects of family’s request do not vary by social class. 
Indeed, the variations are very small. Still, there are some important differences: For example, 
if a EGP I-student has a mark of 5 and demands LGT, the predicted probability that he is 
proposed LGT is nearly 20 per cent (see Figure A5). By contrast, if a family from the working 
class makes such an ambitious request even though the child has a mark of 5, the predicted 
probability is around 10 per cent. Moreover, the staff meeting would rather correct too modest 
requests of families from higher classes than of families of lower social origin (see Figure 20): 
When a student from EGP I whose parents requested LPA has a mark of 15, the predicted 
probability that the staff still proposes LGT is 60 per cent while when the student is from the 
working class the likelihood is around 45 per cent only.131 
 
 
                                                 
130  Note that these are predicted probabilities. Lowess smoother confirm that the staff meeting becomes 
increasingly likely to propose LGT when a student’s mark is better than 10 but actually there are no families in 
the sample who demand LPA when their child has a mark better than 16.  
131 Again, note that these are predicted probabilities. In fact, no family, regardless of their social class position, 
requests the vocational track when the child has mark of 15. 
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Figure 20 Predicted probabilities of receiving an LGT-proposition by school track 
request, mark and social class 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 3 in Table 23; probabilities 
are calculated for students of French origin with parents with intermediate educational motivation, having not 
repeated grades, attending a public school that is located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP, having an 
average number of siblings and at least one working parent; 95%-confidence intervals. Source: Panel national 
1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
The very small social class effect that remains even after student’s performance and 
family’s request are controlled could be caused by the institutional setting in which the staff 
meeting makes its decision. More specifically, the fact that families have the right to reject the 
school’s proposition may motivate the teachers to consider even more the requests of families 
who are likely to reject. If these are – as suggested by the theory – families from higher social 
classes, this could be the cause for the small remaining social class effect. Alternatively, the 
remaining social class differences could be driven by teachers’ evaluation of students’ 
chances of success: Given the same actual performance and school track request, the staff 
meeting is more likely to propose LGT to higher service class students because the teachers 
think that students with such social background will be better supported and helped by their 
parents.  
This assumption that the staff meeting considers parents’ cultural capital and 
involvement corresponds to Hypothesis H9. To analyze this hypothesis, I run logistic 
regressions that additionally include variables that represent parents’ cultural capital and 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
(Y
=
1)
0 5 10 15 20
Mark
LPA
LGT
Family's request
EGP I
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
(Y
=
1)
0 5 10 15 20
Mark
EGP II
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
(Y
=
1)
0 5 10 15 20
Mark
EGP III, V
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
(Y
=
1)
0 5 10 15 20
Mark
EGP VI, VIIa
 
 242 
involvement in school. Hence, the included variables measure the indicators that teachers are 
supposed to consider when evaluating the likelihood that a family rejects (i.e. the parameter r) 
and a student’s chances of success (i.e. the parameter a). Since the data I use do not enable me 
to distinguish r from a, I cannot infer whether the social class effect is caused either by the 
staff’s evaluation of the student’s chances of success (a) or by its assessment of the 
probability that the family would reject its proposition (r). Nevertheless, this analysis 
identifies an important effect of parental involvement and cultural resources on staff 
meetings’ decisions. 
Model 1 in Table 24 reveals that parental education mediates the remaining effect of 
EGP I and provides some support for Hypothesis H9. When parental education is controlled, 
the coefficient’s significance vanishes and its size decreases to less than one third 
(AME=0.005; not significant). Parental education has a highly significant positive effect on 
the likelihood that the staff meeting proposes LGT instead of LPA. Holding constant social 
class, student’s performance, family’s request and the control variables, the probability that a 
student whose parents have an intermediate education (both parents have a CAP or BEP, or 
one parent has a bac) receives an LGT-proposition is 1.8 percentage points higher, on 
average, than the respective probability for students whose parents are lower educated (both 
parents have only a primary education degree or one parent has, at most, a CAP or BEP). The 
corresponding probability difference is 2.5 for students whose parents are higher educated 
(both parents have a bac, or at least one has a tertiary degree) as compared to parents with 
lower education. It seems that the staff meeting does not directly take into account a family’s 
social class but parents’ education or their abilities and cultural resources to meet the school’s 
standards. Furthermore, it appears that – given the same request and level of student 
performance – the staff meeting is significantly more likely to propose LGT to parents with 
intermediate or higher education than to parents with lower education. According to the 
theory, this remaining effect could indicate that teachers perceive higher educated parents to 
be better able to support their children and to be more likely to make the effort of rejecting. 
Alternatively, parental involvement is included in the regression (Model 2). More 
specifically, I take into account parents’ attendance at parents’ evenings, their initiation of 
meetings with teachers, teachers’ initiation of meetings and PA-membership. This analysis 
provides evidence against Hypothesis H9: The EGP I effect remains significant at the same 
level and is only marginally reduced. This clearly indicates that parental involvement does not 
mediate the small social class effects that remain after controlling for performance and 
family’s school track request. Yet, the different parental involvement types exert small direct 
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effects on staff meeting’s proposition and including them slightly increases the model fit 
(AIC=2629 Model 3, Table 23; AIC=2609 Model 2, Table 24). Both parents’ initiation of 
meetings and teachers’ initiation have negative effects but only the effect of teachers’ 
initiation is significant (p<0.05). Still, it is interesting to have a look at the coefficient of 
parents’ initiation of meetings: While controlling for performance makes the effect of parents’ 
initiation of meetings on family’s school track request become positive (see Table 20), the 
effect on the staff meeting’s proposition remains negative. This indicates that – other than the 
parents seem to expect – teachers do not “reward” parents’ initiation of meetings. Instead, this 
type of additional parent effort has a negative impact. The negative marginally significant 
effect of teachers’ initiation of meetings could be due to the fact that teachers think that 
parents who had to be invited and did not contact the teachers by themselves will not support 
their children. Therefore, the teachers prefer to propose the vocational track.  
PA-membership has a highly significant positive effect. This result could be driven by 
the attendance of members of PAs at the staff meeting (see Subchapter 2.3.2). This does not 
imperatively imply that the parents themselves are present at the staff meetings. It could also 
be that the parent representatives who often are PA-members act in the interests of the other 
PA-members. Another explanation could be that teachers think that parents who are PA-
member will better support their children or are more likely to reject the staff meeting’s 
proposition if it does not correspond to their request. Table A19 presents results of a separate 
analysis that investigates the effect of being parent representative.132  
Table A19 reveals that being parent representative in the staff meeting has a weaker 
impact on the staff meeting’s decision than PA-membership (Model 1 and 2). Moreover, PA-
membership more improves the model fit. When both types of involvement are taken into 
account, the effect of being parent representative becomes insignificant and is strongly 
reduced while the coefficient of PA-membership remains significant at the intermediate level 
(p<0.05) but hardly decreases. 52 per cent of the parents who are PA-member are also parent 
representative in staff meetings. This indicates that one part of the positive effect of PA-
membership can be explained through parents’ attendance at the staff meetings; another part 
of the PA-membership effect is either due to the fact that the parent representatives in the staff 
meeting represent the interests of PA-members or – more probably – because teachers take 
into account this kind of involvement. 
                                                 
132 Since the parent representative variable has many missing values and hence would considerably reduce the 
sample size I conduct a separate analysis. 
 244 
To examine whether the effects of parental involvement and education interact, I 
include variables that indicate the educational attainment of the parent who is involved 
(Model 3, Table 24). As the reference category is “tertiary education”, the coefficients’ 
negative signs indicate that an involved parent’s educational attainment has a positive effect. 
Controlling for parental education and parental involvement makes the effects become 
insignificant but they only marginally reduce their size and remain negative (Model 4). 
Therefore, we could infer that there is indeed a positive interaction of parental involvement 
and parental education, regardless of the type of involvement.133  
At the same time, the effects could be due to the fact that parent’s educational 
attainment is correlated with a specific type of involvement. In other words, higher educated 
parents are more likely to be PA-member, for example, and lower educated parents are more 
likely to be invited by the teachers. Since PA-membership exerts positive effects and initiation 
of meetings by the teachers has negative effects, the education of the involved parent has an 
effect.  
When all of the indicators of cultural capital and parental involvement are included at 
one time the model fit further increases (Model 4). The effects of higher parental education, 
the education of the parent who is involved and parents’ initiation of meetings become 
insignificant, those of teachers’ initiation of meetings and intermediate parental education 
remain significant and their size only slightly changes. Hence, one can conclude that parents 
should either both have a CAP or BEP or at least one of them should have a bac if they want 
to increase their chances of getting an LGT-proposition. Moreover, being invited to meetings 
causes an unfavorable treatment by the teachers. 
                                                 
133 An additional analysis that is not presented reveals however that an inclusion of interaction terms of parental 
involvement and education or of parental involvement and education of the specific parent who is involved 
decreases the model fit. This indicates that there is no interaction of parental education and involvement. 
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Table 24 Social class effects on staff meetings’ school track propositions (LGT vs. LPA) and mediating effects of parental education and involvement (results of 
binary logistic regressions) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)         
EGPI 0.005 (0.01) 0.019** (0.01) 0.007 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01) 
EGPII -0.004 (0.01) 0.010 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) -0.005 (0.01) 
EGPIII, V 0.004 (0.01) 0.009 (0.01) 0.006 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01) 
EGPIVc, VIIb 0.016 (0.01) 0.020 (0.01) 0.018 (0.01) 0.014 (0.01) 
EGPIVa, IVb 0.000 (0.01) 0.006 (0.01) 0.003 (0.01) -0.000 (0.01) 
French origin -0.002 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) 
Private school -0.029
***
 (0.01) -0.026
***
 (0.00) -0.029
***
 (0.01) -0.027
***
 (0.01) 
ZEP-school -0.002 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) 
City size  (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)         
< 5,000 inhabitants -0.008 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01) -0.007 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01) 
5,000-20,000 -0.004 (0.01) -0.005 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01) -0.005 (0.01) 
20,000-200,000 0.004 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) 
Mark 0.028
***
 (0.00) 0.028
***
 (0.00) 0.028
***
 (0.00) 0.027
***
 (0.00) 
Previous grade repetition -0.061
***
 (0.01) -0.058
***
 (0.01) -0.061
***
 (0.01) -0.057
***
 (0.01) 
Family’ request: LGT (1) vs. LPA (0) 0.661
***
 (0.02) 0.661
***
 (0.02) 0.662
***
 (0.02) 0.654
***
 (0.02) 
Parental education (Ref. lower)         
Intermediate 0.018
***
 (0.00)     0.013
*
 (0.01) 
Higher 0.025
***
 (0.01)     0.012 (0.01) 
Parents’ evenings   0.002 (0.01)   0.009 (0.01) 
Parents’ initiation of meetings   -0.007 (0.00)   -0.005 (0.00) 
Teachers’ initiation of meetings   -0.013
**
 (0.00)   -0.012
**
 (0.00) 
PA-membership   0.019
***
 (0.01)   0.016
**
 (0.01) 
Education of involved parent (Ref. Tertiary degree)         
Baccalauréat     -0.004 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01) 
Vocational qualification     -0.019
**
 (0.01) -0.013 (0.01) 
Elementary education     -0.027
***
 (0.01) -0.013 (0.01) 
Other or no person involved     -0.007 (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) 
N 10466  10466  10466  10466  
AIC 2613.3  2609.5  2617.4  2598.9  
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second 
degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations.  
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To test Hypothesis H10, I run separate logistic regressions that include interaction terms 
of marks with family’s request, parental education and parental involvement. Hypothesis H10 
is based on the assumption that staff meetings take even more into account family’s school 
track request, parent’s involvement and their education when a student’s chances of success 
are unclear and when the risk is high that a family rejects. None of the interactions, except that 
of marks and family’s school track request, increases the model fit. Therefore, only the 
interaction of marks and family’s request is further investigated with conditional effect plots 
that are based on the regression model including the interaction terms (Table A20). However, 
conditional effect plots obtained from the regression models not including interaction terms 
(i.e. the models presented in Table 24) reveal that, as expected, parents’ education and their 
involvement have no effects when students’ marks are very good but strongest effects when 
students’ marks are in the middle range.134 
 To examine the interaction of marks and family’s request, which appeared to be 
significant and increased the model fit, Figure 21 presents predicted probabilities obtained 
from a regression model containing the interaction term (Table A20). The predicted 
probabilities hold again for French students attending public schools that are located in larger 
cities and that are no ZEP-schools. Figure A5 plots the corresponding discrete change effects. 
The slope of the curve for students whose families demanded LGT is steeper than the curve 
for students who requested LPA. For instance, while the predicted likelihood that the staff 
meeting proposes LGT to an EGP II-student whose parents requested LPA is zero per cent 
when the student’s average mark is 5 and nearly 1 per cent when the student’s mark is 7, the 
respective likelihoods for a similar student whose parents however requested LGT are 10 per 
cent (mark=5) and almost 40 per cent (mark=7). When students have marks under the mean, 
their school performance has a very strong positive impact when a family requested LGT 
while performance has almost no effect at all when the family requested LPA. However, 
given students’ marks are above the mean, the staff meeting starts ignoring families’ demands 
and becomes increasingly likely to propose LGT. 
 
                                                 
134 Lowess smoother support this result. All additional analyses that are not presented are available on request. 
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Figure 21 Interaction effect of family’s request and mark on staff meeting’s proposition 
by social class, predicted probabilities 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 1 Table A20; probabilities 
are calculated for students of French origin, having not repeated, with parents with intermediate educational 
motivation, attending a public school that is not in the ZEP-program and located in a large city or Paris, having 
an average number of siblings and at least one working parent and having not repeated grades in secondary 
school; 95%-confidence intervals. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de 
l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
Hypothesis H10a posits that the staff meeting also takes more account of a family’s 
request when the parents are higher educated or involved. This assumption follows from 
similar ideas as Hypothesis H10: If the staff meeting is worried about keeping rejection rates 
low, as the theory suggests, it takes even more account of the requests of families who are 
likely to reject than of families who are not likely to reject. Regression analyses that take into 
account interactions of parental involvement and family’s school track request show no 
increase of the model fit. 135  However, regression models containing interaction terms for 
family’s request and parental education or educational attainment of the involved parent 
slightly increase the model fit (see Table A20 and Table 24). I further analyze these 
interactions with conditional effects plots (Figure 22 and Figure 23). 
                                                 
135 The results of these analyses are not presented. They are available on request from the author. 
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Figure 22 Interaction effect of parental education and family’s request on staff meeting’s 
proposition (LGT vs. LPA) at three mark-levels (predicted probabilities) 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 2 in Table A20; probabilities 
are calculated for students from EGP II, having not repeated, of French origin with parents with intermediate 
educational motivation, attending a public school that is located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP, 
having an average number of siblings and at least one working parent; 95%-confidence intervals. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
These conditional effect plots reveal that the effect of family’s request varies by parental 
education when a student has marks in the middle range (Figure 22). 136  To evaluate the 
interaction effect, one has to observe the distance between the curve for the LGT-request and 
that for the LPA-request.137 It appears that the staff meeting is more willing to accept the LGT-
requests of higher educated parents than those of lower educated parents when a student’s 
mark is 6 or 9, i.e. below average. This can be interpreted as support for Hypothesis 10a: the 
staff meeting proposes LGT to families if these seem likely to reject or because they seem 
better able to support their children. If a student has marks that are above the overall average 
(i.e. 11), the staff meeting is willing to accept the LGT-request of all families, regardless of 
parents’ educational attainment.  
                                                 
136 As actually very few families request LPA when students have good marks and very few families request 
LGT when students have very low marks, I focus on marks in the middle range. Moreover, lowess smoother 
indicate that predicted probabilities for marks in these ranges fit well the actual distribution in the data. 
137 Instead, I could have shown discrete change effects but as I want to illustrate the absolute size of the 
probabilities, too, I present predicted probabilities. 
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Figure 23 addresses the interaction between family’s request and educational attainment 
of the involved parent: The results are very similar to Figure 22. When a student’s mark is 6 
or 9, educational attainment of the involved parent increases the likelihood that the staff 
meeting accepts an LGT-request. Interestingly, when no parent or another person is involved, 
the staff meeting is also more willing to accept an LGT-request. The predicted probabilities 
further tell that when marks are relatively good (i.e. 12), education of the involved parent does 
not considerably increase the chance of LGT-propositions because practically all LGT-
requests are accepted. 
Figure 23 Interaction of education of the involved parent and family’s request on staff 
meeting’s proposition (LGT vs. LPA) at three mark-levels (predicted 
probabilities) 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 3 in Table A20; probabilities 
are calculated for students from EGP II, having not repeated, of French origin with parents with intermediate 
educational motivation, attending a public school located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP, having an 
average number of siblings and at least one working parent; 95%-confidence intervals. Source: Panel national 
1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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8.4.2 DECISIONS OF THE HEADMASTER AND THE RECALL MEETING 
Since the number of families who reject is small (see e.g. Subchapter 8.3.3), I present 
bivariate descriptive statistics to analyze whether families’ social class affects headmasters’ 
decisions. Among the families in the basic sample, 3 per cent have rejected the staff meeting’s 
proposition and attended the talk with the headmaster. 138  The headmasters formulate a 
virtually binding school track decision for these families. As the observation number is very 
small, only careful interpretations are made. Cramer’s V and Chi² tell a moderate significant 
relationship between family’s social class and headmaster’s decision (Table 25). Higher 
service class families are mostly imposed grade retention (57 per cent) while EGP II-families 
are more imposed the vocational track (38 per cent). For the families from the class of non-
manual workers and supervisors of manual workers (EGP III, V), the rate of retention 
decisions is the highest (47 per cent) and among the working class (EGP VI, VIIa) LPA-
decisions are the most frequent (58 per cent). Overall, grade retention appears to be 
headmasters’ favorite option. 
Moreover, it is interesting to know to which extent headmasters accept families’ 
requests and whether there are social class differences in these acceptance rates. Since by far 
most families in this sample have demanded LGT, the rates of LGT-decisions by the 
headmasters represent these acceptance rates. Families from EGP II are the most likely to 
have their LGT-request accepted (29 per cent), but – as mentioned above – their rate of LPA-
decisions is relatively high. All other classes have considerably lower rates of LGT-decisions, 
which are due – to a minimal extent – to lower rates of LGT-requests among these classes. In 
line with the theory, I infer that grade retention decisions are more prevalent among EGP I-
families as compared to EGP II-families because headmasters use these as “compromise” to 
prevent rejections. By contrast, grade retention decisions may be frequent among students 
from EGP-class III and V because teachers need another year to better assess students’ 
chances of succeeding in the general track. These results provide some weak support of 
Hypothesis H11. 
                                                 
138 The 3 per cent correspond to 392 students out of 12 594 (i.e. the basic sample). 
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Table 25 Family’s social class and headmaster’s decision by social class (frequencies; 
percentages in parentheses) 
EGP-class I II III, V IVc, VIIb IVa, IVb VI, VIIa Total 
 
Headmaster’s decision 
LGT 20 13 22 2 7 9 73 
 (21.51) (28.89) (17.74) (33.33) (14) (12.16) (18.62) 
LPA 20 17 44 2 20 43 146 
 (21.51) (37.78) (35.48) (33.33) (40) (58.11) (37.24) 
GR 53 15 58 2 23 22 173 
 (56.99) (33.33) (46.77) (33.33) (46) (29.73) (44.13) 
Total 93 45 124 6 50 74 392 
 (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
        
Cramer’s V 0.1942       
Chi² 29.555***       
Note: Due to rounding percentages not always sum up to 100. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
Families who reject a headmaster’s decision initiate a recall meeting. In this meeting 
external teachers, the orientation advisors and the headmaster discuss the student’s case (see 
Subchapter 2.3.1). Student and their parents can attend these meetings. Among the families in 
the basic sample, less than 2 per cent have rejected the headmaster’s decision. As 98 per cent 
of these families have requested the general track (not shown in Table 26), the rates of LGT-
decisions by the recall meeting indicate the rates of acceptance. Table 26 shows that recall 
meetings accept almost half of the demands of EGP I- and EGP II-families. As family’s social 
class decreases, the rates of LPA-decisions increase. Generally, grade retention seems a 
popular choice. This further supports the assumption that it is used as compromise. However, 
since the recall meeting has the final say, it is certainly not used to prevent rejections. Rather, 
the additional school year in lower secondary school will give the student the chance to 
improve. Again, these results present weak support of Hypothesis H11. 
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Table 26 Family’s social class and recall meeting’s decision (frequencies) 
EGP-class I II III, V IVc, VIIb IVa, IVb VI, VIIa Total 
 
Recall meeting’s decision 
LGT 29 11 26 1 11 7 85 
LPA 3 3 9 - 5 5 25 
GR 27 9 29 1 10 19 95 
Total 59 23 64 2 26 31 205 
        
Cramer’s V 10.2433       
Chi² 0.1581       
Note: Due to rounding percentages not always sum up to 100. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
8.5 Grade retention decisions 
As mentioned before, grade retention is not the most popular choice. In the end, 7 per 
cent of the students have to repeat grade 9 and will traverse the dialogue a second time. The 
percentage of repeating students slightly varies by social class: 7 per cent of EGP I-students, 6 
per cent of EGP II-students, 8 per cent of students from EGP III and V, 5 per cent of students 
from EGP IVc and VIIb, 4 per cent of students from EGP IVab, and 9 per cent of students 
belonging to EGP VI and VIIa (see Figure 4 in Subchapter 8.1). Table 27 further describes the 
group of students in terms of their social background and their families’ request. According to 
literature on the determinants of grade retention, one would expect high rates of lower-class 
students among those who have to repeat. However, among the 860 students in the basic 
sample for whom the final decision of the dialogue is grade retention, the rate of higher 
service class students is comparatively important (22 per cent). The rate of students from EGP 
III and V is the highest (36 per cent) and the respective rate of children of self-employed and 
the petty bourgeoisie is the lowest (2 per cent). This could be interpreted as first support of the 
assumption that higher-class families use GR as compromise or the school staff proposes it to 
higher-class families as compromise. 
To have a first look at the “reasons” for retention, Table 27 also presents absolute 
chances and frequencies of students who have requested grade retention and of students who 
have not made this request but still have to repeat in the end. Overall, as one can see from the 
column rightmost, the rate of families who requested GR and of families that grade retention 
was imposed on are almost of the same size. However, the distribution slightly differs 
between social classes: While almost 68 per cent of the families from EGP I did not request 
grade retention, around 43 per cent of families from the lower service class and from the class 
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of non-manual workers and supervisors of manual workers did not demand retention. Almost 
every second working-class student who has to repeat in the end requested grade repetition. 
Table 27 Social class and family’s grade retention request among students for whom the final 
outcome is GR, by social class (percentages in parentheses) 
EGP-class I II III, V IVc, VIIb IVa, IVb VI, VIIa Total 
Final outcome of 
dialogue is GR 
186 
(21.63) 
95 
(11.05) 
313 
(36.40) 
150 
(17.44) 
17 
(1.98) 
99 
(11.51) 
860 
(100) 
Among these:        
Family’s request was 
not GR  
126 
(67.74) 
41 
(43.16) 
133 
(42.49) 
63 
(42) 
6 
(35.29) 
49 
(49.49) 
418 
(48.60) 
Family’s request was 
GR 
60 
(32.26) 
54 
(56.84) 
180 
(57.51) 
87 
(58) 
11 
(64.71) 
50 
(50.51) 
442 
(51.40) 
        
Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own 
calculations. 
These preliminary descriptive results show that families from the higher service class 
are relatively well represented among families whose child has to repeat grade 9. 
Interestingly, most of them did not want their child to repeat and hence must have received a 
proposition that does not correspond to their demand. One reason for this result could be that 
they made too ambitious requests, i.e. they demanded the general track although their child 
was poorly performing, and the staff proposed grade retention as a compromise. By contrast, 
for all other classes, the number of families who requested grade retention exceeds the number 
of families who did not make this request. Therefore, it seems that the other classes are more 
likely to request grade retention and the staff meetings are less likely to propose GR to them if 
they did not request it. The following sections present the results of multivariate analyses that 
examine social class effects on families’ decisions to request grade retention instead of the 
vocational track and on staff meetings’ choice of grade retention over the vocational track. 
These analyses attempt to shed light on the mechanisms that generate social class effects on 
families’ and staff meetings’ retention decisions. 
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8.5.1 FAMILY’S GRADE RETENTION REQUEST 
Table 28 presents the results of logistic regressions of a binary variable that 
distinguishes between grade retention and the vocational track.139 Model 1 reveals that – on 
average and holding constant student’s French origin, school type and city size – the 
likelihood that an EGP I-family requests grade retention instead of LPA is 17 percentage 
points higher than the respective likelihood for a working class family (EGP VI, VIIa). The 
lower the social class, the smaller is the average probability difference. For instance, for EGP 
II the corresponding difference is only 11 percentage points and for EGP III and V it is 5 
percentage points. This result supports Hypothesis H12. Families from the class of agricultural 
workers and farmers (EGP IVc, VIIb) are not significantly more likely to request GR instead 
of LPA than families from the working class. 
Model 2 tests a part of Hypothesis H13: It takes into account family’s economic 
situation (i.e. number of siblings and parents’ employment status) and educational motivation. 
As expected, the model fit increases and the social class effects decrease. However, the social 
class effects remain highly significant. Hence, it appears that a family’s resources to account 
for the economic costs of retention and its need to have its child attend the general track (i.e. 
the educational motivation) mediate a part of the social class differences in families’ choice of 
grade retention over LPA. While presence of a non-working parent has no significant effect, 
number of siblings has a small negative effect that is marginally significant: On average and 
holding constant social class, educational motivation and the control variables, the likelihood 
that a family demands grade retention decreases with every additional child by 1 percentage 
point. High educational motivation has a highly significant positive effect: When a family 
thinks that a tertiary degree is necessary to find a job, the likelihood of requesting GR is 
almost 10 percentage points higher, on average, than when a family thinks that no degree or a 
vocational qualification is necessary to find a job. 
Model 3 tests the other part of Hypothesis H13 as it factors in students’ previous grade 
repetition in lower secondary school. The model fit considerably increases and the social class 
effects are slightly reduced. The AME of the repetition variable tells that, on average, the 
likelihood that a family requests grade retention is almost 11 percentage points lower when 
the child has previously repeated grades than when he or she has not made that experience 
before. Model 4 takes into account students’ marks and parents’ performance assessment. The 
                                                 
139 Table A21 lists means of the variables used in the analysis. The means are calculated separately for each 
social class in order to give an idea of the bridging hypotheses. 
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net effect of marks is supposed to represent families’ evaluation of the likelihood that the staff 
meetings will not accept an LGT-request. I additionally include parents’ performance 
assessment to capture the effect of marks on parents’ evaluation of their child’s chances of 
success. The effect of social class increases. This is due to the fact that marks are positively 
correlated with social class but negatively correlated with requesting grade retention. The 
highly significant negative effect of mark indicates that – as expected – families request GR 
when students’ performance is low and thus when the likelihood that the staff meeting rejects 
an LGT-request is high. 
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Table 28 Social class effects on family’s decision to choose grade retention over the 
vocational track (results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) 
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; 
*** p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own 
calculations. 
 
Applying the KHB-method to Model 4, I want to decompose the total social class 
differentials into direct effects and indirect effects. By this means, I am able to quatify the 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)    
EGPI 0.170***  0.127***  0.122***  0.127*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
EGPII 0.112*** 0.083***  0.080*** 0.079*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
EGPIII, V 0.053***  0.047***  0.050***  0.049*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EGPIVc, VIIb 0.023  0.025  0.023  0.026 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
EGPIVa, IVb 0.051***  0.048***  0.049***  0.048*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
French origin -0.008  -0.009  -0.009  -0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Private school -0.020  -0.022*  -0.018  -0.013 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ZEP-school -0.011  -0.009  -0.008  -0.009 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)    
< 5,000 inhabitants -0.001  0.002  -0.006  -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
5,000-20,000 0.013  0.017  0.019  0.021 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
20,000-200,000 0.021  0.022  0.012  0.013 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No parent working  -0.003  -0.003  -0.006 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of siblings  -0.009*  -0.010*  -0.010* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Educational motivation (Ref. Low)    
Intermediate  0.020  0.020  0.019 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
High  0.092***  0.089*** 0.089*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Previous grade repetition   -0.105***  -0.107*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Marks    -0.007*** 
    (0.00) 
Parents’ performance 
assessment 
   
-0.003 
    (0.01) 
N 3610 3610 3610 3610 
AIC 1728.6 1677.4 1487.0 1477.3 
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extent to which the social class effects are explainable by family’s economic situation, 
educational motivation and previous grade repetition, i.e. the parameters costs, educational 
motivation and likelihood of improvement during repetition. If the employed variables suffice 
to operationalize the parameters, this analysis shows to which extent the theoretical model can 
explain social class effects on families’ grade retention decisions. 
The results of the KHB-application reveal that only a little extent of the social class 
effects is due to the core decision-making parameters (Table A22). The effect of EGP I, for 
instance, is mediated by 22 per cent through subjective and “objective” performance 
measures, family’s economic resources and educational motivation. With regard to the EGP 
II-effect, still 23 per cent are driven by these factors. By contrast, they mediate around 3 per 
cent of the effects of EGP III and V or EGP IVa and IVb. Since extremely few families from 
EGP-class IVc and VIIb are in the sample, the effects are not significant. The results cannot 
support Hypothesis H13 since a large part of the social class effects remains unexplained. This 
is either because the theoretical model does not take account of all mechanisms at work or 
because the variables do not capture the full effects of the decision-making parameters. For 
instance, parents’ cultural capital and interaction terms could improve the model specification. 
Indeed, parental education mediates some part of the social class effect, but interaction terms 
do not improve the model fit.140 As the explanatory power of the model does not increase 
when interaction terms of social class or educational motivation and mark are included, I 
conclude that there is no evidence in favor of Hypothesis H13b either. 
8.5.2 STAFF MEETING’S GRADE RETENTION PROPOSITION 
In the present subchapter, I investigate the impact of students’ social class on staff 
meetings’ decision to propose grade retention instead of the vocational track. Table 29 
presents results of nested binary logistic regressions of staff meetings’ choice between GR 
and LPA. Moreover, Table A23 presents a simple bivariate analysis of social class and the 
variables used in the analysis: It lists means of the employed variables by social class. The 
first model in Table 29 includes only the control variables. The results provide evidence in 
favor of Hypothesis H14: student’s social class has a strong positive highly significant effect 
on the probability that the staff proposes grade retention instead of the vocational track.  
Model 2 to 4 test Hypothesis H15. The models reveal that taking into account previous 
grade repetition strongly increases the model fit but only marginally changes the social class 
                                                 
140 Results are not presented but available from the author. They were not included because they further reduce 
the sample size and must be interpreted with caution. 
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effects (Model 2). If a student has repeated grades in lower secondary school, the average 
probability that the staff meeting proposes grade retention again is 23 percentage points lower 
than the corresponding probability if a student has not repeated grades before. When family’s 
request is included, the model’s explanatory power augments dramatically and the effects of 
EGP I and II are reduced by three quarters (Model 3). On average and holding constant social 
class, the control variables and previous grade repetition, the likelihood that a family who has 
demanded GR receives a GR-proposition instead of an LPA-proposition is 80 percentage 
points higher than the likelihood that a family who demanded LPA is proposed GR. Also, if a 
family has requested LGT, the staff meeting is more likely to propose GR than LPA 
(AME=0.37, p<0.00). This indicates that staff meetings may use grade retention as a 
compromise. Moreover, since social class has a strong positive effect even when family’s 
request is controlled, it seems that the staff meeting proposes this compromise to families who 
appear likely to reject or to have cultural resources to support their child during repetition. 
Model 4 factors in parental education and involvement to further examine this assumption. 
The AIC-value decreases only marginally but the social class effects are considerably 
reduced. Notably, the EGP II-effect becomes insignificant. Parental education has a highly 
significant positive effect; among the parental involvement-variables only PA-membership 
has a positive effect that is significant at a low level (p<0.05). This result provides support for 
the assumption that the staff meeting takes into account parents’ cultural capital and 
involvement. Yet, a highly significant positive EGP I-effect remains and indicates that other 
mechanisms contribute to the social class effect. Finally, Model 5 takes into account students’ 
marks. The model fit does not increase, the effect of mark is not significant and the social 
class effect is not modified. Hence, students’ marks neither explain the little remaining EGP I-
effect nor do they have an independent effect on teachers’ retention decisions. 
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Table 29 Social class effects on staff meeting’s decision to choose grade retention over the 
vocational track (results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)      
EGPI 0.385*** 0.342*** 0.081*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EGPII 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.041** 0.010 0.011 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EGPIII, V 0.093*** 0.101*** 0.040*** 0.030** 0.031** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EGPIVc, VIIb 0.041 0.033 0.039 0.018 0.018 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
EGPIVa, IVb 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.018 0.006 0.005 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
French origin -0.027* -0.028* -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Private school 0.018 0.024 0.007 0.006 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ZEP-school -0.061*** -0.052** -0.027* -0.025* -0.025* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)     
< 5,000 inhabitants -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.024* -0.022* -0.021 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
5,000-20,000 -0.055*** -0.050** -0.012 -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
20,000-200,000 -0.016 -0.029* -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Previous grade repetition  -0.231*** -0.128*** -0.125*** -0.125*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Family’s request (Ref. LPA)      
LGT   0.373*** 0.364*** 0.366*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
GR   0.796*** 0.785*** 0.780*** 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Parental education (Ref. lower)      
Intermediate    0.030*** 0.030*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
Higher    0.054*** 0.054*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
Parents’ evenings    -0.016 -0.016 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
Parents’ initiation of meetings    -0.007 -0.008 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
Teachers’ initiation of meetings    -0.005 -0.006 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
PA-membership    0.024* 0.024* 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
Mark     -0.003 
     (0.00) 
N 4465 4465 4465 4465 4465 
AIC 3625.2 3082.1 1458.4 1435.0 1435.3 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track, GR=grade retention; AME=average marginal effect; 
SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Source: Panel national 
1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
To further test Hypothesis H15, I apply the KHB-method to Model 5. Table A24 in the 
appendix reveals that a very large extent of the effects of EGP I, II and EGP IVab is mediated 
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by previous grade repetition, family’s school track request, parental involvement and 
education: 89 per cent of the effects of EGP II and 82 per cent of the effect of EGP I is due to 
social class differences in previous grade repetition, family’s request, parents’ cultural capital 
and involvement. As to the effects of the class of non-manual workers and supervisors of 
manual workers (EGP III and V), the mechanisms explain 46 per cent. These results provide 
evidence if favor of Hypothesis H15. 
8.5.3 REJECTIONS OF RETENTION DECISIONS AND HEADMASTER’S RETENTION DECISION 
As families have the right to reject the staff meeting’s proposition, it is interesting to 
investigate what happens after the school proposed grade retention to families that did not ask 
their children to be retained. Table 30 presents a bivariate analysis of social class and 
families’ rejection decisions for families who were proposed GR but did not request GR 
(N=534). Over all social classes, only about one third of the families decide to reject the staff 
meeting’s GR-proposition; most families accept it. Hence, regardless of social class, most of 
the final retention decisions – for students who did not request grade repetition – are due to 
propositions by the staff meetings that were accepted by the families. 
Table 30 Frequencies and percentages of family rejections of GR-propositions by social class 
(percentage are in parentheses) 
EGP-class I II III, V IVc, VIIb IVa, IVb VI, VIIa Total 
Staff meeting 
proposed GR but 
family did not request 
GR 
170 
 (31.84) 
51 
(9.55) 
173 
(32.40) 
72 
(13.48) 
9 
(1.69) 
59 
(11.05) 
534 
(100) 
Among these:        
Family rejected and 
attended talk with 
headmaster  
62 
(36.47) 
15 
(29.41) 
63 
(36.42) 
23 
(31.94) 
3 
(33.33) 
19 
(32.20) 
185 
(100) 
Family did not reject 
108 
(63.53) 
36 
(70.59) 
110 
(63.58) 
49 
(68.06) 
6 
(66.67) 
40 
(67.80) 
349 
(100) 
        
Note: GR=grade retention. Due to rounding means not always sum up to 1. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves 
du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
Subchapter 8.4.2 addressed headmasters’ decisions and decisions of the recall meetings. 
The bivariate analysis presented in these sections revealed that headmasters are most likely to 
propose grade retention to families from EGP I: for 57 per cent of the higher service class 
families the headmasters choose grade retention while they do so only for 33 per cent of lower 
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service class families, for 47 per cent of EGP III and V-families and 30 per cent of working 
class families (Table 25). Even though the frequencies are generally very low, it appears that 
there is some association between social class and headmasters’ retention decisions. Possibly, 
as mentioned above, headmasters propose grade retention to families who are likely to reject. 
8.5.4 GRADE RETENTION NEXT TO LGT AND LPA 
To complete the picture, this last results section presents predicted probabilities for all 
three options (i.e. LGT, LPA, GR). The computed probabilities are based on multinomial 
regression models (Table A25). Figure 24 addresses families’ requests while Figure 25 
illustrates staff meetings’ propositions. 
Figure 24 reveals that families’ generally opt for grade retention and the vocational 
track only when students have relatively low marks. Service class families prefer to request 
grade retention than LPA when their children have very low marks while families from all 
other class rather choose LPA. Moreover, with a family’s social class, increases the predicted 
probability that it chooses grade retention instead of the vocational track. For instance, when a 
student’s mark is 5, the predicted probability that an EGP I-family requests grade retention is 
around 35 per cent and the respective likelihood that a working class family demands 
retention is around 10 per cent. This result provides evidence in favor of Hypothesis H13a. It 
seems to indicate that families who need their child to attend the general track (i.e. higher 
class families) and who see that the risk is high that the child will not be proposed the general 
track (because the child has low marks) demand grade retention as a compromise.  
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Figure 24 Cumulative predicted probabilities of families’ request (LGT, LPA, GR) by 
mark and social class 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track, GR=grade retention; estimates obtained from Model 1 in 
Table A25; probabilities are calculated for students of French origin, who have not repeated grades, attending a 
public school that is not in the ZEP-program but located in a large city or Paris. Source: Panel national 1995 
d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
The predicted probabilities plotted in Figure 25 hold for families who requested LGT 
and students who did not repeat before. The likelihood that a staff meeting proposes grade 
retention is considerably higher when a family’s social class is high. Generally, the predicted 
probabilities that the staff meeting proposes GR are higher than the predicted probabilities 
that a family demands it. The results show again that the staff meeting uses grade retention as 
a compromise and that it proposes it notably to families from higher social classes. According 
to the theory, two mechanisms could explain the strong social class effect: Either, teachers 
and headmaster tend to think that these families are more likely to reject and therefore the 
staff meeting uses grade retention as a means to prevent them form rejecting; or, the staff 
meeting considers higher class parents to be better able to support their children during 
repetition and to help them improve enough to be admitted to the general track one year later. 
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Figure 25 Cumulative predicted probabilities of staff meeting’s proposition (LGT, LPA, 
GR) by mark and social class 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track, GR=grade retention; estimates obtained from Model 2 in Table 
A25; probabilities are calculated for students of French origin with parents, attending a public school that is not 
in the ZEP-program, that is located in a large city or Paris. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second 
degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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9 Summary and conclusions 
This thesis has addressed how families and school staff make school track choices 
within an institutionalized dialogue between family and school. The interesting features of this 
dialogue are: (i) families make official school track requests prior to a virtually binding 
school track proposition by the staff meeting, (ii) families can reject these propositions which 
implies a meeting with the headmaster, (iii) based on this meeting the headmaster makes 
another proposition, which can be rejected again, (iv) a second rejection leads to a recall 
meeting in which external teachers and other professionals make a binding decision, (v) 
families and the school staff can opt for grade repetition. 
To theoretically address the mechanisms that generate social class differences in 
families’ and school staffs’ decisions along the institutionalized dialogue, I have integrated 
arguments of the “cultural approach” to social inequality in educational attainment into 
seminal “rational action approaches” to educational decision-making. More specifically, I 
have adopted a theoretical suggestion by Lareau and Weininger (2003, see also Lareau 1987, 
Lareau 1989, Bourdieu and Passeron 1964) on cultural capital in family-school interactions to 
explain how social class effects on families’ and school staff’ decisions emerge within the 
specific institutional circumstances of the dialogue. The fundament of the theoretical model 
on families’ decision-making was the SEU-approach by Esser (1999b; see also Breen and 
Goldthorpe 1997; Erikson and Jonsson 1996). Moreover, I applied SEU-theory to explain how 
student social class affects staff meetings’ school track propositions, headmasters’ and recall 
meetings’ decisions. 
I used national longitudinal data on French secondary students – the panel d’élèves du 
second degré or “panel 1995” – to provide an empirical test of the theoretical models on 
families’ and school staffs’ decision-making within the institutionalized dialogue. As the data 
contain detailed information on every step of the dialogue, student’s school performance right 
before the dialogue, family characteristics such as parents’ occupations and educational 
attainment, parents’ involvement in school, parents’ assessment of their child’s performance 
and of the utility of different educational attainments, I was able to test detailed hypotheses.  
In sum, developing the theoretical model and testing detailed hypotheses derived from it 
produced findings that contribute to four research topics. First, with regard to families’ 
decision-making, the findings of this dissertation are in line with previous tests of the 
theoretical models of Esser (1999b), Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) and Erikson and Jonsson 
(1996). I find that social class differences in families’ school track choices are strongly 
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mediated by families’ evaluation of students’ chances of success and their desire to maintain 
the family’s social status while the costs of education seem to play a minor role (Need and De 
Jong 2002; Stocké 2007). Moreover, like previous direct tests of the models, i.e. tests using 
direct measurements of the subjective decision-making parameters, this dissertation finds that 
these theoretical models cannot fully account for the social class differences in families’ 
school track requests and therefore other mechanisms than those proposed by the models may 
be at work (see Becker 2000; Gabay-Egozi, Shavit and Yaish 2010; Stocké 2007).  
As mentioned above, this thesis advanced the argument that social class differences in 
parents’ cultural capital and in their involvement in school operate as an additional 
mechanism: Higher class parents have “cultural resources” – e.g. knowledge of the 
educational system, linguistic abilities and experience in dealing with school staff – that make 
them more confident in the school context and therefore more likely to be involved in school; 
when families make their school track requests, they take into account their involvement and 
cultural capital in order to evaluate the chance that the staff meeting accepts their school track 
request. Moreover, they consider these factors to assess their chances to persuade the 
headmaster or the recall meeting in case they have to reject. Following the assumption of 
Lareau and Weiniger (2004), I assume that parents with the “school relevant” cultural capital 
and parents who are involved think that the staff meeting or the headmaster and recall meeting 
will accept their demands because they “meet the school’s standards”, i.e. they are interested 
in their children’s education, have the capacities to support them and are willing to do so. 
Indeed, I find that parents’ cultural capital measured as parents’ educational attainment 
and parents’ involvement explain an additional part of the social class effects on families’ 
school track requests. Moreover, the refined theoretical model is further supported as families 
take more into account parents’ cultural capital and involvement when the risk is high that the 
staff meeting does not accept an LGT-request (i.e. when student’s marks are low) and even 
when the likelihood that the staff meeting accepts is high, parents are more concerned with 
status decline when they think that the student has low chances of success. Hence, it seems in 
sum that social class differences in parents’ capacities to meet the school’s standards are 
indeed a mechanism that adds to those proposed by Esser’s (1999b) model, Breen and 
Goldthorpe’s (1997) model or the model by Erikson and Jonsson’s (1996).  
However, the extended model seems still not able to fully explain the social class effects 
on families’ school track requests. There remains an important unexplained part indicating 
either that the employed variables are not sufficient to operationalize the decision-making 
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parameters or that even more mechanisms are at work. For instance, social class differences in 
benefits such as a direct pleasure of attending the general track (e.g. Erikson and Jonsson 
1996; Holm and Jaeger 2008) or social returns (e.g. Jaeger 2007) could add to expected 
mechanisms. Due to the indirect measurement of certain parameters, notably of parents’ 
strategic use of their cultural capital and involvement, I also cannot rule out that competing 
mechanisms, i.e. mechanism that are in contradiction to the rational action approach, are at 
work. The effect of parents’ education, for instance, could reflect class-specific norms and 
values and not parents’ subjective evaluation of their capacities to persuade the school staff. 
Certainly, the effect of parents’ involvement also reflects the fact that parents who plan to 
demand the general track early get involved in order to improve their chances of being 
proposed the general track. Even though I cannot identify the causal relation and cannot surely 
conclude that families’ directly consider their cultural capital and involvement to evaluate the 
likelihood that in the end they have their will, the results unambiguously show that 
involvement is related to families’ school track requests and that this association is 
interrelated with social class differences in these requests.  
Another important finding of this dissertation is that families from higher social classes 
are more likely to reject staff meetings’ school track propositions than families from lower 
social classes and that a small but considerable part of secondary effects on final outcomes of 
the dialogue is due to families’ rejections. As assumed by the theoretical model, parents’ 
evaluation of the costs and likelihood of social decline (i.e. their educational motivation) and 
parents’ cultural capital seem to explain the social class effects on families’ rejection 
decisions. To my knowledge, no quantitative empirical study has investigated social class 
effects on families’ objecting against recommendations by the school up to now. 
Second, in respect of school staffs’ decision-making, this thesis detects considerable 
effects of student social origin on staff meetings’ propositions even when student performance 
is controlled. This result is in line with previous studies on teachers’ school track decisions. 
Moreover, like studies that compare transition rates in German federal states with binding and 
non-binding teacher recommendations (e.g. Dollmann 2011; Neugebauer 2010), I find that 
secondary effects are smaller on staff meetings’ decisions than on families’ requests. While 
previous research examines effects of parents’ aspirations on teacher school track 
recommendations (e.g. Ditton and Krüsken 2006; 2009; Dollmann 2011; Schneider 2011), 
analyzing the institutionalized dialogue enabled an examination of the impact of “formalized 
aspirations”, namely families’ school track requests, on teacher decisions. This dissertation’s 
findings line up with those of previous analyses of the dialogue: families’ school track 
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requests have extremely strong effects on staff meetings’ propositions and mediate a great 
extent of the secondary effects (e.g. Roux and Davaillon 2001). However, I moreover detect a 
small but significant social class effect on staff meetings’ propositions that remains even 
when student’s performance and family’s request is controlled. This deviating result could be 
due to the fact that I use other data or, more likely, to a different operationalization of student 
social origin.141 While previous findings indicate that the staff meeting does not correct too 
ambitious school track requests of higher class families, this dissertation’s result even 
indicates that staff meetings slightly reinforce secondary effects on the final outcome. 
To explain how secondary effects on teacher decisions emerge within the dialogue’s 
institutional setting, I followed the argument on higher class families making use of their 
cultural capital to get preferable treatment by teachers (Lareau and Weininger 2003): I 
proposed that staff meetings and headmasters take into account parents’ cultural capital and 
their involvement in school in order to assess the likelihood that a family rejects their school 
track propositions. Since governmental authorities require schools to keep rejection rates low, 
teachers and notably headmasters are supposed to be very concerned with trying to satisfy 
wishes of families who seem likely to reject (see e.g. Duru-Bellat, Jarousse and Mingat 1993; 
Duru-Bellat 2002; Masson 1994; 1997; Van Zanten 2002). Another reason why teachers may 
take into account parents’ cultural capital and involvement is to assess parents’ capacities and 
willingness to support and help their children with school issues (see Duru-Bellat 1996; Duru-
Bellat 2002: 80). This argument is in keeping with previous research on determinants of 
teachers’ school track recommendations and grading-behavior: A group of quantitative and 
qualitative studies shows that teachers consider parents’ support of their children and that this 
partly explains social class effects on their decisions (e.g. Hollstein 2008; Schneider 2011; 
Stahl 2007). 
The empirical analyses in this dissertation show indeed that parents’ cultural capital 
measured by means of parents’ educational attainment has a positive effect on staff meetings’ 
school track propositions. Moreover, parents’ cultural capital seems to explain the small social 
class effect that remains after controlling for student’s performance and family’s request. 
Among the parental involvement types, only PA-membership has a significant positive effect 
on staff meetings’ propositions. Partly, this effect seems mediated by the fact that members in 
parent associations hold offices as parent representatives and therefore attend staff meetings. 
However, this involvement does not explain any social class effect. Finally, educational 
                                                 
141 While Roux and Davaillon (2001) use an occupation classification that is common in France, I employ the 
EGP-schema (see Subchapter 7.2.2). 
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attainment of the parent who is involved in school slightly increases the likelihood that the 
staff meeting proposes the general track and mediates the small remaining social class effect.  
Hence, it appears that social class differences in parents’ cultural capital but not those in 
their involvement contribute to the generation of secondary effects on staff meetings’ 
decisions. Since the measurement of parents’ cultural capital is rather broad and there is no 
direct measure of teachers’ perception of parents’ abilities to support their children or the 
likelihood that they reject, I cannot rule out that other mechanisms than those proposed in the 
theoretical model explain the little net social class and parental education effects. According 
to other theories and previous research, it could be that teachers take into account student 
abilities, effort and habits that are related to parents’ education and class position (see Bowles 
and Gintis 1976) or they have a “taste for discrimination” (Becker 1971). 
Third, this dissertation’s analysis of the French institutionalized dialogue between 
family and school also contributes to research on grade retention decisions. While most of 
this literature deals with consequences of retention for students and schools or with 
determinants of retention (e.g. student social origin, gender, school performance), few studies 
address how relevant actors – i.e. families, teachers and headmasters – make grade retention 
decisions and which mechanisms generate social class differences in these decisions. The 
results of this thesis line up with previous findings and complement them: Like studies for 
Denmark, the Netherlands or other analyses of the French dialogue, I show that families from 
higher social classes are more likely to request grade retention instead of a lower vocational 
track. As against previous research, I empirically test the argument that families’ educational 
motivation or their fear of status decline drives the social class effects and I find, in fact, that 
this mechanism contributes to the social class effects.142 Moreover, I suggest that previous 
grade retention is a main mechanism as it indicates that repeating a school year did not 
improve a student’s performance and has a negative effect on marks. 
In respect to staff meetings’ and headmasters’ grade retention decisions, literature on the 
French dialogue argues that the school uses this option as a compromise: Teachers’ and 
headmasters’ propose it to families from higher social classes in order to prevent them from 
rejecting (Duru-Bellat 2002; Roux and Davaillon 2001). Accordingly, previous analyses of 
the dialogue find that staff meetings are more likely to propose grade retention to students of 
higher social origin who are poorly performing than to students of less favorable social 
                                                 
142 The study by Jacob and Tieben 2009, mentioned in Subchapter 6.3, appears as an exception since it 
analyzes the effect of a status maintenance measure. However, this study does not focus on grade retention 
decisions. 
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background (Roux and Davaillon 2001). This dissertation’s results correspond. Beyond the 
current state of research, I show that grade retention in lower secondary school, parents’ 
cultural capital and PA-membership mediate social class differences in staff meetings’ grade 
retention propositions. Still, even after additionally controlling for family’s request and 
student’s marks, staff meetings are more likely to propose retention to higher service class 
students. These results provide evidence for the assumption that teachers use retention as a 
compromise to prevent rejections. However, the remaining social class effect and the direct 
effect of parental cultural capital could also be due to teachers’ tastes for discrimination, their 
use of student social class as indicator for students’ chances to succeed in the general track or 
unobserved student habits, behaviors and abilities.  
Fourth, this dissertation draws considerable attention to family-school interactions in 
terms of parents’ involvement in school. In line with quantitative and qualitative studies, my 
analyses reveal that parents of higher social origin are generally more likely to be involved 
(e.g. Lareau and Horvat 1999; Lee and Bowen 2006; Reay 1999; 2005). However, the size of 
the social class effects varies depending on which type of involvement is considered. For 
instance, social class effects on attendance at parents’ evenings and initiation of meetings with 
teachers are comparatively small while those on PA-membership and being parent 
representative are more important. Moreover, in keeping with previous research, these social 
class differences seem considerably mediated by parents’ cultural capital – if educational 
attainment is a valid proxy for parents’ educational knowledge, abilities and confidence in 
dealing with school staff. Yet, cultural capital cannot explain all of the social class effects; 
parents’ educational aspirations and status maintenance desires appear to play an important 
part, too. The results further indicate that parents become involved for different reasons: 
While parents who think that parents and teachers should work closely and parents who have 
high aspirations and well performing students attend parents’ evenings or are members in 
PAs, parents with high educational motivation become involved when their children are 
poorly performing.  
What are the general implications of this dissertation’s findings? They contribute to the 
discussion on whether to leave more decision-making power to families or to teachers. On the 
one hand, recent findings notably for Germany indicate that teachers make more meritocratic 
decisions than parents and hence researchers claim that more decision-making power should 
be transferred to schools (e.g. Becker 2000, Dollmann 2011, Neugebauer 2010). On the other 
hand, it is argued that families will find ways to influence the teachers and that teachers’ 
school track decisions are not meritocratic either (e.g. Dollmann 2011, Jackson et al. 2007). 
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The démocratization reforms of the French educational system which implemented the 
institutionalized dialogue and gave students and their parents a voice have followed the idea 
that families should be involved in the decision-making process so that lower class parents 
can send their children to higher school tracks even when teachers would send them to lower 
school tracks (Lapostolle 2005; Prost 1997; also Schimpl-Neimanns 2000 and Geißler 2005 
on Germany). However, as this thesis shows, it is not mainly the teachers, who produce social 
inequality in educational choices, they rather reproduce it as they follow legal requirements. 
That is to say, when not only law tells teachers to take into account students’ educational 
plans but also governmental authorities require schools to keep rejection rates low and 
rejection rates are published to indicate “school’s quality”, teachers have not much scope to 
reduce secondary effects on the actual transitions. Hence, it can generally be inferred that 
teachers should be given considerable autonomy of decision and that requirements “from 
above” as well as publications of “school’s quality”-indicators such as rejection rates could 
contribute to social inequality in educational opportunity (see e.g. Duru-Bellat 1996; Karsten, 
Visscher and De Jong 2001). 
Following up on this reasoning, it also appears that giving families the right to reject 
schools’ propositions could contribute to social inequality in educational transitions. On the 
hand, this could be because families from higher social classes are more likely to reject and, 
by this means, manage to gain access to the general track. Moreover, their school track 
requests may already be more ambitious because they are willing to reject. On the other hand, 
the governmental requirements of keeping rejection rates low strengthen social class effects 
on staff meetings’ and headmasters’ decisions. Therefore, family’s right to reject appears to be 
an institutional feature that rather increases social inequality in educational opportunity than 
reduces it. 
As this dissertation reveals that families from higher social classes are more likely to 
request grade retention and are more likely to be proposed grade retention by the school, it can 
be inferred that giving families and school staff the option to choose grade retention could 
reinforce social inequality in student transitions to general upper secondary education. In fact, 
this is only the case if, after the repeated grade, students gain access to the general track. 
Indeed, preliminary descriptive analyses (not presented in this thesis) of the sample of 
students who have to repeat grade 9 reveal that 80 per cent of those who initially demanded 
the general track gain access to the general track after repetition. Among the students who 
initially demanded grade retention, more than 50 per cent attend the general track after 
repetition. Additionally taking into account student social class shows that around 80 per cent 
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of the EGP I-students who demanded grade retention gain access to the general track after 
repetition. Among the other classes, the rate of students who requested grade retention and 
manages to attend the general track after repetition is considerably smaller. Given these 
preliminary results and the general finding of previous research that retention has negative 
effects on students’ long-term achievement, self-perception and later labor market outcomes 
and that high rates of retained students imply increased costs for schools (see Subchapter 5.3), 
it has to be questioned whether grade retention actually meets its “purpose”. Moreover, other 
than suggested in the literature (see e.g. Klosterman and De Graaf 2010), letting teachers 
decide seems no solution as long as families make official requests and schools have to 
restrict rejection rates. 
Finally, what role does parental involvement play in the generation of social inequality 
in transitions to next educational levels? As argued in previous research, it appears that higher 
class parents of poorly performing students initiate meetings with teachers while lower class 
parents have to be invited by the teachers. Hence, French secondary schools seem to not 
promote family-school interactions in ways that reduce social inequality in parents’ 
involvement in school. As teachers’ initiation of meetings has a significant negative effect on 
the chance that staff meetings propose the general track even when student performance is 
controlled, it seems important to find ways to make lower class parents of students seek 
contact with the school by themselves. Following literature on parental involvement, an 
inviting school climate, e.g. through friendly school staff, could be a solution (Griffith 1998; 
Hoover-Dempsey et al. 2005).  
Other notable involvement types are membership in parent associations and being 
parent representatives: It seems that, in view of the staff meeting’s proposition, higher class 
parents and hence parents with higher aspirations become engaged in these ways. However, 
these involvement types only marginally contribute to social class effects on staff meetings’ 
decisions. Still, they have positive effects on the likelihood that staff meetings propose the 
general track even when student performance, social class, parental involvement and family’s 
request is controlled. Therefore, formal promotion of parental involvement through giving 
power to PAs and letting parent representatives attend staff meetings seem not contribute to 
social inequality in staff meetings’ decisions. While this thesis has analyzed whether parental 
involvement “mediates” social class effects on families’ and school staffs’ educational 
choices, further research should investigate whether parental involvement “moderates” these 
effects and hence whether involvement can reduce or would reinforce social inequality in 
educational decisions. 
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A clear limitation of this dissertation’s empirical analysis is that only very few of the 
decision-making parameters can be operationalized directly and the employed “direct” 
measures have weaknesses, too. In particular, I cannot directly test the model on teachers’ 
decision-making. Therefore, it is not possible to identify whether the effects of parental 
involvement and education are driven by staff meetings’ evaluation of the likelihood that the 
family rejects or of student’s chances of success. Moreover, I cannot rule out that competing 
theoretical arguments such as tastes for discrimination or class-specific norms and values 
explain these effects. With regard to families’ decision-making, the data does not enable me to 
measure families’ subjective evaluation of the costs of education and of grade retention or the 
full scope of the likelihood and costs of status decline.  
Nevertheless, a general advantage of the indirect testing strategy is that it captures the 
association between the macro- and the micro-level of the explanation of sociological 
phenomena since it has to test hypotheses that link individuals’ social situations with their 
actual decisions (Brüderl 2004). By contrast, the direct strategy sticks with the micro-micro-
link. It is argued that sociologists should pay more attention to actors’ social situations than to 
“psychological processes” such as the formation of subjective perceptions like in the direct 
testing strategy and therefore the focus of the indirect strategy corresponds more to that of 
sociology in general (Goldthorpe 1998; Kroneberg und Kalter 2012). Moreover, I suggest that 
a direct test of teachers’ decision-making with survey data could generally be problematic 
since social desirability could distort teachers’ answers (see Stahl 2007 and Nölle et al. 2009). 
This appears particularly likely in France where extensive public and political discussions on 
social inequality in educational opportunity, accompanied by the research of Bourdieu and his 
colleagues, led to important reforms and raise the school staff’s awareness for the topic. 
Hence, indirect tests with secondary data appear to be a reasonable approach, but still the 
disadvantage of indirect tests remains that no empirical evaluation of competing theories can 
be made (Goldthorpe 1998: 169). 
This is where future research has to tie in with: It has to theoretically specify and 
identify empirically competing and complementing mechanisms. One factor that seems 
particularly important within the French dialogue is the availability of places in surrounding 
upper secondary schools, for instance. As indicated by previous research, school context 
effects could cause variations in secondary effects on families’ requests and staff meetings 
propositions over schools and even contribute to the secondary effects on the individual level 
(see e.g. Duru-Bellat, Jarousse and Mingat 1993; Duru-Bellat and Mingat 1989). To test such 
a mechanism and other (related) school effects (e.g. effects of school’s social composition) 
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data is necessary that nests larger numbers of students per school and provides detailed 
information on available places in surrounding schools. 
With this “school-level perspective” comes another mechanism that this dissertation 
neglects but that may contribute to the generation of social class differentials within the 
dialogue: social class differences in social capital, i.e. social networks that provide school 
relevant resources (e.g. informal knowledge of the educational system), and the influence of 
significant others (see e.g. Coleman 1988; Morgan 1998). For instance, there may be a higher 
social cohesion among parents of students enrolled in schools with higher average social 
status (e.g. private schools) and therefore these parents may be more encouraged to object the 
school staff, make “risky” school track requests and reject staff meetings’ and headmasters’ 
propositions. Moreover, social class effects on the evaluation of “social benefits” such as 
staying in contact with peers or satisfying the expectations of members of the same social 
class could play a part. 
Moreover, an application of game theory to families’ and schools’ decision-making 
within the dialogue appears to be a fruitful refinement of this thesis since SEU-theory has 
limitations regarding the explanation of the interdependence of the decisions of actors 
(Brüderl 2004: 166-167; Diekmann and Voss 2004: 18). When the consequences of the 
actions of an individual depend on the strategies of other individuals, the probabilities that 
they assign to the consequences are not exogenous anymore. Instead, they are endogenously 
depending on the “situation of strategic interdependence”. Then, since each actor takes into 
account the behavior of the other when forming his subjective expectations, an infinite 
regression of interdependent expectations is caused. This regression process has to be stopped 
at one time. Typically game theory enables the researcher to detect the strategies that both 
actors – here the families and the school staff – follow and at which point their “bargaining” 
reaches an equilibrium (e.g. the so-called “Nash-equilibrium”) and stops.  
Finally, this dissertation is a case study that provides detailed theoretical arguments and 
empirical tests on how social class differences in families’ and school staffs’ decisions emerge 
under the specific institutional circumstances of the French dialogue between family and 
school. Its findings should incite other case studies investigating social class effects on 
educational choices to put more emphasis on the specific institutional setting of these choices. 
Corresponding additional mechanisms should be specified and empirically tested (see also 
Becker 2000). 
 274 
As this thesis concentrates on one time point and one country, it does not observe a 
counterfactual situation, i.e. an institutional context that differs in the relevant aspects (e.g. 
family’s right to reject). Hence, this thesis does not show whether the fact that families make 
their requests prior to the staff meeting’s proposition increases social class effects as 
compared to when families do not make their decision in such a setting. For the same reason, 
it does not reveal whether parents would be less involved in a context that does not promote 
parental involvement in the ways in which the French educational system does so, or whether 
social class effects on families’ requests would be smaller if they did not have the right to 
reject. Therefore, future research should conduct cross-country comparisons or analyze social 
class effects before and after reforms that alter regulations of transitions to next educational 
levels in order to evaluate whether institutional circumstances such as rejection rights or the 
order of family-school decisions reinforce or reduce social inequality in education. The 
theoretical model developed and tested in this dissertation provides a theoretical foundation 
for such analyses. 
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Table A1 Theoretically expected decisions of the staff meeting by likelihood of success (a) and 
likelihood of rejection (r) 
Likelihood of 
success (a) 
Likelihood of 
rejection (r) 
Result Decision 
  SEU(LGT) SEU(notLGT)  
1 0 G > -D LGT 
1 1 G > -D LGT 
0 0 -D < G notLGT 
0 1 -D = -D LGT, notLGT 
Note: SEU=Subjective Expected Utility, LGT=general track, -D=staff meeting’s costs of rejection and of 
inappropriate decision, G=staff meeting’s benefits of appropriate decision. 
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Table A2 Assignment of PCS-codes to EGP-classes 
EGP-class 
Assignment of PCS-code according 
to Brauns, Haun and Steinmann 
(1997) 
Assignment of two-digit codes that 
are provided by the “panel 1995”-
survey 
I 31, 33, 34, 37, 38 31, 32, 33, 34,35**, 37, 38 
II 43 42**, 43, 44†, 45† 
IIIa 54 52**, 53†, 54 
IIIb 55 55, 56** 
IVab 21, 22, 23 21, 22, 23** 
IVc 11, 12, 13  10 
V 48 46**, 47**, 48  
VI 62, 63, 64, 65 61 
VIIa 67, 68 66 
VIIb 69 69 
No EGP class*  - 81, 85, 86, 99 
Note: PCS=Professions et Catégories socio-professionnelles. *This group contains parents who never worked, 
generally have no occupation, whose occupation cannot be assigned a PCS-code to, who are not known or died. 
**According to Brauns, Haun and Steinmann (1997: 43-44) the assignment of these codes is difficult and more 
information is needed. For instance, occupations with code 23 (entrepreneurs with more than 10 employees) are 
assigned to EGP I when the entrepreneur has at least 50 employees and to EGP IVa when she has less than 50 
employees. As the “panel 1995” only tells whether there are more or less than 10 employees, I assign 
occupations with code 23 – and all other codes with ** – at own discretion. † No direct assignment information 
is provided by Brauns, Haun and Steinmann (1997) on these codes since they are collapsed versions and hence 
too “general”. One example is code 53 “policemen and army”. I assign these codes at own discretion, too. 
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Table A3 Secondary effects on family’s request, staff meeting’s proposition and final outcome 
(results of binary logistic regression; logits) 
Note: SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
  
 Family's request Staff's proposition Final outcome 
 Logit (SE) Logit (SE) Logit (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)    
EGPI 2.321*** 2.031*** 2.223*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
EGPII 1.440*** 1.362*** 1.471*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
EGPIII, V 0.607*** 0.613*** 0.652*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
EGPIVc, VIIb 0.105 0.244 0.210 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
EGPIVa, IVb 1.000*** 0.831*** 0.897*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
French origin -0.578*** -0.461*** -0.504*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Private school -0.238** -0.568*** -0.548*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
ZEP-school -0.136 -0.068 -0.086 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)    
< 5,000 inhabitants -0.871*** -0.748*** -0.790*** 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
5,000-20,000 -0.646*** -0.526*** -0.542*** 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
20,000-200,000 -0.351*** -0.204* -0.239** 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Mark 0.588*** 0.808*** 0.764*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Previous grade repetition -1.507*** -1.707*** -1.703*** 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Constant -4.692*** -7.435*** -6.857*** 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) 
N 11576 11071 10999 
AIC 8492.6 7309.7 7282.9 
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Table A4 Social class effects on attendance at parents’ evenings (results of binary logistic regression; logits and AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b (SE) AME (SE) b (SE) AME (SE) b (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)       
EGPI 0.951*** (0.08) 0.125 (0.01) 0.192 (0.11) 0.025 (0.01) 0.148 (0.11) 0.019 (0.01) 
EGPII 1.083*** (0.11) 0.136 (0.01) 0.428*** (0.12) 0.052 (0.01) 0.403*** (0.12) 0.049 (0.01) 
EGPIII, V 0.506*** (0.07) 0.076 (0.01) 0.268*** (0.07) 0.034 (0.01) 0.269*** (0.07) 0.034 (0.01) 
EGPIVc, VIIb 0.308* (0.14) 0.049 (0.02) 0.038 (0.14) 0.005 (0.02) 0.003 (0.14) 0.000 (0.02) 
EGPIVa, IVb 0.522*** (0.10) 0.078 (0.01) 0.219* (0.10) 0.029 (0.01) 0.218* (0.10) 0.028 (0.01) 
French origin 0.163** (0.06) 0.021 (0.01) 0.111 (0.06) 0.014 (0.01) 0.126* (0.06) 0.016 (0.01) 
Private school 0.352*** (0.08) 0.041 (0.01) 0.318*** (0.08) 0.037 (0.01) 0.319*** (0.08) 0.037 (0.01) 
ZEP-school 0.059 (0.09) 0.007 (0.01) 0.121 (0.09) 0.014 (0.01) 0.109 (0.09) 0.013 (0.01) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)       
< 5,000 inhabitants 0.083 (0.08) 0.010 (0.01) 0.079 (0.08) 0.009 (0.01) 0.072 (0.08) 0.009 (0.01) 
5,000-20,000 -0.075 (0.08) -0.010 (0.01) -0.067 (0.08) -0.008 (0.01) -0.070 (0.08) -0.009 (0.01) 
20,000-200,000 -0.074 (0.07) -0.009 (0.01) -0.074 (0.07) -0.009 (0.01) -0.076 (0.07) -0.009 (0.01) 
Parental education (Ref. Lower)       
Intermediate   0.759*** (0.06) 0.104 (0.01) 0.723*** (0.06) 0.097 (0.01) 
Higher   1.063*** (0.10) 0.132 (0.01) 0.973*** (0.10) 0.121 (0.01) 
Parents’ performance assessment     0.234*** (0.03) 0.029 (0.00) 
Constant 1.052*** (0.07)  0.916*** (0.07)  0.363*** (0.11)  
N 12146  12146  12146  
AIC 10085.6  9892.6  9846.2  
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second 
degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
 
 297
Table A5 Social class effects on parent’s initiation of meetings with teachers (results of binary logistic regression; logits and AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b (SE) AME (SE) b (SE) AME (SE) b (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)       
EGPI 0.250*** (0.06) 0.055 (0.01) 0.251** (0.08) 0.055 (0.02) 0.391*** (0.08) 0.082 (0.02) 
EGPII 0.310*** (0.07) 0.069 (0.02) 0.311*** (0.08) 0.069 (0.02) 0.399*** (0.08) 0.084 (0.02) 
EGPIII, V 0.103 (0.06) 0.022 (0.01) 0.103 (0.06) 0.022 (0.01) 0.115 (0.06) 0.023 (0.01) 
EGPIVc, VIIb -0.490*** (0.13) -0.093 (0.02) -0.491*** (0.13) -0.093 (0.02) -0.408** (0.13) -0.074 (0.02) 
EGPIVa, IVb 0.054 (0.08) 0.012 (0.02) 0.054 (0.08) 0.011 (0.02) 0.065 (0.08) 0.013 (0.02) 
French origin -0.004 (0.05) -0.001 (0.01) -0.004 (0.05) -0.001 (0.01) -0.029 (0.05) -0.006 (0.01) 
Private school 0.456*** (0.05) 0.104 (0.01) 0.456*** (0.05) 0.104 (0.01) 0.467*** (0.05) 0.101 (0.01) 
ZEP-school -0.229** (0.08) -0.048 (0.02) -0.229** (0.08) -0.048 (0.02) -0.208* (0.08) -0.042 (0.02) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)       
< 5,000 inhabitants -0.293*** (0.06) -0.064 (0.01) -0.293*** (0.06) -0.064 (0.01) -0.278*** (0.06) -0.058 (0.01) 
        
5,000-20,000 -0.191** (0.06) -0.042 (0.01) -0.191** (0.06) -0.042 (0.01) -0.194** (0.06) -0.041 (0.01) 
      
20,000-200,000 -0.168** (0.05) -0.037 (0.01) -0.168** (0.05) -0.037 (0.01) -0.164** (0.05) -0.035 (0.01) 
Parental education (Ref. Lower)       
Intermediate   0.003 (0.05) 0.001 (0.01) 0.108* (0.05) 0.022 (0.01) 
Higher   -0.001 (0.07) -0.000 (0.01) 0.242*** (0.07) 0.051 (0.01) 
Parents’ performance assessment     -0.610*** (0.03) -0.127 (0.01) 
Constant -0.753*** (0.06)  -0.754*** (0.06)  0.657*** (0.09)  
N 12099  12099  12099  
AIC 15164.5  15168.5  14623.5  
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second 
degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A6 Social class effects on teachers’ initiation of meetings with parents (results of binary logistic regression; logits and AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b (SE) AME (SE) b (SE) AME (SE) b (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)       
EGPI -0.611*** (0.08) -0.088 (0.01) -0.278** (0.10) -0.040 (0.01) -0.112 (0.10) -0.015 (0.01) 
EGPII -0.450*** (0.09) -0.068 (0.01) -0.149 (0.10) -0.022 (0.01) -0.049 (0.10) -0.007 (0.01) 
EGPIII, V -0.243*** (0.06) -0.039 (0.01) -0.117 (0.07) -0.017(0.01) -0.117 (0.07) -0.016 (0.01) 
EGPIVc, VIIb -0.512*** (0.15) -0.076 (0.02) -0.375* (0.15) -0.052 (0.02) -0.244 (0.15) -0.032 (0.02) 
EGPIVa, IVb -0.247** (0.09) -0.040 (0.01) -0.088 (0.09) -0.013 (0.01) -0.082 (0.10) -0.011 (0.01) 
French origin -0.166** (0.06) -0.025 (0.01) -0.140* (0.06) -0.020 (0.01) -0.203*** (0.06) -0.028 (0.01) 
Private school 0.300*** (0.06) 0.046 (0.01) 0.319*** (0.06) 0.048 (0.01) 0.346*** (0.06) 0.049 (0.01) 
ZEP-school 0.035 (0.09) 0.005 (0.01) 0.003 (0.09) 0.000 (0.01) 0.053 (0.09) 0.007 (0.01) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)       
< 5,000 inhabitants -0.246*** (0.07) -0.036 (0.01) -0.245*** (0.07) -0.036 (0.01) -0.228** (0.08) -0.031 (0.01) 
5,000-20,000 -0.243*** (0.07) -0.036 (0.01) -0.248*** (0.07) -0.037 (0.01) -0.259*** (0.08) -0.035 (0.01) 
20,000-200,000 -0.286*** (0.06) -0.042 (0.01) -0.287*** (0.06) -0.042 (0.01) -0.299*** (0.07) -0.040 (0.01) 
Parental education (Ref. Lower)       
Intermediate   -0.395*** (0.06) -0.059 (0.01) -0.269*** (0.06) -0.036 (0.01) 
Higher   -0.473*** (0.08) -0.069 (0.01) -0.159 (0.08) -0.022 (0.01) 
Parents’ performance assessment     -0.914*** (0.03) -0.122 (0.00) 
Constant -1.028*** (0.07)  -0.951*** (0.07)  1.130*** (0.10)  
N 12094  12094  12094  
AIC 11178.4  11129.6  10345.0  
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second 
degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A7 Social class effects on PA-membership (results of binary logistic regression; logits and AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b (SE) AME (SE) b (SE) AME (SE) b (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)       
EGPI 2.007*** (0.10) 0.249 (0.01) 0.950*** (0.12) 0.112 (0.01) 0.912*** (0.12) 0.107 (0.01) 
EGPII 1.733*** (0.11) 0.194 (0.01) 0.803*** (0.12) 0.090 (0.01) 0.783*** (0.12) 0.088 (0.01) 
EGPIII, V 0.827*** (0.10) 0.063 (0.01) 0.454*** (0.10) 0.045 (0.01) 0.450*** (0.10) 0.045 (0.01) 
EGPIVc, VIIb 1.315*** (0.16) 0.124 (0.02) 0.891*** (0.16) 0.103 (0.02) 0.864*** (0.16) 0.100 (0.02) 
EGPIVa, IVb 0.993*** (0.12) 0.081 (0.01) 0.507*** (0.13) 0.051 (0.01) 0.505*** (0.13) 0.051 (0.01) 
French origin 0.218** (0.07) 0.027 (0.01) 0.206** (0.07) 0.025 (0.01) 0.209** (0.07) 0.025 (0.01) 
Private school -0.052 (0.07) -0.007 (0.01) -0.086 (0.07) -0.011 (0.01) -0.077 (0.07) -0.009 (0.01) 
ZEP-school 0.045 (0.11) 0.006 (0.01) 0.135 (0.11) 0.017 (0.01) 0.130 (0.11) 0.017 (0.01) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)       
< 5,000 inhabitants -0.143 (0.08) -0.018 (0.01) -0.115 (0.08) -0.014 (0.01) -0.127 (0.08) -0.016 (0.01) 
5,000-20,000 -0.132 (0.08) -0.017 (0.01) -0.092 (0.08) -0.012 (0.01) -0.094 (0.08) -0.012 (0.01) 
20,000-200,000 -0.161* (0.07) -0.021 (0.01) -0.153* (0.07) -0.019 (0.01) -0.159* (0.07) -0.020 (0.01) 
Parental education (Ref. Lower)       
Intermediate   0.876*** (0.08) 0.082 (0.01) 0.848*** (0.08) 0.080 (0.01) 
Higher   1.538*** (0.09) 0.185 (0.01) 1.471*** (0.10) 0.176 (0.01) 
Parents’ performance assessment     0.175*** (0.03) -0.022 (0.00) 
Constant -2.903*** (0.10)  -3.231*** (0.11)  -3.649*** (0.14)  
N 12157  12157  12157  
AIC 10038.7  9738.1  9713.1  
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second 
degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A8 Social class effects on being Parent representative in the staff meetings (results of binary logistic regression; ; logits and AMEs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 b (SE) AME (SE) b (SE) AME (SE) b (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGP VI, VIIa)       
EGP I 1.879*** (0.13) 0.153 (0.01) 0.774*** (0.16) 0.061 (0.01) 0.730*** (0.16) 0.057 (0.01)
EGP II 1.719*** (0.14) 0.130 (0.01) 0.730*** (0.16) 0.057 (0.01) 0.710*** (0.16) 0.055 (0.01)
EGP III, V 0.862*** (0.14) 0.043 (0.01) 0.443** (0.14) 0.031 (0.01) 0.440** (0.14) 0.031 (0.01)
EGP IVc, VIIb 1.445*** (0.20) 0.096 (0.02) 0.948*** (0.21) 0.080 (0.02) 0.923*** (0.21) 0.078 (0.02)
EGP IVa, IVb 0.988*** (0.17) 0.053 (0.01) 0.467** (0.17) 0.033 (0.01) 0.471** (0.17) 0.033 (0.01)
French origin 0.370*** (0.09) 0.031 (0.01) 0.368*** (0.09) 0.030 (0.01) 0.371*** (0.09) 0.030 (0.01)
Private school -0.661*** (0.09) -0.051 (0.01) -0.684*** (0.10) -0.052 (0.01) -0.674*** (0.10) -0.052 (0.01)
ZEP-school 0.231 (0.13) 0.022 (0.01) 0.317* (0.13) 0.031 (0.01) 0.316* (0.13) 0.031 (0.01)
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)       
< 5,000 inhabitants 0.124 (0.10) 0.011 (0.01) 0.154 (0.10) 0.014 (0.01) 0.140 (0.10) 0.013 (0.01)
5,000-20,000 inh. 0.092 (0.10) 0.008 (0.01) 0.133 (0.10) 0.012 (0.01) 0.130 (0.10) 0.012 (0.01)
20,000-200,000 inh -0.047 (0.09) -0.004 (0.01) -0.040 (0.09) -0.003 (0.01) -0.050 (0.09) -0.004 (0.01)
Parental education (Ref. Lower)       
Intermediate   1.042*** (0.12) 0.062 (0.01) 1.007*** (0.12) 0.061 (0.01)
Higher   1.648*** (0.13) 0.130 (0.01) 1.570*** (0.13) 0.123 (0.01)
Parents’ performance assessment     0.194*** (0.04) 0.017 (0.00)
Constant -3.582*** (0.14)  -4.007***  -4.471*** (0.19)  
N 10415  10415  10415  
AIC 6606.4  6419.3  6401.2  
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second 
degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Figure A1 Discrete change effects of social class on attending 
parents’ evenings 
 
Note: Estimates obtained from Model 1 in Table A4; a discrete change 
effect corresponds to the difference in probabilities of Y=1 between each 
social class and the reference class (EGP VI, VIIa); probabilities are 
calculated for students of French origin attending a public school that is 
located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP. Source: Panel national 
1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; 
own calculations. 
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Figure A2 Discrete change effects of social class on parents’ initiation of meetings, 
teachers’ initiation of meetings, PA-membership and being Parent 
representative 
 
Note: Estimates obtained from Model 1 in Table A5, A6, A7 and A8; a discrete change effect 
corresponds to the difference in probabilities of Y=1 between each social class and the reference class 
(EGP VI, VIIa); probabilities are calculated for students of French origin attending a public school 
that is located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A9 Social class effects on attendance at parents’ evenings and parents’ initiation of meetings and effects of educational aspiration and 
educational motivation (results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) 
  Attendance at parents’ evenings  Parents’ initiation of meetings 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE)  AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGP VI, VIIa)        
EGP I  0.018 (0.02) 0.003 (0.02) 0.011 (0.02) 0.090*** (0.02) 0.082*** (0.02) 0.079*** (0.02) 
EGP II  0.031 (0.02) 0.017 (0.02) 0.028 (0.02) 0.087*** (0.02) 0.079*** (0.02) 0.082*** (0.02) 
EGP III, V  0.033** (0.01) 0.024* (0.01) 0.031** (0.01) 0.013 (0.02) 0.007 (0.02) 0.010 (0.02) 
EGP IVc, VIIb  -0.002 (0.02) -0.004 (0.02) -0.003 (0.02) -0.077* (0.03) -0.081** (0.03) -0.079* (0.03) 
EGP IVa, IVb  0.028 (0.02) 0.018 (0.02) 0.026 (0.02) 0.001 (0.02) -0.006 (0.02) -0.002 (0.02) 
Parental education (Ref. Lower)        
Intermediate  0.092*** (0.01) 0.079*** (0.01) 0.088*** (0.01) 0.028 (0.01) 0.020 (0.01) 0.023 (0.01) 
Higher  0.121*** (0.01) 0.106*** (0.01) 0.115*** (0.01) 0.042* (0.02) 0.034 (0.02) 0.027 (0.02) 
Parents’ performance assessment  0.022*** (0.01) 0.006 (0.01) 0.019*** (0.01) -0.129*** (0.01) -0.138*** (0.01) -0.134*** (0.01) 
Educational aspiration 
 (Ref. Apprenticeship / CAP / BEP) 
 
        
Professional bac   0.035*  (0.02)   0.058** (0.02)  
Technological bac   0.073*** (0.02)   0.058*  (0.03)  
General bac   0.087*** (0.02)   0.039* (0.02)   
General bac L/ES   0.081*** (0.02)   0.082*** (0.02)  
General bac S   0.080*** (0.02)   0.061** (0.02)  
Educational motivation (Ref. None)          
Intermediate    0.025*  (0.01)   0.012 (0.02) 
High    0.027** (0.01)   0.049*** (0.01) 
N  7525 7525 7525 7491 7491 7491 
AIC  5538.1 5500.0 5532.1 9069.4 9063.1 9059.0 
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; the coefficients of the control variables (school type, immigration background, city 
size) are omitted; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A10 Social class effects on PA-membership and being Parent representative and effects of educational aspiration and educational motivation 
(results of binary logistic regression; AMEs) 
  PA-membership  Parent representative in staff meetings 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE)  AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGP VI, 
VIIa) 
       
EGP I  0.100*** (0.02) 0.090*** (0.02) 0.094*** (0.02) 0.057*** (0.01) 0.052** (0.01) 0.053*** (0.01) 
EGP II  0.077*** (0.02) 0.068*** (0.02) 0.074*** (0.02) 0.048** (0.02) 0.043** (0.02) 0.047** (0.02) 
EGP III, V  0.043** (0.01) 0.038* (0.01) 0.041** (0.01) 0.030* (0.01) 0.027* (0.01) 0.029* (0.01) 
EGP IVc, VIIb  0.132*** (0.03) 0.131*** (0.03) 0.132*** (0.03) 0.093*** (0.03) 0.094*** (0.03) 0.094*** (0.03) 
EGP IVa, IVb  0.050** (0.02) 0.044* (0.02) 0.048* (0.02) 0.030* (0.02) 0.027 (0.02) 0.029 (0.02) 
Parental education (Ref. 
Lower) 
       
Intermediate  0.086*** (0.01) 0.082*** (0.01) 0.085*** (0.01) 0.064*** (0.01) 0.061*** (0.01) 0.063*** (0.01) 
Higher  0.201*** (0.01) 0.189*** (0.01) 0.193*** (0.02) 0.121*** (0.01) 0.115*** (0.01) 0.117*** (0.01) 
Parents’ performance 
assessment (p) 
 
0.020*** (0.01) 0.011 (0.01) 0.017** (0.01) 0.020*** (0.00) 0.013* (0.01) 0.018*** (0.00) 
Educational aspiration          
(Ref. Apprentic. / CAP / BEP)        
Professional bac   0.004 (0.02)   -0.004 (0.02)  
Technological bac   0.058*  (0.02)   0.028 (0.02)  
General bac   0.065*** (0.02)   0.030*  (0.01)  
General bac L/ES   0.059** (0.02)   0.038*  (0.02)  
General bac S   0.055** (0.02)   0.038* (0.02)  
Educational motivation  
(Ref. None) 
 
      
Intermediate    0.015 (0.02)   0.008 (0.01) 
High    0.028** (0.01)   0.018*  (0.01) 
N  7530 7530 7530 7533 7533 7533 
AIC  6616.5 6605.7 6613.5 4957.3 4955.9 4956.8 
Note: AME=average marginal effect; the coefficients of the control variables (school type, immigration background, city size) are omitted; concomitant variables are immigration 
origin, school types and city size; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own 
calculations.  
 305 
Table A11 Decomposing social class effects on opinion on parent-teacher relationship into 
direct effects and indirect effects via parental education; AMEs. 
Decomposing social 
 class 
(Ref. EGPVI, VIIa) 
EGPI EGPII EGPIII, V 
EGPIVc, 
VIIb 
EGPIVa, IVb 
 
Meet when problem vs. better not meet 
Total effect 0.083*** 0.077** 0.073*** 0.023 0.058* 
Direct effect -0.004 0.002 0.038* -0.011 0.021 
Indirect effect 0.087 0.075 0.035 0.035 0.038 
      
Confounding percentage 104.79 98.00 47.87 148.54 64.65 
N 4917     
 
Meet frequently vs. better not meet 
Total effect 0.102*** 0.120*** 0.072*** 0.036 0.057** 
Direct effect 0.006 0.038 0.035* -0.009 0.012 
Indirect effect 0.096 0.083 0.037 0.045 0.045 
      
Confounding percentage 94.34 68.85 51.56 125.49 78.50 
N 6312     
Note: AME=average marginal effect, LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained with Stata-
command “khb” (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011); concomitant variables are French origin, school types and 
city size. Standard errors are adjusted for school-level clustering. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A12 Descriptives of variables used in the analysis of family’s school track request 
 EGP I EGP II EGP III, 
V 
EGP VI, 
VIIa 
EGP IVc, 
VIIb 
EGP IVa, 
IVb 
Total 
 Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Family’s school track 
request 
       
LGT 0.94 0.87 0.68 0.50 0.65 0.71 0.73 
LPA 0.06 0.13 0.32 0.50 0.35 0.29 0.27 
Parents’ performance 
assessment (p) 
2.94 
(0.77) 
2.80 
(0.76) 
2.54 
(0.78) 
2.47 
(0.76) 
2.74 
(0.71) 
2.56 
(0.77) 
2.66 
(0.79) 
Number of siblings (C) 1.63 1.59 1.58 2.43 1.89 1.63 1.78 
 (1.01) (1.06) (1.08) (1.81) (1.18) (1.21) (1.30) 
No parent working (C) 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.06 
Educational motivation 
(c*SD) 
       
None 0.22 0.38 0.54 0.65 0.57 0.51 0.47 
Intermediate 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.12 
High 0.71 0.52 0.32 0.20 0.29 0.36 0.41 
Mark 12.41 12.05 11.01 10.17 11.63 10.90 11.30 
 (2.53) (2.54) (2.70) (2.68) (2.68) (2.59) (2.75) 
Previous grade 
repetition 
0.09 0.13 0.23 0.28 0.17 0.21 0.19 
Parents’ evenings 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.80 0.86 0.89 0.88 
Parents’ initiation of 
meetings 
0.37 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.20 0.31 0.32 
Teacher’s initiation of 
meetings 
0.14 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.18 0.17 
PA-membership 0.33 0.26 0.13 0.06 0.20 0.14 0.18 
Opinion on parent-
teacher relationship 
       
Better not meet 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.12 
Meet when problem 0.36 0.32 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.37 
Meet frequently 0.54 0.59 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.51 
Parental education        
Higher 0.80 0.61 0.12 0.01 0.17 0.20 0.33 
Intermediate 0.16 0.32 0.48 0.25 0.52 0.46 0.34 
Lower 0.04 0.07 0.40 0.74 0.31 0.34 0.33 
Knowledge of right to 
reject 
0.88 0.88 0.82 0.72 0.81 0.80 0.82 
French origin 0.79 0.83 0.80 0.70 0.90 0.77 0.78 
Private school 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.35 0.29 0.21 
ZEP-school 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.09 
City size        
< 5,000 inh. 0.12 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.56 0.23 0.21 
5,000-20,000 inh. 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.21 0.18 
20,000-200,000 inh. 0.25 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.15 0.25 0.26 
>200,000 inh., Paris 0.51 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.04 0.31 0.35 
N 1984 1214 2878 1798 309 819 9002 
Note: SD=standard deviation; standard deviations of binary variables are omitted. Due to rounding means not 
always sum up to 1. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, 
DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A13 Decomposing social class effects on family’s school track request (LGT vs. LPA) 
into direct effects and indirect effects via the decision-making parameters p, C 
and c*SD (AMEs). 
Decomposing 
social class  
(Ref. EGPVI, VIIa) 
EGPI EGPII EGPIII, V 
EGPIVc, 
VIIb 
EGPIVa, IVb 
      
Total effect 0.431*** 0.360*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.210*** 
Direct effect 0.260*** 0.203*** 0.101*** 0.055* 0.121*** 
Indirect effect 0.172 0.156 0.077 0.121 0.089 
      
Confounding percentage 39.79 43.48 42.94 68.76 42.52 
N 9002     
Note: AME=average marginal effect, LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained with Stata-
command “khb” (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011); concomitant variables are French origin, school types and 
city size. Standard errors are adjusted for school-level clustering. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
 
Table A14 Decomposing of social class effects on family’s school track request (LGT vs. LPA) 
into direct effects and indirect effects via effects via the decision-making 
parameters p, C and c*SD and student’s marks, parents’ cultural capital and their 
involvement; AMEs. 
Decomposing social 
class 
(Ref. EGPVI, VIIa) 
EGPI EGPII EGPIII, V 
EGPIVc, 
VIIb 
EGPIVa, IVb 
      
Total effect 0.424*** 0.351*** 0.180*** 0.170*** 0.211*** 
Direct effect 0.139*** 0.084*** 0.048*** -0.013 0.069*** 
Indirect effect 0.285 0.266 0.132 0.182 0.142 
      
Confounding percentage 67.23 76.31 73.32 107.96 67.36 
N 9002     
Note: AME=average marginal effect, LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained with Stata-
command “khb” (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011); concomitant variables are French origin, school types and 
city size. Standard errors are adjusted for school-level clustering. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A15 Interaction effects of the decision-making parameters on family’s school track 
request (LGT vs. LPA) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Logit (SE) Logit (SE) Logit (SE) Logit (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)     
EGPI 1.899*** 2.494*** 1.921*** 1.403*** 
 (0.14) (0.63) (0.14) (0.16) 
EGPII 1.266*** -1.246 1.271*** 0.806*** 
 (0.13) (0.88) (0.13) (0.14) 
EGPIII, V 0.600*** 0.205 0.590*** 0.449*** 
 (0.09) (0.44) (0.09) (0.09) 
EGPIVc, VIIb 0.073 -0.766 0.089 -0.145 
 (0.18) (1.00) (0.17) (0.18) 
EGPIVa, IVb 0.831*** 1.097 0.828*** 0.642*** 
 (0.13) (0.61) (0.13) (0.13) 
Parents’ performance 
assessment (p) 
-0.291 0.614*** 0.607*** 0.603*** 
 (0.25) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Number of siblings (C) -0.076** -0.079** -0.077** -0.067* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
No parent working (C) -0.098 -0.127 -0.109 0.050 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Educational motivation (c*SD) 
(Ref. None) 
    
Intermediate 0.599*** 0.604*** -0.271 0.575*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.50) (0.10) 
High 1.349*** 1.365*** -0.167 1.251*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.49) (0.09) 
Previous grade repetition -1.271*** -1.308*** -1.302*** -1.280*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Mark 0.311*** 0.487*** 0.476*** 0.430*** 
(0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
Parental education (Ref. lower)     
Intermediate    0.361*** 
    (0.08) 
Higher    0.738*** 
    (0.13) 
Parents’ evenings    -1.099* 
    (0.45) 
Parent’s initiation of meetings    0.631 
    (0.40) 
Teacher’s initiation of meetings    0.846* 
    (0.43) 
PA-membership    -0.190 
    (0.60) 
Interactions with Mark     
Mark * Parents’ performance 
assessment (p) 
0.089***    
(0.03)    
Mark * Parents’ evenings    0.139** 
   (0.04) 
Mark * Parents’ initiation of 
meetings 
   -0.048 
   (0.04) 
Mark * Teachers’ initiation of 
meetings 
   -0.108* 
   (0.04) 
Mark * PA-membership    0.046 
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Table A15 continued 
Note: SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
  
    (0.06) 
Social class     
(Ref. Mark * EGPVI, VIIa)     
Mark * EGPI  -0.060   
  (0.06)   
Mark * EGPII  0.254**   
  (0.09)   
Mark * EGPIII, V  0.039   
 (0.04)   
Mark * EGPIVc, VIIb   0.080   
 (0.09)   
Mark * EGPIVa, IVb  -0.028   
 (0.06)   
Educational motivation      
(Ref. Mark * None)     
Mark * Intermediate   0.087  
  (0.05)  
Mark * High   0.156**  
   (0.05)  
Constant -3.666*** -5.407*** -5.264*** -5.167*** 
 (0.60) (0.34) (0.26) (0.47) 
N 9002 9002 9002 9002 
AIC 5707.1 5711.3 5709.4 5642.2 
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Figure A3 Interaction of mark and social class on family’s school track request 
(LGT vs. LPA); discrete change effects of social class (reference: EGP 
VI, VIIa), parent’s performance assessment held constant at 1 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 2 in Table A15; 
probabilities are calculated for students of French origin with parents with intermediate educational 
motivation and higher education who assessed student’s performance as very low, having not 
repeated grades, attending a public school that is located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP, 
having an average number of siblings and at least one working parent; 95%-confidence intervals. 
Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; 
own calculations. 
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Figure A4 Interaction of mark and attendance at parents’ evenings on family’s 
school track request (LGT vs. LPA) by social class; discrete change 
effects of attendance at parents’ evenings 
 
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 4 in Table A15; 
probabilities calculated for students of French origin with parents with intermediate educational 
motivation and higher education who assessed student’s performance with “3”, having not repeated 
grades, attending a public school that is located in a large city or Paris and not in a ZEP-program, 
having an average number of siblings and at least one working parent; 95%-confidence intervals. 
Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; 
own calculations. 
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Table A16 Means of variables used in analysis of family’s rejection decision 
 EGP I EGP II EGP III, V EGP VI, VIIa EGP IVc, VIIb EGP IVa, IVb Total 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Social class        
EGP I       0.24 
EGP II       0.10 
EGP III, V       0.32 
EGP VI, VIIa       0.19 
EGP IVc, VIIb       0.02 
EGP IVa, IVb       0.13 
Family’s rejection 0.38 0.39 0.33 0.27 0.20 0.33 0.34 
French origin 0.77 0.80 0.75 0.53 0.80 0.72 0.71 
Private school 0.38 0.25 0.28 0.24 0.53 0.34 0.30 
ZEP-school 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.08 
City size        
< 5,000 inh. 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.53 0.15 0.13 
5,000-20,000 inh. 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.07 0.25 0.15 
20,000-200,000 inh. 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.18 0.25 
>200,000 inh., Paris 0.58 0.45 0.46 0.40 0.20 0.42 0.47 
Parental education        
Lower 0.66 0.56 0.12 0.02 0.33 0.19 0.29 
Intermediate 0.26 0.30 0.46 0.20 0.53 0.38 0.34 
Higher 0.08 0.14 0.43 0.78 0.13 0.43 0.38 
N 238 102 311 190 15 126 982 
Note: Due to rounding means not always sum up to 1. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; 
own calculations. 
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Table A17 Descriptives of variables used in analysis of staff meeting’s proposition (means, standard deviations in parentheses) 
 EGP I EGP II EGP III, V EGP VI, VIIa EGP IVc, VIIb EGP IVa, IVb Total 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Social class        
EGP I       0.20 
EGP II       0.13 
EGP III, V       0.32 
EGP VI, VIIa       0.22 
EGP IVc, VIIb       0.04 
EGP IVa, IVb       0.09 
Staff meeting’s proposition: LGT (1) 
vs. LPA (0) 
0.90 0.82 0.61 0.42 0.61 0.63 0.66 
French origin 0.79 0.83 0.80 0.67 0.89 0.76 0.77 
Private school 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.13 0.33 0.29 0.20 
ZEP-school 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.19 0.04 0.07 0.10 
City size        
< 5,000 inhabitants 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.56 0.24 0.21 
5,000-20,000 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.18 
20,000-200,000 0.25 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.16 0.26 0.26 
>200,000, inh., Paris 0.50 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.03 0.30 0.34 
Mark 12.56 12.08 10.97 10.03 11.51 10.87 11.24 
(2.46) (2.54) (2.74) (2.68) (2.67) (2.60) (2.78) 
Previous grade repetition 0.10 0.14 0.26 0.32 0.19 0.24 0.22 
Family’s school track request        
LGT 0.93 0.85 0.65 0.47 0.62 0.69 0.69 
LPA 0.07 0.15 0.35 0.53 0.38 0.31 0.31 
GR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Parents’ evenings 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.77 0.85 0.87 0.85 
Parents’ initiation of meetings 0.36 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.20 0.31 0.32 
Teachers’ initiation of meetings 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.17 
PA-membership 0.31 0.25 0.12 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.17 
Parental education        
Lower 0.04 0.08 0.42 0.74 0.34 0.34 0.36 
Intermediate 0.16 0.32 0.46 0.25 0.50 0.46 0.34 
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Table A17 continued 
Note: Due to rounding means not always sum up to 1. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
 
  
Higher 0.80 0.61 0.12 0.01 0.16 0.19 0.30 
Education of involved parent        
Tertiary degree 0.64 0.47 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.23 
Baccalauréat 0.18 0.28 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.17 0.16 
Vocational qualification 0.12 0.18 0.50 0.41 0.46 0.46 0.36 
Elementary education 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.40 0.17 0.16 0.17 
Other or no person involved 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.08 
N 2130 1316 3378 2308 378 956 10466 
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Table A18 Decomposing social class effects on staff meeting’s school track propositions 
(LGT vs. LPA) into direct effects and indirect effects via student’s performance 
and family’s school track request; AMEs 
Decomposing social 
class 
(Ref. EGPVI, VIIa) 
EGPI EGPII EGPIII, V 
EGPIVc, 
VIIb 
EGPIVa, IVb 
      
Total effect 0.351*** 0.292*** 0.169*** 0.207*** 0.177*** 
Direct effect 0.022** 0.012 0.011* 0.021 0.008 
Indirect effect 0.328 0.281 0.158 0.185 0.169 
      
Confounding percentage 93.69 96.08 93.35 89.81 95.60 
N 10466     
Note: AME=average marginal effect, LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained with 
Stata-command “khb” (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011); concomitant variables are French origin, school types 
and city size. Standard errors are adjusted for school-level clustering. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
 
Figure A5 Predicted probabilities and discrete change effects of receiving an LGT-
proposition by marks for families from the higher service class and the 
working class who requested LGT 
  
Note: LGT=general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained from Model 4 in Table 20; 
probabilities are calculated for students of French origin with parents with intermediate educational 
motivation, having not repeated grades, attending a public school that is located in a large city or Paris 
and not in a ZEP, having an average number of siblings and at least one working parent; 95%-confidence 
intervals. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, 
DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A19 Effect of being parent representative and PA-membership on staff meeting’s 
proposition (LGT versus LPA); results of binary logistic regression; AMEs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 AME (SE) AME (SE) AME (SE) 
Social class       
(Ref. EGP VI, VIIa)       
EGP I 0.022*** (0.01) 0.025*** (0.01) 0.022*** (0.01) 
EGP II 0.011 (0.01) 0.012 (0.01) 0.011 (0.01) 
EGP III, V 0.011 (0.01) 0.011 (0.01) 0.011 (0.01) 
EGP IVc, VIIb 0.020 (0.01) 0.022 (0.01) 0.020 (0.01) 
EGP IVa, IVb 0.006 (0.01) 0.007 (0.01) 0.006 (0.01) 
Mark on brevet 0.027*** (0.00) 0.027*** (0.00) 0.027*** (0.00) 
Previous grade repetition -0.050*** (0.01) -0.050*** (0.01) -0.050*** (0.01) 
Family’s request: LGT vs. 
LPA 
0.669*** (0.02) 0.671*** (0.02) 0.669*** (0.02) 
Parents’ evenings 0.001 (0.01) 0.002 (0.01) 0.001 (0.01) 
Parents’ initiation of 
meetings 
-0.009* (0.00) -0.009* (0.00) -0.009* (0.00) 
Teachers’ initiation of 
meetings 
-0.013** (0.00) -0.012** (0.00) -0.013** (0.00) 
PA-membership 0.021*** (0.01)   0.019** (0.01) 
Parent representative   0.018** (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) 
N 8970  8970  8970  
AIC 2071.5  2080.2  2073.1  
Note: AME=average marginal effect; SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; 
***p<0.001. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; 
own calculations. 
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Table A20 Interaction effects of family’s school track request and marks, parental education 
and education of involved parent on staff meeting’s proposition (results of binary 
logistic regression) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Logit (SE) Logit (SE) Logit (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGP VI, VIIa)       
EGP I 0.591** (0.19) 0.144 (0.22) 0.194 (0.22) 
EGP II 0.257 (0.20) -0.116 (0.22) -0.081 (0.22) 
EGP III, V 0.251 (0.15) 0.117 (0.15) 0.179 (0.15) 
EGP IVc, VIIb 0.668 (0.36) 0.491 (0.37) 0.545 (0.35) 
EGP IVa, IVb 0.202 (0.20) 0.014 (0.20) 0.078 (0.19) 
Mark 0.517*** (0.04) 0.833*** (0.03) 0.839*** (0.03) 
Previous grade repetition -1.432*** (0.12) -1.460*** (0.12) -1.450*** (0.12) 
Family’s request: LGT (1) vs. 
LPA (0) 
1.574* (0.65)     
Parental education (Ref. Lower)       
Intermediate   0.393 (0.31)   
Lower   -0.866 (0.83)   
Education of involved parent       
(Ref. Tertiary)       
Bac     2.025 (1.25) 
Voc. Qual.     1.832 (1.18) 
Elementary     1.677 (1.20) 
No parent inv.     2.020 (1.23) 
Interactions with family’s request 
Family’s request * Mark 0.434*** (0.06)     
Parental education       
(Ref. Family’s request * 
Lower) 
      
Family’s request * 
Intermediate 
  0.110 (0.34)   
Family’s request * Higher   1.695* (0.83)   
Education of involved parent       
(Ref. Family’s request * 
Tertiary) 
      
Family’s request  * Bac     -2.233 (1.26) 
Family’s request  * Vocational 
quali. 
    -2.537* (1.19) 
Family’s request  * Elementary 
quali. 
    -2.597* (1.21) 
Family’s request  * No/other 
pers. involved 
    -2.350 (1.25) 
Constant -8.583*** (0.50) -12.197*** (0.48) -14.010*** (1.27) 
N 10466  10466  10466  
AIC 2599.6  2609.3  2615.3  
Note: SE=standard error adjusted for school-level clustering; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Source: Panel 
national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. Control 
variables are included but not shown.  
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Table A21 Descriptives of variables in analysis of family’s retention decision (means, standard deviations in parentheses) 
 EGP I EGP II EGP III, V EGP VI, VIIa EGP IVc, VIIb EGP IVa, IVb Total 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Social class        
EGP I       0.05 
EGP II       0.06 
EGP III, V       0.37 
EGP IVc, VIIb       0.05 
EGP IVa, IVb        0.09 
EGP VI, VIIa       0.37 
Family’s request: LPA 0.81 0.86 0.92 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.93 
 GR 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.07 
Parents’ performance assessment (p) 1.96 2.07 2.02 2.13 2.28 2.09 2.08 
 (0.65) (0.70) (0.64) (0.69) (0.64) (0.71) (0.67) 
Number of siblings (C) 1.76 1.70 1.75 2.53 2.27 1.77 2.07 
 (1.22) (1.04) (1.21) (1.82) (1.83) (1.22) (1.53) 
No parent working (C) 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.10 
Educational motivation (c*SD)        
None 0.55 0.58 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.73 0.71 
Intermediate 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.14 
High 0.34 0.29 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.14 
Mark 9.07 8.78 8.83 8.62 9.56 8.87 8.80 
 (2.32) (2.12) (2.20) (2.24) (2.20) (2.19) (2.22) 
Previous grade repetition 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.39 0.46 0.45 
French origin 0.85 0.81 0.81 0.71 0.84 0.80 0.77 
Private school 0.28 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.33 0.27 0.19 
ZEP-school 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.03 0.07 0.13 
City size: < 5,000 inh. 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.53 0.28 0.25 
5,000-20,000 inh. 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.26 0.21 
20,000-200,000 inh. 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.16 0.25 0.26 
>200,000 inh., Paris 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.02 0.22 0.28 
N 181 231 1347 1348 166 337 3610 
Note: Due to rounding means not always sum up to 1. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A22 Decomposing social class differentials in family’s decision to request GR instead 
of LPA into direct effects and indirect effects via economic situation, 
educational motivation and previous grade repetition; AMEs. 
Decomposing 
social class  
(Ref. EGPVI, VIIa) 
EGPI EGPII EGPIII, V 
EGPIVc, 
VIIb 
EGPIVa, 
IVb 
      
Total effect 0.164*** 0.105*** 0.051*** 0.027 0.052*** 
Direct effect 0.130*** 0.079*** 0.050*** 0.025 0.049** 
Indirect effect 0.034 0.026 0.002 0.002 0.003 
      
Confounding percentage 21.91 23.23 3.21 19.36 3.92 
N 3610     
Note: AME=average marginal effect, LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained with Stata-
command “khb” (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011); concomitant variables are French origin, school types and 
city size. Standard errors are adjusted for school-level clustering. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A23 Descriptives of variables used in analysis of staff meeting’s retention proposition (means, standard deviations in parentheses) 
 EGP I EGP II EGP III, V EGP VI, VIIa EGP IVc, VIIb EGP IVa, IVb Total 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Social class        
EGP I       0.09 
EGP II       0.07 
EGP III, V       0.36 
EGP IVc, VIIb       0.04 
EGP IVa, IVb       0.10 
EGP IVa, IVb       0.34 
Staff meeting’s proposition         
LPA 0.51 0.75 0.83 0.93 0.90 0.83 0.83 
GR 0.49 0.25 0.17 0.07 0.10 0.17 0.17 
Family’s school track request        
LGT 0.57 0.30 0.19 0.12 0.09 0.27 0.21 
LPA 0.34 0.60 0.75 0.85 0.87 0.67 0.73 
GR 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 
Mark 9.05 9.00 8.86 8.65 9.42 8.74 8.82 
 (1.78) (1.91) (2.09) (2.18) (2.19) (2.02) (2.08) 
Previous grade repetition 0.33 0.40 0.44 0.43 0.36 0.42 0.42 
Parental education        
Lower 0.11 0.16 0.52 0.79 0.51 0.46  
Intermediate 0.29 0.36 0.40 0.21 0.42 0.43 0.54 
Higher 0.60 0.48 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.33 
Education of involved parent       0.13 
Tertiary degree 0.43 0.40 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.10 
Baccalauréat 0.23 0.23 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.11 
Vocational qualification 0.25 0.31 0.52 0.39 0.45 0.50 0.43 
Elementary education 0.05 0.04 0.22 0.41 0.25 0.22 0.26 
Other or no person involved 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.10 
Parents’ evenings 0.86 0.88 0.81 0.73 0.79 0.82 0.79 
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Table A23 continued  
Parents’ initiation of meetings 0.55 0.53 0.40 0.33 0.24 0.40 0.39 
Teachers’ initiation of meetings 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.28 0.28 
PA-membership 0.22 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.10 
French origin 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.69 0.85 0.78 0.76 
Private school 0.34 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.36 0.30 0.21 
ZEP-school 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.12 
City size        
< 5,000 inh. 0.11 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.53 0.25 0.23 
5,000-20,000 inh. 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.26 0.20 
20,000-200,000 inh. 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.17 0.23 0.26 
>200,000, inh., Paris 0.48 0.36 0.34 0.29 0.04 0.27 0.32 
N 409 326 1614 1501 168 447 4465 
Note: Due to rounding means not always sum up to 1. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A24 Decomposing of social class differentials in staff meeting’s decision to propose 
LGT instead of LPA into direct effects and indirect effects via family’s request, 
previous grade repetition, student’s mark, parental education and involvement; 
AMEs. 
Decomposing social  
class  
(Ref. EGPVI, VIIa) 
EGPI EGPII EGPIII, V 
EGPIVc, 
VIIb 
EGPIVa, 
IVb 
      
Total effect 0.276*** 0.106*** 0.060*** 0.023 0.054*** 
Direct effect 0.050*** 0.012 0.032** 0.013 0.004 
Indirect effect 0.226 0.094 0.028 0.011 0.049 
      
Confounding percentage 81.96 88.72 46.33 46.05 91.99 
N 4465     
Note: AME=average marginal effect, LGT= general track, LPA=vocational track; estimates obtained with Stata-
command “khb” (Kohler, Karlson and Holm 2011); concomitant variables are French origin, school types and 
city size. Standard errors are adjusted for school-level clustering. Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du 
second degré, Ministère de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
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Table A25 Determinants of family’s request and staff meeting’s proposition: LGT, LPA, GR 
(results of multinomial logistic regression; logits) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Family’s request Staff meeting’s proposition 
Dependent variable LGT vs. LPA GR vs. LPA LGT vs. LPA GR vs. LPA 
 Logit (SE) Logit (SE) Logit (SE) Logit (SE) 
Social class (Ref. EGPVI, VIIa)     
EGPI 2.318*** 2.431*** 0.641*** 1.474*** 
 (0.11) (0.26) (0.18) (0.22) 
EGPII 1.455*** 1.859*** 0.245 0.570* 
 (0.10) (0.26) (0.18) (0.24) 
EGPIII, V 0.611*** 1.268*** 0.280* 0.745*** 
 (0.07) (0.20) (0.14) (0.18) 
EGPIVc, VIIb 0.089 0.565 0.757* 0.801 
 (0.13) (0.40) (0.33) (0.48) 
EGPIVa, IVb 1.005*** 1.234*** 0.045 0.295 
 (0.10) (0.26) (0.18) (0.25) 
French origin -0.576*** -0.203 -0.112 0.066 
 (0.07) (0.17) (0.12) (0.15) 
Private school -0.243** -0.299 -0.671*** 0.120 
 (0.08) (0.19) (0.13) (0.15) 
ZEP-school -0.147 -0.202 -0.156 -0.556* 
 (0.09) (0.23) (0.18) (0.24) 
City size (Ref. >200,000 inh., Paris)     
< 5,000 inhabitants -0.877*** -0.046 -0.171 -0.454* 
 (0.09) (0.21) (0.16) (0.21) 
5,000-20,000 -0.660*** 0.287 -0.177 -0.216 
 (0.09) (0.20) (0.15) (0.19) 
20,000-200,000 -0.359*** 0.287 0.134 0.037 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.13) (0.16) 
Mark 0.600*** -0.144*** 0.906*** -0.161*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Previous grade repetition -1.502*** -2.599*** -1.428*** -2.424*** 
 (0.07) (0.24) (0.11) (0.18) 
Family’s request (Ref. LGT)     
LPA   -6.559*** -4.699*** 
   (0.20) (0.22) 
GR   -3.172*** 2.531*** 
   (0.69) (0.28) 
Constant -4.806*** -1.698*** -6.568*** 1.437*** 
N 11838  11838  
Note: LGT=general track, LPA= vocational track, GR=grade retention; SE=standard error adjusted for school-
level clustering; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001; Source: Panel national 1995 d’élèves du second degré, Ministère 
de l’Éducation nationale, DPD; own calculations. 
